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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses how Syrian men in Egypt renegotiate notions of masculinity during 
forced displacement. Based on fourteen months of ethnographic research in Egypt in 
2014–2015, the thesis focuses on how Syrian men position themselves regarding the label 
of “refugee”, how they handle changing work and marriage patterns, deal with 
sectarianism, manage the encounter with Egyptian and Syrian ‘others’, experienced 
growing up and living in an oppressive state and how the uprising affected them. This 
thesis suggests that a focus on class should become more prominent when researching 
refugeeness and masculinity. Furthermore, it pays attention to men’s need for ‘others’ to 
create successful masculinity, the significance of women’s positions in society and men’s 
conscious and careful composition of their manhood. This thesis raises the issue of the 
intimate, paradox relation of men with the state, deals with men’s handling of emotions, 
and pays close attention to various sentiments and experiences that migrate with men and 
affect their lives during forced displacement. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
Arabic words are transliterated according to the system developed by the International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Included are special characters, diacritic sounds and 
long vowels. Where contextually appropriate some transliterations have been adapted to 
reflect the original dialects that were used (Egyptian and/or Syrian Arabic dialect), such 
as argīle (water pipe) or tāwle (backgammon), while others are written in line with the 
pronunciation of Modern Standard Arabic. Arabic transliterations are italicised and when 
a term is first introduced a translation is provided within square brackets. 
 
Arabic names of places, towns, and people are transliterated according to the above 
system unless an alternative transcription is dominant in English. For example, Deraa not 
Dara‘a, Shia not Shi‘a, Morsi not Mursī. 
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Introduction: Researching gender negotiations among Syrian refugee men in 
Egypt 
 
One evening in October 2014, when I had been doing fieldwork for almost three months 
in Cairo, after we had eaten and shared argīle (water pipe), Fādī decided, to show me his 
workplace. He was in his early twenties, and on arriving in Egypt in 2012 he had had to 
interrupt his studies in order to support his family. His dream was to become an engineer; 
however, when I met him he was working in the lingerie shop that belonged to a distant 
relative, on a busy street in an affluent neighbourhood of Cairo. After he showed me the 
tiny, neat shop that sold women’s tights, nightgowns, underwear and socks, we strolled 
down the street, absorbed in a conversation about his work and his struggle to 
simultaneously prepare for his final exams in high school, which he had to retake because 
his Syrian high school diploma was not accepted in Egypt. We were passing an old 
woman who was sitting on the sidewalk begging. In a monotone voice, she kept asking 
for help and because of her accent and the way she was dressed I identified her as 
Egyptian. Fādī, without interrupting our discussion, slowed down and gave her some 
money. He made no comment as to his action and continued walking down the street. 
Only a couple of weeks later, I was waiting for Abū Khālid in the crowded streets of 
another wealthy and busy Cairene district. I had met Abū Khālid at the beginning of my 
fieldwork. He was introduced to me as a community leader in 6th of October City, a 
satellite town around 30 km outside Cairo, where many Syrians had settled since late 
2011. He said he was trying to help Syrian families in need by raising awareness, funds 
and donations, and this was the reason for our short meeting. As we walked down the 
road to find a taxi or mini-bus so that we could both return to our homes, an Egyptian 
child approached us. The boy asked for money and Abū Khālid gave him a couple of 
Egyptian Pounds before continuing on his way. 
Both situations left me utterly at odds with my own stereotypes, ideas and 
positioning of the prototype of a refugee. They left me struggling with the way I had been 
raised, and I came to learn about ‘the natural order of things’, in this case: the location of 
the host society vis-à-vis ‘the refugee’; the position of ‘the refugee’ in the social 
hierarchy; and the agency and self-perception of ‘the refugee’. They disrupted my 
prejudice with regards to help and being helped and that ‘the refugee’ ought to be on the 
receiving side. At that moment, at the beginning of my fieldwork, these two situations 
would significantly guide future encounters with Syrian men and women. They made me 
	 12 
ask my Syrian contacts specific questions, such as: ‘Do you feel like a refugee?’ and 
‘What does it mean to be a refugee for you?’. Two and a half years later, while writing 
this introduction in the spring of 2017, I consider these incidents to be evocative of many 
aspects and themes that are relevant for this thesis. They bring to the forefront questions 
of class and wealth, of receiving and giving help, of masculinity as a conscious 
performance and a practice, of my positionality in the field and of the relations between 
Syrians and Egyptians.  
This is a dissertation about the situation of Syrians who came to Egypt after the 
Syrian uprising1 in 2011, and to whom the label ‘refugee’ is usually ascribed by national 
and international aid organisations, the UNHCR, the Egyptian government, and by 
national and international media. In the first place, this thesis deals with Syrian men and 
the challenges they faced during forced displacement in Egypt. I explore how they 
negotiated their status as people who left and lost their home country, which brought me 
to question the refugee label on a conceptual level and its effects on those, who are put in 
this category. Furthermore, I trace what kind of challenges Syrian men encountered as 
participants in the Egyptian labour market and how they faced up to changes in marriage 
patterns. I analyse Syrian men’s interactions with the Egyptian and Syrian states; their 
understanding of sectarianism and its impact on their daily lives as well as their feelings 
and experiences during the Syrian uprising.  
The title I chose for this dissertation suggests understanding masculinities as 
mosaics. I chose it in the first year of my PhD when preparing for my upgrade 
presentation. At that point in time, I liked the symbol of the mosaic and the idea that 
masculinities are pieced together, made of various small aspects to create a bigger, 
complete picture. Over the course of my fieldwork and during the writing up phase, I 
realised that the metaphor of the mosaic is used frequently when describing Syrian society 
(see Beshara 2011: 2; Salamandra 2004: 33) or the Middle East more broadly (see Weiss 
2015: 65), and when approaching immigration and multiculturalism (see Walter 2006). It 
was also applied to the context of masculinity studies: Tony Coles (2008: 238) refers to 
‘mosaic masculinity’ when he describes the process by which men construct masculinity, 
																																																						
1 Following Bjørn Thomassen’s (2012: 690) definition of a ‘political revolution’, what happened in Syria in 2011 and 
in the years to come cannot be considered a revolution because what is missing is the actual overthrow of the regime. 
Another reason why I refrain from using the term ‘revolution’ and use instead the term ‘uprising’ in this dissertation is 
that in contrast to revolution (thawra), events (aḥdāth) and crisis (azma), the term ‘uprising’ seems to be the one that 
is leaning the least to either the pro-regime or the anti-regime side. Among Syrian men and women I met in Egypt, I 
heard thawra, (aḥdāth) and azma, but rarely the term uprising (intifāḍa) when they referred to the situation in Syria in 
and after 2011. People who called it ‘a revolution’ were usually considered to be pro-uprising, while people who defined 
it as ‘events’ or ‘crisis’ were assumed to side with the regime. 
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“drawing upon fragments or pieces of hegemonic masculinity which they have the 
capacity to perform and piecing them together to reformulate what masculinity means to 
them in order to come up with their own dominant standard of masculinity”. Coles 
highlights, in accordance with my own understanding of masculinity, that the bits and 
pieces that compose masculinity do not always fit neatly into what is supposed to form a 
bigger, coherent, presentable pattern. The mosaic metaphor is often criticised for being 
too static and fixed to describe fluid, processual and ever-changing parts of identity or 
society (see Salamandra 2004: 33). I also received this criticism in my upgrade 
presentation from my supervisory team. What makes me continue to use this metaphor in 
the title, knowing that it does not account for the fluidity and instability of identities, is 
the idea of the small pieces that form a bigger image, an image that is individual and 
differently formed by each man, and the hard work and effort that need to be put in 
forming such an image out of various, sometimes broken, and ill-fitting fractions. The 
idea of masculinity as put together out of various aspects and notions that are present in 
a man’s social contacts and situations, and the effort it takes to create a coherent 
masculinity, feature strongly in this dissertation.  
This thesis is more about Syria than it is about Egypt; it is more about Syrian 
men’s contact with other Syrians than it is about their interaction with Egyptians; it is 
more about Syrian men’s past and its impacts than it is about their present; it is more 
about their personal and individual endeavours and struggles than it is about their contact 
with the UNHCR or other aid organisations; it is more about their ideas about life and 
their attempts to achieve them than it is about their psychological well-being. Moving 
away from the ‘traditional’ foci of the discipline of refugee studies, such as encampment 
(e.g. Turner 2016; Horn 2010; Hanafi 2008), psychological conditions (e.g. 
Puvimanasinghe et al. 2015; Marlowe 2010; Pupavac 2002), contact with aid 
organisations (e.g. Agier 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010; Harrell-Bond 1999), and 
“women and children” as the main victims of displacement (e.g. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2014a; Amirthalingam 2012; Mooney 2007; Carpenter 2005; Benjamin 2000), this thesis 
attempts to present refugeeness from a different angle, paying close attention to the 
‘refugee’ as a classed, gendered person, who is defined by his history as well as his current 
living conditions and future aspirations. Consequently, this thesis does not fit smoothly 
within refugee studies but should be located at the disciplinary intersection of 
anthropology, Middle Eastern studies and gender studies. The collection of data is 
thoroughly informed by, and makes use of, anthropological theories, methods and 
methodology, while gender, and especially masculinity studies, are the critical lenses that 
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I use for the analysis and conceptualisation of data. Literature stemming from Middle 
Eastern studies features strongly because I realised that neither the history and current 
context of Egypt as host country, nor the country of origin, Syria, could be ignored when 
framing accounts of Syrian men in Egypt.  
This research does not aim to be generalisable, representative or unbiased. These 
adjectives are so often used to articulate research objectives by scholars following a 
specific approach within refugee studies, namely an approach influenced by the study of 
International Relations (e.g. Buscher 2013: 19; Landau and Duponchel 2011: 3; Jacobsen 
2006: 285). Furthermore, this research seeks to avoid terms like ‘vulnerabilities’, 
‘resilience’, livelihoods’, or ‘coping strategies’ – a vocabulary similarly favoured by 
some refugee studies scholars (e.g. Buscher 2013; Gladden 2013; Landau and Duponchel 
2011; Benjamin 2010; Andrews Gale 2006; Jacobsen 2006). This top-down, often policy-
focused approach within refugee studies has been critiqued by anthropologists (e.g. 
Hayden 2007; Scalettaris 2007; Malkki 1995), legal studies scholars (e.g. Chimni 2009), 
sociologists and feminist scholars (Gatt et al 2016; Hyndman 2010). They critique its 
problematic relationship with governmental policy-making and development aid as well 
as its dependency on policy definitions and concerns (Chimni 2009; Scalettaris 2007; 
Black 2000). Furthermore, they claim that this approach supported and spread specific 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, the individual and the nation-state 
(Hayden 2007: 473; Scalettaris 2007), and was uncritical of the use of prominent terms, 
such as ‘refugee’, ‘IDP’, ‘economic migrant’, etc. (Black 2000; Scaettaris 2007). 
Starting from the premise that ‘refugees’ are not a different category of human 
beings who need an entirely new framework and vocabulary to be analysed or understood, 
this thesis presents a nuanced, in-depth, gender and class-sensitive analysis that deals with 
the struggles, challenges and emotions of recently displaced Syrians in Egypt. With its 
focus on masculinities, this thesis responds to a recent scholarly recognition that women’s 
migration experiences tend to be over-emphasised while men are neglected in the study 
of forced migration. If male refugees or migrants are analysed, they are merely 
represented as oppressive, dangerous, conservative patriarchs or criminals (e.g. Charsley 
and Wray 2015; Andersson 2014). I seek to complement the existing academic work 
dealing with refugee women by analysing the perspectives, negotiations, worries, 
encounters and affective relations of displaced men. The focus on men during forced 
displacement presented in this thesis can not only contribute to the field of refugee 
studies, but can also critique and add to the conceptualisations and arguments having 
emerged from the study of men and masculinities (e.g. Connell 1995; Kimmel 1994; 
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Wentzell 2015; Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 2003), since it shows how men adapt and 
are subject to enforced changes, how masculinities are interrelated with place and time, 
and are thoroughly interconnected with women and femininities. Moreover, this 
dissertation takes issue with the lack of focus on class in the literature dealing with forced 
displacement. Instead of locating refugees according to their socio-economic background, 
refugee studies scholars often identify refugees merely as ‘poor’, ‘vulnerable’ or ‘better 
off’, or classify them by their belonging to ‘wealth groups’ in the ‘vulnerability context’ 
(e.g. Buscher 2013: 19; Landau and Duponchel 2011: 3; Jacobsen 2006: 279). In this 
thesis, I aim to show that class needs to be dealt with more thoroughly in accordance with 
displaced people’s self-positioning and by focusing not only on their socio-economic 
situation during forced displacement, but also on their pasts and their strivings for the 
future. I argue that sensitivity to class has the ability to bring to light and explain 
endeavours, ambitions and emotions during forced displacement. 
Having given a preliminary idea of this thesis, I outline in the following sections 
relevant historic developments in both Syria and Egypt and provide the context of both 
societies in order to be able to embed and introduce the main themes and arguments of 
this thesis. 
 
Syria – a brief overview of its history and society 
 
Life in Syria has been heavily influenced by constant fear of state security mechanisms 
and a lack of articulated opposition to the government prior to the uprising. Other defining 
aspects of living in Syria are the assumed fragility and insecurity of the sectarian balance 
and the importance of the regions that make the nation state. These characteristics are 
highly relevant, especially when considering the topics of fear, mistrust, lack of 
community cohesion, loss of status, and experiences of oppression and inequality in the 
following chapters. 
Historians argue that the first signs of a Syrian identity were apparent by the end 
of the 19th century when Syria described a geographical location within the Ottoman 
Empire inhabited by people belonging to various religious and ethnic groups defining 
themselves primarily via their region (see Beshara 2011; Groiss 2011). The region as a 
political entity has retained its importance over the centuries, since Syrians are still judged 
by others and by the state authorities on the basis of their region of origin (Khaddour and 
Mazur 2013). After World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria was ruled for 
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two years by Faysal Ibn Husayn before it became a French Mandate in 1920 
(Meininghaus 2016: 4). From a federation of states, the Syrian state developed, acquired 
its current geographical shape, and became independent in 1946. The following decade 
was unstable, with several military coups and counter-coups, and culminated in the 
proclamation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) by Egypt and Syria in 1958. The UAR 
broke apart in 1961 and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath party, which had been founded in 1953, 
was brought to power in a coup d’état in 1963 (ibid.: 5). In 1970, Hafiz al-Assad, rising 
from within the ranks of the Ba’ath Party, became the president of Syria. He created a 
presidential monarchy on the basis of kin and sectarian solidarity, party loyalty, and the 
appointment of a majority of Alawites - the sect he himself belonged to - to the Central 
Committee of the Ba’ath party as well as to the military elite (Hinnebusch 1993: 246). 
Thus, the Ba’ath Party began its transformation from a movement committed to its 
ideology into institutionalised clientelism (Hinnebusch and Zintl 2015: 4).  
For the regime, it was always of great importance to win the support of the various 
religious sects and ethnicities, and to avoid conflict with or among them (Ziadeh 2013). 
Hence, Hafiz al-Assad ruled in a paradoxical way: Officially, he dismissed sectarianism 
and encouraged instead an inclusive Syrian Arab nationalism and secularism, however, 
at the same time, politicised sect identities were reproduced and co-opted by the regime 
and by internal and external enemies (Phillips 2015: 365). Moreover, Hafiz al-Assad 
expanded the military and security apparatus of the country so that, by the 1990s, fifteen 
percent of the country’s total workforce was employed in these sectors (Chatty 2010: 43). 
Because of the omnipresence of the mukhābarāt (security service), Syrians lived in a 
climate of fear and encountered other Syrians with scepticism and suspicion. They could 
not be sure whether one’s counterpart was somehow involved in the structures of the 
mukhābarāt and would reveal information about them (Schneiders 2013: 233). 
Furthermore, the state reduced societal autonomy, destroying or co-opting social forces 
while creating alternative ones loyal to the regime (Hinnebusch 1993: 246). Another 
crucial aspect of political life in Syria was an inseparability of the nation from the ‘eternal 
leader’ Hafiz al-Assad, who bequeathed his power to his son Bashar al-Assad when he 
died in 2000 (Ismail 2011: 541). Lisa Wedeen (1999: 6) argues that the regime had 
disciplined its people to act as if they believed and supported its every word. Citizens 
should behave as if they were children and Hafiz al-Assad was their father, and they were 
therefore expected to act as if they loved him and were willing to sacrifice themselves for 
him (ibid.: 65).  
	 17 
 While under Hafiz al-Assad state institutions provided basic services and the 
economy was controlled, Bashar al-Assad introduced a system of “crony capitalism” in 
Syria, in which members of the president’s family secured rent-producing activities (Aita 
2015: 292). Key regime figures and segments of the business community merged into a 
political-economic ruling class (Azmeh 2014: 12). Additionally, the mukhābarāt 
transformed more and more into a political and economic tool of the regime (ibid.). 
Immediately after he came to power, Bashar al-Assad made space for what is referred to 
as the ‘Damascene Spring’ – a period of political opening up, in which freedom of speech 
was, to an extent, possible. Nevertheless, it was only one year later, in 2001, that the 
regime went back to intimidating, arresting, and convicting critics and oppositionists 
(Schneiders 2013: 233). 
As far as social identity, status and class in Syrian society are concerned, scholarly 
work produced over the past twenty years avoids giving clear definitions of class status, 
highlighting instead the relevance of sectarian belonging, region, competitive 
consumption and the state. Anthropologist Christa Salamandra (2004: 12) advocates the 
use of Bourdieu’s term ‘habitus’ to properly describe social standing in Syrian society, 
arguing that religious and class distinctions merge with those relating to region. By this, 
she means that there is, among other markers, a rural-urban distinction, which serves as 
a defining characteristic of people. Furthermore, she identifies, when looking specifically 
at Damascus, that the place of residence within the city defines one’s status and social 
background (ibid.: 41). Salamandra, as well as Khaddour and Mazur (2013), stresses that 
sectarian belonging must be analysed in the context of social relations that emerge in the 
regions. Additionally, anthropologist Annika Rabo (2005: 8) undergirds the importance 
of the state and its impact on class constructions. In the case of Syria, the state has 
contributed to the growth of the petty bourgeoisie since the 1970s and 1980s. Another 
aspect of Syrian social identity is competitive consumption, that is, the ability to buy 
expensive goods and to present oneself in fashionable venues. This type of consumption 
is gendered: while Syrian men are image-conscious and show their status through 
expensive clothes, jewellery and cars, women are the ones who represent the family’s 
status through their outward appearance (Salamandra 2004: 50).  
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The Syrian Uprising 
 
The Syrian uprising began in 2011 with several small events and protests throughout the 
country. In March 2011, children sprayed a wall in the southern town of Deraa with the 
slogan: ‘the people want the downfall of the regime (al-sh‘ab yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām)!’. The 
local governor responded with extreme brutality, ordering the boys to be thrown in jail 
where they were tortured. Townspeople and the boys’ families reacted with repeated 
demonstrations over the following weeks (Stacher 2012: 16). The regime countered with 
violent crackdowns and a siege of the city until May 2011 (Ziter 2014: 1). Eventually, 
protests and rallies spread throughout Syria, demanding freedom and the end of the rule 
of the security services. Further demands of the protestors were: the release of all political 
detainees; the removal of the state of emergency; and constitutional changes that would 
terminate the monopoly of the Ba’ath party in government institutions (Ismail 2011: 539). 
Outrage over the regime’s actions in Deraa – the torture of the children; the disrespect 
shown to the elders, who attempted to negotiate with the regime; and the lack of 
accountability of the regime officials who had tortured the children, added to 
dissatisfaction with corruption, authoritarian caprice, and the government’s ignorance 
about its people’s circumstances (Wedeen 2013: 856).  
At the beginning of the uprising, activists and members of the opposition tried to 
maintain peaceful and nonviolent resistance. However, from its early days, the army 
quashed the protest movement with violent crackdowns on public demonstrations, arrests, 
imprisonment, and torture in custody, which was in turn met with further resistance from 
the population (Ismail 2011: 539). Moreover, the regime provoked sectarian strife by 
dividing the people according to their religions and regions, and by promoting the arming 
of the pro-government Alawi population (Sawah and Kawakibi 2014: 154). Since 2012, 
the conflict in Syria can be viewed as a civil war between the government and rebel forces. 
Over time, the war started to develop sectarian undertones with clashes between Sunni, 
Shia and Alawite sects and jihadist groups, such as ISIS (Deardorff Miller 2017: 4). The 
conflict eventually became fully sectarianised and the multiple oppositions forces 
increasingly engaged in combat against one another (Lawson 2017: 13/14). In 2013, Syria 
saw an acute escalation in armed conflict as the government intensified its attacks and 
began using increasingly deadly and indiscriminate weapons, including a chemical 
weapons attack on the Damascus countryside in August that year (Human Rights Watch 
[HRW] 2013a). Eventually, the conflict became a proxy war involving Iran, Russia, 
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Hezbollah (supporting al-Assad) and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and the US 
(supporting Sunni rebel factions) (Deardorff Miller 2016: 5). By 2016, the death toll had 
risen to 470,000; 6.1 million Syrians were internally displaced and 4.8 million were 
seeking refuge abroad. Since 2011, 117,000 people have been detained or have 
disappeared. By mid-2016, an estimated one million people lived in besieged areas (HRW 
2017).  
Having briefly introduced the context in Syria, I now turn to give an overview on 
Egypt’s society, history and political situation before and at the time of my fieldwork. 
 
Pre- and post-uprising developments in Egypt 
 
In the past decade, Egypt has experienced a number of tumultuous years after decades of 
relative stability and constant authoritarian rule under President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir 
(1952-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011).  
Various developments led to the popular uprising in 2011 that put an end to then-
president Mubarak’s thirty-year long rule. For instance, the Egyptian government 
liberalised its economy over the previous decades, reducing public services and subsidies, 
selling off a significant share of the public sector, and decreasing government 
employment (Singerman 2013: 4). In this process of liberalisation, Mubarak’s 
government launched legal reforms to guarantee ‘flexible’ employment, privatised 
agriculture, removed trade barriers and put the interests of capital above all else 
(Abdelrahman 2015: 7). The gradual removal of the welfare structure, and state subsidies 
on food, education and housing sectors had a major effect on the economic well-being of 
the rural and urban poor (Ali 2003: 323). Agnès Deboulet (2009: 202) identifies a 
“generation of neoliberal modernity” that lives predominantly in informal 
neighbourhoods, consisting of deprived families who do not receive any security from 
the state because of the unavailability of subsidised goods and services as well as the 
scarcity of jobs and low wages. Sixty percent of all workers in Egypt are employed in the 
informal economy, which means that most of them lack minimum wage protection, health 
insurance, pensions, sick leave, paid vacations, maternity benefits and trade union 
protection (Singerman 2013: 1). Furthermore, a significant number of Egyptians are 
either unemployed or underemployed, and even those with higher education often have 
to work in the informal sector (Grabska 2006: 15). For Syrians coming to Egypt, this 
means that they enter a saturated, overcrowded and unstable labour market and live in an 
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overall climate of precarity facing the same struggles as Egyptians, if not more severe 
ones, due to the challenges that result from their labelling as refugees. 
In order to facilitate neoliberalism, political rights were severely restricted under 
Mubarak’s rule. There was no opportunity for Egyptians to organise any political 
opposition or to hold political meetings, and it was forbidden for the few legal opposition 
parties to arrange public activities. Human rights workers and opposition journalists 
became the target of repeated intimidation by closures, court cases and imprisonment 
(Mitchell 2012: 233). Moreover, with the rising impoverishment of society and the fear 
of Islamists gaining influence in the poor neighbourhoods, Mubarak’s government 
invested heavily in increasing the power of the police. Since the 1990s, police violence 
became endemic and gradually more visible, taking place not only in police stations and 
detention centres but also on the streets (Abdelrahman 2015: 16/17). Torture was not an 
exception, but was applied regularly as an interrogation method. It was not only perceived 
criminals who were subjected to torture, it was also employed against ‘ordinary’ citizens 
(ibid.: 19).  
According to Hafez (2012: 38/39), men in general, and young men in particular, 
became the target of random state violence, torture and humiliation in Mubarak’s Egypt. 
State power was made effective and oppressive by installing a sense of arbitrariness and 
unreliability, which fostered a feeling of helplessness and dependency on the state. An 
Egyptian friend of mine, Islām, who was in his late twenties and was from Egypt’s upper 
middle class, remembered when we talked about Mubarak’s rule that policemen could 
stop anybody and confiscate whatever was in their pockets. “It was a tool for the past 
regime to oppress people and keep their mouth shut”, he told me bitterly. Cynthia Enloe 
(2013: 78) argues that Mubarak’s regime sought to establish a connection between class 
and masculinised thuggery, aiming to present male civilians from a working-class 
background as thugs, in contrast to the professionalised male security police forces. Based 
on Islām’s account, conversations with other middle-class Egyptian men, and my own 
experiences and observations in the streets of Cairo, I argue that this police tactic was not 
only directed at lower-class men, but in fact at men from all social backgrounds, and did 
not disappear with the end of Mubarak’s rule. Syrian newcomers in Egypt were similarly 
affected by and feared the Egyptian state authorities and their cruel interrogation methods. 
Abū Walīd, for instance, whose problems I introduce in the coming chapters, suffered 
from the ill-will and power of the Egyptian police in the form of blackmailing and threats 
by an individual police officer. He found no way to get away from the police officer’s 
control and the suffering he caused him. 
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Poverty, unemployment, the uncontrollable power of the police, and a lack of 
political freedom were some of the reasons so many Egyptians stormed onto the political 
stage in January 2011 with the goal of bringing down Mubarak and his regime. According 
to Hazem Kandil (2012: 218), Egypt had become a failed state in the eyes of its own 
people. It was perceived as the state of the upper class with laws only being passed so 
that the rich could make themselves richer by breaking them. The poor had to pay taxes 
while the rich evaded them, since bribery and corruption had become normalised. 
Confronting the regime and demanding its fall was grounded in moral disarray and anger, 
fed by a language of political discontent and a fantasy of a better life (Schielke 2015: 
180). Other aspects that are commonly perceived as having sparked the uprising were: 
discontent with an older generation that had accepted and compromised with corrupted 
political and economic elites; useless political parties, state-run unions; and the presence 
of an educated younger generation who could not put their potential to use (Chalcraft 
2012).  
When Mubarak stepped down on 11 February 2011 the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) took over and immediately announced a withdrawal from politics 
after a six-month transition period, when power would be passed to an elected authority 
(Kandil 2012: 228). During the SCAF rule, which in fact lasted for eighteen months, 
violence against demonstrators remained systematic and reached its peak during the fights 
on Muhammad Mahmoud Street in November 2011, where nerve gas and live 
ammunition were used, and killed close to a hundred activists. In February 2012, the 
Ultras, who played an important role in the street battles in 2011, were assaulted during 
a football game in Port Said, when security forces prevented anyone escaping from the 
stadium, leaving around seventy activists dead (ibid.: 231). While in power, SCAF 
organised two rounds of presidential elections, ballots for both upper and lower houses 
of parliament, and two sets of constitutional referenda, in all of which the Muslim 
Brotherhood managed to increase its power. Consequently, SCAF’s rule resulted in the 
reaffirmation of the military’s privilege and power in economy and state institutions, and 
the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood in both houses of parliament, and thus, 
Muhammad Morsi, the candidate of the Brothers, became the President of Egypt in 2012 
(Abdelrahman 2015: 73).  
Morsi’s presidency did not last more than a year. Sociologist Maha Abdelrahman 
(ibid.: 112/114) argues that while the military wanted to continue ruling the country 
behind the scenes and had accepted the Muslim Brotherhood as its civilian face, it readily 
abandoned the Brothers in 2013 when they proved to be incapable of creating a stable 
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political environment. In June 2013, Morsi was removed from power by an alliance of 
the military, the Ministry of the Interior, old system loyalists, liberal media, and radical 
revolutionaries. He was succeeded by a new military regime with a formal civil 
leadership, while the Muslim Brotherhood became the victim of brutal suppression 
(Schielke 2015: 186). On 14 August 2013, security forces stormed two demonstration 
camps of Morsi supporters, Rabaa Square in Cairo and al-Nahda Square in Giza, killing 
at least 817 people. Moreover, the new military regime initiated a campaign of mass 
arrests of over 40,000 political prisoners and issued 509 mass execution sentences in 2014 
(Mandour 2015). ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the new president, promised to free the country 
from terrorism, provide security and stability, and bring about economic changes, which 
increased his popularity. The regime managed to unite large parts of the population 
through a nationalist and security discourse based on the demonisation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. And thus, by declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation, an 
enemy was constructed that evoked a sense of fear and insecurity (Abdelrahhman 2015: 
136/137).  
Not only did Syrian newcomers in Egypt live with the Egyptians through these 
unsteady times of frequent demonstrations, attacks and street fights, they were also 
vulnerable in a specific way during the political upheavals of the post-revolutionary years 
and to the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, which I discuss in the following 
section.  
 
Syrians in Egypt 
 
Syrians had settled in Egypt long before the uprising in 2011 and the consequent arrival 
of many thousands fleeing Syria. The first wave that came to Egypt in the 18th century 
consisted mainly of Greek Catholics. A second wave of immigration of Christian 
Maronites, Greek Orthodox Christians and Muslims started in the middle of the 19th 
century and ended with WWI (Philipp 1985). By 1914, about 35,000 Syrians of different 
socio-economic and educational backgrounds were living in Egypt, most of whom were 
Christians and a minority wer Muslim (Booth 2011: 228). They automatically received 
Egyptian citizenship unless they explicitly opted for another one. However, after WWII 
several laws were imposed, and national and religious tendencies became more prominent 
so that the lives of minorities in Egypt worsened and many left (Abdulhaq 2016: 195). 
During the period of the UAR, again, many professional Syrians and businessmen left 
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Egypt because of Nasir’s socialist political system (Barbir 1986 cited in Ayoub and 
Khallaf 2014: 20).  
At the end of 2011 and in 2012, when Syrians began arriving in Egypt, having 
fled the rising violence and insecurity in their home country, then-president Morsi and 
his Muslim Brotherhood allies supported the Syrian uprising and there was a welcoming 
attitude within Egyptian society, especially among Egypt’s ageing Nasserist generation, 
young liberal activists, the Muslim Brotherhood and Anti-Alawite Islamists (Ali 2012). 
Morsi announced Egypt’s full support for the Syrian uprising, emphasised an open-door 
policy for Syrians entering Egypt, and granted Syrians full access to public services. Since 
Egypt has no policy of encampment, Syrians settled all over Egypt, predominantly in the 
governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta and Mansoura (Ayoub and Khallaf 2014: 7). 
In August 2013, immediately after Morsi was toppled, visa restrictions for Syrians were 
imposed. Furthermore, Syrian refugees became the subject of a government-organised 
media campaign that labelled them as ‘terrorists’, allies of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
supporters of Morsi. This generated an increase in xenophobia and discrimination against 
Syrian refugees in the Egyptian population, which was still affecting them in their daily 
lives, albeit to a lesser extent, when I began conducting my research in August 2014. 
Because of the demonisation of the Muslim Brotherhood driven by al-Sisi’s regime, being 
considered a supporter or sympathiser could seriously damage one’s reputation or could 
even be dangerous. This had a direct impact on the conditions of Syrian refugees in Egypt, 
since the majority of Islamic charities that had provided them with major support were 
shut down in the summer of 2013. I witnessed how the head of a Syrian private nursery 
in which I volunteered, a woman of Syrian-Egyptian descent wearing a niqāb (face veil) 
and a long black dress, became the object of rumours that she was a supporter of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, so she had to close the nursery and move to another place in the 
spring of 2015.  
After the public campaigns that fuelled anti-Syrian sentiments in 2013, there 
appeared to be a new trend in the Egyptian media in 2015 that used the plight of the 
Syrians as a political tool to expand the support for the military and al-Sisi’s regime. 
Rīhām Saʿīd, an Egyptian broadcaster, for instance, posted a video of herself handing 
food and clothes to Syrian refugees in a Lebanese camp. After having complained about 
the Syrians and how they disrespectfully grabbed the donated items, she described their 
plight and their behaviour as the fate of a people whose country was destroyed. The clip 
ends with the broadcaster praising Egypt’s armed forces (AlNahar TV 2015). Another 
time, Saʿīd used the picture of Syrian-Kurdish toddler Aylan washed up on the shore to 
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make the point that Egyptians should support the army. As described critically by a 
journalist of Madamasr, Saʿīd said that the military was fighting on the Egyptian borders 
to prevent such a tragedy from happening and asked the rhetorical question of who could 
be still against the army (Magid 2015). When I discussed these video clips with Maḥmūd, 
a tour guide in his thirties, whom I had got to know in Syria and met again in Cairo where 
we spent a lot of time together, he said to me: “they use us as a lesson” meaning that in 
Egypt the Syrian civil war was taken as a tool to promote the people’s support for the 
regime. 
Another trend can be observed in official speeches and statements by al-Sisi and 
his government: in an article by Daily News Egypt the regime presented itself, despite 
the economic difficulties Egypt was facing, as selflessly supporting their “brothers from 
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea” (Youssef 2015). In a 
speech in September 2015, al-Sisi said that Egypt had accepted at least “500,000 people 
of our brothers (ahlinā) from Syria”.2 He continued: “The UN counted only 130,000. No 
one heard our voice. And no one heard our voice when we welcomed them”. In this 
speech, al-Sisi further highlighted that the Egyptian state had to be prevented from 
becoming a “refugee state”. Nevertheless, he stressed that refugees in Egypt would be 
treated as if they were Egyptians, since they had access to all social, educational and 
health services (MENA 2015). Before he moved on to another topic, al-Sisi said, “So why 
did I start by talking about this? Because our strategic goal is to keep the Egyptian state. 
[…] We don’t want the idea of defending and keeping our country to be absent from our 
thinking. Always remember to protect our country…”. In 2015, upon the release of the 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), an aid plan for Syrian refugees in the 
Middle East and the host communities, Abdulrahman Salah, then-Assistant Foreign 
Minister for Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs, reiterated that Egypt had taken it upon 
itself from the beginning of the refugee crisis to support its Syrian brothers by offering 
full and free access to the same public services provided to Egyptians (3RP 2015).  
The public statements by the Egyptian regime gloss over the fact that al-Sisi’s 
government introduced major restrictions in 2013, effectively denying Syrian refugees 
access to Egypt. Likewise, the emphasis on free access to education is a euphemism, since 
Syrians who want to enrol their children in Egyptian public schools or universities must 
first meet several requirements. Muhannad, a student of dentistry in his early twenties, 
																																																						
2 I watched and translated his speech in September 2015 via the following link: 
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=jqfkVupCabs. 
	 25 
who founded an NGO helping Syrians in Egypt to gain access to education, explained the 
challenging process of enrolment to me. Syrian students are not able to enrol at an 
Egyptian university unless they can present their birth certificate, Syrian high school 
diploma and a letter from the Syrian embassy in Egypt. In the context of a community 
who fled from a civil war, such requirements effectively diminish the number of Syrian 
students who can successfully enrol in Egyptian universities and schools. 
Yet another discourse has developed around the Syrian presence in Egypt: at a 
workshop in winter 2016, an Egyptian scholar told me that nowadays successful Syrian 
entrepreneurs would be praised in the Egyptian media for their resilience and creativity 
in making a living in Egypt. And indeed, several Egyptian TV shows, among them Kalām 
Tānī (Dream TV Egypt 2017), deal with the assumed productivity and creativity of the 
Syrians in 6th of October City, vis-à-vis the ‘idleness’ of the Egyptians.  
The difference between the Egyptian and the Syrian dialect was another recurring 
theme. Many Syrians felt the need to avoid using their dialect on the streets, especially in 
the aftermath of 2013 when they were publicly denounced as supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood protests. Many Syrians told me that there was a communication problem 
when Syrians arrived in Egypt in 2012, with the Egyptians not understanding them. 
Therefore, Syrians had to adapt and learn the Egyptian dialect. Looking at the context of 
Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan, Massad (2008) argues that a “battle of the 
accents” took place. In a process that came to create Palestinians as the ‘other’ against 
which Jordanians defined themselves, two distinct accents developed and became 
national markers. The fronts over dialects hardened when the urban Transjordan 
population felt that the Palestinian upper-middle class who settled in less developed small 
towns in Jordan engaged in a nation-class narrative of superiority. The battle of the 
accents had a gendered component, too. Among urban Jordanians, certain pronunciations 
were defined as more masculine, while others were created as feminine. Palestinian men, 
in order to not be perceived as feminine, began to imitate the perceived masculine 
pronunciation among Jordanians. It is also true for the Syrian-Egyptian context that 
dialects are a strong marker of nationality and have a gendered aspect. However, the 
confrontation of the Syrian and the Egyptian dialects was less direct than in Jordan, since 
the number of Syrians arriving in Egypt was smaller than the number of Palestinians in 
Jordan and most Syrians I met used the Egyptian dialect in public. Nevertheless, 
throughout my fieldwork, I was engaged in many debates with Syrians and Egyptians 
about which dialect was closer to fuṣḥa (Modern Standard Arabic), more grounded in 
Arab history and Islam, easier to learn, and more beautiful. Both Syrians and Egyptians 
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made fun of the other’s dialect. Syrians said that Egyptians were not able to speak or 
understand anything but their own, not very beautiful dialect, while Syrians had been able 
to adapt to the situation and speak with an Egyptian accent in public. Often, I heard from 
Egyptians that the Syrian and Lebanese dialect was erotic if a woman spoke it, but was 
considered gay if a man was talking. 
 
The field site: Cairo  
 
The settings of my fieldwork were Cairo and the satellite town of 6th of October City, 
where I conducted research for fourteen months.  
My image of Cairo is that of a cosmopolitan, crowded, dirty and loud city that 
never sleeps; its streets blocked with buses, trucks, taxis and donkey carts; the smell of 
exhaust and garbage in the air; and the sound of honking that barely even stops at night. 
Looking at Cairo from the perspective of a village in Northern Egypt, Schielke (2015: 10) 
describes that the capital is ‘the place to be’ within the country, where the financial, 
political and cultural elites converge. It is the place that promises wealth, career, power, 
culture and glamour, even though the path of social advancement in the capital is in fact 
difficult. And indeed, despite its glamorous, cosmopolitan reputation in the countryside, 
many parts of Cairo cannot fulfil this promise: some of the urban poor and the middle-
class poor live in cemeteries, on rooftops and on public lands on the outskirts of Cairo, 
creating informal communities. Greater Cairo hosts more than 111 informal settlements 
(ʿashwā’īyāt), where more than six million people have created homes for themselves 
(Bayat 2010: 80/81). Cairo is divided into various neighbourhoods that differ 
significantly in their character and history, from upmarket gated communities in New 
Cairo and gardened villas in al-Maʿadi, to the dilapidated Downtown, and numerous 
shʿabī (local, popular) areas that house the majority of Cairo’s lower-class population. 
Crossing the often-invisible line between two districts, I felt that lifestyle and expected 
behaviour differ significantly, and for a newcomer, it takes a while to recognise these 
lines and codes of behaviour. There is a connection between place and class in Cairo, and 
one’s particular background and performance determine in which part of the city one can 
feel at home and how one is perceived and treated.  
Egyptian society is extremely stratified and class-conscious with class 
background marked by one’s lineage, education, income and housing (see Schielke 2015; 
De Koning 2009; MacLeod 1991). There is also a strong association between socio-
	 27 
economic privilege and cultural superiority (De Koning 2009: 46). Education is 
considered the marker of, and key to, social respectability. It is perceived as a guarantee 
of work outside the personal services and cleaning sectors, both of which imply a 
distinctly low standing. Thus, a manual worker will be perceived as being from a lower 
class than an unemployed university graduate, even though the latter has no income while 
the former earns a wage. This is because the unemployed young graduate still embodies 
the promise of a future middle-class life while the manual worker has apparently settled 
for less (ibid.: 76). Schielke (2012: 132) describes the modern middle-class lifestyle as 
“the aim of almost every Egyptian” – an aim that was motivated by the influx of imported 
goods and migrants’ remittances in the 1970s. Likewise, an upper-class lifestyle is 
predominantly dependent on consumption, public demonstration of one’s good taste in 
terms of international food and fashion, and mixed-gender socialising –  all of which can 
be practised and presented in the newly built compounds and malls on the outskirts of 
Cairo (Peterson 2011: 141).  
In Cairo, I knew and met Syrians in various neighbourhoods, such as in the 
expensive gated communities of Rehab and Medinaty, in upper- and middle-class areas, 
such as al-Maʿadi, Dokki and Medinat Nasr, and in lower-class neighbourhoods, such as 
Faysal and Haram. In 6th of October City, Syrians lived in the affluent neighbourhoods 
close to the Huṣarī Mosque, but I also visited families in the extremely poor areas of 
Masakin Othman or Bayt al-ʿĀʾila. 6th of October City (which has been often referred to 
in national and international media as ‘little Syria’) has attracted many Syrians to move 
there over the past years because of the availability of Syrian goods and restaurants, the 
presence of various aid organisations, affordable rent, and the possibility to avoid 
engagement with Egyptian neighbours.  
 
Refugees in cities 
 
Life for refugees in cities differs notably from the more restrictive experience of 
encampment. Generally, studies have found that refugees in urban contexts are more often 
able to generate income, mostly through informal labour. Furthermore, according to 
refugee studies scholar Karen Jacobsen (2006: 283), refugees in cities can more often rely 
on social capital, that is local friendships, aid organisations, charity-minded individuals 
or diasporic communities. Landau and Duponchel (2011: 5) stress that living in an urban 
context can translate into social mobility and freedom of movement. Conversely, 
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however, refugees are struggling under the challenges the receiving cities face, such as 
over-population, inadequate infrastructure and insufficient public services (Buscher 
2013: 17). They often lack support networks, face legal uncertainties due to their status, 
and become victims of xenophobia (see Sommers 2001; Dryden-Peterson 2006; Briant 
and Kennedy 2004, Sperl 2001; Jacobsen et al. 2012). Other problems that evolve in the 
urban context are difficulties with regards to access to education for children (Dryden-
Peterson 2006: 382), expensive medical care (Banki 2006: 343), and little legal support 
or police protection (Briant and Kennedy 2004: 440). Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016) 
stresses that there should be a focus on urban refugees’ experiences of “overlapping 
displacement”, that is, that forced migrants often share a space with other displaced 
people. Refugees of various nationalities may experience mistrust, segregation and 
divisions in their contact with each other, but may similarly be advantaged through their 
relations with other refugee communities (ibid.) Living as refugees in Cairo, these 
challenges of living in the urban context are exacerbated by the need for Syrians to get 
used to Cairo’s sheer size, its transportation system, the long distances, blocked roads, 
crowds of people, the constant noise, and the smell. Moreover, the poverty, authoritarian 
governmental legacy and unstable political climate in Cairo impact on refugees and make 
Egypt’s capital “an uneasy refuge”, “a troubled host” and “a source of anxiety” for 
refugees (Danielson 2015: 15).  
The fact that Syrians in Egypt did not live in camps but had settled in various parts 
of Cairo was one of the aspects that affected my fieldwork to a significant extent. As it is 
the case with any urban anthropology, there was no clear-cut ‘field site’ but only a 
network of Syrian men and women spread across Cairo and 6th of October City that I tried 
to keep track of by embarking on daily journeys through the city. I could only meet people 
when they explicitly invited me and wanted me to be there and take part in their lives. I 
was not part of a commonly shared social space, where encounters and joint activities 
might have occurred more ‘naturally’ and regularly, but rather always a guest, who was 
welcomed to houses, cafes, offices or communal spaces, but only when the time was right 
for my contacts. I was a visitor occasionally allowed to take part in my contacts’ lives. I 
suggest that being in the position of the visitor provides the interlocutors with the 
advantage of knowing that they can control their contact with the researcher. They are 
thus freer to speak and choose what they want to share in the researcher’s presence than 
in a situation where daily contact is unavoidable. Conversely, however, this meant that I 
had to deal with the fact that Syrian men and women disconnected from me when they 
faced troubles and that there was no ‘natural’ way to share these times with them because 
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of the lack of physical proximity in Cairo. Sometimes, I would not hear from Syrian 
acquaintances for several months and only once they reached out to me again did I find 
out that they had been going through a difficult time. For instance, this was the case with 
Suhayr, whose situation I describe in more detail in Chapter 3. She was married to an 
Egyptian man and used to invite me regularly to her flat. I had been teaching her three 
daughters for several months. However, suddenly, she cut her contact with me without 
explaining why. After six months, she got in touch with me again, asking whether I could 
teach her daughters during the summer break. When she eventually invited me to her new 
flat, she told me that she had experienced a divorce in the previous months and had to 
find a new place for herself and her children. As Suhayr’s case illustrates, the lack of 
regular contact at certain times was not only due to the absence of physical proximity, but 
similarly grounded in the instability and uncertainty inherent in the lives of Syrian 
newcomers in Egypt. Like Suhayr, several Syrian contacts of mine would move to new 
neighbourhoods unexpectedly, would suddenly not attend my classes anymore, or would 
leave Egypt for good and I could only wait for them to get in touch with me again. 
When reflecting on my fieldwork, I find similarities with Zina Sawaf’s (2017: 14) 
ethnographic strategy in Riyadh that she describes as lateral movement foregrounding 
“instability, placelessness and vastness”. She argues that her fieldwork experiences felt 
like a constant movement between inclusion and exclusion, inclusiveness, marginality, 
integration and feeling like being cast out (ibid.: 15). Having conducted research in Cairo 
and facing the daily challenge of reaching out and meeting my contacts all over Cairo, I 
similarly felt temporarily part of a group, then completely disconnected, sometimes 
included in a circle of friends, and in the next moment far away without any ability to 
bridge the (spatial) distances. As Sawaf (ibid.: 22) suggested, being in and manoeuvring 
the urban context defined my interpersonal encounters and illustrated my role in the field 
as a temporary visitor in other people’s lives and private spheres. 
 
Doing fieldwork 
 
When I came to Egypt at the beginning of August 2014, it was not my first visit to the 
Middle East. I had spent a year volunteering in a Coptic orphanage in Cairo directly after 
I graduated from school in 2007. In the following years, I returned to Egypt for several 
internships that lasted between two and six months, spent six months in Palestine and 
visited several other countries in the Middle East.  
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In 2009, I had spent six months in Syria studying Arabic at the University of 
Damascus. This time had given me an idea about the regime, its security apparatus and 
Syrian society in a nutshell. I remember that I once asked a friend of mine from Hama on 
a car ride from Damascus to his hometown, what had happened in the 1980s to the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood and what he knew about the massacres that had taken place in his 
home town.3 To my surprise, he simply stopped talking to me for a while and we sat in 
awkward silence before he introduced another topic, completely ignoring my question. I 
was also surprised to find that whenever my language partner wanted to say something 
critical about Syria, he would close the curtains and start to whisper. And eventually, I 
got to experience the arbitrariness of the Syrian security apparatus: when I left the country 
in February 2010, hoping to come back for a longer stay after graduation, the border 
police at the airport stopped me and left with my passport and my ticket only to come 
back to tell me that I was not allowed to enter Syria again. When I said, utterly confused 
and in a panic, that I was just a language student and that I was not doing anything wrong 
(thinking of all the things I learned not to do while being in Syria, such as travelling to 
Israel or publishing journalistic pieces about Syria), he coldly and stoically repeated that 
it was written on his computer that I would never be allowed to access Syria again. Scared 
and shocked, I boarded the plane. I had to accept that with most of my Syrian 
acquaintances I would not be able to keep in touch because social media was heavily 
restricted and controlled in Syria at that time. Apart from a few Syrian friends, who left 
before the uprising to Europe or the US, I only managed to stay in touch with Maḥmūd, 
the tour guide, who came to Egypt in 2011 to try to establish his business in Cairo. 
When conducting fieldwork from August 2014 to September 2015, I met and 
talked to Syrian and Egyptian men and women. Egyptian participants were mostly 
acquaintances I had met during previous visits and their friends and relatives. My Syrian 
interlocutors hailed from various villages and cities in Syria and were of different ages. 
As far as my interlocutors’ religious and ethnic background is concerned: apart from one 
man who identified as Christian, I only met Syrians who presented themselves to me as 
Sunni Muslims. In Syria prior to 2011, Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, Isma’ili and Alawite 
communities lived together (see van Dam 2017; Sluglett 2016). However, in Egypt, I 
could not detect the presence of all those sects among Syrian refugees. Most Syrian 
Muslims I met were knowledgeable with regards to Islamic rules and traditions, pursued 
a lifestyle in accordance with Sunni religious ethics, and followed religious obligations 
																																																						
3In 1982, an uprising by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Hama was brutally destroyed by the regime through a siege 
of the city leaving more than 20,000 people dead (see Lia 2016; Lefèvre 2013).  
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like praying, fasting during Ramadan, paying zakāh (almsgiving), etc. In terms of 
religious affiliation, I thus analyse the narratives and arguments of a group that presented 
itself as homogeneous to me.  
Regarding their legal status in Syria, I met one family whose roots were 
Palestinian. This family had lived in Syria in Yarmouk refugee camp and they held a 
special legal status both in Syria and Egypt. Apart from this family, all the other Syrians 
I met were ‘Syrian citizens’: their belonging to the Syrian nation was unchallenged (in 
contrast to the case of 200,000 Syrian Kurds who were considered ‘stateless’ prior to 
2011). 
Most of my interlocutors I met through my voluntary work as a teacher of English 
and German in various NGOs. These NGOs, most of them privately established and run, 
usually provided a space for me to teach a variety of groups. Over the course of my 
fieldwork, I had several women-only classes, one men-only class, which I taught together 
with a male volunteer, and classes for students who did not attend school in Egypt or had 
just returned to school. As a language teacher, I was not part of the regular NGO staff and 
was only admitted for as long as the class lasted. Hence, my dealing with NGOs, their 
agendas and management of humanitarian aid was limited. Sometimes, my contact with 
students developed into regular meetings outside the classroom, and several times, my 
students introduced me to their close family members and other relatives. Moreover, at 
the very beginning of my fieldwork, I met a couple, Abū and Um Khālid, who described 
themselves as community leaders and introduced me to several families whom they 
perceived as impoverished and needy. They hoped that I would not only visit these 
families regularly, but would also raise financial, food or clothes donations for them after 
having been introduced to their plight – all of which I did, especially over the course of 
the first six months of my fieldwork.  
Over the course of fourteen months of fieldwork, I conducted sixty-one semi-
structured interviews with Syrian and Egyptian men and women, most of which were 
recorded. I documented some in the form of written notes. These interviews lasted 
between 30 and 90 minutes, were predominantly carried out in Arabic and translated 
afterwards. Due to my engagement in voluntary work, I had various informal 
conversations on a daily basis, which I noted in my fieldwork diary. With some Syrians 
I met I then developed close relationships: we started to meet regularly and eventually, 
usually after several months of knowing one another, they gave me permission to record 
an interview with them. Semi-structured interviews were usually guided by questions 
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about the interlocutor’s childhood and life in Syria, about their individual experiences of 
the Syrian uprising, their reason for fleeing, and the challenges of living in Egypt. In 
addition to these intimate, one-on-one, semi-structured interviews, I sometimes had the 
chance to engage groups in discussion, usually when I was invited by a contact, who had 
gathered friends and family to meet and talk to me.  
 
Being a researcher during “a new era of repression” 
 
In August 2014, when I started my fieldwork, the hope for a better Egypt that had been 
so present during my visits in 2011 had vanished. Most of my Egyptian friends who had 
been on Tahrir Square were depressed and felt betrayed. I remember a conversation in 
which Ashraf, an Egyptian friend, told me bitterly that he had gone out on to the streets 
and risked his life for the good of the whole country. Ashraf, who was from a wealthy 
family, studied at an international university and worked as an engineer, felt that he had 
not needed the revolution as much as the millions of urban and rural poor in Egypt. He 
could not believe that he and his friends, who could have simply enjoyed the privileges 
they had through their social background, had protested against a dictator and his regime, 
and the outcome was the installation of yet another dictator, Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. 
Likewise, Schielke (2015: 183) recounts that it was particularly those Egyptians who had 
actively participated in street protests in 2011 who came to express a frustrated and 
sceptical vision of the situation and the country’s future.  
Post-revolutionary Cairo in 2014 and 2015 was relatively quiet compared to the 
preceding years. Nevertheless, I sensed an underlying tension that defined my daily life 
and dictated my decisions. My fieldwork was embedded with what Amr Hamzawy (2017) 
describes as a ‘new era of repression’, which included accusing civil-society activists of 
treason and foreigners of espionage, depriving citizens of their freedom with legal 
backing and through police brutality. I felt its presence in conversations with both 
Egyptians and Syrians, when I read about cases of ‘forced disappearances’ on social 
media, and whenever I had to introduce myself and explain why I was in Egypt. The ‘new 
era of repression’ was the reason I decided not to affiliate myself with any institution, 
such as the American University in Cairo, why I put my SOAS online profile to sleep 
before I left for Egypt, and why I used to say I was in Egypt for personal reasons, 
volunteering as an English teacher and studying Arabic with a private teacher. 
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Helena Nassif (2017) makes a brilliant argument about the change of self-
consciousness and self-perception as a researcher in post-revolutionary Cairo, especially 
after Giulio Regeni’s4 murder. Even though my official fieldwork ended six months 
before his killing, the insecurity she describes speaks to the ubiquitous tension, endless 
worries and self-control that were part of my daily life in Egypt. I constantly surveilled 
and governed myself, wondering if anything I did could have turned me into a subject of 
concern for the Egyptian mukhābarāt. Every three months, when I had to reapply for my 
tourist visa, I had trouble sleeping and spent the days in brooding anticipation, hoping 
that it would be extended without any inquiries. The first time I tried to extend my visa 
in October 2014, I was told by the employees in the Mugamm’a, a massive government 
administration building at Tahrir Square, that my file had to be checked and that I could 
come back after a week to reapply. I spent the week paralysed with shock, trying to 
imagine what it would mean to relocate myself and my fieldwork to Jordan, Lebanon or 
Turkey. An Egyptian friend of mine, whose father had wasta (connections), offered to 
ask him whether I had to worry about being forced to leave. His father called me a couple 
of days later to tell me that I would not get in trouble, refusing to mention who he had 
called, what was said and if the secret service were indeed keeping an eye on me.  
In order to maintain the anonymity of participants in this thesis, I use pseudonyms 
and give only vague ideas about age and places of origin. In some cases, I also disguised 
key identifying details such as profession, or information about family background. One 
participant asked me to embed the narrative he wanted to share with me in an identity that 
made identification impossible, so as to protect himself and his family back in Syria, 
which I did. Even though several men, mostly younger ones, who felt secure and stable 
in Egypt, did not mind the possibility of being identified, the majority wondered 
nervously who would get to read this thesis and whether it could somehow affect them, 
their future or their loved ones. Generally, I realised that Syrian men and women tended 
to be restrained and cautious when it came to the recording of their voice or the use of 
their stories if they could be traced back to them. Even when I asked the three men 
mentioned on the first page whether I could dedicate this thesis to them, they asked me 
repeatedly what such a dedication was worth and whether this would get them in trouble. 
Eventually, each one of them asked me to write their name so that only they and their 
																																																						
4 Giulio Regeni was a PhD student from Cambridge conducting fieldwork on labour unions in Cairo. He disappeared 
on the fifth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution and was found dead showing signs of torture in a ditch close to 6th 
of October City several days later. Evidence strongly suggests that the Egyptian secret service is responsible for his 
murder (see Amnesty International 2017; Soliman 2017; Nassif 2017). 
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loved ones would know that it was them who I was thanking and acknowledging. Only 
at that point did I feel that the three of them sensed the recognition and appreciation I had 
meant to convey to them. 
 
Refugees as ‘research objects’ 
 
Having briefly discussed several aspects of my fieldwork, I now turn to what I consider 
explicit challenges I faced in Egypt especially with regards to positionality, issues of 
power during the research process, ‘reciprocity’ and responsibility towards participants.  
While writing this introduction, I realised that I was troubled by the ‘standard 
way’ of positioning myself and those who participated in this research. I realised that 
there is a standardised way of ‘positioning oneself and others’, when I was asked by 
several blind peer-reviewers, who read article manuscripts of mine, to share my 
positionality by mentioning in one paragraph my language, gender, ethnicity and 
nationality, and to say who my participants were with regards to their age, ethnicity, 
religion, and sexual orientation. I struggle with this kind of ‘standard’ for various reasons: 
first of all, it assumes that by positioning myself and my counterparts in a certain way, in 
a “visible landscape of power” (Gilligan 1997: 313), I, as a researcher, can circumvent 
false neutrality. However, following Rose Gilligan’s argument, this way of positioning 
oneself depends on the idea of a “transparently knowable agent whose motivations can 
be fully known” (ibid.: 309) and a clearly structured space that can be entirely grasped 
and understood by the researcher (ibid.: 310). Opposing this approach, Gilligan (ibid.: 
314) calls for an understanding of positionality as relational and of the self as “a decentred 
site of differences”.  
In this context, again, a question asked by Kanafani and Sawaf (2017: 6) speaks 
to me: they wonder “how to do ethnography with attention to the subjective experience 
of the ethnographer without rendering subjective experiences into token gestures, or 
worse, into ‘“ready to wear” products of identity politics’” (Robertson, 2002: 788 cited 
in Kanafani and Sawaf 2017: 6)”. Likewise, Richa Nagar and Susan Geiger (2007: 268) 
urge for a critical engagement with reflexivity and positionality but stress avoiding 
defining oneself by the same categories one seeks to disrupt and unpack in the research 
process. Rather than referring to pre-given social categories, such as ‘white’, ‘female’, or 
‘middle class’ in order to position oneself and others, they emphasise that reflexivity and 
positionality should be understood as processes (ibid.: 272). Nicole Laliberté and Carolin 
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Schurr (2016: 73) argue that it is through consideration of one’s emotions that a researcher 
can manage to properly pay attention to power hierarchies in the research process. They 
understand emotions, following Sara Ahmed (2004), as embodied experiences of social 
relations and thus suggest analysing our emotional encounters in the field as an outcome 
of “bodily memories and histories of contact between racialized, gendered, sexualized, 
and otherwise differentiated bodies” (Laliberté and Schurr 2016: 74). They stress that our 
way of acting in the field is an emotional reaction to our encounters with others. Kanafani 
and Sawaf (2017: 10) suggest a form of self-reflection that deals with “inter-subjective 
landscapes of emotional, sensory and epistemic/rhetorical experience, which compels—
often by way of self-doubt and anxiety— methodological strategies and manoeuvres as 
necessary avenues towards understanding”. 
I began this thesis by writing about the evocative encounters that put my taken for 
granted knowledge in question and introduce the challenges I was confronted with in the 
field by using my emotions as a starting point, recognising that “where and when the field 
is constituted starts to shift between the conditions of the field and the emotional states 
that ethnographic labour entails and tries to capture” (Kanafani and Sawaf 2017: 8, 
emphasis in original). I also pay attention to emotions in the following chapters, albeit to 
a lesser extent, in order to give space to Syrian men’s and women’s narratives and 
accounts and to minimise the risk of patronising them in my writing. I believe that in the 
end, I and my emotions should not be at the forefront when analysing Syrian men’s 
experiences during forced displacement. Instead, this thesis ought to give space to the 
experiences and stories of Syrian men and women and these should not be overlaid but 
rather only accompanied by the opinions and emotions I felt in relation to the telling of 
their stories and my following analysis. I wanted to find a balance between presenting my 
emotions and theirs, because, as Sara Ahmed (2004: 11) argues, emotions are not 
necessarily felt and experienced in similar ways.  
 
Responding (or failing to respond) to loss and need 
 
“[Anthropologists] are observers yet participants. We collect life histories and 
other data from individuals, analyze them and construct theories which ‘absorb’ 
our informants’ stories into the larger context of human experience. Yet we also 
glimpse the private worlds of others, share their pains and struggles and at times 
espouse their causes” (Chierici 2007: 306). 
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The ‘pains’ and ‘struggles’ that were the most difficult to witness for me relate to working 
among people who had left a war-torn country – many of them in dire need of financial 
support, contacts and network. Especially in the first six months of my fieldwork, I was 
challenged when confronted with some families’ extreme poverty and neediness after 
they had lost their savings or their provider and turned to raising donations as a way of 
‘giving something back’.  
There were, for example, Um and Abū Khālid’s contacts in 6th of October City, 
who had experienced severe impoverishment: Um and Abū Māzin could not afford 
medical treatment for Um Māzin’s inflamed gum so that she had to eat liquid food for 
weeks; Um Bāssim was unable to pay the rent; and Um ‘Abd Allah, who was in her 70s, 
had to take care of her grandchildren after her son had died in the war. She could neither 
afford clothes for the children, nor could she buy the medication for her husband that he 
needed to live with his chronic diseases. Witnessing their struggles and suffering made 
me extremely uncomfortable and so I decided to raise donations among Egyptian and 
German contacts of mine. I did this for a couple of months. It was not only challenging 
to accept the Syrian families’ poverty, but also my initial reaction to their suffering – a 
“Western” way of believing that with money s their circumstances could somehow easily 
and continually be eased.  
On the question of reciprocating with financial and economic rewards, there is a 
debate both in refugee studies and in anthropology. As noted by the refugee scholars 
Catriona Mackenzie, Christopher McDowell and Eileen Pittaway (2007: 303), refugees 
participating in research might have unrealistic expectations of the benefits of research 
and the researcher’s impact on legal or resettlement processes. Consequently, the authors 
call on researchers, to avoid to “merely document[ing] the difficulties of refugees and 
their causes without, whenever possible, offering in return some kind of reciprocal benefit 
that may assist them in dealing with these difficulties and, where possible, in working 
towards solutions” (ibid.: 310). For these scholars “a sufficient justification for research 
into suffering of others is, if it reduces future suffering of other populations, for example 
by generating lessons about how to minimize similar suffering in the future” (ibid.: 311). 
Similarly, Barbara Harrell-Bond and Eftihia Voutira (2007: 290) argue that the only way 
to engage refugees in research is “to convince them that the research is in their own best 
interest either because it addresses urgent conditions of survival or because it 
acknowledges their presence and historicity or both”. Both statements leave me 
wondering: how can the researcher assume what is in ‘the refugee’s’ best interest and 
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how can the researcher confidently guarantee that he or she is able to change something 
for the better for ‘the refugees’ and provide ‘solutions’ to their situation? 
On the other hand, several scholars strongly advocate giving something material 
back to their respondents. Vinay Srivastava (1992: 18), for instance, focuses on the 
question of ‘fair returns’ supporting the idea that interlocutors must be properly 
reciprocated. He suggests, among other things, making a gift to individuals, gatekeepers 
or the entire community. Sukarieh and Tannock (2012: 501), after various conversations 
with members of an over-researched community in Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp in 
Lebanon, came to the conclusion that research was perceived as valuable only if it was 
“connected to a tangible social change”. Those frequently interviewed felt that research 
questions did not concern their challenges but were conceptualised outside of the camps, 
solely oriented towards themes considered relevant in Western university contexts. The 
outcome of such, often poorly conducted research, consequently did not bring them any 
concrete benefits. Sukarieh and Tannock (ibid.: 502) point out that Palestinians in Shatila 
camp were deeply aware that they were mainly a tool, “a lab for experiments” as one 
informant called it, used to boost researchers’ careers. Scholars often gave them false 
promises and made use of the power hierarchies within the camp: they searched for 
respondents through NGOs and the people, who were recipients of the NGOs’ aid could 
not make free choices as to whether they wanted to participate but had to give in to the 
pressure from the NGOs to be interviewed (ibid.: 505). Sukarieh and Tannock (ibid.: 507) 
urge researchers to pay critical and reflective attention to the positioning of all parties 
involved in a research process within “local, regional, national and global structures and 
processes of power, identity, inequality, interest and control” in order to confront the 
problem of exploitation, furthered suffering and humiliation at the hand of researchers.  
Even though I believe in the importance of ‘giving something back’ to those under 
research, understand the suffering of over-researched communities, and cannot but agree 
with Sukarieh and Tannock’s calls for thorough positionality of all parties, I also 
experienced that the pressure to collect funds, whether clothes or money, was sometimes 
unbearable and, once money was involved, the relationship with informants usually 
changed. This was the case with Um and Abū Khālid and the families they had introduced 
to me. As much as I tried to clarify that the financial and material donations I managed 
to raise were not from my own pocket but were given to me by Egyptian and German 
acquaintances, I was directly associated with the donations and I was eventually judged 
and treated, based on my ability to give something. I had to realise that a few Euros, given 
by friends and family, were not sufficient to permanently change the situations under 
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which these families suffered. The donations could perhaps provide with a form of 
momentary relief, but they were never enough to truly ease their problems, which were 
of a completely different dimension. In addition to the realisation of the insufficiency of 
giving donations, I sometimes felt reduced to a ‘cash cow’ and I also often felt that 
participants threw the responsibility of their survival entirely on me. Being constantly 
pressured to ‘do something’, once I had been given the status of a ‘helper’, made me feel 
extremely uncomfortable because there was only so little I could do, especially once the 
interest and capabilities of donors decreased. 
 
An unbridgeable hierarchy 
 
Another challenge I encountered was related to my whiteness and belonging “to the world 
of privilege and power” (Jackson 2013: 200) conducting research among people who at 
that time did not have access to this world. With some Syrian contacts of mine, mostly 
the ones in less fortunate circumstances in Egypt, I experienced a barely bridgeable 
hierarchy and struggled with interlocutors’ ideas and consequent expectations of me. It 
took time to realise this hierarchy based on whiteness and power and this process of 
realisation was painful, as my interaction with Salīm illustrates.  
Salīm came to the office of an NGO where I spent the day volunteering. He picked 
up free diapers that the NGO provided, and was eager to speak to the bāḥitha (researcher). 
He emphasised that he had experience working in Dubai as an engineer and that his wife 
was the first French teacher in their area back in Syria. In Cairo, however, Salīm could 
not find work, despite his professional background, which was causing him a lot of 
distress. He could not afford the rent for his small flat in a slum in 6th of October City, 
and did not know how to buy food and clothes for his four children. He had started to 
work as a street vendor next to the Huṣarī Mosque. In our conversation, his mood changed 
from angry to friendly, aggressive to sad. Among other topics, he expressed his anger and 
disappointment in the UN staff and other aid agencies. He complained that at the UN 
office, he was told to come back another day but never got an appointment, and the two 
aid agencies he had approached had also refused to help him. Eventually, he directed all 
his anger and disappointment at me. He asked me what I could do for him and demanded 
that I wrote down the identification number on his ‘yellow card’ in order to support his 
case at the UN office in Germany. When I expressed doubts about my ability to influence 
his case, he shouted angrily as to how could I refuse to help him, while I was obviously 
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getting paid for my research and could live a good life by using his and other Syrians’ 
stories. He only calmed down after I told him that I was not paid by anyone. He 
apologised, said that he was only joking and added that the whole situation was making 
him stressed and nervous. Salīm had anticipated that I had the necessary network and 
influence to move his case forward because of my positionality as a German researcher, 
and arguably came to talk to me for this reason. When he realised that he had invested 
time and effort by sharing his story with me and that I could not give back the expected 
support, he became angry. 
Similarly, my encounter with Um Walīd made me question my position in the 
field. Um Walīd was a young mother of two boys and attended one of the all-women 
English classes I offered. After knowing her for several months, she started to share with 
me in our chats after the classes her worries about her family’s future in Egypt. She once 
asked me if I knew people working for the German embassy and I answered her honestly 
that I had briefly met a couple of German staff members. One day, Um Walīd told me 
that her husband was in serious trouble, since he was being regularly blackmailed by an 
Egyptian officer. I asked her whether I could meet her husband to learn more about his 
predicament and interview him for my research. She promised to ask him and told me a 
couple of days later that he was ready to meet me. After I had met her husband at his 
workplace and was walking in the streets, overwhelmed that he was being harassed, 
threatened and blackmailed by an Egyptian police officer and was unable to protect 
himself, I received a message from Um Walīd. She asked me whether the interview he 
had given me would increase their chances when applying for a visa at the German 
embassy. Shocked, surprised as to why shy asked me this, and eventually embarrassed 
and ashamed because I realised that I had raised false hopes in her, I had to tell her that 
neither my research nor my contact to the people I knew at the embassy would impact on 
her chances to apply for a visa. Only later, did I come to fully understand the extent of 
this incident. I realised that Um Walīd had pushed her husband to share his story with me 
– a dangerous endeavour given the circumstances he was in and the minimal knowledge 
he had at that time about me and my intentions. However, what seemed to have convinced 
Um and Abū Walīd to allow me to learn about their situation was their belief that I could 
somehow help them to leave Egypt for Germany. 
The encounter with them thus made me recognise my privileges compared to their 
neediness and dependence and the consequent hierarchical asymmetry that defined our 
relationship. My nationality and contact with other Germans, which I had briefly 
mentioned to her, had made her assume that I was in a position to help her leave Egypt 
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and I had naively not expected to raise such hopes in her. Even though I had learned about 
these issues in my pre-fieldwork training, I had somehow not expected to encounter them 
so viscerally during fieldwork. As it was the case when I witnessed two of my contacts 
giving money to Egyptian beggars, through my encounters with Um Walīd and Salīm I 
was confronted with my own stereotypes, my taken for granted assumptions and the 
unrealistic image I had of myself and others.  
Literature dealing with feminist ethics of care pays close attention to issues such 
as exploitation of research subjects, reciprocity and giving back for the privilege of asking 
informants about their lives. As Beverley Skeggs (2001: 434) argues: “[we] enter 
ethnography with all our economic and cultural baggage, our discursive access and the 
traces of positioning and history that we embody. We cannot easily disinvest of these. In 
fact, we may not even know that much about ourselves”. Accepting that I was not aware 
of all the aspects of my baggage helped me to ease the shame and discomfort related to 
my encounter with Um and Abū Walīd and Salīm. 
Finally, I should stress that contact with the Syrian and Egyptian men and women 
who participated in this research did not end on 28 September 2015, when I left Egypt 
for London. Just this morning in the spring of 2017, while writing part of this introduction, 
I was contacted by a dear Syrian friend still residing in Egypt, whom I met during the 
fieldwork and whose story is part of this research. While there is a lot of training that 
deals with questions of how to ‘enter the field’, I realised that there is a lack of literature 
and training related to how to ‘exit the field’. In my case, just like in the case of any 
anthropologist who stays in touch with interlocutors after the official end of fieldwork, 
there was no ‘easy way out’, but ongoing interactions and sometimes “open-ended and 
imponderable relations” (Kanafani and Sawaf 2017: 8) with participants. I went back to 
Egypt for a few visits in 2015 and 2016, when I met a few participants again, and I am in 
regular contact with several of them via social media. Some conversations continued 
when meeting participants after they had left Egypt during or directly after my fieldwork 
and had sought asylum in Germany. My fieldwork thus connected different times and 
places, in and outside of Egypt. The ongoing interaction meant that it took me a long time 
to emotionally disconnect and distance myself from fieldwork, decipher encounters and 
feel ready to write about people and their experiences from a rather analytical and 
conceptual angle.  
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Chapter overview 
 
The coming chapter, the chapter dealing with feelings of dignity, arrogance and 
humiliation, introduces encounters and experiences that instilled a sense of refugeeness 
in Syrians after their arrival in Egypt, among them their contact with the UNHCR, 
insecurity related to identity documents and a physical discomfort. The chapter then turns 
to document strategies Syrian men used to disconnect themselves from the negatively 
connoted refugee label. This process includes the formation of the image of a refugee and 
one’s disassociation from it by creating distances from those, who were found to fit the 
stereotypical refugee image. The prototype of a refugee was the Syrian man who fled to 
Europe to seek asylum. 
 Chapter 2, the chapter of pride, shame and judgement, explores Syrian men’s 
negotiations of paid labour and experiences in the Egyptian labour market. Syrian men in 
Egypt identified the ideal of a Syrian middle-class masculinity through discourses around 
their own and other men’s approaches to work and unemployment. This chapter also 
illustrates men’s engagement with and praise of ‘traditional’ complementary gender roles 
and their sense of “patriarchy-as-usual” (Kandiyoti 2013), as well as the trouble they 
experienced when gender relations were subject to change. This is demonstrated in the 
context of Syrian women who started working in Egypt and men’s response to it.  
 In the third chapter, dealing with misrecognition, love and fury, the focus is on 
Syrian men’s positions as bachelors in the marriage market trying to find a Syrian bride. 
Young Syrian men realised that their accumulated (economic, symbolic and cultural) 
capital and status did not travel with them to Egypt. This put them in a situation, in which 
they had to compete and struggle if they wanted to convince the potential bride and her 
family that they were a good catch. 
 The chapter of rage, estrangement and hate, Chapter 4, engages with various 
processes of ‘othering’. It discusses the importance of an intersectional approach to 
masculinity, how sectarianism is an influential marker on Syrian masculine selfhood, and 
how Syrian masculinity is further marked by contact with the Egyptians and the 
consequent establishment of ideal Syrian middle-class manhood vis-à-vis its multiple 
others.  
 In Chapter 5, the chapter of fear, uncanniness and mistrust, I discuss Syrian men’s 
encounters with the Syrian and Egyptian states and their authorities. Being aware of the 
regime’s oppressive methods and injustice, most men had to comply and find a way to 
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live and survive under dictatorial regimes. Furthermore, this chapter sheds light on the 
omnipresent fear of the Syrian security service and how it did not stop at the borders of 
Syria but travelled with Syrian men to Egypt. 
The last chapter dealing with sadness, depression and despair challenges the 
connection between masculinity and armed combat that is often perceived as natural. By 
engaging with Syrian men’s understanding of the army, the militarised upbringing and 
the use of weapons back in Syria, it manifests that men are critical, sceptical and aware 
of their expected support of and engagement in armed combat, which they however reject 
for various articulated reasons. Instead, men search for other accepted masculine roles, 
such as fatherhood, which they can adopt instead of militant masculinity. Another 
significant aspect of this chapter is men’s responses to and experiences of the uprising. 
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Chapter 1: Positioning this research in academic debates 
 
This chapter introduces the central theories and concepts around which this thesis is built 
and it aims at positioning this research in relevant academic debates. I begin by presenting 
the perspective I use to approach the research, which is informed by the concept of 
intersectionality, and continue by summarising the development of masculinity studies. 
Then, I introduce how I approach the subjects of emotions and class in the context of 
forced migration, and I end the chapter by alluding to the topic of masculinity and the 
state. 
 
Intersectionality 
 
Intersectionality is the lens I apply throughout this thesis to explore how Syrian men in 
Egypt made sense of forced displacement and how they strategised to find an acceptable 
version of masculinity for themselves. The core concept of intersectionality was 
introduced by legal scholar Kimberley Crenshaw (1991: 1245) who argues that a focus 
on intersectionality is needed “to account for the multiple grounds of identity when 
considering how the social world is constructed”. Looking at masculinity from an 
intersectional lens means to analyse how forms of social differentiation, such as class, 
race or age, influence, form and shape masculinity. Masculinity is understood to vary for 
different ethnic groups and to be potentially damaged or strengthened by its specific 
intersection with class, ethnicity, age, etc. (Christensen and Jensen 2014: 69). 
Furthermore, an intersectional lens is crucial to grasp the formation of masculine 
identities as strategies and performances which emerge within distinct local contexts and 
in certain social and sensual realms drawing on specific sources and capacities available 
from one’s surroundings (Hopkins and Noble 2009: 813 - 816). Applying an 
intersectional perspective helps to highlight the significance of a man’s position in his 
life-course, including his marital and parental status, for an analysis of the construction 
of masculinities. 
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The development of the study of masculinities 
 
Masculinity studies has flourished over the last four decades. Tim Edwards (2006:2) 
structures the developments in the discipline in three waves. The first phase refers to the 
development of the sex role paradigm in the 1970s to apply more directly to questions of 
masculinity. The emphasis was on demonstrating the socially constructed nature of 
masculinity and on how these processes were limiting to men. The second wave of 
masculinity studies emerged, according to Edwards (ibid.), in the 1980s and was 
concerned predominantly with power and its complex meanings and operations. The 
introduction of the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Carrigan et al. 1985; Connell 
1995) was a significant moment in the developing discipline. This concept, which defines 
the existence of various masculinities competing for power based on the subordination of 
women, received wide recognition. However, it was also severely criticised: critiques 
referring to the nature of men’s conformity to hegemonic masculinity (e.g. Wetherell and 
Edley 1999); the concept’s failure to recognise situations in which various hegemonic 
masculinities coexist (see Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994: 20); or the constructed dualism 
of hegemonic and non-hegemonic masculinities (Demitrou 2001). The third wave of 
masculinity studies is, again according to Edwards (2006: 3), influenced by the advent of 
post-structural theory and has a common focus on representation and its connection with 
wider questions of change and continuity in contemporary masculinities and identities. 
What unites studies of this wave is their emphasis on the social and cultural construction 
of masculinity. Another aspect that has concerned the study of manhood, especially in the 
1990s, was the question of whether there was an ongoing crisis of masculinity (ibid.: 22).  
One of the most-cited and well-known concepts in masculinity studies is, as 
already mentioned, Connell’s concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’. In her work, she 
(Connell 1995: 76) not only identifies the existence of various forms of masculinities 
within the male gender, but also describes a hierarchy among them. She argues that 
masculinity is relational, intersectional and situational and exists in contradistinction from 
femininity. Hegemonic masculinity refers to the supremacy of one form of masculinity, 
which, at that space and point in time, has the “accepted answer to the problem of the 
legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant 
position of men and the subordination of women” (ibid.: 77). Connell (ibid.: 79) 
emphasises that indeed not many men meet the standards of hegemonic masculinity in a 
given pattern of gender relations; however, they may still support it since they benefit 
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from the overall advantage of subordinating women. Several empirical case studies have 
been framed with the help of Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity (e.g. Ismail 
2006; Birenbaum-Carmeli and Inhorn 2009; Jaji 2009; Hafez 2012; Haugbolle 2012). 
They mostly reference Connell to explain culturally dominant ways of being masculine; 
to describe and categorise marginalised and subordinated groups of men; to reference a 
competition for domination among men; to analyse women’s ability to shake masculinity 
or to discuss men’s reaction to challenges of their masculine identity. The main challenge 
I see with Connell’s concept is to translate a rather sociological, structured and static 
approach into an anthropological one that aims to pay close attention to incongruities, 
contradictions and struggles with masculinities. 
Another classic conceptualisation of masculinity worth mentioning is Michael 
Kimmel’s (1994: 128) focusing on men’s homosocial environment. He theorises 
masculinity as a constant fight for recognition and approval by other men. In his 
understanding, women are relegated to a ‘currency’, which men use to improve their 
ranking on the masculine social scale (ibid.: 129). Masculinity is a homosocial enactment, 
guided by the fear of being unmasked and rendered unmanly. Women and gay men 
become the ‘other’ against which heterosexual men project their identities. Consequently, 
only a selected group of men can achieve manhood (ibid.: 134/135). Again, while his 
concept is thought-provoking and features with its focus on ‘othering’ in several 
arguments of this thesis, it is the challenge to translate a static concept coming from 
sociology into an anthropological analysis. 
 
Approaching the study of masculinities 
 
My approach to studying masculinities is not only informed by Kimmel’s and Connell’s 
concepts but also draws on a range of developments in anthropology, human geography, 
Middle Eastern and migration studies.  
Literature on manhood in the Middle East has increased significantly over the past 
decade. Most authors suggest approaches that pay tribute to life changes, transformations, 
diversity and historic specificity (see Naguib 2015; Ghannam 2013; Inhorn 2012; 
Monterescu 2006). Moreover, recently developed concepts of ‘Middle Eastern 
masculinity’ take into consideration the fact that gender is always changing and in 
progress, and differs depending on the social context people face. Medical anthropologist 
Marcia Inhorn (2012: 31) for instance, focuses on the emergent social and physical 
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changes in men’s lives such as fatherhood or marriage, aging or disease, and men’s 
various and differing responses to these life changes. Anthropologist Farha Ghannam 
(2013), who conducted long-term, ethnographic research in one of Cairo’s low-income 
neighbourhoods, suggests the concept of ‘masculine trajectory’, which she uses to 
describe the process of becoming a man and how, during this process that lasts over a 
lifespan, men identify with various ideals, norms, and values. Masculine trajectories do 
not develop neatly, nor are they fixed in order of their steps, rather they are defined by 
ambiguity and contradiction. Ghannam’s (ibid.: 7) approach takes into account both the 
ideal version of manhood many men hold on to, and the unexpected and often messy 
reality men are confronted with. Her analysis highlights men’s aspiration for approval by 
their surroundings and their consequent struggle and effort to conform to the norms and 
expectations of the society they live in. 
I find it additionally useful to conceive of masculinities as subjectively and 
actively constituted (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 2003), and as composites of various 
acts, attitudes and relationships available at a given time in a specific context that are 
weaved by the individual into a “coherent masculine selfhood” (Wentzell 2015: 179). 
Moreover, I draw on Daniel Monterescu’s (2006) metaphor of masculinity as being at the 
centre of an imagined polygon communicating dialectically with the vertices. He argues 
that the categories positioned at the vertices “serve as symbolic referential axes from and 
to which one measures the appropriate cultural distance which marks the inferior 
alternatives to the hegemonic Arab masculinity” (ibid.: 129). Ultimately, Monterescu 
suggests that masculinity is incoherent and internally fractioned. He, like others, 
highlights the importance of recognising that there exists “an array of vectors of 
relationality” (Hopkins and Noble 2009: 815) and thus urges researchers to engage in an 
intersectional analysis of masculinity. 
Finally, my understanding of masculinity is influenced by Judith Butler’s (2004: 
42) argument that the masculine and feminine are performed, produced and naturalised 
and that (gendered) norms come into being because they are iteratively produced and 
constantly re-done, even though people are unconscious of their continuous involvement 
in the conditions that structure their lives (2010: 168). According to Butler (1999: 173), 
gender is an ongoing bodily performance of imitating what is broadly understood as 
acceptable acts, behaviours and desires. Nevertheless, performativity is not a choice but 
a repetitive “practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint” (2004: 1). Moreover, 
she (ibid.: 4) highlights that gender norms define how one can appear in public, how the 
public and the private are distinguished, who becomes subject to stigmatisation, and who 
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experiences precarity in one’s surrounding (2009: iii). Thus, gender performativity is 
constrained by the boundaries in which a subject becomes eligible for recognition and is 
perceived and accepted as a living being (2004: 4).  
 
(Forced) migration and masculinity 
 
The existing literature in the field of gender and displacement has predominantly focused 
on female and child refugees. Anthropologist Doreen Indra (1999: 2) was one of the first 
to argue that gender in the study of forced migration should not be automatically equated 
with women, but should instead be viewed as relational, informed by, and having 
consequences for, both men and women. Highlighting the relevance of masculinity 
studies during forced displacement, scholars began to stress that men and women should 
not be analysed in isolation from each other, that intersectionality is an important lens, 
and that the focus on manhood shows how traditional power structures are subject to 
change (e.g. Matsuoka and Sorensen 1999; McSpadden 1999; Schrijvers 1999). While 
the importance of intersectionality, the relevance of relationality and the interdependence 
of the construction of masculinity and femininity have been discussed in depth by 
feminist researchers over the past decades, combining these approaches with the study of 
forced displacement was novel and necessary.  
There is a body of literature that deals with men in conflict and their consequent 
migration (see for example Lewis 2014; Large 1997; Dolan 2003). This literature shows 
men’s specific vulnerabilities during armed conflict, such as the burden many men sense 
because they are expected to conform to the ideal of militant masculinity. Non-combatant 
men often experience a loss of economic and political power and can thus barely achieve 
markers of the normative model of manhood. From this literature I developed a sensitivity 
regarding Syrian men’s challenging position as non-combatants and show in Chapter 7 
how Syrian men in Egypt negotiate this position.  
Another significant body of literature originates in the study of male, young 
Palestinian refugees born into refugee camps (see for example Achilli 2015; Hart 2008). 
This literature pays specific attention to the difficulty of finding an acceptable version of 
manhood for oneself in the context of protracted displacement often without a clearly 
defined legal status. Furthermore, the literature on Palestinian refugees is evocative of the 
significant relation that exists between gender, nationalism and the ‘nation-in-exile’ (Hart 
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2008, Massad 2006). I will extend the analysis of gender and the nation state in this thesis 
by discussing how Syrian men had a paradoxical relation to the Syrian nation state. 
More recent work in the field of migration studies, like Charsley and Wray’s 
(2015: 404) article, has yet again recognised the invisibility of men in the study of (forced) 
migration and calls for a deconstruction of the homogenising, generalising and negative 
image of the ‘migrant man’. The authors stress that male migrants merely receive public 
attention as the ‘illegal immigrant’, who is both villain and victim, anonymous and out of 
place, and bereft of national belonging (see as well Andersson 2014: xxxiv).  
Based on these conceptualisations of gender and masculinities, stemming from 
the fields of (forced) migration studies, Middle Eastern studies, gender studies and 
anthropology, and based on the analysis of my fieldwork data, I have come to perceive 
of masculinity as an endeavour and a product, its performance dependent on its respective 
audience and subject to change if context and audience are altered. Furthermore, I 
understand masculinity as an aspect of men’s identity that is protected and shielded. It is 
communicated through actions, practices and narratives and needs ‘others’ not only as an 
audience, but also to serve as an abject prototype, as the ‘currency’ of masculinity, as a 
role model or as the controlled. 
 
Conceptualising emotions 
 
Initially, I organised the six chapters of this thesis around themes and topics, such as 
work, marriage, contact with the state, and sectarianism. However, I realised that these 
themes go hand in hand with certain emotions and I started to ascribe these emotions to 
the chapters. Emotions began to feature stronger and stronger in my thinking about, and 
analysis of, the material I had collected and thus the thesis took its final shape containing 
a chapter of fear; a chapter of anger, rage and hate; and a chapter of utmost despair. There 
is a chapter of loss – be it loss of control, loss of status, loss of a name or loss of 
possessions; a chapter that features struggle and endurance; and another that deals with 
confusion and its consequent struggle to regain a sense of clarity and mastery of the 
situation. Ultimately, I argue that an intersectional analysis of masculinity requires that 
attention is paid to men’s emotions. 
The emerging significance of emotions in the process of analysing my data 
warrants a paragraph describing what informs my understanding and use of ‘emotions’. I 
provide a conceptualisation of emotions based on literature in the fields of cultural 
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studies, anthropology, sociology and to a lesser extent in masculinity studies as I found 
refugee studies scholars were predominantly occupied with refugees’ psychological well-
being, mental health, anxieties, depressions and trauma (see Shidlo and Ahola 2013; 
Ahearn 2000; Summerfield 2005), while emotions as a marker, a map or an informative 
expression of the conditions of refugeenesss are rarely analysed.  
Emotions are, especially in Western contexts, predominantly associated with 
women, while reason and thought are the realm of men. Based on this widely-held 
assumption, anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1996: 151) concluded that every discussion 
of emotions automatically has a gendered component. In the way American men and 
women she interviewed talked about the need to control emotions, Lutz (ibid.: 152/154) 
found a proof that both women and their emotionality are perceived as a danger, which 
legitimates control because allowing emotions to be experienced could threaten the order. 
In most publications stemming from the field of masculinity studies, the discourse of 
associating men with thought rather than emotion is reiterated. Most versions of 
hegemonic masculinity in various traditions and contexts do not build on feelings (e.g. 
Connell 1995; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). Rather, literature from the field of 
masculinity studies recognises that men’s emotions are suppressed, kept at a distance and 
are a sign of femininity in contrast to masculine thought and reason (e.g. Seidler 2006; 
Shamir and Travis 2002; Connell 1995; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). The fear of 
being considered unmanly, of losing control and showing fear is thus assumed to motivate 
certain forms of behaviour in men (de Boise and Hearn 2017: 8; Pease 2012: 129). 
Acceptable emotions in men are rage, anger and aggression (e.g. Ghannam 2013; Levant 
2004), while vulnerabilities and ‘unmanly’ emotions are found to be turned into anger 
and violence (e.g. Seidler 2011; Levant 2004). The consideration of emotions in the study 
of masculinities thus reflects the persistent discourses and representations around ‘manly’ 
and ‘unmanly’ emotions and the pressure to conform to them. What the traditional study 
of masculinities and emotions lacks, however, is a focus on the gap between those 
prominent images and assumptions and men’s actual sensuality and affect, as well as an 
exploration of the ways men understand and interpret emotions (see de Boise and Hearn 
2017: 2; Hopkins and Noble 2009: 816).  
There is a recent trend in sociological approaches to the study of men and 
masculinities that aims to fill this gap, starting from the premise that emotions are 
outcomes and configurations of resources available in men’s specific contexts 
(Cottingham 2017). However, this trend focuses predominantly on privileged, 
heterosexual men from the global north (Pease 2012: 127), and mainly questions whether 
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new forms of hegemonic masculinities appear, whether there is a change towards more 
gender equality, and whether masculinity generally shifts and changes (e.g. de Boise and 
Hearn 2017; Cottingham 2017). These scholarly works are thus of limited help for the 
conceptualisation of emotions and masculinities I pursue in this thesis, since Syrian men 
I met were not in a conscious process of redefining their masculinity towards more 
‘sensitivity’ and gender equality. Rather, they were in many ways overrun and overtaken 
by the events and accompanying emotions they experienced. What I nevertheless 
consider useful for the conceptualisation and understanding of emotions in this thesis is 
the observation of sociologists de Boise and Hearn (2017: 2) that men’s emotions are 
context-dependent and historically contingent based on patriarchal and colonialist 
frameworks. Likewise, Lutz (1996: 158) drew a connection between the control of 
emotions and the colonisers’ perception of the colonised as both uncivilised and 
dangerous, coming to the conclusion that emotions are closely related to frameworks of 
dominance and control. Moreover, de Boise and Hearn (2017: 12) underline the need to 
understand men’s emotions intersectionally, as both affective and affecting, and suggest 
researching men’s emotions by paying attention to bodies, language and historical 
discourses, as well as to the researcher’s personal emotional experiences and 
assumptions. 
For this thesis, it is additionally important to highlight that the use and experiences 
of emotions are not only gendered, but are also classed as described by sociologist Diane 
Reay (2004). She argues that, as well as economic, cultural and social capital, as 
introduced by Bourdieu, there is also emotional capital that women and men from 
different social class backgrounds draw on in specific ways. She suggests that emotional 
capital comes into being within affective relationships and contains the stock of emotional 
resources that people share with those they care about (ibid.: 60). Skills in managing 
emotions, for example through masking them, also qualify as emotional capital 
(Cottingham 2017: 4). The constitution of emotional capital differs between different 
social class contexts albeit to a lesser extent than Bourdieu’s other capitals (Reay 2004: 
69/70). 
 The concept I consider most useful for this thesis is Sara Ahmed’s (2004) 
perception of emotions as both ‘sticky’ and moving, as connecting and attaching. 
Emotions denote a version of bodily change, are interrelational, intentional and 
directional. They are culturally produced and thus prove one’s apprehension of the world. 
Based on Butler, Ahmed (ibid.: 12) argues that emotions attach themselves to social forms 
of subordination. These social forms are outcomes of repetition and appear as set 
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standards only because the effort that needs to be put into their reiteration is concealed. 
Furthermore, Ahmed (ibid.: 10) suggests the model of the ‘sociality of emotions’, through 
which she describes that emotions have the ability to shape and demarcate: “emotions 
create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside 
and an outside”. She portrays emotions as a glue that binds groups, and aligns and 
mobilises them through their circulation and distribution (2004a: 118). Her focus is on 
how emotions create coherence and collectivity through their ability to unite groups often 
through demarcation of a distinct ‘other’. This argument is important for this thesis, 
especially when analysing the various ‘others’ that Syrian men actively created. However, 
this thesis also shows that emotions work as a dissolver, unmaking communities and 
groups.  
As Samar Kanafani and Zina Sawaf (2017: 5) describe, fieldwork brings the 
researcher in contact with various emotions, such as fear, suspicion and discomfort, which 
bring them to wonder “what kind of critical knowledge can attention to these aspects of 
the ethnographic encounter (and the methodological adaptations that ensue) generate”. 
Based on Ahmed, I suggest that through the Syrian men’s expressed, remembered and 
embodied emotions, it is possible to analyse how they see and understand the world and 
how they locate themselves in it. I perceive of these emotions as contours of my 
interlocutors’ experiences and by recognising these emotions and tracing them they can 
become a bridge to broader underlying, interconnected issues. Being guided by my 
interlocutors’ emotions was for me a way of knowledge-making and thus I trace in the 
following chapters how their emotions shed light on processes of ‘othering’, their drawing 
of boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and their need for clearly defined demarcations 
to recreate their masculine selves. Furthermore, their emotions illustrate how and why 
they relate to certain social norms, such as the patriarchal gender order. I perceive of 
emotions as markers illuminating the intensity with which Syrian men experienced 
certain losses and as signposts guiding towards linkages and connections between their 
past and present, their masculine selves vis-à-vis various others including the nation state. 
For this reason, I briefly engage with the profound relation between men and the state in 
the coming paragraph. 
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Masculinity, middle-class identity and forced displacement 
 
As I have already mentioned, there is a noticeable absence of analysis of social class in 
the field of refugee studies. Often, social class is merely hidden behind other terms, when 
refugees are described as ‘vulnerable’, ‘poor’ or ‘better off’. In this thesis, I explore the 
significance of class, in particular middle-classness, among Syrian men in Egypt. For 
them, middle-classness was a marker of their identity, an approach to life and forced 
displacement and played a major role in their understanding and construction of 
masculinities. 
Belonging to the Syrian middle class was an important and recurring theme in 
conversations with Syrians living in Egypt. Most of them defined themselves as middle 
class (ṭabaqa mutawassiṭa; ḥāla maddiyya mutawassiṭa), on the basis of their former 
work position, family background and possessions. Syrian men and women I met referred 
to properties, such as a chalet at the beach or a beautiful house they owned, also 
mentioning their family’s status, education and influence. Middle-classness was 
perceived to grant people stability, modest wealth and happiness. Syrians highlighted that 
middle-classness was dependent on the region one originated from and on one’s 
upbringing. Despite the reiterated discourse of belonging to the middle class and even 
though the few reports and assessments that exist describe Syrians in Egypt as stemming 
predominantly from a middle-class background with work experience and (initially) 
secure savings (Ayoub 2017; Ayoub and Khallaf 2014), it is important to stress that the 
group of Syrians is not homogenous. While I mostly met people with a similar 
background, I also got in touch with Syrians who I would ascribe to a working-class or 
upper-class background based on their former profession, education, savings and income. 
Furthermore, several families I met were severely impoverished after they came to Egypt, 
having lost their savings over the years.  
Existing literature in the field of refugee studies recognised the fact that financial 
resources and networks determine migration routes and the destination country of 
refugees (see Van Hear 2006). In a few publications, it has been acknowledged that a 
forced migrant remains a ‘classed’ person and that, consequently, class impacts on the 
migrant’s position in social hierarchies in both the home and host communities (Van Hear 
2010: 1531 cited in Stepputat and Nyberg Sørensen 2014: 91). Human geographer JoAnn 
McGregor (2008: 467), researching the Zimbabwean diaspora in Britain, understands 
class primarily as an ascribed or assumed cultural identity. Zimbabwean migrants are 
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positioned and locate themselves in relation to their workplaces, neighbourhoods, British 
social discourse and the state’s legal categories, as well as family networks and social 
judgements in their homeland. Furthermore, there is a relation between being conscious 
about one’s class and a sense of loss, which can lead to the experience of anxieties among 
migrants. McGregor (ibid.: 468) suggests that these anxieties are due to the difficulties in 
making one’s social status transfer to the host country because of new racial hierarchies, 
the need to accept low-status jobs and legal barriers. Nauja Kleist (2010: 198) finds that 
an educated middle- or upper-class background in the context of migration or forced 
displacement can ease the start in the host country, but can also lead to a sense of 
frustration and misrecognition, especially if the social position in one’s country of origin 
cannot be established in the host country. Stef Jansen (2008: 182) suggests, by analysing 
the context of Bosnian refugees living in resettlement, that the celebrated social status 
Bosnian men remembered was not transferrable to the country of resettlement because it 
was dependent on a specific time-space context that no longer existed. This literature thus 
suggests paying attention to the relation of class to loss and the struggle of migrants to 
make their social status travel with them – themes I discuss in Chapter 4. 
 The rare combination of an analysis of class, forced migration and masculinity, 
conducted by Lucy Ann McSpadden (1999: 251) shows that class and status affect men’s 
judgement of good and bad lives and that men from a high-class background “favoured 
class-congruent life trajectories and at least verbally rejected what they judged to be class 
inappropriate”. It is to such an argument that I aim to tie my own intervention, namely 
that class status, especially middle-classness, affects refugee men’s thinking, ambitions, 
judgements and behaviour. Certainly, a focus on class is relevant to embed changes in 
gender relations. Additionally, I suggest that it sheds light on refugees’ priorities and 
decisions during forced displacement as well as on accompanying emotions, for example 
shame, alienation or superiority. 
In my approach to class, I follow Don Kalb (2015: 14), who suggests that the 
study of social class from an anthropological perspective needs to take into consideration 
the intersections between “place and space, between local time and world time, between 
production and reproduction and among local pasts, presents, futures, as well as the ways 
that these are connected to the rituals of everyday life”. Consequently, I understand class 
as a notion related to the historical, temporary and spatial context and as being visible in 
people’s way of life. Following Heiman et al. (2012: 13), I believe that class is 
researchable by paying attention to its articulation in and through “culturally specific 
parameters of gender, nation, race, and ethnicity”. And in accordance with Mary Rizzo 
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(2015: 5), I perceive of class as related to income, education and profession, but also to 
dress, comportment and body language. This was already put forward by sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu (1987: 5) who argued that one’s social stance is both conscious and 
unconsciously experienced, is inscribed in the body, felt in relation to the positioning of 
others and “in the form of personal attraction or revulsion”. Looking specifically at 
middle-class habitus, I also follow Rizzo’s argument that middle-class status is 
predominantly perceived to follow naturally from a person’s family background and 
upbringing. She defines it, in a similar vein to Bourdieu, as a performance of which people 
are both unaware and simultaneously able to consciously manipulate and use to achieve 
certain social effects.  
Anthropologist Samuli Schielke’s (2015: 112) suggests that middle-classness in 
the context of Egypt means being at the centre of one’s society and thus being the “good, 
decent people” (ibid.: 155). He argues that respect, success, a strong and ambitious 
personality as well as the confirmation of a good life are all dependent on proving one’s 
ability to consume (ibid. 2012: 136/137). Furthermore, middle-classness means living 
one’s life in the future around the aspiration for inclusion in the nation and demarcation 
from those lower in the hierarchy. Heiman et al. (2012: 20) argue that a lot of energy is 
dedicated to the management of being middle class, and to the calming of anxieties related 
to not being able to secure it. And indeed, being middle class was a highly contested 
terrain, and Syrians I met invested a lot of effort in maintaining or reclaiming this status. 
Schielke’s argument is very insightful in the context of my work, nevertheless, I should 
add a nuance: it was not only the future that was important as a temporality in the context 
of class among Syrians I met in Egypt, they also engaged the past in their class narratives. 
The past was revitalised as a proof of their ability to be middle class, which I will 
elaborate on in more depth in the following chapters.  
 Ultimately, I understand education, profession and possessions as the relevant 
markers of middle-class identity among Syrian refugee men in Egypt. Predominantly, 
middle-classness was based on work: a man’s status was defined based on his income, 
type of profession, productivity, inventiveness and success. Moreover, middle-classness 
was expressed through certain morals and values and manifested itself in forms of 
accepted (gendered) behaviour, certain expectations in how one should be seen and 
treated by others, and in people’s dreams and aspirations. 
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Men and the nation state 
 
The state can be described as a centrally organised body of institutions, built with the 
intention of control including a juridical and repressive apparatus of enforcement at its 
command and basis (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989: 5). Various approaches to the state 
coming from human geography, Middle Eastern Studies, and anthropology have 
illustrated the affective and emotional connections between citizens and the state (e.g. 
Stasiulis and Amery 2010; Mendieta 2009; Ahmed 2004). Citizenship can create a sense 
of security and stability, it is a “substance with heft” because of citizens’ economic and 
cultural rights, their right to enter and live in ‘their’ territory, their entitlements, duties, 
and claims to identity (Macklin 2007: 346). Eduardo Mendieta (2009: 156) describes the 
emotional connection between citizens and the state as defined by feelings of trust, loyalty 
and identification, which are in turn related to the individual’s self-respect and dignity. 
“Citizenship is a bundle of rights and duties, but it is also a bundle of emotions, passions, 
desires, in short, affect” (ibid.: 157/158). The loss of connection to the state, “when states 
of nationality fail to fulfil certain aspects of the citizenship relationship within the state” 
(Macklin 2007: 341) is conversely similarly burdened with emotions. Philosopher Serena 
Parekh (2014: 646), drawing on the ground-breaking work of Hannah Arendt, who was 
the first to recognise that being a refugee transforms a person’s identity, argues that the 
loss of citizenship means a deprivation of fundamental human qualities, namely, a 
reduction to bare life, a separation from the realm of humanity and reduction of one’s 
ability to act. While these authors do not discuss the relation of citizens to the state from 
a gendered perspective, it is important to keep in mind that the modern nation state had 
mandated a citizen as masculine (Joseph 2000: 4) and that women’s citizenship is usually 
of a dual nature. While women are included in the body of citizens they are usually 
subjected to rules, regulations and policies that are specific to them (Yuval-Davis 1997: 
24). Women in many Middle Eastern countries are often only able to interact with the 
state through a man, be it their father, husband or another male relative (see Moghadam 
2004: 147; Joseph 1991; Molyneux 1991). For the context of Syria’s personal status law, 
Van Eijk (2016: 77) writes: “A woman’s status is determined by her relationship to her 
male family members: until she marries she is connected to her paternal family and, after 
marriage, her status is connected to that of her husband. Nor is she regarded as a full 
Syrian citizen”. I consequently suggest that the state-citizen relationship does not mean 
the same to men and women. 
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 The nation – a different concept from the state – can be best described as an 
“imagined political community”, which is both inherently limited and sovereign 
(Anderson 2006 [1983]: 6). The nation is conceived as a horizontal comradeship, as 
membership in a people or a fraternity, which can ask for sacrifices from the individual, 
such as willingness to die for the imagined nation (ibid.: 7). The roles assigned for men 
and women by the nation state are of different natures, disempowering and empowering 
men and women in different ways (Joseph 2000: 4). Engaging in a gender-sensitive 
analysis of the connection between a people and their nation, Joane Nagel (1998) calls 
terms like state power, citizenship, nationalism, dictatorship and democracy ‘masculine 
projects’ and defines nationalist politics as a major venue in which to realise one’s 
masculinity (ibid.: 243). Nationalism resonates with masculine cultural themes like 
honour, patriotism, bravery and duty (ibid. 251/252). Consequently, Nagel (ibid.: 261) 
wonders how the nation ‘feels’ to men and women. Based on the gendered expectations 
regarding defence of the country, representation and leadership, she contends that men 
are the protagonists within and in control of the nation while women only hold supportive 
roles. She concludes that the intimate link between masculinity and nationalism shapes 
the thinking and feeling of both men and women albeit in different ways (ibid.).  
 I suggest in this thesis that Syrian men had an ambivalent and paradoxical 
relationship to their state that defined them in their core. On the one hand, the state and 
the nation granted them access, rights and duties that it denied to women and was thus a 
backbone and guarantee of their dominance and control. On the other hand, however, the 
state, its authorities, vast security apparatus and totalitarian regime, threatened them and 
followed them from their childhood onwards even to their exile in Egypt and thus had an 
extremely destabilising effect on their manhood.  
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Chapter 2 – Of Dignity, Alienation and Humiliation 
or Becoming and ‘un-becoming’ refugees 
 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, when I had just started to get in touch with NGOs and 
Syrian contacts of friends of mine, I met Um Khālid, the community leader, mother of 
two teenagers and a recipient of aid from the UNHCR (the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees). She introduced her husband to me as an activist and 
recipient of donations that he shared among a broad network of Syrian families. On my 
first visit, he met me at the Huṣarī mosque, a huge mosque in the centre of 6th of October 
City, and took me to his family’s flat. There he excused himself showing me a long list 
of names and addresses of Syrian families living in 6th of October City who were in need, 
he said, and left me with Um Khālid and her son and daughter. Um Khālid did her best 
to explain the situation faced by her own family and all the Syrian families her husband 
supported. While we had a simple meal of manā’īsh and homemade ’ūzī, she complained 
bitterly about the food voucher policy and the treatment she received from the UNHCR. 
Referring to the food vouchers, which were distributed among Syrian families in Egypt 
for several months by the World Food Programme under the supervision of the UNHCR, 
she said to me sarcastically: "Refugees are not allowed to eat chocolate”. Furthermore, 
she felt that her personal freedom to choose which food was best for her was constrained 
by the rules set out by the agency: “They think they know better”, she continued 
sarcastically.  
Um Khālid’s criticism speaks volumes: she disapproved of how the UNHCR and 
the World Food Programme drew the line between what was considered a necessity and 
what was merely an item of luxury. In addition, she criticised how the agency had taken 
away her ability to choose what was best for her. Moreover, her critique is testimony of 
a middle-class lifestyle she had adapted to but had to give up in Egypt, which defined 
itself through consumption and modest luxury.  
This chapter is divided into two parts: the first engages with encounters and 
experiences that instilled a sense of refugeeness in Syrians I met, such as visits to the 
UNHCR office, worries about identity documents and papers, absence of legal protection 
in Egypt, and physical discomfort. The second deals with Syrian men’s strategies of 
distancing themselves from the refugee label. This strategy included a process of 
‘othering’, in which Syrians in Europe were defined as the ultimate failure. With the ‘real’ 
refugee in Europe defined as the abject ‘other’, Syrian men in Egypt could establish a 
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hierarchy, in which they were ranked more highly because of their self-ascribed economic 
success and independence from government support. By calling the first part of this 
chapter ‘becoming refugees’, I do not aim to imply that this process is one-directional, 
linear and all-encompassing. Rather, I suggest that ‘becoming refugees’ is a situational 
transformation that can be reversed, challenged, actively confronted and rejected, as will 
be shown in the second part.  
These discussions are preceded by an introduction to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and critiques of it. In addition, I present critical scholarly commentaries on 
the refugee label and its impact on individuals who find themselves in a situation, in 
which the refugee identity is pressed upon them.  
 
Defining the refugee: The 1951 Refugee Convention 
 
The following lines are the most universally cited part of the basic legal definition of 
refugee status in international humanitarian law: 
“[T]he term “refugee” shall apply to any person[,]… owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees).  
The 1951 Convention was a crucial instrument in the institutionalisation of the handling 
of refugees after World War II. It was established to deal with Europeans who were 
displaced by the war and sought resettlement and assimilation in foreign countries (Chatty 
2010: 15). Since it was specifically intended to address this particular refugee situation 
rather than refugees as a universal phenomenon, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees was developed to resolve the geographic and temporal limitations of the 
Convention.  
Several scholars have been critical of the definition: Political Scientist Peter Nyers 
(2006: xvi) argues that the Convention can be praised for replacing the classification of 
refugees according to their place of origin. Instead, refugees are perceived as human 
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beings with certain inalienable rights. Nevertheless, the aim of the Convention to use 
humanity as its organising principle is deceptive. Nyers (ibid.: 45) contends that the 
Convention defines the refugee by the human capacity to reason, which is held in tension 
with the refugee’s emotion of fear that motivated their flight. Being defined by fear, Nyers 
(ibid.:46) contends, bears the risk of reducing the individual to a social outcast, incapable 
of showing autonomy, self-government and personal subjectivity. The Convention thus 
assists the process of not recognising refugees as active, visible and vocal subjects, but 
rather accords them invisibility, voicelessness and victimage (ibid.: 47). Nyers (ibid.: 46) 
stresses that, despite the Convention’s aim to create a universality to the refugee 
condition, it defines an exclusive category that can be employed to exploit difference and 
reinforce hierarchies.  
Likewise, anthropologist Michel Agier (2011: 11) highlights that the 
universalistic aim of the protection of the stateless that accompanied the Convention’s 
definition of the refugee and the establishment of the UNHCR gradually turned into a 
function of control. According to political scientist Michael Barnett (2001: 252), the 1951 
Convention was perceived as being necessary to ensure legal protection and rights for 
refugees, who were in the anomalous situation of being invisible in national and 
international law. At the same time, however, states were eager to guarantee their own 
sovereignty and limit their obligations: in order to reduce these obligations, refugee status 
was confined to individuals who crossed national borders and were persecuted by national 
governments. Feminist scholars have criticised the Convention’s gender blindness that 
pays no attention to gender-related persecution and the asylum claims of refugee women. 
Rather, the Convention was developed for the prototype of an adult male, heterosexual 
asylum seeker (see. Smith 2016; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014; Edwards 2010; Bhabha 1996). 
Egypt signed both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa in 1969 (Kagan 2011: 10). In the absence of a national asylum system, 
registration, documentation, refugee status determination and provision for assistance are 
conducted by the UNHCR based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Egyptian government and the UNHCR in 1954 (UNHCR 2011: 142). The country 
stipulated several reservations to the 1951 Convention, specifically regarding articles 
related to personal status, universal primary education, public relief and assistance, as 
well as to employment and social security (UNHCR 2003: 11 cited in Rowe 2009: 9). 
These reservations have enabled the government to consider refugees as foreigners, who 
can be excluded from several basic rights (Al-Sharmani and Grabska 2009: 459). For 
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instance, refugees’ rights to employment fall under domestic statuses applicable to 
foreigners in general and require sponsorship by an employer, legal residence and travel 
documents, proof of specialised skills that do not put them in competition with Egyptian 
workers, HIV tests, and the payment of processing fees (Rowe 2009: 9). This means that 
legal employment is only accessible to the extremely small, educated elite who can meet 
these rigid requirements, while the vast majority of refugees in Egypt survive 
economically only because the Egyptian authorities have tolerated unauthorised labour 
(Kagan 2011: 18/19). Another challenge refugees face due to their categorisation as 
foreigners is the high level of rent foreigners in Egypt are expected to pay. While nationals 
fall under a rent-protection law, foreigners have to pay between ten to fifteen times more 
(Briant and Kennedy 2004: 439). A further restriction to refugee life in Egypt is the 
exclusion of most refugee children from state-funded education with the exception of 
Sudanese and, since 2012, Syrian refugee children (see Norman 2016: 34). Several 
community schools, mainly operated by church-based organisations try to fill this gap for 
refugee children of other nationalities. However, these ‘refugee schools’ are not 
accredited by the Egyptian Ministry of Education (Kagan 2011: 17).  
Based on an agreement signed in 1954, the UNHCR conducts refugee status 
determination on behalf of the Egyptian government but must obtain approval from the 
government as to which nationalities are eligible for asylum (Norman 2015: 85). 
Consequently, an asylum seeker entering Egypt must register with the UNHCR for 
protection and eligibility for assistance. The individual then receives the ‘yellow card’ – 
the proof of asylum-seeking intent that enables the person to stay in Egypt under the 
protection of the UNHCR until a refugee status determination interview is scheduled. 
With the ‘yellow card’, one needs to register with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and receives a residence permit that must be renewed every six months at the 
respective city hall (Ayoub and Khallaf 2014: 9). Even though refugees can stay 
indefinitely and have access to residence permits from the government, local integration 
is difficult and naturalisation impossible. Repatriation and resettlement are considered the 
only permanent solutions for refugees in Egypt (Kagan 2011: 26).  
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Labelling and internalisation of the refugee category  
 
I now turn to scholarly engagement with the term ‘refugee’ and its impact on individuals 
who find themselves in a situation in which the refugee identity is stamped upon them, in 
order to embed the analysis of the encounters of Syrians with the category.  
Refugee studies scholar Roger Zetter (1991: 40) argues that there is a need to 
scrutinise not just the label ‘refugee’, but also the process of labelling including 
“stereotyping, conformity designation, identity disaggregation and political/power 
relationships”. Labelling is a process of delinking and replacing the individual identity 
with a stereotypical one, and the transformation of the individual story into a case that is 
part of a wider category. On the part of the labelled, the process of labelling involves 
accepting external control, since silent conformity with the stereotype is required (ibid.: 
44). Aiming at analysing the meaning and consequences of the refugee status for the 
individual, anthropologist Liisa Malkki’s (1995: 496) classical work shows that the term 
‘refugee’ often conceals the variety of socioeconomic statuses and personal histories of 
the people who are defined by it. She argues that the elaboration of legal refugee status 
into a social condition or a moral identity does not occur in an automatic or predictable 
way. Instead, people come to define the meaning of being a refugee differently depending 
on the reality they face. Anthropologist Aihwa Ong (2003) focuses on power relations 
involved in the shaping of refugees and citizens in the US. She argues that ‘refugees’ are 
subjects to a series of determining codifications and administrative rulings that govern 
how “they should be assessed and treated, and how they should think of themselves and 
their actions” (ibid.: 16). Basing her argument on Foucault, she stresses that refugees are 
both subjected to objectifying modes of knowledge and power and engaged in self-
making by struggling against imposed knowledges and practices. Likewise, 
anthropologist Ilana Feldman (2012: 388) stresses that “people live their lives in part 
through the categories in which they fall”. In the case of Palestinians, she observes that 
the legal definition of the ‘refugee’ creates a discursive and material framework for action 
and opportunity, but might simultaneously function as a source of constraint. The 
association with refugeeness translates concurrently both into the absence of rights, such 
as the right to citizenship and homeland, and into access to rights, for example rights to 
relief and recognition, as well as political possibility and acknowledgement of Palestinian 
national loss (ibid.: 398). In a similar vein, Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Yousif 
Qasmiyeh (2010: 295) argue, drawing on Boal’s term of the ‘spect-actor’, that ‘refugees’ 
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do not merely observe what frames their lives but actively engage in and transform the 
discourses that surround them. 
Like Feldman, several scholars refer to the double-edged characteristic of the 
refugee label: its strategic usefulness on the one hand, and its constraints and stigmatising 
potential on the other. Sociologist Bernadette Ludwig (2013: 6) conducted research 
among Liberians in the US. She argues that people who were forced to leave their home 
country may identify as refugees given its legal and material advantages in the host 
country, while simultaneously rejecting the stigmatising label because it enforces a 
constant negotiation with a painful past. Social anthropologist Marita Eastmond (2011: 
289) indicates that Bosnians in Sweden rejected the refugee label because they felt it was 
generalising and stigmatising, and did not acknowledge their professional qualifications 
and social status. They contested the implication of being a victim, which they perceived 
as being linked to the refugee status, and aimed to accentuate instead competence and 
motivation to work. However, Eastmond (ibid.: 290) also describes how the refugee label 
has certain advantages and was used strategically. In addition to the simultaneous 
usefulness and stigmatising capacity of the category, both case studies reinforce the 
potential of the refugee marker to overshadow the individual’s other identities and 
characteristics and its ability to deny agency. Refugee status can thus be experienced in a 
variety of ways, as protection or constraint or as both enabling and restricting at the same 
time. For this reason, the meaning of refugee status as an experiential category in a 
specific context cannot be taken for granted and requires in-depth empirical inquiry 
(Malkki 2002: 358).  
Based on the literature briefly introduced here, I understand the category ‘refugee’ 
for the following analysis as a definition and a marker of identity that has legal, material 
and symbolic implications. Through the dynamic, contradictory, and not always 
consensual process of labelling, one ‘becomes’ rather than ‘is’ a ‘refugee’. The meaning 
of ‘refugeeness’ – the state of being a refugee – in a specific social context is furthermore 
determined by individual agency. 
 
‘Becoming’ a refugee: the encounter with the UNHCR 
 
Coming back to the ethnographic vignette introduced at the beginning of this chapter, I 
turn to Um Khālid’s experiences with the UNHCR, perceiving them as markers that made 
her become a refugee. Not only was Um Khālid upset about the agency’s definitions of 
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necessary items for refugees, she also accused the UNHCR of nepotism, favouritism, 
lying and accepting bribes. Her husband and her son wrote a letter of complaint in 
December 2013 about the UNHCR regional office in Cairo addressed to the UNHCR 
headquarters in Geneva that was signed by several Syrian families. The statement 
criticised the head of the UNHCR regional office in Egypt for publicly stating that the 
UNHCR would provide Syrians in Egypt with a large amount of money, which, according 
to the writers and signatories of the complaint, was not only false but also led to a decline 
in financial support by other donors. The group had already protested in front of the 
UNHCR office in November 2013. holding posters, one of them saying: “Lā aḥad mas’ūl 
ʿan al-lāji’īen al-sūryīīn ghayr al-mufawaḍiyya al-sāmiya faqaṭ” (No one is responsible 
for the Syrian refugees except the UNHCR).  
Um Khālid told me that even though the group received a formal response from 
the UNHCR office, nothing changed and their demands were not met. What she described 
signifies both a belief in the UNHCR as the entity legitimately responsible for Syrian 
refugees and the group’s identification with this category. The statement printed on the 
poster addressing neither Egypt nor Syria, but demanding the UNHCR’s protection for 
Syrian refugees resonates with Hannah Arendt’s (1973) classic analysis of the refugee as 
a ‘rightless’ person, facing the nation state, who has to seek protection elsewhere. Being 
excluded by the host country because of their status as non-citizens, refugees continue to 
exist in relation to entities other than the state, such as the UNHCR or NGOs, in order to 
satisfy their material needs and to have an identity (Parekh 2014: 654). That the group of 
Syrians made the effort to protest in front of the UNHCR office and that they filed a 
complaint shows that there was an initial trust in the agency, which Um Khālid and the 
signatories however lost when the response by the UNHCR was unsatisfactory and did 
not result in any action. 
It was not the first time that the Cairo office of UNHCR was severely criticised. 
In 2005, a major protest and sit-in organised by Sudanese refugees in Cairo ended in 
bloodshed after the Egyptian police emptied the protest camp, where people were 
protesting about conditions in Egypt and demanding resettlement in a third country. And 
even before that protest, there was growing criticism of the UNHCR office in Cairo 
because of prolonged waiting periods and non-transparent and biased procedures (Rowe 
2009: 7/8).  
Um Māzin, who was introduced to me by Um Khālid, was also dependent on 
support from the UNHCR and the World Food Programme. She belonged to one of the 
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families that were on Abū Khālid’s list because her husband could not find work in Cairo 
due to his advanced age and poor health. Neither of their two children could support their 
elderly parents: their daughter had moved to Spain with her husband ten years earlier, 
where they were facing a constant challenge to provide for their three daughters; and their 
son, who lived with them in Egypt, was still a student of dentistry managing to continue 
his studies because he had found a sponsor. Um Māzin described how the UNHCR staff 
had come to their flat to conduct a needs assessment and asked her if and how often she 
and her family brushed their teeth, whether they ate fruits regularly, and if they had a 
garbage bin. She was appalled by the humiliating nature of the questions and by their 
implications. She also showed me the food vouchers, stored safely in a shelf of the 
cupboard in the living room, which she could use to buy basic groceries, such as rice, 
pasta, oil and sugar. However, she was not allowed to buy detergents, shampoo or body 
lotion with them.  
Um Māzin, who always stressed that they had lived a luxurious life in Syria, felt 
restricted by the food vouchers, which implied to her that she could not make reasonable 
food choices, could not buy what she perceived as necessary, and did not know what was 
best for her and her family. As suggested by Zetter (1991: 44), Um Māzin became one of 
many, a faceless part of a bigger group that could be judged and managed according to 
stereotypes created about them. Likewise, Malkki (1996: 378) states that refugees stop 
being specific persons and as “universal woman”, “universal man” or “universal child”, 
they become pure victims. Furthermore, Um Māzin’s experience with the UNHCR 
echoes Julie Peteet (2005: 76) in her ethnography in a Palestinian refugee camp in 
Lebanon, when she describes the inscription of the refugee status on the individual’s body 
and the subjective transformation into a docile recipient of food aid through rations. 
Another time, I accompanied Um Māzin to Muhammad Mahmoud hospital, as 
she needed treatment urgently, since her gum was extremely inflamed. At Muhammad 
Mahmoud hospital, Syrians could receive medical treatment subsidised by the UNHCR, 
which had an office right next to the hospital’s entrance. According to information Um 
Māzin had heard, the UNHCR or Caritas would cover most of the cost for medical 
treatment in Muhammad Mahmoud hospital. However, in the UNHCR office that was 
only identifiable by a hand-written sign saying UN, she was told that UNHCR would only 
contribute 100 LE to the treatment she needed and that Caritas only operated in 
Alexandria. After asking her son’s opinion, Um Māzin decided to go back to 6th of 
October City, where she hoped to find a Syrian dentist who would accept payment in 
small instalments.  
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A couple of weeks later, I went with Māzin to the UNHCR office in Zamalek, 
where he intended to register as an asylum seeker. He and his family had the right to 
reside in Egypt because he was enrolled as a student at an Egyptian university. However, 
since he was close to graduation, their residency would expire soon. If he wanted to work 
as a dentist in Egypt, he needed to be a specialist registrar for a year. His university offered 
this training, but he would need to pay 200 Dollars per month and his prospects of 
practising in Egypt afterwards were not promising. Hence, he hoped that through finally 
applying for asylum with the UNHCR, he would have the chance to be resettled at some 
point and to take the training abroad. When we approached the office, a security guard 
stepped in our way refusing to let us enter. He said that Māzin would need to call the 
office’s hotline first to request an appointment. This was in contradiction to what Māzin 
had heard, namely, that registration for asylum seeking did not require an appointment. 
Additionally, there was a display case next to the office door, in which documents in 
English and Arabic explained the procedures. One of the documents clearly stated that 
‘new registration for asylum seeking’ was possible at the office without requesting an 
appointment in advance. The security guard explained coldly that procedures had 
changed and that, according to the new rules, Māzin would need to call the hotline first. 
Eventually, a UNHCR caseworker left the office to speak to Māzin and other people, who 
had gathered in front of the door because they had been denied entrance by the security 
guard, explaining that the new rules required everyone to make an appointment via the 
hotline. After this experience, Māzin did not speak about seeking asylum anymore 
thinking instead of alternatives to leave Egypt for a third country. 
Both encounters with the UNHCR left Māzin and his family feeling helpless, 
ignored and humiliated. Rules and procedures were changing constantly which led the 
family to feel that the UNHCR was unreliable and indifferent to their situation. In both 
cases, the family had to seek alternative solutions for their problems.  
 
Lack of protection through documents and loss of contact with the state 
 
For many Syrians I met in Cairo another marker of their refugeeness was their constant 
worry about their papers and whether the Egyptian authorities would accept them. They 
were concerned about documents they needed to enrol their children at school, whether 
their Syrian driver’s licence would be recognised by the Egyptian police, and about their 
Syrian identity documents in case they were about to expire. Their anxiety was 
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exacerbated by the fact that the only establishment that could provide them with these 
various documents was the Syrian embassy. The Syrian embassy had a very bad 
reputation among Syrians and most of them tried to avoid going there, if they could. It 
was perceived as the long arm of the regime and many horrible stories grew around it, 
such as arrests of Syrian visitors and forced returns to Syria. I will discuss the Syrian 
embassy and its role in the life of Syrian men I met in Egypt in depth in Chapter 5. 
For many Syrians I met in Cairo, being a refugee was connected to doubts about 
documents and papers that could potentially not secure and guarantee their identity and 
position in Egypt. Many Syrian men talked about it with sadness, hopelessness or despair, 
and with their body language, tone and facial expression revealing the severity of the 
issue. Not so ʿAbd al-Raḥman, recently married and living with his wife in a small flat, 
who worked for an NGO supporting the Syrian opposition in Egypt. I had met him 
because his wife attended one of my English courses and had invited me several times to 
her flat. ʿAbd al-Raḥman got angry and raised his voice whenever he mentioned the topic 
of identity documents. On the evening we talked about expired passports, he was the only 
man in the room with his wife, his mother- and sisters-in-law, and myself seated around 
him. After food, he lit a cigarette, took a sip from the tea that was being served and began 
explaining to me the issues Syrians were facing in Egypt. The tone of his voice became 
increasingly aggressive, he would not listen to any interruptions, and his monologue felt 
like a lecture. With regards to the expiring passports, he stated: 
“We are afraid here in Egypt of being stopped at any checkpoint, and if they 
checked our passports they would find that they are expired. We said that even if 
the passport was expired that doesn't mean that my identity is expired, too. The 
name is written in the passport and the passport has the code. Only the date is 
expired in the passport, so my identity shouldn't be expired, too. We demand that 
even in the case of an expired passport, the holder of the passport should be treated 
like a human being”.  
His voice trembling with anger, he continued: 
“Imagine that your passport is expired and you were not able to renew it, imagine 
they told you that you were not Magdalena and that you were a problem. No, I am 
not a problem! I am not a disaster! I am a human being and a human being has the 
right to live wherever he wants in the world!”. 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman refers to the fact that without the state’s registration, approval, and 
acceptance the individual does not legally exist as a social person (Rabo 2011: 230). As 
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suggested by Yael Navaro-Yashin (2007: 81), documents, which she defines as 
“ideological artefacts” (ibid.: 88), are in specific social relations with people to whom 
they belong, and have the potential to provoke multiple effects in them, such as fear, 
insecurity or nervousness. Documents are especially prone to engender fear and 
uncertainty when they are absent or useless, that is, when bureaucracies leave people and 
things undocumented or routinely contest the validity of the existing documents (Hull 
2012: 258).  
In addition to his comments about documents, ʿAbd al-Raḥman took up another 
theme: the right to have rights based on his humanity, which he continued to describe in 
the following way: 
“We have the right as people and from the principle of humanity to be treated with 
respect in any country in the world, to be provided with a living, a place to live, 
and to be provided with a good life. An Egyptian official might say: ‘I can't 
provide these things to my people!’. This is right, but at least provide me with 
what you provide your people. You give your people an identity card and a 
passport. You protect your people, so why don't you protect me too?”. 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s words resonate with anthropologist Ruba Salih’s (2013: 83) 
observation that Palestinian refugees she worked with in Lebanon called into question 
that rights were only accessible for those who were citizens of the country they lived in. 
Criticising this restricted access to rights, they expressed a different political imagination 
in which their humanity, and not their belonging to a nation state, granted them access to 
full rights and to political life (ibid. 2018). Likewise, ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s experience of 
refugeeness leaves him critical of the political order, in which, he, as a refugee, does not 
find a place for himself that has any dignity and security. Similarly, Mustafa told me in a 
tone and attitude that left no space for disagreement: “No, I am not a refugee. I am living 
my life. It’s my country. It’s one earth. God created me on this earth, not in Syria. In 
Quran, it is written that the earth is for all the people”. Like ʿAbd al-Raḥman, Mustafa 
relates his humanity and access to rights not to the nation state but to his humanity and to 
the bigger principles of religion.  
Coming back to ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s account, it additionally proves that 
refugeeness holds the potential to shake the core of one’s (legally recognised) being and 
thus threatens one’s ability to build self-confidence on the fact that one has the right to be 
in this world, to exist, and to claim political subjectivity. Again and again in this thesis, 
the topic of a man’s relation with his nation state comes up and ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s 
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narrative is the first implication of the intimate connection that exists between men and 
their state, and the furious effort that is required to reclaim one’s selfhood and identity if 
this core relationship is disturbed.  
 It was not only the expression of critique and worries about expiring documents 
that alluded to the heightened relevance of papers in the context of refugeeness, but also 
the procedure of filling in documents that I witnessed several times. While the struggle 
with papers is clearly not exclusive to refugees, it seems that being a refugee in Egypt 
nevertheless intensified the disputes with the authorities and increased the amount of 
paperwork. Most Syrian families I met were constantly thinking about solutions for their 
situation and filling in various applications for scholarships, resettlement or family 
reunions. I sensed that the effort to manage bureaucratic hurdles often evoked uncertainty, 
unrealistic hope and fear, which were all related to the question of whether the effort 
would be rewarded. Once, I helped Layla, a widowed mother of two children, to fill in 
documents to apply for a family reunion with her son who had managed to gain asylum 
in Sweden. Layla felt extremely vulnerable with no male provider and protector in the 
household. She had tried to find work as a secretary in Egypt but was not working at the 
time I met her. She was worried about her daughter, who was studying sociology and had 
experienced sexual harassment several times on Cairo’s streets. Layla’s cousin and his 
family, who were her closest contacts and support in Cairo had been accepted for 
resettlement to Germany and were about to leave. Hence, Layla’s situation was about to 
worsen. Despite the hardship she faced, the chances that the family reunion would be 
successful were minimal given that her son was over eighteen years old. Nevertheless, 
we filled in the documents required by the Swedish embassy meticulously, as if this alone 
could convince the authorities. I was seated on the couch with a fan directed at my face 
and Layla, who did not speak English, sat next to me looking over my shoulder all the 
time I was writing, trying to control how I filled in the papers and making sure that I did 
not lose focus. She did not allow her daughter, who spoke basic English, to fill in the 
documents, but at the same time she had difficulty trusting me, an outsider, with this 
important task.  
 I also filled in documents together with Muhannad, the student of dentistry who 
had founded an NGO offering support for Syrian refugees. In contrast to Layla, who was 
desperate to leave Cairo because of her extremely challenging situation, Muhannad did 
not need to leave Egypt. He lived quite comfortably in Cairo and enjoyed his life in all 
its aspects. His father, who had worked in the Gulf for several years, had opened a 
cosmetics shop in 6th of October City and was able to pay for his sons’ fees at private 
	 69 
universities in Cairo. In his free time, Muhannad was busy promoting the work of his 
NGO meeting journalists, university deans and potential foreign funders. When we filled 
in documents together, he sat me at the desk of his office in the NGO, on which he had 
put a golden name plate with his name preceded by the title ‘Doctor’, which, in fact, he 
did not hold. He mainly needed my assistance for the fine-tuning of various applications 
to workshops, conferences and scholarships abroad. He was keen to convey a certain 
picture of himself and the NGO he had founded and gave me clear instructions on how 
to phrase things. Being a Syrian in Egypt came in handy for some applications, because 
it allowed him to express his political awareness and display his human side, by 
highlighting his activism for other Syrians through his NGO. 
 Overall, I contend that documents were highly important items in the everyday 
lives of Syrians in Egypt, had the potential to evoke various emotions and were entangled 
with refugeeness. Which emotion was triggered, however, was dependent on the 
individual’s personal situation, vulnerability and political consciousness during 
displacement. 
 
The encounter with the Egyptian authorities  
 
For Abū Walīd, falling into the refugee category meant not having legal assistance and 
being excluded from the right to be protected from crime. The father of two boys was 
regularly picked up at his workplace by a police officer in plainclothes and taken to the 
police station, where he was kept and beaten until he paid a huge bribe. I heard about Abū 
Walīd’s fate because his wife attended one of the English courses I offered in a nursery 
for the mothers of the children (I described the difficulties of our encounter in the 
introduction).  
Abū Walīd had come to the attention of the police officer when he had tried to 
open a sweetshop in the area and the police regularly came to check if he had the required 
licences. The police officer eventually figured out that Abū Walīd was victim to his ill 
will, because no one felt responsible to protect him. This led to several visits to Abū 
Walīd’s workplace, where the officer entered in civilian clothes and took him to the police 
station. There, the officer applied different strategies, accusing him of being a terrorist or 
a criminal and eventually settling on the fact that Abū Walīd had no official work permit. 
In fact, Abū Walīd only had the student residence for his family because his sons were 
going to school in Egypt (which did not give him official permission to work). Any 
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attempt to counter the blackmail was useless, since the policeman threatened that if he 
did not pay the bribe he would be thrown out of Egypt. The visits became more frequent 
and Abū Walīd became more afraid that one day he would not be able to pay the bribe 
and the police officer would then take him to the Syrian embassy, where he would be sent 
back to Syria and killed.  
When Abū Walīd asked a lawyer at the UNHCR to help him, the lawyer only 
requested the number of Abū Walīd’s file at the police station. Obviously, there was no 
file because the blackmail happened on an individual, arbitrary basis. When Abū Walīd 
tried to ask for international protection through the UN by calling the agency’s hotline, 
he could not reach anyone in the relevant office. Then, Abū Walīd got in touch with a 
lawyer working for a Syrian NGO, who told him to call him the next time he was taken 
by the police officer. However, when this happened, the lawyer did not show up, 
presumably out of fear of getting into trouble himself. When Abū Walīd tried to involve 
an international NGO, he was told that his problem with the officer was of a personal 
nature. The NGO caseworker was worried that if the officer was asked by the NGO law 
department to stop abusing Abū Walīd, he would seek revenge. Even though the 
caseworker tried his best to help Abū Walīd, he felt helpless vis-à-vis the comprehensive 
power of the police officer. The only advice the caseworker could give him was to find a 
job in another area of Cairo, where the police officer could not find him.  
The experience of being victim to a police officer’s malevolence and the lack of 
legal support are surely not exclusive to Syrians in Egypt. Indeed, large numbers of 
Egyptians themselves have been regularly subjected to police violence, arbitrary arrests 
and forced disappearances (see Hamzawy 2017; Abdelrahman 2015; HRW 2015; Ismail 
2006). However, I argue that Abū Walīd’s specific vulnerability lies in his extreme fear 
of being sent to the Syrian embassy or back to Syria – an outcome of his status as a 
refugee, in addition to the financial and personal pressure applied by the police officer. 
 
An embodied experience  
 
Several times when I met Syrian men and women in Egypt, I got the impression that 
displacement was also experienced and exhibited physically. Qutayba, who came to 
Egypt as a student together with his family, but soon after his arrival managed to find 
work in an international cultural institute as an IT specialist, told me during our first 
meeting how offended and embarrassed he was when a foreign female friend wanted to 
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pay for their drinks because he was a refugee. Even when he recalled the situation, I could 
feel his unease about being considered poor because of the association of his nationality 
with refugeeness and of refugeeness with poverty. Likewise, when I met Urwa for tea and 
argīle right after he had tried to renew his visa in the crowded Mugamm’a, he told me 
that he felt that his chest was about to explode. He hugged himself tightly, saying that he 
felt pain inside because of the problems that the Egyptian authorities and their 
bureaucracies caused him. Khālid once described to me that he thought of being a refugee 
as an “injury inside” that he recognised in himself and in people around him. Despite the 
presence of this injury, he said: “no one speaks about it, not even with close contacts”.  
ʿAbd al-Raḥman, whose anger I could feel as I listened, voiced several emotions, 
such as humiliation, despair and hopelessness in relation to displacement: 
“If the contract of my flat is expired and I have given 2,000 or 3,000 LE as a 
deposit and the owner refuses to give it back to me - what shall I do? I have a 
problem in my homeland so I left, but they [the Egyptians] think that they 
have humiliated me out of my country. The principle of humanity says: this man 
left his country and he lost his family and he is in a bad psychological condition. 
This man needs a lot of care more than anyone else. They [the Egyptians] do the 
opposite. I am really surprised of the treatment in the neighbouring countries and 
in the countries that have accepted refugees. This kind of treatment forces the 
Syrians and Palestinians who came from Syria to leave through the sea. Some 
people say that they have no problem in drowning and dying in the sea as long as 
they are leaving this country because they can't live in it anymore. Death has 
become easier than staying in the country. Some people left Syria to Jordan and 
from Jordan to Egypt and left Egypt via the sea. Some other people left from Syria 
to Jordan and then to Algeria and then to Libya. Some people also left to Sudan. 
What makes a person take such a huge risk? It is a risk of life like suicide. I will 
jump from this height. Maybe I will die, and maybe I will survive”.  
In addition to feeling pain and discomfort, several Syrian women I met explained that 
living in Egypt had diminished their beauty. One of these was Nūr, who was in her late 
thirties, unmarried, lived with her brother in a well-off area in Cairo and worked for an 
Egyptian agency. She was planning to move to Europe to study for her Masters and was 
busy applying for scholarships in her free time. We met regularly at her place where she 
cooked for us and I contributed desserts. Watching musalsalāt (soap operas) while eating, 
we waited until her brother went to his room before we started chatting about various 
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topics, such as the Egyptian lifestyle compared to the Syrian one, beauty salons, work 
and the future. Nūr could not imagine staying in Egypt. She was eager to leave because 
she felt that Egypt did not contribute to her well-being and among other issues, it had 
decreased her beauty. She told me sadly that since she had arrived in Cairo, her hair had 
become thin, dull and dry, and she had it cut short.  
Likewise, Layla said that since the departure of her son, who had spent eight days 
on a boat travelling to Italy, her face had grown old because of her grief and worries. She 
said she used to have a youthful face and that no one believed that she was a mother in 
her forties with two children. However, she felt that in Egypt, due to her son’s departure, 
her face had aged and had become wrinkled. Another time, I was sitting together with a 
group of Syrian women. Suzanne had invited us to her parents’ home and we were 
drinking the coffee she had prepared and eating fruits she offered us. One of the women 
passed around an argīle. During our conversation, we started speaking about the situation 
of Syrians in Egypt. Suzanne’s friend Hayfa’ spoke up and described vividly how the 
insults she received on Egyptian streets made her feel. She explained by pointing to her 
arm, that she could sense it all over her body when Egyptians shouted lagī’a (refugee) or 
zibāla (garbage) at her. At the beginning, none of the Syrians had a thick skin, she 
continued to explain, so it took them a while to adapt and overcome their fear. 
 For Um Bāsim, being a refugee in Egypt was less related to loss of beauty, and 
more to an increase in physical pain and illness. She had to be the main provider for her 
family – her husband, two sons and one daughter - since her husband had lost all his 
savings when he tried to do business in Egypt with several partners, who eventually 
cheated him out of his money. Um Bāsim vividly recalled the day her husband found out 
that his last project was not viable and that he had been tricked and robbed of his 
investment yet another time. “He didn’t speak for three days”, she remembered tearfully. 
Ever since, her husband barely talked, did not seem to hear properly, was oblivious of his 
surroundings and easily irritated. He repeatedly said that he wished to die. Um Bāsim 
took her husband to the doctor but he could not diagnose anything. Having lost its main 
provider, the family struggled to survive and Um Bāsim, after having sold her gold 
jewellery, tried to establish a business at home as a hairdresser together with her daughter. 
Once, when I visited her, she showed me a huge plastic bag filled to the brim with 
ointments and tablets. She explained that she needed the medication to cure the various 
forms of pain she suffered all over her body. Sometimes, the pain in her hands, arms and 
neck was so strong that she could not work for days.  
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 The body plays an important role in various scholarly works dealing with forced 
displacement. Salih (2016) observed that it was through their bodily experiences that 
Palestinian women were able to express the traumas they survived. Their bodies 
remembered and felt the pain and grief of forced displacement during the Nakba and the 
Naksa. Likewise, Elizabeth Coker (2004: 403) argues that undocumented southern 
Sudanese refugees in Cairo told stories of their traumatic past and uncertain present and 
future by using their bodies and the harm afflicted to them as metaphors. Social 
anthropologist Anne Grønseth (2011: 321) stresses that Tamil refugees in Norway 
embodied the experienced need for adaptation and assimilation and the absence of their 
familiar social and religious context, by developing lasting pain and fatigue. And Peteet 
calls displacement “an embodied experience” that alters the body profoundly and 
transforms it into an “unknown terrain that must be relearned” (Becker 1997: 81 cited in 
Peteet 2005: 54).  
 In conclusion, I argue at the end of this first section that refugeeness had various 
facets among Syrians I met in Egypt. It was experienced as: humiliation; worries and 
insecurity; dependence on institutions and entities; inability to form one’s future; risk 
taking; despair and hopelessness; and as pain, embarrassment, and loss of the body one 
used to know. In this climate, in which identity needs to redevelop around, and adapt to, 
these experiences and encounters of refugeeness, I suggest that masculine identity can 
easily be damaged by this process and requires active and conscious effort to be 
reinvented. I discuss the process of attempting to cure masculinity damaged by 
refugeeness in the following section. 
 
Defining what makes a person a refugee 
 
There are certain attributes associated with the ‘genuine refugee’, such as pacifism, 
morality, trauma, victimhood, and femininity (Griffiths 2015: 472; Pupavac 2008: 272). 
Other associations with the ideal refugee are neediness, lack of competence, and 
helplessness (Szczepanikova 2010: 466/470). Maysa Ayoub and Shaden Khallaf’s (2014) 
study, one of the few that deals with the situation of Syrians in Egypt, shows that by 2013, 
when the study was conducted, a significant number of those surveyed had not 
approached the UNHCR for registration. One of the reasons was hesitance about bearing 
the title ‘refugee’, which was loaded, in the eyes of the study’s participants, with negative 
connotations, such as weakness, desperation, and misery (ibid.: 22). This finding overlaps 
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with my observation that most Syrians I met had initially refused to register with the 
UNHCR.  
During several conversations with Syrian NGO caseworkers, I was told that 
Syrians needed time to adapt to and accept their new situation, in which they had to bear 
the refugee title. Khalīl, for instance, who worked with an Egyptian NGO offering 
psychosocial support to refugees, described the Syrian people as “proud and rich”. Before 
the Syrian uprising, it was unthinkable for a Syrian to ask for help, he explained. 
Consequently, Syrians in exile needed time to accept their new status that was defined 
externally by need and poverty. Qutayba said that it was probably due to the sudden 
change in their life that Syrians were reluctant to apply for refugee status. Most Syrians 
who came to Egypt had a good life before the outbreak of the civil war and had yet to 
come to terms with the abrupt transformation of their lifestyle, he said. Nūr referred to 
the Syrians’ pride and dignity that prevented them from approaching the UNHCR when 
they first arrived. She explained that Syrians did not want to be treated like people who 
had to ask for money to survive. The reluctance to publicly admit one’s need and poverty 
echoes Peteet’s (2005: 127) observations that “displacement meant learning anew how to 
carry oneself and present oneself to others” and thus enforced the transformation of 
identities. Likewise, Malkki (1996: 381) stresses that refugeeness had to be interiorised 
as an aspect of people’s identities.  
Another reason for rejecting the association with refugeeness was put forward by 
Abū Muhannad, the father of Muhannad who had successfully opened a cosmetics shop 
in 6th of October City and could pay the fees at a private university for his two eldest sons. 
He opposed the stigmatising refugee label because of its incompatibility with Syria’s 
perceived wealth and history: “Refugee is a difficult word for me. It doesn’t fit the Syrian 
people. We are from a rich country and we had everything. We have never been refugees 
before”. He assured me emphatically that he would not accept being called a refugee: “I 
would kill the Egyptian who says to me that I am a refugee. We have developed 6th of 
October City to what it is today. There was nothing here before. It is only through the 
Syrians that 6th of October City has become such a good place”. According to Peteet 
(2005: 210), self-characterisations as refugees in the context of Palestinians in Lebanon 
became a barometer indexing the individual’s power, dependency and vulnerability. 
Following her argument, Abū Muhannad could refuse to characterise himself as a refugee 
because of his secure economic situation and relative independence.  
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Abū Muhannad’s son also opposed the stigmatising refugee label. As the founder 
of an NGO for Syrian students, Muhannad repeatedly mentioned that he perceived it as 
his mission to transform the picture of the needy, poor, victimised Syrian refugee in 
Egyptian society. This was the reason he and his NGO colleagues attended every event 
they organised or were invited to in white button-down shirts and jackets. Muhannad 
explained to me that he did not only aim to prove this image outwardly to the Egyptian 
host population, but also wanted to instil self-confidence and self-esteem in young 
Syrians who had to cope with their new, externally imposed status as refugees.  
Majd, a student of economics in his early twenties who worked while studying 
and had high ambitions for the future, stressed his initial reluctance to go to the UNHCR 
office. He explained that he and his mother did not want to have refugee status because 
of their notable family background. From our first meeting, when he assisted me in 
teaching an English class, I knew that his great-grandfather used to hold a key role on the 
political stage before Hafiz al-Asad’s rule. Due to being from a family of “influential 
politicians and investors”, as he called it, in whose footsteps he wanted to follow, he did 
not find it easy to reconcile his lineage with claiming asylum. What changed his mind 
eventually was the increasing insecurity of living in Egypt without a proper residence 
permit. By his being enrolled in university and being granted a student residency, Majd 
and his mother could eventually stay in Egypt. However, for a while, it was uncertain 
whether he could be enrolled into one of the Egyptian universities and thus Majd decided 
that it was safer to go to the UNHCR and apply for refugee status. In order to justify his 
decision, he said: “I don’t like the idea of asylum, however, this card [the yellow card] is 
like a guarantee for the future, so if in the future, I need to seek asylum, I should have this 
card with me in order to get a visa”. And Ghassān justified his registration and use of the 
‘yellow card’ in the following way:  
“Yes, I went to the UNHCR and I have the yellow card. At the beginning, we 
didn’t want it, however, for four months we have it now. At the end, this yellow 
card can be useful if the father or mother dies and the children become orphans. 
Maybe then the UN can help them. If you have a legal problem the UN lawyer 
can defend you, especially if they arrest you and they want to send you back to 
Syria. In this situation, it is useful”. 
It is noteworthy that even though many Syrian men I met rejected the category for 
themselves and tried to escape it in their narratives, as in the case of Majd, almost all of 
them had eventually registered as refugees with the UNHCR. Their action thus stood in 
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contrast to their narratives. Ayoub and Khallaf’s (2014: 22) report stresses that most 
Syrians in Egypt eventually did register with the UNHCR because of the changing 
political situation in the summer of 2013 and the consequent heightened need for 
protection and assistance. This rejection of the refugee marker for various reasons and 
simultaneous acceptance of the refugee status to guarantee one’s security in Egypt echoes 
Peteet’s (2005: 209) argument that the meaning of legal refugee status among Palestinians 
in Lebanon was not constant over time but shifted in accordance with the power and 
persistence of the Palestinian resistance movement. At times when they were empowered 
by the resistance movement, the Palestinians in Lebanon rejected any self-reference as 
refugees. However, belonging to the category eventually became a necessity in order to 
receive services from UNRWA (ibid.: 210). Similarly, Ludwig (2013: 13) observed 
changing uses of the refugee status over time: Liberians in New York defined refugeeness 
as a transient and momentary situation related to their immediate forced displacement 
from their home countries. Acknowledging that they were refugees at some point, they 
expressed success and created hierarchies based on the person’s ability to leave refugee 
status behind and transfer into a new category, for example permanent residency. 
Likewise, Malkki (1995a: 158/159) observed that refugeeness was linked to a temporally 
bounded period. The early years in the host country were connected to social hardship 
and poverty and were defined as their experience of refugeeness. The improvement of 
one’s economic situation over time was then often linked to the successful escape from 
the refugee label (ibid.: 161).  
While both scholars found that refugeeness was primarily linked to early years in 
the host country, most Syrians I met strictly refused any identification with refugeeness 
when they first arrived in Egypt and only recognised and reluctantly accepted its 
usefulness and necessity at a later stage of their stay in exile. I argue that the initial 
reluctance followed by an eventual acceptation of the refugee status relates to the 
specificity of the Syrian case in terms of its uncertain outcome. When I conducted 
fieldwork, Syrians in Egypt had been displaced for no more than two years and the civil 
war in Syria was still ongoing. Their mindset, thinking, and planning still had one foot in 
Syria and they were in a position of absolute liminality, not knowing if they could return 
to Syria or would continue with their journey in exile. 
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Creating distance 
 
Having discussed why most of the Syrians I met rejected the refugee definition for 
themselves, I now turn to the strategies applied by several of the Syrian men to actively 
distance themselves from this category. I found the use of this strategy especially 
prominent among Syrian men who were relatively well off in Egypt, having found work 
and being able to live a relatively comfortable life. They clarified their personal 
incompatibility with the refugee marker through their ability to pay for their expenditures 
and their consequent independence from governmental support.  
A sociological theoretical contribution that merits study in the context of proving 
one’s incompatibility with the refugee category is the sociological work of David Snow 
and Leon Anderson (1987) dealing with distancing processes among homeless people. 
The authors base their argument on Erving Goffman’s (1961) classical concept of ‘role 
distancing’. They argue that through ‘identity talk’ the homeless people they met 
consciously created a distance between themselves, others in the same situation, and the 
institutions that offer services to homeless people. Based on the assumption that self-
worth is connected to “the imputed social identities of one’s associates” (Snow and 
Anderson 1987: 1349), the authors found that homeless people engaged in role distancing 
in the form of showing one’s lack of commitment or attachment to the role ascribed to 
them from the outside, in order to keep their self-worth. I argue that my participants 
frequently and actively engaged in the creation of distance between themselves and what 
they perceived as a stigmatising status held by other Syrians, but which did not fit with 
their personality, background and lifestyle. The concept of ‘role distancing’ can be 
combined with Michael Kimmel’s (1994: 126) argument that “masculinity is defined 
more by what one is not rather than who one is”. Syrian men actively created their identity 
by referring to what they were not, namely beneficiaries of governmental support, 
purposeless, and unable to ensure their own survival. It is also helpful to consider R. W. 
Connell’s (1995) concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and her argument that masculinities 
are actively produced through the use of resources and strategies available in a given 
milieu (1998: 5).  
One of the Syrian men I met who was relatively well-off in Egypt was Maḥmūd. 
I knew him from my semester abroad in Damascus in 2009. He used to be a tour guide in 
Syria and managed to work in this profession in Egypt due to his vast network among 
independent backpackers, his ability to speak four languages, his knowledge of the 
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Middle East, and his self-developed tours and information booklets. When I asked him 
whether he felt like a refugee he answered: “On the one hand, we can say refugee because 
I am afraid of going back to Syria, so I can be considered a refugee. At the same time, 
however, I am working and I sometimes help if I can, and in this case, I don’t feel like a 
refugee”. Several times, Maḥmūd gave me money for the Syrian families in 6th of October 
City about whom I had talked with him. The ability to work and provide for oneself as a 
marker of incompatibility with refugee status is even more pronounced in Hānī’s 
narrative. He was a student of dentistry, who came to Egypt in 2010 to study and returned 
in 2011 after the Egyptian uprising only to experience the beginning of the revolution in 
Syria, when he came back to Egypt. He lived by himself in 6th of October City.  
“I don’t feel like a refugee because the government doesn’t pay for me and there 
is a difference between someone who is supported by the government and 
someone who doesn’t receive anything. I am not like this. I am working and I pay 
the rent and I pay for my life. I don’t need the government to help me”.  
Hānī’s account suggests that being an independent agent, who can lead and control his 
life, is incompatible with the refugee identity. A similar line of thought was present in 
many other conversations: accepting external help was generally conflated with being a 
refugee and hence rejected for as long as possible. Several case workers employed in 
NGOs that assisted refugees described how most Syrian families were ashamed to show 
publicly that they required support and were consequently hesitant not only to register 
with the UNHCR, but also to approach NGOs for assistance. 
Besides work and independence from support, Maḥmūd’s and Hānī’s statements 
include another significant aspect that was taken as a proof of their personal 
incompatibility with the title of the refugee: they had a purpose in life. Maḥmūd worked 
as a tour guide and Hānī was a university student. Likewise, Ghassān’s statement asserts 
that having a purpose in life could not be aligned with refugeeness: “The people who are 
going by boats to Europe can be considered refugees, but if you are a student and you 
want to study I think that they will accept you as a student. Then you will work hard and 
you will be useful for their country”. Ghassān, who was a final year student in high school 
aiming to study pharmacy, created a hierarchy between the people who migrated by boat, 
who could not easily escape the refugee definition over time, and a student, who would 
eventually be useful to the host country. Additionally, he relates refugeeness to migration 
to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. This needs to be placed in context: all the Syrians I 
met in Cairo had travelled to Egypt by plane. This implies that they had the financial 
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capability to pay for a ticket for themselves and their families, and that their trip was 
direct and relatively safe, mainly departing from Damascus airport and arriving without 
further interruption in Cairo. Ghassān disparages Syrians in Europe because of the means 
of transportation they used to travel to the host country, which indicates despair and the 
inability to choose a safer option for oneself and one’s family.  
In a similar vein, Maḥmūd once told me: “Now you can read on Facebook that 
Syrians differentiate based on how they came to Europe. They say: ‘You came by boat 
but we came by plane!’”. The classification he refers to is most likely based on the fact 
that travelling to Europe via plane was only possible if one had a visa in advance or was 
chosen to resettle by the UNHCR. The judgement of the individual’s means of 
transportation thus seems to relate to one’s ‘legality’ in the host country and the ‘legality’ 
of one’s journey.  
Ascribing status to a person based on their means of transportation to a new 
country is not unique. In a process of distancing themselves from the newcomers and in 
order to reassert their national belonging, American identity and loyalty, the Arab 
diaspora in Detroit engaged in a process of stigmatisation of the newly arrived ‘others’. 
They defined those, who seemed most likely to conform to the stereotypes of Arab 
Muslims prevalent in the American society after 9/11, as immigrants, temporaries, 
illegals or ‘boaters’ (Howell and Shryock 2011: 79/80).  
The strategic importance of stressing one’s independence from government 
support, one’s success in the Egyptian labour market, and the emphasis of one’s 
incompatibility with the refugee definition may explain why those Syrian men who were 
in a good economic position in Egypt often immediately clarified what brought them to 
Cairo in our first encounter. They mentioned that they came to Egypt for economic 
reasons; like businessman Fāris who stressed that he was sent by his boss in Syria to 
become the supervisor of a local branch of the company in Egypt. Others mentioned 
immediately that they came to study. Correspondingly, Syrian men with work and relative 
security in Cairo stated that they would only go to Europe to pursue an education or a 
specific career. Nūr’s brother Dāwūd, for instance, a man in his mid-thirties who had 
found work as a consultant in an Egyptian organisation and had just got engaged when I 
met him, described to me what would have motivated him to go to Europe:  
“I tried to go to Europe through scholarships and I tried to apply with some 
organisations like the UN but I got rejected. There are ideas that you can improve 
and develop in order to use them later to return to the homeland, as generations, 
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as governments, as a society. I wanted to study conflicts that happened around the 
world during a Master’s programme”. 
The focus in Dāwūd’s narrative is clearly on a legal entry into Europe and a purpose for 
his stay that would even benefit Syrian society in the post-conflict era. Furthermore, the 
discussion revolving around one’s personal incompatibility with the refugee label 
because of one’s educational aspiration or background reiterates the model of the modern 
middle-class man, which, according to historian Keith Watenpaugh (2006), emerged at 
the beginning of the 20th century in the Eastern Mediterranean ruled by the Ottoman 
Empire. He argues that the modern, middle-class man “employed not physical action but 
intellectual action; ultimately, he would be measured by political, social and commercial 
achievement in the public sphere rather than by considerations of birth and religious 
affiliation” (ibid.: 89). Being a modern middle-class man or woman meant reaching out 
for education, cultural and social improvement as well as political awareness (ibid.: 
90/91). The focus on one’s incompatibility with the refugee label based on one’s 
profession, educational aspirations or achievements and hard work thus suggests 
masculinity based on a certain class consciousness.  
The resources available to Syrian men in Egypt which they can use to produce 
masculinity are their various experiences of displacement and differing successes in 
finding work and establishing a life. Many affluent Syrian men I met used the currency 
of managing one’s life upon displacement to create a hierarchy between themselves and 
others, labelling those, who in their perception were the least successful, namely the one 
who takes a boat to Europe, as ‘refugee’. 
 
Image and perception of Europe 
 
Based on the idea that being a refugee was contradictory to successful participation in the 
labour market, many Syrians, who were in a privileged situation, stated that only the 
economically successful Syrian newcomers stayed in Egypt, while those who could not 
settle and make ends meet, left for Europe. Syrians in Europe were described by Abū 
Muhannad as coming “from a lower-class background”, and by Muhannad as “a burden 
on society” and “lazy”. In contrast, Syrians who stayed in Egypt were defined by Būlus 
as “rich and hardworking”. With these narratives, my interlocutors not only created a 
distance from, but also identified themselves as superior to, Syrian refugees in Europe 
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based on their attributed hard work, class background and wealth. They actively de-
classed Syrians in Europe. 
It is worth looking at what Europe meant to Syrian men in order to examine their 
negative opinions of Syrians who fled there and to embed these statements in context. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I realised that Europe occupied an ambivalent status: 
some Syrians praised it for its development and humane treatment of refugees, others 
despised it for its cultural distance from the Middle East. Most Syrians I met believed that 
life in Europe for Syrians arriving as refugees was good and certainly better than the 
treatment Syrians experienced in Egypt and the wider Middle East. ʿ Abd al-Raḥman said: 
“They [people who made it to Europe] have a good life there which meets the 
human standards and they are happy. We are always in touch with our friends who 
travelled via the sea to Europe or got resettled by the United Nations. They arrived 
in Germany, France, the Netherlands, or Sweden. They are comfortable there”. 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s in-laws were about to resettle to the Netherlands after his wife’s 
brother, who was only thirteen years old when he made the journey via the Mediterranean 
Sea to Europe, had applied for lam al-shamal (family reunion) in Holland. ʿAbd al-
Raḥman’s wife could not imagine being left behind with her husband in Egypt once her 
whole family had gone to the Netherlands. Consequently, she decided to embark on the 
journey to Europe on her own with the aim of applying for lam al-shamal after her arrival 
in the Netherlands in order to bring her husband to Europe, too.  
Often, I heard idealised assumptions about the treatment refugees would receive 
in Europe, which was clearly based on rumours and speculations. Said Abū ‘Alī: 
“As refugees in Europe our situation would be much better. Here we don’t get 
anything as refugees. In Europe, there is money, they give us houses and 300 
Dollars. The Syrians in Europe are refugees just like we are, but we are 
underprivileged. No one knows how to deal with us. They don’t care for us. This 
is not my country”.  
I met Abū ‘Alī when I volunteered in an Egyptian organisation providing aid to refugees. 
He and his wife lived in one of the poorest areas in Cairo and he complained that the 
Egyptian authorities would not provide him with basic services and that he could not 
expect any support from the Egyptian police if he was in trouble. He used to work as a 
lawyer in Syria but was unemployed when I met him. He had worked in several jobs, 
such as a cashier or a chauffeur for a couple of months after his arrival in Egypt but could 
not continue because of bad health. While Abū ‘Alī had an overly positive image of the 
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reality for refugees in Europe and contrasted it with the unfair treatment in Egypt, some 
Syrians, like Wasīm, doubted the rumours they heard: 
“They [the Syrians] started to talk with their friends in Europe: ‘I am happy here 
and I have a house and a salary!’ So, the people started to think about Europe as 
a paradise. No one arrives there and shares the real situation, only very few people. 
When people go there, their main goal is to improve their lives and the second 
topic is the question of education. Education is very important for them”. 
In addition to the widespread belief that Europe treated refugees well, Syrians talked 
frequently about the stable political and economic situation they believed they would find 
in Europe, and about its considerable development, wealth and progress.  
In contrast to these assumptions, I also heard that European countries were 
perceived as the countries of the kufār (unbelievers), where morals and values were 
degraded, and people did not care for each other. Europe was associated with sexual 
relationships before or outside marriage, promiscuity, sexual laxity, and a lack of morals 
and code of ethics. Frequently, I was asked by Syrians who had relatives in Europe or 
planned on going to Europe themselves, if and how the governments in Europe would 
interfere in the nuclear family’s life: Would the child be taken away by the state 
authorities if it was beaten once? How much parental authority was acceptable? Does the 
voice and signature of a woman as wife and mother count as much or more than the 
husband’s or father’s? Can a woman decide family-related issues on her own without 
consulting her husband? Can she travel on her own?  
Abū Muḥammad, Layla’s cousin, who was preparing himself and his family for 
resettlement to Germany, had several questions and concerns regarding his prospective 
life there and told me the following: 
“If you go to Europe you should assimilate and accept new things. You will need 
to spend at least one year studying the language. You will waste one year only for 
getting a language certificate. I wasted years of my life just because of this. It’s 
better to study German in Syria and then go to Germany immediately. It’s better 
than staying in Germany for two years doing nothing but studying the language. I 
am really upset that I will go to Germany and lose two years of my life doing 
nothing but studying the language”. 
Here, living in Europe is clearly associated with a standstill in one’s personal 
development and with giving up autonomy over one’s personal plans and preferences in 
exchange for asylum and the obligations that come with it. Likewise, Qays, the founder 
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of an aid organisation for Syrians in Cairo, was extremely critical of the idea of leaving 
the Middle East for Europe. He spoke in fuṣḥa to me, presumably to make his words 
sound more sophisticated, educated and convincing: 
“If I were in Germany, I would get a salary. There, you could work and your wife 
could work as well at the minimum (inta hunāka kunt tastaṭīʿ an taʿysh wa taʿamal 
zawgatik fī al-ḥudūd al-dunyā). In Germany, there are people who prefer to just 
take money, so they don’t need to worry about anything. The Egyptian society is 
close to the Syrian society. It’s better that the Syrian stays in societies that are 
close to our societies (fa-kān yufaḍḍil baqa al-sūrī fī mujtamaʿāt qarīb min 
mujtamaʿātnā). The Western society for us is a strange and different society. 
Europe and the US are strange for us. It’s different from the Middle Eastern 
societies. Many Syrians left and went to Europe. I find it strange. It means that 
there is a social problem (hadhā dalīl inu fī hunāka azma mujtamaʿiyya). I don’t 
remember that it was said that the Germans left Germany after the war. I didn’t 
hear anything like that. Even if the German left the country, he decided to come 
back to rebuild Germany (qarrara an yuʿīd bināʾ almāniyā)”.  
Qays juxtaposes the proximity of Egyptian and Syrian culture with the alienating ‘other’ 
culture of the West. Even though he was at times extremely critical of the Egyptian host 
population, in this specific context he made use of the notion of the uniting, border-
crossing Arab culture. This resonates with Peteet’s (2005: 185) observation of the habit 
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon of oscillating between Arabness and Palestinianism 
depending on its usefulness, to either express belonging to the Arab culture and history 
or to highlight the Palestinians’ separateness and distinction. 
 Furthermore, travelling to Europe evoked rejection, because in the post-2011 era 
Syrians were forced to leave their home country and were dealt with as refugees rather 
than being able to freely migrate, as suggested by Bashār, a student of dentistry living by 
himself in 6th of October City: “Is a civil servant working in the ministry able to live on 
the street for one week without water and a toilet? No! So why do I have to live on the 
streets? Because I am now a second-class human being (daraja tāniya)”. Bashār when 
referring to the news from Germany which went viral in the summer of 2015, when 
hundreds of new arrivals waited for many hours and even slept in front of LaGeSo (the 
State Office for Health and Social Affairs) in Berlin in order to submit their asylum 
applications (see Eddy and Johannsen 2015; Murray 2015). He continued: “Before 2011, 
no one travelled from Syria via the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. The situation was good 
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back then. Now, I have to be scared that my children and I could get killed in my own 
country. That is the reason why so many Syrians flee to Europe”. Angrily, he added that 
no country felt any responsibility towards them: not Europe nor America nor any other 
state. 
The following narratives that classify Syrians in Europe should be read keeping 
in mind the general perception of Europe just described, since the value of Europe defines 
the image of the people seeking asylum there. 
 
Developing new masculine hierarchies 
 
Muhannad was not against going abroad. In fact, several times we filled in scholarship 
applications together because he wanted to attend summer school in the US or a 
conference or a language course in Europe. However, he disagreed with the rising trend 
in Syrians leaving for Europe via the Mediterranean Sea or the Balkan route.  
“When the guy cannot find a job, cannot study and cannot find anything [in 
Egypt], he will think about going to Europe. In Europe, he will drink, he will eat 
and he will sleep. Should this be the reason to make me leave? Why? Here, I am 
going out, I am working, I am meeting people, and I am getting new experiences. 
There, I will just stay at home and I will be a ʿibaʾ [burden] on society. 
Muhannad was also critical of the illegality of actions people accepted in order to enter 
Europe: “Why do you travel to Europe via the sea?”, he asked, “you can apply for a 
scholarship and you can travel the legal way!”. This echoes the theme of one’s legality or 
‘illegality’ that was brought up by Ghassān in relation to the means of transportation from 
Syria to Europe. Furthermore, it displays Muhannad’s privileged background. 
In a similar vein, Maḥmūd said in one of our conversations that Syrians in Europe 
had opted for an undignified treatment only to receive financial support in return. “They 
must feel like beggars in Europe since they are dependent on money from the government. 
No one admits it, but it really does something to the people. No one would have ever 
accepted such support in Syria. This goes against one’s dignity”. Just like Muhannad, 
Maḥmūd had thought more than once about travelling to Europe, weighing his options 
and trying to estimate which place could guarantee him most security, well-being and a 
meaningful future. He then decided that staying in Egypt was his best option. In Cairo, 
he could continue working and would not need to interrupt it or find a new profession 
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while waiting for his residency to be approved in a European refugee camp. Maḥmūd 
created the image of Syrians in Europe as people who should be pitied, since they had 
lost their former status and became the ones who were the lowest in the hierarchy, left 
without agency and totally dependent on help from outside. Maḥmūd thus strips refugees 
in Europe of their agency and arguably their manhood. The connection he draws between 
refugeeness and begging was also observed by McSpadden and Moussa (1993: 210) in 
their study of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in North America. The beggar is usually 
associated with a physical handicap and consequent dependence. A person, who is 
physically whole and still begs is considered shameful and can only be ridiculed. Because 
of one’s dependence on welfare and charity, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees frequently 
bitterly called themselves beggars. 
Even though Maḥmūd was convinced that travelling to Europe was not feasible 
for him, he kept complaining about his life in Egypt. Once, he got in trouble with an 
Egyptian doorman when he wanted to withdraw money from his bank account. The 
Egyptian doorman, when he had found out that Maḥmūd was from Syria, made a joke 
about Syrian women working as prostitutes in Egypt. Angrily, Maḥmūd told him:  
“If a war breaks out in your country, you will hear stories worse than this about 
your people. In any place in the world, if there is a war, you will even find men 
working in prostitution. The war makes people this way. If there was a war in 
Egypt, you will find more Egyptians than Syrians travelling to Europe!”. 
The doorman answered that he could not imagine that Egyptians would ever leave their 
beloved country. Maḥmūd remembered that he responded: “Yes, you will leave your 
country! We said the same. We said that we would never leave Syria and now we are 
spread all over the world!” This conversation is revealing because leaving one’s country 
is used here to define the individual’s failure and functions as a humiliating insult. The 
underlying theme is clearly a man’s responsibility vis-à-vis his home country and his 
inability to prevent women from working in prostitution. Likewise, Qays judges other 
Syrians by using the currency of leaving or staying in a country that is culturally similar 
to one’s country of origin.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described situations and encounters in Egypt that made Syrians feel like 
belonging to the refugee category, such as encounters with the UNHCR or the Egyptian 
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authorities. In these contexts, Syrians in Egypt had to negotiate various forms of labelling. 
Falling into certain bureaucratic categories can sometimes offer access to resources and 
consequent relaxation on the part of the refugee. However, among most Syrians being 
identified as a refugee led to furious disentanglement of one’s self from the ascribed label 
and its consequences. 
 Refugeeness was experienced as a feeling of insecurity, uncertainty, helplessness, 
and sometimes as anger, fear or sadness. One’s identity was felt to be in question, and a 
feeling of being subject to others’ ill will was prevalent. These aspects affected 
constructions of masculinity. Nevertheless, the most prominent emotions in the narratives 
I heard and actions I observed were dignity and pride that the Syrian men tried to keep 
intact by distancing themselves from the refugee category. Another constantly emerging, 
underlying emotion was arrogance with the consequent demarcation of those who were 
perceived to stand lower in the hierarchy. 
This chapter then discussed Syrian men’s strategies to create distance between 
themselves and the prototype of a ‘refugee’ – an emasculated phantom that they construed 
and that the ‘refugee in Europe’ embodied. Syrian men in Egypt created a hierarchy by 
downplaying this ‘other’ Syrian, who sought refuge in a Europe. I suggested that the 
discussion about the ‘other’s’ refugeeness is not only a way to prove one’s incompatibility 
with the refugee label, but is simultaneously a way of establishing proper middle-class 
manhood. Syrian men I met actively erected boundaries and a hierarchy based on their 
self-ascribed moral and economic superiority and stern discipline in contrast to the Syrian 
refugee’s assumed laziness in Europe, and on their loyalty to the Arab world in contrast 
to the Syrian refugee’s willingness to compromise their autonomy and lifestyle in return 
for governmental support in Europe.  
When looking at Syrian men’s negotiations of the refugee label, keeping in mind 
that they had just fled a brutal civil war (I will discuss memories of the conflict in more 
detail in Chapters 5-7), being a refugee should not be understood as a ‘solution’ to the 
violence and persecution they experienced, but rather as an extension of the insecurities 
they had already faced in their lives. In the following chapter, I will shed light on Syrian 
men’s participation in the Egypt labour market as refugees and how this challenged them 
and, in many ways, increased their insecurity and vulnerability.  
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Chapter 3 – Of Pride, Shame and Judgement 
or Claiming successful middle-class masculinity through work 
 
Having discussed what instilled a sense of refugeeness in Syrian men and women I met 
in Egypt and how men found ways to disconnect themselves from the label and from 
other people associated with that label, I turn in this chapter to Syrian men’s experiences 
in the Egyptian labour market. Scholars dealing with men and masculinity have long 
recognised and theorised about the connection between employment and masculinity (see 
Connell 1995; Edwards 2006; Hearn 2001; Morgan 1992). Particularly in the context of 
migration and forced displacement, scholarly attention is focused on men’s ability to 
work and remain as provider for the family. This literature suggests that men are likely to 
experience a crisis when they can no longer uphold their status as provider, and especially 
if women take over increased economic responsibilities (see Kabachnik et al. 2013; 
Donaldson and Howson 2009; Jaji 2009; Schrijvers 1999). Another recurrent focus 
targets the question of whether men and women’s changing economic responsibilities and 
daily practices during displacement lead to the transformation of gender relations (see 
Brun 2000; Turner 2000). However, discussions with Syrian men about their work 
conditions and their perceptions of Syrian working women suggest that refugeeness, work 
and gender interrelated among Syrians in Egypt in a different way and do not confirm the 
claims in the literature. I argue that Syrian men in Egypt identified the ideal of Syrian 
middle-class masculinity through narratives about their own and other men’s work. 
Where they could not uphold this status, they used strategies of de-classing and 
emasculation of others and referred to traditional ideals of gender relations to reinstate 
their manhood. I also show in this chapter that it is important for an analysis of 
masculinity to take into consideration men’s position during their lifespan. 
 
Working in Egypt 
 
As previously mentioned, Syrians who live as refugees in Egypt face difficulties finding 
legal employment and are thus pushed towards informal labour. There is no doubt that 
the economic situation of most Syrians in Egypt worsened over the years with decreasing 
support available from the UNHCR and through loss of savings. According to Ayoub and 
Khallaf’s (2014: 25) study, 45.5 per cent of the respondents reported work as their only 
source of income while the rest depended on a combination of work, financial aid and/or 
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withdrawing from savings to sustain their livelihoods. Compared to other refugee groups 
living in Egypt, Syrians are considered advantaged because of their reputation as 
experienced and hard-working employees and entrepreneurs with outstanding skills in 
the food industry (Ayoub 2017; Ayoub and Khallaf 2014: 25). In fact, the Syrian presence 
in Egypt is demonstrable through the proliferation of Syrian restaurants, food shops and 
bakeries, and their increasing visibility in the Egyptian food sector has attracted national 
and international media attention (e.g. Shahine 2016; Primo 2015; Kingsley 2013). 
Despite this reported success of a number of Syrian restaurant managers and company 
owners in Egypt, Ayoub and Khallaf’s (2014: 27) study and a report by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) (2015: 20) reveal that the majority of Syrians work 
informally, having changed their occupation and taken up less-skilled jobs in Egypt. 
While a third of the respondents reported to be satisfied with their current job, those not 
satisfied mentioned low wages, difficult work conditions, and a mismatch between their 
jobs and their level of education. Moreover, work was perceived as unstable and irregular, 
and respondents felt they could be dismissed at any time (ibid.: 28).  
The variety of work experiences in Egypt was reflected in the occupations of 
Syrians I met in Cairo. Among them, there was a chef in a Syrian fast-food restaurant, a 
dentist, numerous case workers in NGOs, several shop assistants, a shop manager, a 
housekeeper, a young man employed in IT support, primary school and language 
teachers, taxi drivers, and shop owners. Some had received or “bought”, as Dāwūd put it, 
permission to work, however, most of them worked informally. Apart from Abū Walīd, 
who was threatened and blackmailed by a police officer because he had no work permit, 
most Syrian men I met assured me that they could work in Egypt with no fear of 
interference by the state. Nevertheless, even if the state seemed to turn a blind eye to 
Syrians’ informal labour, their work conditions were mostly far from satisfactory. In the 
following paragraphs, I introduce the situation of several Syrian men to illustrate the 
challenges they faced as participants in the Egyptian labour market.  
The first time I met Abū Walīd in the accessories shop, where he was a shop 
assistant, was on the Egyptian national holiday shām al-nassīm (Egyptian Spring 
Festival). The shop consisted of one main room packed with fashion jewellery, cosmetics, 
false eyelashes, scarves and stockings. To my surprised question as to why he had to work 
on a public holiday, he answered, “I have to work because I am Syrian”. He explained 
that his boss was Egyptian and demanded his presence on public holidays, that he had to 
work long hours and could not ask for any vacation. According to Abū Walīd, his boss 
knew that he, as a Syrian, could not complain. Hence, he worked thirteen hours a day for 
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1,500 LE per month (in 2015 this amounted to approximately 170 US Dollars). Because 
he and his family could not live off this income due to a monthly rent of 1,000 LE (approx. 
115 US Dollars), he started offering body-piercing services in the shop and had begun 
attending a course in the evenings after his thirteen-hour shift. He opened a drawer in a 
corner of the shop to show me his piercing instruments and pointed at a discreet sign in 
the shop window written in English that referred to the piercing services offered. I had to 
promise him not to tell his wife about his second profession, since Abū Walīd was sure 
that she would disapprove. He explained: 
“I was obligated to do another job, which my wife doesn’t know about. For my 
age and my situation, it is ‘ayb (shame) to do this work. My wife doesn’t know 
my workplace because I am working as a piercer. My wife thinks that I work with 
accessories only. I get a percentage for this work because I introduced it to this 
shop”. 
Abū Walīd constantly repeated throughout our various conversations that there was no 
future in Egypt – neither for him and his family nor for the Egyptians. He felt 
overwhelmed by the fact that he could not afford education in a private school for his 
children and that even though both he and his wife were working, the family could barely 
make ends meet. He felt that he could not rely on anyone’s help, saying that he “stopped 
going to the UN” because he never “had an advantage through the UN” and that he had 
“never got used to asking people for help”.  
Even though many of the Syrians I met had found work, most of them did not 
work in the profession they had held in Syria and their new job lacked the prestige of the 
previous one. An old woman, whom I met in an NGO in 6th of October City providing 
aid for Syrians, told me that her son used to be a trader and had his own office in Syria, 
while in Egypt he was employed as the office boy in an engineering company preparing 
tea and coffee for the other employees. Another woman shared with me that her husband 
was currently unemployed, but had worked as a waiter for a while and was desperate and 
ready to accept any kind of work in Egypt. In Syria, he used to be an accountant.  
The loss of prestigious work and the inability to find a suitable job following 
forced displacement were themes I also discussed with ʿAbd al-Raḥman. He explained:  
“The situation in Egypt is more comfortable [than in Jordan]. It is possible for the 
man to work and go out, but unfortunately the salary is low. The Syrian teacher 
couldn’t find work when he came to Egypt. His wife also couldn’t find work, 
while they used to have a solid income in Syria, which they spend partially and 
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partially saved, and they had their own house there. […] As you can see here in 
Egypt, there are many people, who have university degrees but they work as 
drivers. […] Any man who has a family and left Syria for any other country suffers 
a lot because there are no jobs but there is the responsibility. He was comfortable 
in Syria. His big family was close to him and when he needed money he asked his 
brother or his friend. Now, I am in Egypt and a friend of mine is in Jordan and 
another one is in Libya. There was no suffering before, but now there is a huge 
suffering”. 
He describes that in Syria, working held the promise of consumption, possession and ease 
of life. However, in Egypt it is an accumulation of loss of prestige, network, income and 
savings, living in a country with a high unemployment rate, and especially a man’s 
responsibility for his family, which creates a man’s suffering during forced displacement. 
The problem of not finding a job in one’s former profession was also experienced 
by Rāfī, a father of three children in his late thirties. He had learned to be a carpenter from 
his father and later opened a clothes shop in Syria. In Egypt, Rāfī initially tried to work 
as a carpenter and decorator but was often not paid by his clients. Consequently, he 
decided to work as a driver by renting an old car from an Egyptian for which he had to 
pay a high lease. The car was not air-conditioned, could not go faster than 80 km per hour 
and used a lot of petrol. The car was always meticulously clean on the inside as well as 
on the outside and in order to protect the occupants from the burning sun, Rāfī had put 
black curtains at each window. The first time Rāfī drove me in his car to 6th of October 
City, he immediately drew my attention to the car’s condition, which he had improved 
himself, because, as he said, he was a hardworking man: “I love to work. All the Syrians 
are hardworking people”. Then, Rāfī reiterated that he decided to work as a driver because 
it was the most reliable way to get money in Egypt. Nevertheless, being a driver was not 
an easy occupation for Rāfī. He had difficulties memorising street names, routes, and 
easily got lost in Cairo. He had clients who left him waiting at the agreed meeting point 
in his car without an AC in the middle of the day, not telling him that they would be late 
and not answering their phones. However, when comparing this kind of work to staying 
at home unemployed, Rāfī said that he preferred hard work and tough working conditions; 
being at home without work would make him distressed and depressed. On one of our 
regular trips to 6th of October City, he joked that his children would be happy not to have 
him at home unemployed, because, feeling anxious and unsettled, he would be very strict 
with them and would compel them to study all day. Rāfī was even available during 
Ramadan and the time of ifṭār (fast breaking). He told me he would take a bottle of water 
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and a sandwich with him in case he was booked at the time of sunset. His strict work 
schedule, his availability at any time even in Ramadan, and the determination with which 
he practised street names and tried to memorise routes in Cairo made it clear to me that it 
was far from easy for a man with a completely different career background to make a 
living in Egypt. Despite all the challenges he faced starting from the scratch, Rāfī was 
full of new business ideas. He wanted to rent a car with an AC and in better condition to 
attract more passengers, and he eventually managed to find an Egyptian car owner who 
agreed to give him a newer car with an AC, albeit for a higher rent than the old one. The 
first time Rāfī picked me up with his new car, he was not only full of pride but also 
showed me his newest service: On getting into the car, I was offered water and biscuits. 
Rāfī believed that this service would improve the clients’ overall comfort during the 
journey and was surely a unique business idea. Rāfī’s aim for success through hard work 
echoes Schielke’s (2012) argument that success is a significant aspect of middle-classness 
and an important marker upon which the individual is judged. 
In contrast to Rāfī, who, despite his creativity, diligence and ingenuity, was 
always on the edge of being unable to provide for his family, Dāwūd had a more relaxing 
work routine in Cairo. Since arriving in Egypt, he had worked for several Egyptian 
organisations. The first time, I met Dāwūd close to his home in a branch of an 
international café chain that was frequented by foreigners and middle- and upper-class 
Egyptians. He described Syrians as energetic, despite the hardship they faced as non-
Egyptians seeking work in Egypt.  
“You need documents from the ministry of social affairs and you also need health 
insurance and a visa. These are the most necessary things for the non-Egyptian 
workers. There are some Egyptians who give work to Syrians but without 
contracts. Also, they make them work longer hours than the Egyptians. Their 
salary is less and I don’t want to say that they are ‘taking advantage’, but I see 
that the Syrians are better workers than the Egyptians. […] Some people opened 
restaurants and some people opened clothes shops. They are working in these 
fields because they already have experiences. You cannot work in something that 
you don’t know. A restaurant or a sweet shop or clothes shop, these types of shops 
are the main jobs that the Syrians do”.  
His sister Nūr added that she and her brother saw that Syrians were preferred by Egyptian 
employers because they would work more efficiently for the same payment, had a better 
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education and would not disagree with their employers. When I asked her why Syrians 
would not protest, Nūr simply answered: “because they cannot complain”. 
These ethnographic vignettes show the variety of experiences and challenges 
Syrians face as participants in the Egyptian labour market. The repeatedly mentioned a 
spirit of invention, creativity, hard work and new paths that were either perceived as a 
need for survival or as a characteristic that distinguished Syrian men from others, and 
reify a form of middle-class masculinity. Furthermore, the vignettes indicate the need to 
be able to handle hardship, precarity and an uncertain future, to challenge oneself by 
working in previously unknown professions, and the difficulty of coming to terms with 
the fact that all the effort might still not be enough to make ends meet for oneself and 
one’s family. Pride in one’s inventions and new ideas alternated with fear for one’s 
existence; the feeling to be better off in Egypt than somewhere else interchanged with 
anger about Egypt’s strict work and immigration laws.  
Several studies deal with men’s precarious working conditions and the effects on 
their lives. In the context of migrant men and refugees in Canada, it was found that 
exploitation, racism, prevention of job advancement and use of oppression in the 
workplace were widespread causing damage to men’s dignity (Austin and Este 2001: 
219). Nevertheless, out of fear of losing their jobs and being unemployed, migrant men 
predominantly accepted this treatment (ibid.: 220). Daniel Mains (2007: 661/662) found 
during his research among young, unemployed Ethiopian men, that engaging in low-
status employment changed one’s position in relation to others and thus acquired a new, 
less respectable, even shameful meaning. Working in inferior occupations meant to 
consciously place oneself at the bottom of levels of authority in exchange for money, and 
thus unemployment and waiting for a better job were often preferred. Bučaité-Vilké and 
Tereškinas (2016: 200), who conducted research among unemployed young Lithuanian 
men, found that a widening variety of identification, values and attitudes relating to work 
aggravated pressure on the individual. Precarity in the labour market, experienced when 
working in part-time, temporary or dead-end jobs, thus became more than an economic 
or political condition, but translated into a constant feeling of insecurity, instability and 
contingency for the individual. These studies together with the ethnographic material here 
demonstrate the vulnerability men encounter if their participation in the labour market is 
challenged. Nevertheless, they also show the energy men put into finding new professions 
and building new lives from scratch. 
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Working and studying at the same time 
 
Having focused on Syrian men’s experiences in the Egyptian labour market more 
generally, I now turn to young Syrian men who had interrupted school or university 
studies to work, or worked and studied at the same time in order to support their family. 
Their age and position in their life course defined their negotiations of masculinity.  
This was the case with Fādī, who should have been in his first year of university 
but had had to interrupt his education to support his family upon their arrival in Egypt. 
By the time I met him, he only worked occasionally as he had to prepare for his final 
school exams. One day, he took me to his workplace, a lingerie shop owned by a distant 
relative of his. While Fādī showed me around, a female customer interrupted our 
conversation in the shop asking for the best body-shaping underwear. In a professional 
tone and manner, he recommended one model and then referred her to his female 
colleague. Afterwards, while we were smoking argīle and playing tāwle (backgammon), 
he told me: “It is not my dream job. I would like to become a programming engineer. I 
find it embarrassing to work in this job because the girls who shop there flirt with me”. 
He described that coping with work while also studying for his final exams in high school 
made him feel “older” than his peers, and “impatient” and “depressed”, sensing that this 
double burden distinguished him from others. He said: “I feel that I am not supposed to 
handle of all of this”. Nevertheless, Fādī was also proud of his abilities to work and study 
at the same time: “Men should be strong. They are stronger than women. They should 
support the family. I work and study at the same time. This makes us men. We stand more 
than we can”.  
Taking into consideration what traditionally defines manhood in contrast to 
adolescence in many Middle Eastern contexts – namely, marriage, completed education, 
a professional career, fatherhood and knowledge about one’s society (see Ghannam 2013; 
Inhorn 2012; Peteet 1994) – Fādī cannot qualify as a man. He had not completed his 
education when he started working and was not able to save his income to move out of 
his parental home and get married. Nevertheless, in an environment with limited 
resources available, he spoke of the burden of simultaneous work and study as a threshold 
to manhood. He transformed the heavy workload he was facing on a day-to-day basis into 
a sign of masculinity and proof that he had transcended from boyhood to manhood.  
His perception of having grown up speaks to an argument put forward by 
anthropologist Jennifer Johnson-Hanks (2002: 868), who starts from the premise that life 
	 94 
trajectories do not only vary between people but also within an individual, since the 
individual is internally complex. She argues that adulthood is an “articulated composite” 
(ibid.: 865) consisting of multiple distinct statuses, depending on the respective social 
interaction, one’s resources and skills. Entry into adulthood is consequently not a single 
moment, but, rather a status that social actors can inhabit in specific interactive 
relationships (ibid.: 869). Another concept worth mentioning is Wentzell’s (2015: 179) 
‘composite masculinities’. She assumes that being a man demands different actions from 
the individual depending on the context. Masculinity is a composite collection of actions, 
attitudes and performances that are made to hang together and become a coherent image 
of the individual’s masculinity. She contends that men consciously weave materials 
available in their current life into a coherent, complete selfhood (ibid.). Fādī’s case 
suggests that masculine adulthood is not a complete status but one that depends on the 
social context and on the people before whom he defines it. 
Over the years, Fādī continued supporting his family through work in the 
baqāliyye (corner shop) his father bought in an affluent neighbourhood in Cairo, while at 
the same time studying. Once, at the end of 2016, when I had been back in the UK for a 
long time, we chatted about his workload on WhatsApp.  - Fādī: I am now in my second year at university studying engineering and I am 
working too. This is how I am spending my life (hayk ʿam qaḍy ḥayātī). - Magdalena: You are working a lot! - Fādī: yes, wallah Magdalena, I am tired but this is life. We need to exhaust 
ourselves in order to reach what we want (lazim nitʿab la-naḥṣal ‘ala al-shī illy 
bidnā). 
Fādī suggests a version of masculinity that expects of men to exhaust themselves to be 
successful in the labour market. This is an example of the constant hard work to reach 
security, stability and fulfilment that Schielke (2012; 2015) describes as a major aspect 
of being middle class and living one’s life in the future tense. 
I also discussed young men’s responsibilities with Muhannad. He was always 
busy studying for his exams in medical school or involved in organising events, planning 
future activities and raising funds for the NGO. As mentioned before, Muhannad’s family 
enjoyed very good living conditions in Cairo with his father being able to pay the high 
tuition fees at private universities for his children. Thus, Muhannad neither needed to 
work nor was he forced to interrupt his studies.  
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“I don’t work because I need money; I work because I feel that it is necessary that 
I work. As an adult guy, one should be able to take care of one’s family. Also, I 
should not remain a problem for my family. There are people who are spoiled and 
they are against working while studying”. 
Similar to Fādī, Muhannad describes work as a necessity of adult manhood. Not working 
as a grown-up male can only be condemned and looked down upon.  
Understanding masculine adulthood as an articulate composite consisting of 
multiple distinct statuses, and thus following Johnson-Hanks and Wentzell, helps to make 
sense of Fādī’s and Muhannad’s accounts in which they describe themselves as men in a 
specific social context, namely, when comparing themselves to other young Syrian men, 
who were not currently working and studying. Furthermore, these young men’s 
perceptions of work clearly show the importance of paid work and labour in order to be 
considered a mature man and thus reiterates the ideals of middle-class masculinity. 
 
Being a father during forced displacement  
 
While I used to spend a lot of time with Syrian male students, mostly in their early 
twenties, I also got to meet men who were fathers. After having met and talked to several 
older Syrian men who had children, I became interested in the impact the uprising and 
living in exile had on fatherhood. Again, I show in this paragraph that men’s position 
within their life course has a significant impact on their experiences and constructions of 
masculinities. 
Anthropologists have hinted at the interdependence of cultural and economic 
transformations in the ways men engage in parenting and understand their roles as fathers 
(see for example Gutmann (1996)). Marcia Inhorn et al. (2015: 7) suggest the term 
“emergent fatherhood” to highlight the various ways in which men respond as fathers to 
the processes and challenges of globalisation. This term is intended to capture the 
creativity, hybridity, instability, constructedness and dynamism that the researchers 
detect in discourses and practices of contemporary fatherhood. Like manhood, fatherhood 
is described as unstable, ever-changing and being dependent on the various social 
contexts men encounter in their everyday lives (ibid.). In the context of forced migration, 
scholars suggest that fatherhood based on men’s position as the family breadwinner might 
not be sustainable (Szczepanikova 2005: 285) and that being a father becomes central to 
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manhood in exile. Consequently, men frequently suffer from the challenge to be a ‘good’ 
parent during forced displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh 2010: 307). 
Generally, fathers were talked about with respect and with appreciation. They 
were the ones who did the right things for the families, made important decisions, had 
important roles to fulfil in various situations in life, supported their children for as long 
as possible, and were in most situations the backbone of the family. Layla, whose husband 
passed away when their children were adolescents, said the following about fathers from 
the perspective of a mother and wife: 
“Muḥammad [her husband], may God grant rest to his soul, passed away and it 
became very difficult for me because I had a doubled responsibility. Whenever I 
think of anything I wonder what he would have done if he were still alive. The 
father is very important in the house. It is a real mercy for the family to have a 
father. You can give half of the decisions to him. […] My son felt, after his father 
passed away that a pyramid collapsed in front of him”. 
Following her description, it can be argued that the father has an essential importance for 
the stability of the family and thus, assuming the role of a caring father comes with great 
respect. 
 Abū Walīd, a father of two boys in primary school, stressed that the life he had to 
live in Egypt did not allow him to be the father he aspired to be. He suffered from the 
feeling of being unable to protect his children. He told me that his son’s teacher wanted 
to be paid for giving him good marks, and that she used to beat his son. Abū Walīd felt 
that he could not complain, comply or protect his son from his teacher because he had no 
name, means, or network to rely on and no support to turn to in Egypt. He was driven by 
the fear that his inability to provide his children with what they asked for would harm 
their well-being: 
“I am working sixteen hours a day so that I can live in this country in a reasonable 
situation. […] If my children ask for something and I can’t provide them with it, 
it will cause them psychological damage. I am trying to answer their needs so that 
they don’t feel that they are missing anything”. 
Abū Walīd was mostly worried about his children’s future and their education. He seemed 
to feel that it was his failure as a father that he could not afford to send them to better 
schools: “I know that they won’t improve because I cannot afford to let them go to private 
schools”. Jaji’s (2009: 192) analysis of young refugee men in Kenya comes to mind, in 
which she argues that the painful situation for men in exile is often triggered by their 
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inability to live up to their pre-flight aspirations and interpretations of the concept of 
masculinity, in Abū Walīd’s case, fatherhood. Este and Tachble (2009: 460) describe that 
to Sudanese fathers in Canada fatherhood meant responsibility, commitment and care – 
notions that Abū Walīd felt he lacked as a father who faced the challenges of forced 
displacement. Due to his economically unstable situation, the poverty he lived in and the 
constant blackmailing he experienced, he could neither juggle with different registers of 
masculinity nor use fatherhood as a protective shield to boost his manhood like Abū 
Muḥammad and Firās. His inability to be the father he wanted to be made him feel 
depressed, guilty and inadequate. 
Not only fathers were conscious about changes in their role, sons also recognised 
these changes. Muhannad said:  
“Back in Syria the family was more confident with their son. If I had trouble I was 
sure that they would help me. This is not the case here. They tell you here: ‘if 
there is a ten-percent chance that something will cause problems then stay away 
from it. We don’t need problems.’ Families changed and started to put pressure 
on their sons. In the past, they were more relaxed. There was more security in the 
family. The worst feeling is if the son has a problem and his father has to watch 
him struggle and cannot do anything for him, or if the father has to force his 
children to leave school in order to help the family. From inside the father’s heart 
will be cut in pain. […] There are many actions they had to take and they didn’t 
want to do it”. 
There are two emergent themes in Muhannad’s narrative: On the one hand, he voiced a 
feeling of loss of safety and security because the family has broken away as his mainstay 
and protector in times of problems and trouble. On the other hand, he articulated 
compassion for fathers who have to observe their children struggling without being able 
to support them, or who even have to make their children’s life and future more 
challenging by taking them out of school. He can understand a father’s pain. His account 
echoes Rabo’s (2005) analysis of the interdependence of fathers and sons. Muhannad 
recognises that this father’s support has declined in Egypt and this affects his own life, 
since he can no longer take risky decisions. He clearly described that with the family’s 
move to Egypt, his father’s dominant, and at the same time reassuring, position shook 
and fractured. Furthermore, his statement is about love and care for each other and about 
the pain of seeing his father’s weakness. 
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 I will return to the theme of fatherhood in Chapter 6, where I address how Syrian 
men used their role as fathers strategically as an acceptable and respectable version of 
manhood when other forms of masculinities, such as militant masculinity, were not 
available to them.  
 
Facing unemployment in Egypt 
 
Work opportunities, work conditions and future perspectives dominated many 
conversations I had with Syrians in Egypt. Unemployment was often a topic of particular 
concern.  
The misfortune of unemployment for men during displacement is the focus of 
several academic articles. During her research among men who have been refused asylum 
in the UK, Melanie Griffiths (2015: 476/480) found that unemployment and poverty were 
associated with the stigma of idleness and dependency and contributed to a feeling of loss 
of control. Unemployment was also experienced as a disruption of normality, and the 
consequent vulnerability was a source of shame for many of the men she interviewed. 
Likewise, Rosemary Jaji (2009: 182) observed that young refugee men from the Great 
Lakes Region who settled in Kenya felt marginalised and unable to live up to their own 
standards of masculinity due to unemployment during their displacement. Unemployed 
men living with their families sensed that their roles as husband and father were 
undermined, especially if humanitarian organisations intervened, which caused them to 
feel inadequate, undignified and insecure (ibid.: 8/9). 
Wasīm, a social worker in a community centre for refugees, shared gossip with 
me that seemed to be present in every neighbourhood and was always about this one 
unsuccessful, male figure, who used to be a well-paid manager, doctor or engineer in 
Syria, but had not found adequate work in Egypt even though he tried, which made him 
eventually stay at home. Such stories circulated about a man ‘failing’ his family in Egypt 
despite his professional background in Syria, and while most Syrians appeared to feel 
sympathy for this unsuccessful man, a lack of understanding was also prevalent - 
especially if the consequence of not finding a job was for the man to stay at home. Wasīm 
talked mostly empathically about unemployed men: 
“There are some men, who just stay at home although some of them were 
managers of companies back in Syria. The husband of Sāmiya [a woman in the 
neighbourhood] was working in programming. He is not working now and when 
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he finds a job it is usually only a small job and usually the salary is not enough so 
until now he is staying at home. This puts a lot of pressure on him and on the 
family. I think that men are the neglected ones. The aid associations focus on 
children and women. No one looks at men. No one looks at their problems! It is 
correct that many men are working, however, I think that associations should 
focus on men that are older than thirty years. These people don’t work or study, 
they just stay at home which puts more pressure on them, especially, when he is 
at home and his wife is working instead of him or if he sits down and his brother 
in Saudi Arabia or the Emirates sends him money”.  
Wasīm describes how the experience of unemployment is aggravated if female relatives 
work instead of men or if they become the recipients of financial support from more 
affluent male relatives. In contrast, Qays, who talked to me predominantly in fuṣḥa, was 
less compassionate and generally characterised unemployed men as idle, dishonest, and 
wishing to live off others: 
“The majority of men could find jobs and men who didn’t find work are just trying 
to escape from work (wa man lam yagid ‘amalan huwwa yatharrab min al-‘amal). 
The Syrian in general is characterised by his ability to create job opportunities and 
to find economic solutions. I don’t recall that men ever had a problem finding 
work. We could find jobs for all the people who asked us. There are some Syrians, 
as it is the case in every society, who like to have privileges without working 
(yurīduna tagannub wa yurīd al-ḥusūl ‘ala al-imtiyāzāt bidūn ay muqābil bi-
suhūla)”. 
Qays not only looks down on unemployed Syrian men, but also denies them the status of 
Syrian, since, for him, good ‘Syrianness’ is defined through high work ethics, 
commitment and creativity.  
Another issue that came up in the form of gossip was the value of work. Abū 
Muḥammad, the father of four and owner of a corner shop in Cairo, told me disparagingly 
and indignantly about a Syrian man living in his neighbourhood, who decided that he 
would not work in Egypt if he could not earn more than 500 to 1,000 LE per month 
(approx. 60 – 110 US Dollars in 2015). Because of this man’s refusal to work, his children 
and wife had to provide for the family. Abū Muḥammad assumed that the man was not 
altogether sane, even though he excused such a sentiment as well, by saying that it was 
difficult for men, who used to be successful business owners back in Syria, to come to 
terms with the modest salary they would get for their labour in Egypt. Abū Muḥammad’s 
	 100 
narrative discussing the value of work echoes an observation by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and 
Qasmiyeh (2010: 308), who found that an asylum-seeking man in the UK they 
interviewed emphasised his productivity, even though he was engaged in voluntary and 
unpaid labour. They argued that their participant relocated the focus from being paid and 
being the breadwinner to being economically active, and that he turned his activity into a 
proof of his aim to regain his position in society and his family – none of which Abū 
Muḥammad’s contact did, and for which he was consequently criticised. 
The significance of gossip and judgement of men by other men that is prevalent 
among Syrians in Cairo echoes an argument by Nauja Kleist (2010:199), who analyses 
how Somali men in Europe restored and normalised their masculinity in conversations 
about other refugee men, who did not manage to adhere to what they defined as an ideal 
version of masculinity. By referring to a continuum between the poles of respected and 
failed masculinity, the norm was also established. Through speaking about other men who 
fail, Somali men managed to position themselves, sometimes emphatically and 
sometimes scornfully, at a distance from the abject prototype of man. Similarly, Syrian 
men I met in Cairo used gossip to distance themselves from the ‘failing’ unemployed 
Syrian man. Referring to the failing man put them automatically in a better position, 
whether or not they could maintain the prestige and status of their former employment in 
their new profession in Egypt. 
There was only a small number of men who had ‘no good reason’, such as illness 
or advanced age, and thus no excuse for not working and who were willing to talk to me. 
Often, it was through women I met during visits to various NGOs that I would hear about 
their husbands’ unemployment. This was the case with Um Bāsim, whom I introduced in 
the previous chapter. I got in touch with her through Um Khālid and I started to meet her 
regularly over several months. We usually met in her flat, however, whenever I visited 
her, her husband was not at home – or if he was, he would not appear. Um Bāsim told me 
when we met for the first time that her husband used to be a mu‘allim (boss) in Syria, a 
successful and influential businessman and owner of an ironworks, and that she did not 
have to work. When the family arrived in Cairo, he tried to run several business projects 
with different Egyptian partners but was tricked by all of them, which caused him to lose 
all of his savings. Since then, Um Bāsim’s husband had developed hearing difficulties, 
distractedness and bursts of rage and irritability. Um Bāsim and her children had to find 
ways to provide for the family. She and her daughter tried to establish themselves as 
hairdressers working from home and one of her sons worked in a car repair shop. Often, 
she would ask me if I could help her with the monthly rent or if I knew someone that I 
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could ask for financial support on her behalf. Knowing that the current situation was 
unbearable for her husband, Um Bāsim tried to protect him in front of others: “I don’t 
want to shame my husband by telling people that I am working. He was an important man 
in Syria”. Her reluctance to speak in public about the family’s poverty because of her 
husband’s former status in Syria shows the irreconcilability of their lives in Syria and in 
Egypt. Furthermore, Um Bāsim’s attempt to protect her husband echoes an observation 
by Farha Ghannam, who found that women used the authority of their husbands in their 
statements and acts in strategic ways. Often, they overemphasised their husband’s work 
and effort and undermined their own. Ghannam (2013: 76) comes to the conclusion that 
this behaviour helps support the standing of a man and that the woman in this case 
“garner[s] for him the kind of public recognition and legitimacy central to a masculine 
trajectory”. The encounter with Um Bāsim shows that she was aware of her ability to 
bestow on, or take away recognition from, her husband and that she tried to protect his 
reputation for as long as possible.  
However, it might not only be sorrow and pity for her husband that motivated her, 
but also that it somehow guaranteed some dignity for her and her children as well. This 
echoes an argument by Friederike Stolleis (2004: 30), who asserts that women in 
Damascus were cautious with what they shared about their own contribution to the 
household income. If they had admitted that their labour was significant for the family’s 
survival, they would have not only undermined their husband’s reputation but also their 
own. Likewise, Penny Vera-Sanso (2016: 92) argues that if men in South India are unable 
to provide for the family and their wives take over – which effectively feminises the man 
and masculinises his wife – the family has to be cautious about sharing this in public 
because having a feminised head of household “exposes the behaviour and status of 
family members to greater social scrutiny and negative commentary” (ibid.: 94).  
When I met Salīm (to whom I briefly referred in the introduction), I experienced 
a similar interaction in which women protected the ‘failing’ man in front of me. Salīm 
came to the office of an NGO where I spent the day volunteering. His clothes were worn 
out and dirty, his beard and hair needed cutting. After entering the office, he immediately 
asked for the food that the secretaries shared behind the desk and ate it eagerly. After his 
outburst of anger during our conversation, which I described as a painful experience in 
the introduction, he left, but not before making me promise to try to help him and his 
family. When he was gone, the Syrian women working as secretaries told me to be 
sympathetic: Salīm had been a respectable engineer in Syria and had lost everything when 
he came to Egypt, and at that time he could barely make ends meet. I was told by one of 
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them that I should understand that unemployment and the consequent struggle destroyed 
men’s psychological well-being and that I should not take his anger personally. Similar 
to what is described by Ghannam’s work and to what occurred to me when I visited Um 
Bāsim, the secretaries came to Salīm’s defence and appealed to me to understand the 
challenges he faced so as to better classify his reactions.  
Like Salīm and Abū Bāsim, Abū Nabīl was unable to provide for his family, 
although he chose a different way to hide this piece of information in public and from 
me. He was in his fifties and came to Cairo in 2012 with one of his wives and the two 
children he had with her. I met him in a shop selling orthopaedic shoes and medical 
supplies located in a dark side-corridor in one of the malls in 6th of October City, which 
belonged to an Egyptian businessman. The mall, the corridor and the shop itself had seen 
better days and it did not seem as if many customers found their way to it. The next time, 
I met Abū Nabīl at his flat where I was offered tea and juice and was introduced to his 
wife and daughters. Soon after these first meetings, Abū Nabīl began to ask me for money 
in order to give it to Syrian families he knew, who were in need of financial support. Um 
Khālid, who had put me in touch with Abū Nabīl, was the one who explained to me that 
through these requests Abū Nabīl was asking for financial support for himself, but was 
too shy and embarrassed to tell me that. She begged me not to reveal that I knew he was 
in dire need of money and that his story of providing for other families was made up. 
Thus, I did not challenge, though not without discomfort, his continuous requests for help 
and donations for poor and needy acquaintances. Once, Abū Nabīl asked me to get 
medication from an Egyptian pharmacist I knew, who had offered to help Syrians by 
selling his products at a huge discount. When I delivered the medication, Abū Nabīl’s 
wife opened the door and thanked me cheerfully for bringing the medication for Abū 
Nabīl’s mother. She obviously had no idea that Abū Nabīl asked me for money and 
support by positioning himself as a community leader helping Syrian families in need, 
rather than admitting that he could not afford the medication for his mother. 
And finally, there was Abū Khãlid. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he 
introduced himself to me as community leader and several times I gave him bags filled 
with clothes that a friend of mine had collected in the school where she was working. 
After one clothes donation, I met him and he was wearing one of the suits from the bags 
of clothes that he had promised to give to Syrian families in need. It made me wonder 
whether he himself was in need just like Abū Nabīl. He asked me for money for a Syrian 
family and I promised that I would try to ask for donations among Egyptian and German 
friends. The son of that family had cancer, he told me, and needed expensive treatment. 
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A couple of weeks later, I received a phone call from Abū Khālid asking to meet me 
urgently. Once we had sat down in a quiet café in 6th of October City, he told me that he 
himself needed the money which I had collected for the boy with cancer. He assured me 
that someone else had taken care of the boy and that he had helped so many families over 
the years and now it was his turn. He told me that he needed the money urgently to be 
able to meet his family in Turkey. He said that he was embarrassed to confess in front of 
his family that he did not have enough money for the ticket from Cairo to Istanbul. 
Furthermore, his wife needed to see a doctor and the whole family needed to find a way 
to settle down in Istanbul. During this time, I often chatted via Facebook with his son in 
Turkey. He said the following with regards to my interaction with his father: 
“Don't expect of someone like my father to tell you the truth about all the small 
details, especially in these days. it's considered embarrassing. […] I hope you 
don't misunderstand the fact that he wouldn't be able to be honest about these 
details and to tell you the truth more, even me I wouldn't like to talk about these 
details. we don't think it's like bad lying, but it's just something unnecessary to 
share… You wouldn't like someone to worry about you even if your things aren't 
100% okay, but if things are going well with you then you say to others that things 
are fine”. 
For Abū Nabīl and for Abū Khālid, it seemed most important to prove in public and in 
front of me that they were in control of the situation and that they were still able to provide 
for their family. There was an embarrassment related to admitting helplessness and the 
inability to get out of one’s situation independently that men seemed to avoid and 
circumvent for as long as possible; in Abū Nabil’s case, through hiding the truth about 
his desperate economic situation despite his efforts to work. This resonates with a study 
by Alice Szczepanikova (2010: 465) who argues that male and female refugees from the 
former Soviet Union in the Czech Republic considered it undignified for a man to ask for 
help from strangers and acknowledge his helplessness and dependency. This, she 
suggests, was related to a dominant idea that considers masculinity to be incompatible 
with asking for help (ibid.). As a result, men rarely approached the Czech aid 
organisations but sent their female family members instead. 
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Masculinising by referring to traditions and patriarchy  
 
While several scholars dealing with work and masculinity jump to the generalising 
conclusion that male unemployment leads to men seeking to assuage their dented 
masculinity through crime, violence, or drug use (see Bučaité-Vilké and Tereškinas 2016: 
201; Kabachnik et al. 2013), I argue that precarity in the labour market or unemployment 
lead to far more nuanced reactions from Syrian men. One of these was the constant 
referral to Syrian patriarchal ‘traditions’ and customs. Majd said: 
“In our tradition, it’s shameful if the woman is responsible for providing money 
for the house. This is shameful for the man. If she wants to work because she 
wants to go out and get to know people, it’s okay. However, if she has to pay for 
the flat – no, if she has to buy the house – no, if she has to pay for her clothes – 
no, if she has to pay for her gold – no. This is the man’s responsibility”.  
I heard statements like this one idealising ‘traditional’ gender relations in a patriarchal 
system and naturalising men in the provider position and women in the position of the 
weak and privileged in need of manly protection, when I asked Syrian men about Syrian 
women’s participation in the Egyptian and the Syrian labour markets. By patriarchy, I 
mean a system of gender relations that is organised around the senior man’s position of 
superiority over all women and younger men of the family. The man is responsible for 
the honour of the women in his family (Kandiyoti 1988: 278/279). A system of patriarchy 
keeps functioning because of the use of kinship structures, morality, and idioms as its 
legitimation. Furthermore, patriarchy should be understood as intersecting with 
nationality, class or ethnicity (Joseph 1993: 459/460).  
As suggested by Majd, the dominant discourse that determined work as men’s 
responsibility was based on the notion that Syrian women had the luxury of staying at 
home and taking care of the children. Working for pleasure, self-education or networking 
was acceptable, but a woman’s financial contribution to the household translated into 
shame for her husband. Rabo (2005: 21) comes to a similar conclusion; she found that 
the ideal for most Aleppians, male and female, was that women should not be employed, 
nor have their own enterprise, nor work in other ways for money. The common perception 
was that a woman had the right to be supported by her husband, which means that he must 
feed the family and do the shopping. In return, it is the woman’s obligation to create a 
home.  
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Since gender provides a way of articulating and naturalising differences and 
inequalities, class is deeply gendered (Scott 1999: 60). The image of complementary 
masculinity and femininity is not only prevalent in Syria but can be traced to the rise of 
the British middle class in the 19th century and is deeply engrained in a global culture of 
middle-classness and lifestyle that idealises the position of women in the home (see 
Radhakrishnan 2009: 199) For the middle class, respectable femininity confined to the 
home constitutes a crucial element of symbolic capital (ibid.: 201). It can be found in 
various parts of the world, such as in South India, where Penny Vera-Sanso (2016: 80) 
observed that masculinity and femininity were used as ‘metaphors’ by various actors to 
attribute hierarchically structured values, to create and discipline subjectivities and to 
naturalise relations of inequality. She observed that in South India masculinity is defined 
through the provision of food while dependents can simply sit and eat. Men claim their 
right to pay for food by referring to the complementarity of sex roles, social expectations, 
and biology. If men are unable to provide for and feed their family, for example, because 
of unemployment due to age discrimination in the labour market, what lies in wait for 
them is feminisation. According to Henrieke Donner’s (2015: 137) ethnography on the 
Indian middle class in Kolkata, the aim of highlighting conservative gender roles is to 
distinguish oneself from those above and below. She observes that working middle-class 
women aim to separate themselves from working lower-class women by stressing that 
working-class women need paid employment and only work in specific professions (ibid.: 
138).  
In a conversation I had with Sāmir, the director of the Syrian programme in an 
influential NGO, he spoke about an approach suggested by a Western donor organisation 
directed at Syrian women, which he strongly condemned. The donor organisation had 
announced that it would support Syrian women who submitted ideas for business plans 
aimed at earning an income. Indignantly, Sāmir said: 
“It is as if you asked a child to hold 100 kg. If you ask a man to hold 100 kg, he 
will find it hard, but a child will not be able to do it at all. In Syria, women took 
care of their husbands and children only and now they are supposed to come up 
with business ideas. In Syria, it’s not appreciated to have a wife that works”. 
As Sāmir explained, Syrian women were not able to stand up to the responsibility because 
they had not been exposed to work in Syria. The ability to work is, in his account, 
comparable to bodily strength that women simply lack. Despite his professional 
knowledge of the conditions of Syrian refugees in Egypt, Sāmir tried to keep patriarchy 
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intact and ignored the fact that many women in Egypt have in fact started working. 
Instead, he portrayed women’s labour as simply impossible and additionally 
unappreciated.  
For Muhannad, the incompatibility of Syrianness and female labour was a 
unifying aspect, a way the Syrian community came to imagine itself: “For us as Syrian 
society, the common thing is that the girl doesn’t work. […] In Syria, the girl is sitt al-
bayt (the lady of the house)”. According to him, communality is created based on the idea 
that women’s participation in the labour market was not part of the Syrian identity. He 
continued: 
“I told you that a high percentage of Syrians don’t like that, even if he is about to 
die from hunger, to ask his wife or sister to go to work. He finds it difficult to 
request money from her or her family. For us, it is a big shame (‘ayb), if I don’t 
spend for the family. Even if I am dying from hunger I rather choose to die. 
Likewise, if I receive a guest I should be generous with him even if I don’t have 
anything. Poverty is not a shame, but the mistakes are a shame”. 
Muhannad speaks in idealised terms about masculine responsibility, and women’s lack 
of responsibility, for the household income. He himself had not experienced poverty and 
thus spoke from a privileged position describing women’s contribution to the household 
as disgrace and failure.  
It is noteworthy that Majd, Muhannad and Sāmir all referred to some form of 
‘tradition’, past, culture or life back in Syria organised through patriarchy to define 
women’s position in Syrian society. They seem to turn to these terms in order to gain 
more credibility and give their statements more weight. According to Mary Ann Tétreault 
(2000: 75), tradition creates “images of timelessness and subjection” implying that 
people’s positions in life are determined by certain essential qualities. However, tradition 
is never as static and fixed as it is presented. Rather, it is “constituted as it is lived and 
used” (Ratele 2013: 148). It “takes and strips form and content, and is charged by different 
meanings in the mouth of different actors” (Monterescu 2006: 139). Several scholars (see 
Ratele 2013; Kleist 2010; Sideris 2004; Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985) have noted how 
men make use of tradition to guarantee and preserve their dominant position over women. 
Kleist (2010: 199) observed that Somali men in the diaspora used a rhetoric that 
naturalised certain versions of culture and tradition and failed to highlight the processes 
through which these have come to be seen as dominant. Kopano Ratele (2013: 151) 
highlights that men’s turn towards tradition might in fact signal the insecurity of the 
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dominant group within traditions (ibid.). And for the context of patriarchy, Deniz 
Kandiyoti (2013) suggests that in case ‘patriarchy-as-usual’ is no longer secured, it comes 
to a process of ‘masculinist restoration’, during which higher levels of coercion and 
violence are exercised and more varied ideological state apparatuses are employed to 
ensure its reproduction. Based on these authors, I suggest that Majd and other Syrian men 
in Egypt referred to Syrian tradition and culture in order to put their claims for masculine 
domination on stable ground and to restore a certain version of patriarchal order. I suggest 
that turning to tradition and restoration of patriarchy makes sense during forced 
displacement in which gender relations and patriarchal structures are inherently unstable 
and subject to change.  
Despite Syrian men’s attempts to ignore and downplay women’s work, Syrian 
women were visibly engaging in different forms of employment in Egypt. I met Syrian 
women who worked as primary school and kindergarten teachers, social workers, 
hairdressers and secretaries, and I got in touch with several women selling home-cooked 
food on the street on a daily basis. In some areas, Syrian women were also begging in the 
streets. Catherine Brun (2000) describes the negotiation of women’s roles in the labour 
market in her analysis of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. She argues that men’s self-
perception of being the main breadwinner of the family did not change despite women’s 
rising contribution to the household income. Rather, women’s changing practices with 
regards to work became a symbol for men’s inadequacies, and women’s presence in the 
labour market would not have been approved if men had been able to provide for the 
family on their own (ibid.: 11). Likewise, Kamran Ali (2003: 331) who analysed Egyptian 
working-class life argues that for working-class men in Egypt employment was 
considered the only source of male dignity and consequently women’s participation in 
the labour market to ensure the family’s survival destabilised men’s role as the provider 
and challenged their authority within the family. Thus, I suggest that men do not only try 
to restore ‘patriarchy-as-usual’, but to similarly save their class position to which 
women’s role in the household is highly important. 
Muhannad, Sāmir and Majd ignored the fact that Syrian women were present and 
visible in the Egyptian labour market. Instead, they kept referring to an idealised version 
of gender relations, in which men remained the main and sole breadwinner while women 
could stay at home. They masculinised against women by defining women as weak and 
themselves as their ‘natural’ and ‘traditional’ protectors and providers. When bringing 
together the analysis of masculinity, femininity and tradition, Connell’s classic concept 
of hegemonic masculinity is useful again. She argues that the relationships within gender 
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are defined by the relationships between genders. Masculinities and femininities are 
produced together through their contact with each other in the process that constitutes a 
gender order (Connell 1998: 7). Gender is relational and notions of masculinity are 
defined in contradistinction from some model of femininity (Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005: 848). Women’s position in society is thus extremely relevant to constructions of 
masculinity and to constructions of class belonging.  
 
Perceptions of Syrian working women 
 
Syrian women in Egypt were not only visibly working in Cairo’s streets, NGOs and 
schools, they also described themselves and others as working women. When talking with 
Syrian women who attended my English classes or when I was invited to a women’s 
gathering, there were frequent discussions about work that altered the picture presented 
to me by most Syrian men. Some Syrian women told me that they were indeed working 
for the first time in Cairo, and would have not started working had their family’s 
economic conditions not forced them to do so. Others had held jobs as teachers, 
accountants or secretaries in Syria. Most women agreed that in Syria a woman would not 
be seen cleaning the streets or working in a shop, which reflected their middle-class 
backgrounds, but they indicated that there was nothing unusual about the notion of 
working women in and of itself.  
Existing literature (that is mostly outdated) on women in the Syrian labour market 
points to the importance of taking into consideration a woman’s class background. 
According to official numbers summarised by Shaaban (1998: 111), women made up 
twenty-one percent of employees working for the Syrian government and constituted a 
third of the labour force in the agricultural sector in the 1990s. However, Shaaban (ibid.: 
112) doubts the latter number assuming that women constituted fifty percent of the 
workforce in rural areas but were neither officially recognised, nor had access to the 
attendant benefits, such as independent income, pension or a role in management. Rabo 
(1996: 162) goes as far as to call rural women in most Syrian regions the backbone of the 
labour force. Furthermore, she highlights that it was well known and accepted that poor, 
uneducated women worked as house cleaners or engaged in work from home, which was 
usually low-paid, and mainly textile-related, farmed-out work (Rabo 2005). For women 
from the Syrian upper class, however, work was a way to see and be seen. Young, single, 
upper-class women rarely worked to become self-sufficient and to set up an independent 
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household; work was rather a venue for display with the aim to secure a successful future 
as a married woman (Salamandra 2004: 52). For married women, work functioned as an 
opportunity to gain social contacts and exhibit their husbands’ affection and economic 
status through their outward appearance (ibid.).  
Layla, the widow and mother of two teenagers, who always stressed her family’s 
middle-class background, said the following with regards to women’s position in the 
family and in the labour market in Syria: 
“The woman in Syria was very precious […]. The woman only works if she wants 
to and only in a good job. According to our traditions, the woman is allowed to 
work and can go out and to do whatever she wants, but all of that was optional for 
her. If she wants to work then she works, if she wants to practise her hobbies or 
teach, she can do that. She had the freedom to do whatever she wants, but her role 
here in Egypt of course has changed”. 
She continued: “The woman in our homeland is honoured (al-marā’a ‘annā mukarama). 
The husband does everything. Everything is done by the husband or the brother or the 
son. The girl at her family's house gets whatever she wants”. Layla reiterated what most 
Syrian men I met said. She referred to the Syrian tradition, the patriarchal order of the 
Syrian middle class that guaranteed women’s precious, valued and honoured position in 
Syrian society. Thus, she created a middle-class masculinity and femininity that gave men 
the responsibility to provide and women the privilege to choose whether they wanted to 
work or not. 
While most Syrian men’s description of women working in Syria was rigid, static 
and clear, some of them reluctantly acknowledged that women’s situation had changed 
and that some women were indeed engaged in work in Egypt. Rāfī, for instance, proposed 
on one of our trips to 6th of October City that his wife could cook Syrian dishes for me. 
He explained that she would cook for Egyptian clients occasionally and justified this by 
saying that she would simply love to work, just as all the Syrian people would love to 
work. He also mentioned that she could keep the money for herself while he was in charge 
of providing for her and the children. Interestingly, the narrative he used resonates with 
Stolleis’ (2004: 30) analysis of middle- and upper-class working women in Syria, 
mentioned before. Rāfī uses the same line of argumentation as the women Stolleis met in 
Damascus, who commonly underlined that they were not forced to work, that their 
husbands had a good income, and that they could keep their income for personal expenses, 
knowing that it could damage their reputation if they confessed that their husbands did 
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not earn enough to provide for the family. Rāfī’s way of introducing his wife’s work did 
not only seem to protect his wife’s reputation but also his own, assuring me that it was 
his wife’s will, personal freedom and love for work that made her start cooking, while he 
was still in charge of providing for her and his three children.  
Qutayba acknowledged women’s participation in the labour market, as well. He 
told me that he recognised women’s presence as street vendors in Cairo’s streets, which 
was a sharp contrast to women’s labour in his home town. There, women rarely worked 
and if they did, they worked as teachers. Qutayba said that he had a hard time accepting 
seeing Syrian women working in the street. Once, he saw a teenage girl from his home 
town selling food in the streets. While her family used to have a good standard of living 
back in Syria, here, she had to carry her wares and surely had to endure sexual harassment 
from Egyptian men. He also believed that Egyptian men would consider her to be a 
prostitute.  
Only a few Syrian men, among them Abū Walīd, whose wife worked as a 
kindergarten teacher, expressed a positive perception of the developments that made more 
and more Syrian women start working in Egypt. 
“Women became stronger. What happened in the country made them rely on 
themselves. My wife didn’t use to buy anything on her own. I used to buy 
everything for her. In Syrian society, a woman can work, she can be employed, 
she can go to university, but according to the majority of the people, the man 
should provide for everything. He should buy everything for her. Any time she 
goes out, the husband should pay for it and in addition to that, she sometimes 
doesn’t know the names of the streets. But this situation here obligates them to 
rely on themselves. So, they started to go out buy themselves and make decisions. 
The whole thing helped them in general. They were tortured by the situation but 
it made them stronger, so they started to know how to make a decision. Speaking 
about my wife and my sister and the people around me, they all changed 180 
degrees. They became stronger. 
Abū Walīd recognised a change in women’s attitudes and was one of the few men I met 
who seemed to welcome his wife’s increased autonomy and self-confidence. 
Making sense of Syrian women working in Egypt seemed to have evoked in 
several men the need to downplay or straightforwardly ignore their presence. Only 
reluctantly did men acknowledge Syrian women’s contribution to the labour market 
because it threatened to challenge their middle-class masculinity and position in the 
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patriarchal order that was already challenged because of their unstable working 
conditions. The overriding wish appeared to be to put women in their place based on 
men’s difficulty in making sense of changing gender roles and a change to ‘patriarchy-
as-usual’. Women’s work rarely had a positive connotation. 
 
Building masculinity on women’s ascribed weakness 
 
When spending time with young Syrian men, I observed that they used another strategy 
to masculinise against women: they described women as being unable to live the life they 
as bachelors lived on their own in Cairo. Hānī, the medical student, said the following 
when we were discussing that he lived without his family in Cairo: 
“If I don’t want to cook, I order food from the restaurant. Food is not so important. 
For the guy, it’s normal, but a girl might care more about what she wants to eat. 
It’s not like a family or like a woman, who has children and she is alone and she 
needs someone to help her. If you are a man alone, you can manage. Maybe for 
her, if she will marry without rights, it’s better for her than to stay alone. It’s better 
than staying alone and the people disturb her. There are really bad people. But for 
the guy he can do anything: he can eat, not eat, sleep, not sleep. And if he cooks 
and the food is bad, he can eat it without problems.  
Hani takes women’s ‘pickiness’ with regards to food and sleep and her inability to defend 
herself against harassment as a proof of men’s strength and endurance in times of 
hardship. He also takes it as a reason to justify living in an unfair, unwanted marriage. 
The version of masculinity he creates achieves meaning and depends on the contrasting 
definition of femininity and is again a way of finding positive aspects in ‘patriarchy-as-
usual’. Likewise, Majd differentiated between men and women’s varying resiliences. 
“Dealing with the girls in the Syrian families is the same as before, but they are a 
bit more concerned about them because of the situation in the country. The nature 
of the country here is strange. If the guy goes out, something will happen to him. 
If it happens to a guy, for sure it will happen to a girl”. 
Akram, an Arabic primary school teacher in his late twenties who lived by himself in 6th 
of October City, related women and men’s ‘naturally’ different capabilities to adapt and 
women’s assumed weakness to men’s enhanced responsibilities for women’s safety: 
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“In Syria, she goes out and buys the things herself – here no! she can meet my 
family and get to know them. In Syria, the girl would have lived among my family, 
but here I don’t really know the people who are around me. So, I stay with her at 
home. If we need food, I will go to bring it. If she wants to go out with my sisters 
or friends, I’ll bring her out. The important thing is the unknown fear and the 
absence of security here in Egypt, but it is the responsibility of a man”. 
In contrast to Abū Walīd who argued that men in Syria had immense duties, Akram 
described how the hostility of the unknown place they lived in, increased women’s 
dependence on men’s support. 
The following quote by Frank Barrett, who conducted research in the US navy, 
resonates with the accounts I collected from Syrian men dealing with women’s ‘natural 
weakness’: 
“Masculinity achieves meaning within patterns of differences. If success for men 
is associated with “not quitting” in the face of hardships, femininity becomes 
associated with quitting, complaining, and weakness. This follows Kimmel’s 
(1994) notion that definitions of masculinity depend on changing definitions of 
women and gay men who serve as the “others” against which heterosexual men 
construct and project an identity (Barrett 1996: 133).  
Barrett observed that women who joined the US navy became associated with weakness, 
lack of will and bodily strength in the accounts of male officers. He found that a general 
consensus was created that defined a bodily and psychological difference between male 
and female sailors. What these men engage in, he argued, was a devaluation of women 
through which to define their own masculinity. In a similar vein, young Syrian men 
managed to gain masculine capital by describing that they were able to live on their own, 
that they could eat bad food, and that they could survive on the street on their own, while 
they stressed that Syrian women were unable to do so, and thus needed constant support 
from men.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the Egyptian labour market, Syrian men faced difficulties in reclaiming their middle-
class masculinity. They were confronted with the pain of starting again from scratch, of 
status loss, and an inability to prove one’s skills, and they experienced humiliation, 
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dependency on others and vulnerability in the labour market. Unemployment was 
especially feared and considered to be the opposite of proper manhood. Hence, several 
Syrian men who interacted with me could not admit their inability to provide and were 
instead hiding this from me – if necessary, by circumventing the truth.  
The first part of this chapter described Syrian men’s sense of pride and shame and 
showed how most men found it difficult to put their middle-class masculinity, essentially 
built on providing, on stable ground, while the second part of this chapter illustrated 
several strategies men applied to reclaim their middle-class manhood. One of these 
strategies was men’s engagement in judging others and demarcating themselves from 
them. The circulation of gossip and the judgement of unsuccessful Syrian men in Egypt 
also involved the fear of being judged, exposed and humiliated one day.  
Adopting another strategy, Syrian men marked the labour market as male territory 
and fought to keep the ability to define themselves as hard-working providers, protectors, 
and as stronger in times of hardship. In order to do so, they highlighted women’s role in 
the household and their presumed weakness. Women had no space in these territories and 
the harsh application of a black-and-white-model of complementary gender ideals proves 
that. Moreover, denying the position of breadwinner to women seemed be a way to avoid 
admitting that women did not need them as much as men wanted to be needed. By 
highlighting that women were better off in the household, Syrian men managed to 
effectively undermine women’s power and self-worth and did not need to imagine 
whether the construct of the strong, able man and the weak woman was indeed an illusion.  
 This chapter shows the enormous value Syrian men gave to the ideal of the male 
provider role, even if this role is contradicted by facts. Men, at various stages of their life, 
were guided by an urgency to uphold and hold onto being the patriarch. No matter if they 
were at the threshold of adulthood or struggled with their role as fathers and sons, Syrian 
men made an effort to conform to the role of provider in their narratives, interactions and 
decisions. With its focus on fathers and youths specifically, and men of working age more 
generally, this chapter emphasises the significance of analysing masculinity from an 
intersectional lens that pays attention to a man’s position within his life course as well as 
his marital and parental status. 
In this chapter, I applied several classic concepts of masculinity studies and found 
them relevant and useful. To reinstate masculinity there was again (as in Chapter 2) a 
need for the ‘other’, as well as a need for the ‘weak woman’ and a need for references to 
patriarchal traditions. As illustrated, these arguments echo the works of Connell, Kimmel 
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and Barrett. A finding of this chapter that might add to the classical concepts is that men 
jumped between different strategies and discourses when and how it suited them.  
	 115 
Chapter 4 – Of Misrecognition, Love and Fury  
or Loss of status and ‘groom-ability’: Making sense of changes in marriage 
negotiations 
 
“It’s too early to think about [marriage]. The situation is difficult so it will be 
delayed. In Syria, it was possible because there was a house and a car, but here I 
don’t have this idea”. 
Bashār said this to me when we sat together with Hānī and Māzin in Māzin’s family’s 
flat. We were talking about marriage and whether they were thinking about finding a 
spouse and getting married at that point in time in Egypt. As young men in their mid-
twenties almost at the end of their studies, it would have been the ‘right’ time to start 
considering marriage – at least in pre-2011 Syria. Bashār’s response includes several 
aspects that also came up in conversations I had with other single Syrian men in their late 
twenties or early thirties: acknowledgement of displacement as a difficult and exhausting 
situation, referring to the capital and status they held in Syria that would have made it 
possible to get married, and the inability to think about marriage in their current situation 
in Egypt. Overall, I sensed, when spending time with Syrian men of this age group that 
the topic of marriage was a heavy burden on them. I was told that the engagement and 
marriage procedures that were prevalent in Syria had changed since they had come to live 
in Egypt, and that they had to find a way to deal with these changes if they did not want 
to delay their marriage.  
This chapter deals with the changes in marriage patterns experienced and 
observed by Syrian men in Egypt. Furthermore, I discuss the issue of loss of status and 
capital that were most visible in the context of marriage. Because of displacement, Syrian 
men asking for a woman’s hand in marriage frequently experienced misrecognition based 
on the in-laws’ lack of knowledge of the groom’s former status. Love and the 
development of a marital relationship were directly related to one’s economic stability 
and future perspectives, and consequently it was not only the groom’s lost symbolic 
capital but also his economic capital that hampered the marriage process. Another aspect 
that warrants analysis is the marriage of Syrian women to Egyptian men. Syrian men had 
difficulty accepting this situation and blamed Syrian women’s weakness for 
intermarriages. 
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Remembering marriage traditions in Syria 
 
Um Māzin and Abū Māzin, whom I visited regularly in their modest flat, had been 
married for almost forty years and happily shared with me the story of how they met, 
became engaged and were married, which was intertwined with the experience of when 
their daughter got married in Syria ten years ago. They were both in their sixties and due 
to their unstable health conditions were unable to often leave the flat. Abū Māzin used to 
work at an electricity company owned by the Syrian state and Um Māzin took care of 
their, now grown-up, children. Um Māzin told me almost every time I met her about the 
possessions and social position they previously had in Syria. She frequently spoke about 
their real estate properties in the city they came from, in the countryside and at the beach. 
Abū Māzin talked extensively about his social life and his political and voluntary work 
at the communal level in his home town. Once he proudly showed me a business card 
indicating that he was member of a political party in the city he came from, which he 
pulled out of an otherwise empty wallet and carefully put back after I had looked at it.  
 When I asked them about their engagement and marriage, Um Māzin recalled how 
sharing a house with the family was the norm for newlyweds forty years ago, whereas 
nowadays brides would ask for a house of their own, a car, a chalet and a lot of gold. As 
well as Um Māzin describing today’s importance placed on possessions and consumer 
goods, Maḥmūd also made it very clear to me what was expected of him as a groom: 
“there are three keys to marriage: a house, a car, and a shop”. 
Their wedding celebration was modest, Um Māzin said, with home-made food 
and a party in the house of the groom, while “nowadays the party takes place in a hall and 
costs a lot more”. When I asked them how young men could pay for all these expenses, 
Abū Māzin explained that the family of the groom would usually step in to support him 
financially. Their engagement period was short, Um Māzin continued to explain, because 
they were related and already knew each other. Their marriage was arranged, she said, 
since until now, “men prefer that the family chooses”. Abū Māzin added that the main 
criterion for choosing a suitable spouse was the family’s reputation: “even if he only has 
little money we care the most about his family background”. He cited a Syrian proverb to 
illustrate expectations in a future spouse: “Don’t be afraid of someone who got hungry 
after he had been sated, instead fear the one who is sated after he was hungry (La takhāf 
min al-shabʿān idha jāʿa. khāf min al-jūʿān idha shabʿa)”. According to this proverb, the 
poor man is not trustworthy while the noble man remains noble and keeps his manners 
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and morals, even if he encounters problems. Abū Māzin said that this proverb meant that 
the prospective spouse should not be from a poor family because he or she could turn out 
to be greedy once he or she had access to wealth. There is an immanent relation to class 
formation and frontiers that could be read into this proverb. The way Abū Māzin uses it 
describes a lack of trust and respect for people from a lower-class background, who are 
seemingly eternally marked by their poor background. In order to find out whether the 
family of the potential spouse fit the criteria and was suitable for marriage, fathers would 
ask around among neighbours and friends, Um Māzin explained. Again, Abū Māzin made 
use of a proverb to explain the situation to me: “Each person considers his colleague an 
idol”, meaning that one’s choice of friends and acquaintances speaks volumes about one’s 
morals, interests and educational background.  
Abū Māzin’s ascription of utmost importance to the reputation of the groom’s 
family and the inquiry taking place in the social circle of the groom resonate with Rabo’s 
(2005: 80) finding that, among Aleppian traders, the family name, the name of the father, 
the quarter where one lives and where the father grew up establish a frame of reference 
by which the potential groom gets socially classified. The more that is known about the 
family of the groom or the bride, the more one is able to vouch for the character of the 
individual (ibid.: 90). Likewise, Salamandra (2004: 41) describes how the place of 
residence in Damascus is linked to the status of the people who inhabit it. What is 
described here is the individual’s ‘symbolic capital’ – assets like public 
acknowledgement, recognition and honour, perceived by others as “self-evident” and 
permanent (Bourdieu 1985: 731). Diane Reay (2004: 57/58), who engages in a feminist 
analysis of Bourdieu’s work, writes, “symbolic capital is manifested in individual prestige 
and personal qualities, such as authority and charisma”. A Syrian man can acquire these 
characteristics through his name, place of residence and his family’s reputation. 
Certain aspects of the engagement process in Syria are entirely female-dominated. 
However, women only search for a potential bride on behalf of a marriageable bachelor, 
not vice versa (Stolleis 2004: 152). Girls and their mothers ought to wait for offers. If 
boys and girls find someone without the help of relatives, both families must be convinced 
of the suitability of the arrangement. Young men usually depend on the financial support 
of their fathers and the young woman’s family needs assurance that their daughter will 
have a standard of living similar to what she is accustomed to at home (Rabo 2005: 
89/90). Um Māzin explained that usually it would be hinted to the mother of a son that 
there was a girl of marriageable age suitable for her son. Thereafter, the mother of the 
groom would go and meet the girl and her family.  
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“She makes an appointment by phone and then she goes to see the girl. When she 
enters, the girl brings her coffee. The girl offers the coffee to her, then, she leaves. 
[…] The mother of the groom returns to her house and tells her son that the family 
is good and the girl is pretty. Then, the mother makes another phone call and tells 
the other family: ‘I liked the situation. Can I bring my son to see her?’”. 
After the first official encounter of bride and groom-to-be, both families make a deal 
about the mahr and how the couple will live. The mahr is a transaction from the groom 
and his household to the bride’s family. The amount is agreed on before the engagement 
and is paid before the wedding (Kastrinou 2016: 104). The mahr is usually divided into 
two parts: the first one is the prompt mahr (muqaddam) to be paid at the time of marriage, 
the second one is the deferred mahr (muʾajjal/muʾakhir) that is paid upon the dissolution 
of the marriage by death or divorce (Fournier 2013: 141). The amount of the mahr is of 
great significance because it is commonly understood to confirm the ‘value’ of the bride 
(see Rabo 2005: 87).  
In the case of Um Māzin’s daughter, the engagement period was introduced 
through katb al-kitāb (signing of the marriage contract). Afterwards, the couple had the 
chance to get to know each other: they went to cafés together and the groom visited the 
home of his future parents-in-law frequently. Over the time of the engagement, Um 
Māzin’s daughter received many gifts, such as gold jewellery, from her fiancé. Gift-
giving, especially of gold, plays an important role in the context of marriage in most parts 
of the Arab world (see Singerman 2007; Moors 2003, Hoodfar 1997). The wedding 
process is then completed by the wedding party (faraḥ in Egypt/‘urs in Syria) and the 
consummation of the marriage (dukhla). Similar wedding customs, habits and 
negotiations are described for Egypt (see Ghanam 2013; Hoodfar 1997) and other parts 
of the Middle East (e.g. Mundy 1995).  
Firās, a married man in his mid-thirties, engaged in a discussion about his wedding 
with me when I met him through my friend Maḥmūd, who had invited Firās to help me 
with my research. Firās unexpectedly brought Yāsmīn along, who was approximately of 
the same age, even though I could only guess because she gave different hints about her 
situation, marital status and family background throughout our meeting. They had 
obviously met only recently. She did not know Firās’ actual name and called him 
‘Aḥmad’ throughout the conversation. Maḥmūd was irritated by her presence but tried to 
be a polite host. Over the course of the evening we spent together, I found out that Yāsmīn 
and Firās had met through their mutual search for a trafficker who could bring them across 
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the Mediterranean to Europe, where they were planning to seek asylum. Our conversation 
was guided by their countless questions about visa procedures in Germany but soon 
turned to their life in Syria. Yāsmīn, who was from a rural town in the east of Syria, 
frequently mocked Firās, who was from Damascus, for what she perceived as snobbery 
and an ignorance about life back in Syria. She related his unawareness to his class status 
and to the fact that he was born ‘with a silver spoon in his mouth’ (huwwa mawlūd wa fī 
batmuhu mala‘aqa min fiḍa’)5 meaning that he was born rich and privileged. Firās said 
the following, regarding his wedding: - Firās: My wedding was for a big amount of money: 120,000 Dollars. It was for 
the house, the mahr and everything else. When I got married, I bought a house in 
Damascus and I furnished it and I rented a wedding hall for 8,000 Dollars. For the 
honeymoon, we went to Turkey. So, all in all it was for 120,000 Dollars. I paid 
for everything. The woman in Damascus has a value, so she doesn’t pay for 
anything. She is more respected than the Egyptian woman…  - Yāsmīn: What do you mean? Are you saying that in [my hometown] they don’t 
value a girl? - Firās: … It was a family engagement. These are the old traditions. My mother 
went out to see girls and when she liked a girl she told me and then I went to see 
her. I was engaged for two years so we could get to know each other. At the 
beginning, she was a stranger to me so you should spend time with her to get to 
know her. After two years, we made the deal (iʿtamadnā). Getting married in 
Damascus is very challenging. - Yāsmīn: Is it a commercial thing? Is it marriage or trade? - Firās: In these days, it has become a little bit like trade. - Maḥmūd: Yes, it became a trade in Syria. In Egypt, it is the same. 
Firās’ account confirms the financial burden traditionally put on the shoulders of the 
groom’s family and also shows his pride in having been able to fulfil these expectations. 
His wealth and level of consumption play an important role in the way Firās described 
his wedding. Moreover, Firās directly relates the woman’s value to the man’s ability to 
pay for all the expenses and is challenged for this statement. Maḥmūd told me after Firās 
and Yāsmīn had left that he was shocked by the amount of money his friend had spent. 
																																																						
5 In Syria, it is more common to say: “he was born with a golden spoon in his mouth” (huwwa mawlūd wa fī batmuhu 
mala‘aqa min dhahab).  
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Where he comes from, he said, it used to be possible to think about marriage when a man 
had accumulated 2,000 Dollars. 
 According to Andrea Cornwall (2003: 493), being capable to consume and enable 
the woman to spend money have become highly significant in the context of love. Her 
young male interlocutors in Nigeria described that in order to sustain a relationship with 
a woman, they would need to spend considerable amounts on her. In their accounts, 
money served as a form of power that reiterated the discourse of man as the controller 
and provider. Likewise, young men in post-war Sierra Leone felt that they could only 
have a relationship if they could enable a woman to spend money on whatever she wanted. 
Without a secure income, they could not be in a lasting relationship and thus many of 
them decided to remain single in order to avoid the humiliation of being abandoned as a 
result of their inability to provide (Enria 2016: 143). In a similar vein, Firās highlights the 
importance of money and consumption if a man wanted to be a successful Syrian groom. 
Women are described accordingly to have different ‘values’ which depend on the amount 
of money men spent on them. Furthermore, their conversation, as well as Abū and Um 
Māzin’s words, speak to Schielke’s (2012: 136) argument that wealth and consumption 
translate into respect, recognition, and the promise of a good life and happiness in the 
context of Egypt. Consumption has become “the key register in which people judge 
various social relationships, most notably marriage and social standing” (ibid.) Through 
his wedding, Firās was able to claim respect and recognition for himself. 
 My conversations with Um and Abū Māzin and Firās, Yāsmīn and Maḥmūd 
brought to the forefront the significance of family reputation and background for a man’s 
‘groom-ability’ and chances in the marriage market. Furthermore, the ability to spend is 
described as being of utmost importance if men aspire to prove their middle-class 
belonging and proper manhood in the marriage market.  
 
Challenges to ‘groom-ability’ in Egypt 
 
Having focused on accounts of pre-war Syria’s engagement and marriage patterns, I now 
discuss changes in the marriage market observed by young Syrian men in Egypt. I was 
told that the first challenge in the process of getting married was related to meeting 
women. I met ʿAyman, Wasīm’s friend, at the community centre in which Wasīm 
worked, who said: “The problem is that the people don’t know each other. The Syrians 
don’t meet each other, especially in some areas. Any Syrian man who is able to marry but 
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doesn’t know any Syrians, won’t get married. For sure, he won’t marry an Egyptian 
woman”. And Wasīm added: “The problem is that the guys cannot meet the girls and at 
work they only meet Egyptian girls”. 
Likewise, Qutayba stressed that he had observed a change in the way Syrian men 
and women got to know each other in Egypt. Qutayba was in his early twenties, worked 
as an IT adviser in an international institute and had lots of friends from abroad. He was 
not looking for a spouse when I met him, but believed that in Egypt there was the 
possibility to meet and fall in love with a woman “just like it happens in the movies”. In 
Cairo, young Syrian men and women could meet and get to know each other in the 
workplace, and in the streets, cafés or restaurants, he told me enthusiastically. They would 
meet, fall in love, and tell the family later. He considered it positive that, due to 
displacement, families were scattered over various countries and could no longer uphold 
the tradition of choosing a spouse. While it was not uncommon in Syria to marry one’s 
cousin or someone else from the extended family, this also became more difficult, since 
families were spread over various countries, he explained. 
Akram, in contrast to Qutayba, wanted to get married and did not welcome the 
fact that he could not rely on his relatives’ judgement and recommendation in the process 
of finding a potential spouse. He was a primary school teacher in his late twenties from a 
small city in the north of Syria and told me how he got engaged to his fiancée. The first 
challenge was to be sure that the woman he liked had ‘good’ morals:  
“If I want to marry a girl, I should ask about her and her family, as I told you, to 
find out if she is from a good family. Before I get engaged to her, I should know 
her morals, if she is good or not, and also if her brothers are good. So, I talked 
with her frankly”.  
Even though it was not the usual way of getting to know a woman, Akram decided that, 
due to the absence of his family, he had to speak to the woman he liked in order to be 
able to judge whether they could have a future together. Once he was convinced that she 
was a suitable spouse for him, he introduced himself to her father. That they were not 
from the same region was reason enough for her father to initially resist. However, his 
father-in-law knew someone from Akram’s hometown and could therefore inquire about 
his background. Because Akram was working as a teacher in the very same school that 
his father-in-law had founded in Egypt, his father-in-law used the opportunity to observe 
his behaviour for a while.  
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In addition to being accepted by his in-laws, the negotiations about the mahr 
between Akram and his father-in-law were complicated, because his father-in-law did not 
know the financial background of Akram’s family. Akram explained:  
“[…] she [the potential bride] should be a girl from my place. Her father would 
know who I am, because in the village the people know each other. They would 
say this is the son of so and so and they are good people. So, he might agree. You 
can give what you have in terms of money and it will be fine. …It’s the issue that 
I told you before regarding the origin of people and the family so and so… this is 
lost here in Egypt”.  
Akram identified the main challenge during his marriage negotiations as the fact that he 
was away from his hometown, his comfort zone, where people knew him and his family 
background.  
His father-in-law initially requested 75,000 LE (in 2015 approximately 9,700 US 
Dollars) arguing that his daughter’s cousin had got married for the same amount and that 
he did not want his daughter to feel less worthy. However, Akram could not afford this 
amount and because his father-in-law knew that his daughter loved Akram, they 
eventually agreed on 50,000 LE (approximately 6,500 US Dollars). Looking back, even 
though he perceived the process of getting engaged in Egypt as challenging, Akram found 
a positive aspect: 
“All the people here are in the same situation. We all became refugees (muhājir) 
and displaced (musharrad). The person who was rich has lost all his money and 
became poor, and the poor is still poor, so all the people are now in the same class. 
It was like melting and all are now in the same container. This is a positive factor 
that we found here in Egypt”.  
Describing himself as being from the “normal class or middle class in Syria”, Akram 
believed that if they had not been displaced but had met in Syria, his father-in-law would 
have rejected him, because of the class differences between the two families. His father-
in-law was rich and had many real-estate properties that had been destroyed in the war; 
in Egypt, his father-in-law was, as Akram said, “just like us”.  
Likewise, Wasīm described how some families had lowered their standards to 
accept a potential groom as a result of being displaced: “there are some families that make 
it easier to marry in terms of expectations. There is no problem. We’re all refugees, we’re 
the same. However, there are some people who believe that they still live in Syria”. Both 
descriptions echo an argument by Simon Turner (1999: 7), who conducted research 
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among Burundian refugees in a camp in Tanzania. He concluded that the unknown length 
of the liminal situation refugees encounter opened up the possibility for some of them to 
transgress norms and customs that are usually taken for granted. Their accounts also speak 
to literature that engages with changes in marriage patterns in times of uncertainty and 
hardship. According to Aitemad Muhanna (2013: 118), marriage decisions and dowry 
payments started to transform during the demanding years of livelihood crisis in Gaza 
after the second Intifada. They were shaped by giving priority to calculations of material 
and social advantages rather than to tradition (ibid.: 125). Likewise, Jane Kani Edward 
(2007: 98) found that among southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo culturally accepted 
ways of conducting marriages were altered during displacement. Family background 
became irrelevant when women in Cairo married across ethnic and racial lines and the 
absence of close family members in Egypt meant that marriages were increasingly 
witnessed by distant relatives or friends. The payment of bride wealth tended to be 
postponed until times of peace in the home country. 
Coming back to Akram’s process of getting engaged, he ended his story with the 
following sentence: “In Syria, the people used to know each other and if I had stayed in 
my village, I would have married someone from there. Here, I don’t know the different 
cities or the people. This is the difference between Syria and Egypt”. Akram was both 
hampered and advantaged by the renegotiation of class and status due to forced 
displacement. He faces difficulties because his father-in-law misrecognises him and his 
financial situation. However, at the same time he sees a potential for change and a new 
form of solidarity and equality in the misrecognition of one’s former status.  
 Dāwūd, a man in his mid-thirties, experienced that the differences of opinions 
regarding politics that fragmented the Syrian society since the uprising had entered 
marriage negotiations. When I met Dāwūd for the first time, he had just got engaged and 
was eager to share his story with me. He lived in Cairo with his older sister and when he 
saw his fiancée in a restaurant he went to talk to her and managed to get her father’s phone 
number and asked for her hand, thus living what was described by Qutayba as the ‘movie-
like’ way of meeting one’s partner. The negotiations were challenging and were about to 
fail because Dāwūd, even though he had lived in Damascus for a long time, was not 
originally from Damascus, which his potential family-in-law was. Dāwūd recalled that it 
was an advantage that he had picked up the Damascene accent. His description thus 
illustrates that the significance of the Damascene/non-Damascene and the urban/rural 
divide, described by Salamandra (2004: 12) and Rabo (2012: 83) is still relevant. The 
negotiations further included an inquiry about his political views. His father-in-law asked 
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him about his opinions regarding the uprising in Syria and Dāwūd remembered that he 
tried his best to guess what his father-in-law would appreciate as an answer, wondering 
whether he was with or against the regime. Furthermore, he was conscious of the fact that 
his unstable financial situation in Egypt could make marriage problematic. In contrast to 
Syria, where Dāwūd possessed all the assets necessary to marry, such as a car, a flat and 
a good employment, in Egypt, he rented a flat in Egypt and his work was not secure. In 
Syria, he could have asked for any girl’s hand, he told me confidently, but in Egypt he 
had to hope for her and her family’s sympathy and understanding about his financial 
situation. Despite all his worries, Dāwūd’s father-in-law accepted him and once they had 
agreed about the mahr, Dāwūd’s family in Syria and the in-laws in Cairo talked via skype 
and then Dāwūd and his fiancée read the fātiḥa (first sūra of the Quran) as a confirmation 
of their engagement. 
 
Not being ‘groom’ enough 
 
Maḥmūd was in a similar situation to the young Syrian men introduced above. He had 
been looking for a bride for over a year and had tried one through a variety of ways: he 
asked his Syrian acquaintances to act as matchmakers; he posted an ad about himself in 
a Facebook group that was designed for Syrians of marriageable age in Egypt; and he 
asked his uncle, who also lived in Cairo, to find him a bride. In his search, he had already 
met various families and was used to the different questions he had to answer: he was 
asked about his political views, his religious beliefs und practice, and about his future 
plans. One family he visited wanted to know whether he was planning to flee to Europe. 
When he replied that he was not, “the mother raised her eyebrow and asked me if I had 
no ambitions”, he remembered.  
One time, I met Maḥmūd after a potential bride and her family had just rejected 
him. The woman was twenty-nine years old, which was far beyond what was considered 
the marriageable age for women, he told me angrily, but she was educated and had a 
similar interest in tourism, which had convinced Maḥmūd to meet her. However, she and 
her family doubted his morals and religiosity because Maḥmūd was in regular touch with 
foreign women due to being a tour guide. Maḥmūd was outraged that a woman of her age 
demanded that he should change his profession and shouted angrily: “The Syrian women 
who are in Egypt deserve to be treated like the girls in Zaatari Camp, where men come to 
pay the families to marry and exploit them”. Generally, Maḥmūd felt that it was unfair 
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that so many women he met in Egypt were hesitant, demanding and arrogant, even though 
he assured me that he ought to be considered a good match with his career, language 
skills, relatively assured income, savings and high education. What increased his anger 
was the fact that most of the women who rejected him had in his opinion nothing to offer, 
since he considered them neither beautiful nor young enough. His outrage and call for 
women to learn to appreciate what they had in Egypt are evocative of the feeling of 
misrecognition and status loss he felt whenever he was rejected by a potential spouse and 
her family. According to Charles Taylor (1994: 25) misrecognition can cause severe 
damage to the individual’s self-esteem: 
“a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people 
or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict 
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and 
reduced mode of being”. 
Taylor’s argument can lay the foundation for contextualising Maḥmūd’s outburst of anger 
after he felt misjudged, misunderstood and misvalued by a potential bride and her family. 
Likewise, ‘Abd al-Raḥman, who had got married to a Palestinian-Syrian woman 
in Egypt the year before, observed a change in perceptions of marriage among Syrian 
families and in their expectations of a groom. He compared what men had to pay in Syria 
before the outbreak of the civil war and how they got married in exile in Egypt. 
“[The bride] was always dreaming about her soul mate, who will come to her on 
his white horse and she doesn’t agree to get married unless [the groom] is a doctor 
or an engineer. When the revolution started, many young men were killed and 
many others took up arms so the number of men decreased. Before the revolution, 
people were giving around 200,000 or 300,000 Syrian Lira6 in gold to the bride. 
However, since the revolution only the ring is enough even without the white dress 
that the girl has always dreamed about. [..] The important thing is that you take 
good care of the bride”. 
Indeed, the photographs ‘Abd al-Raḥman shared with me that were taken on his wedding 
day showed him and his bride in a living room with about ten guests. His wife told me 
later that her impressive wedding dress was only rented for that day.  
																																																						
6 Before 2011, this was approximately 4,000 US Dollars and 6,000 US Dollars. 
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‘Abd al-Raḥman’s account suggests that the expectations that Syrian women and 
their families had of potential grooms used to be considerably more ambitious, and had 
come to be reined in through the experience of displacement. He even mocked women 
for their unrealistic expectations and appeared to feel satisfaction and a sense of justice 
knowing that women could not ask for as much as they used to in Syria. His complaints 
about women’s expectations resonate with one of Rebecca Joubin’s (2013a) findings, 
which are based on her in-depth analysis of Syrian musalsalāt (TV series). Many Syrian 
soap operas, she observes, pick up on the topic of marriage, highlighting the difficulties 
young Syrian men face because of the on-going economic crisis before the uprising and 
their consequent inability to fulfil social expectations. In several musalsalāt women were 
blamed for these high demands. Joubin (ibid.) describes an episode in which the newly-
wed protagonist becomes impotent due to the high wedding debts and his wife’s 
expectations. He consults a doctor, who prescribes medication that repairs his ‘hurt 
dignity’.  
‘Abd al-Raḥman was not the only one who argued that Syrian men’s absence, due 
to their death or because they were fighting, would change the meaning of marriage and 
engagement with a Syrian man. After I share with Rāfī that a Syrian friend of mine had 
been left by his fiancée, he told me that a woman who would break up with a Syrian man 
was ghabiyya (stupid) for letting him go, since there were no Syrian men left. He told me 
firmly that she was to be blamed if the relationship did not work out, since she ought to 
be aware that the number of Syrian men had decreased. Likewise, Qutayba was convinced 
that not only in Egypt but also back in Syria the number of women ready to get married 
was bigger than the number of men and thus, women should demand less from a Syrian 
groom. 
That several Syrian men I met blamed women for being picky or too demanding 
suggests that these men had felt ‘not good enough’ and humiliated at some point of their 
search for a spouse. Being in Egypt without their family, without the reputation they used 
to have in their hometown, and having lost what would had made them a favoured match 
in Syria, seemed to exacerbate the feeling of ‘hurt dignity’ that Joubin (ibid.) identified 
as an important theme in Syrian musalsalāt and explains the rigour and anger expressed 
by Rāfī, Maḥmūd and ‘Abd al-Raḥman. The loss of social context and the consequent 
misrecognition appear to equal loss of one’s identity, since these men could no longer 
rely on their family name or origin. The man’s ‘frame of reference’ (Rabo 2005: 80), 
namely his father’s name, the quarter he lives in and the family’s history, is nullified in 
Cairo, which leaves men without solid proof of their identity. These men’s inner state of 
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anger and frustration can be described by using Bourdieu and Wacquant’s metaphor of 
the ‘fish in water’: 
“Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in 
habitus, outside and inside social agents. And when habitus encounters a social 
world of which it is the product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the 
weight of the water and it takes the world about itself for granted” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant: 1992:127). 
As long as these men remained in their comfort zone, where their name and background 
were known and their class status was valued, they did not feel the burden of marriage. It 
only turned into a severe challenge when they could not take their position at home for 
granted anymore. According to Reay et al. (2009: 1105), who apply the opposite 
metaphor of a ‘fish being out of water’ to the context of working-class students in elite 
universities, when habitus encounters an unfamiliar situation, the “resulting disjunctures 
can generate not only change and transformation, but also disquiet, ambivalence, 
insecurity and uncertainty”. In a similar vein, I suggest that Syrian men began to feel like 
‘fish out of water’ during forced displacement in Egypt. They sensed insecurity and 
uncertainty when forced to question what made them attractive grooms in Syria and 
directed their anger at women’s unrealisable expectations in them. 
 
Marriage and economic capital 
 
Several young Syrian men I met explicitly voiced yet another challenge in the context of 
getting married. They told me that getting married in Egypt had to be delayed until they 
could afford it. The prospect of getting married was directly related to finding work and 
graduation from university as described by Fādī in a recent conversation we had via social 
media. He told me the following: “I want to get married, Magdalena. If only I could 
complete my studies (bidī atzawaj yā Magdalena. Yā rab aqadir kamil dirāstī)”. Fādī 
works long hours to support his family and thus had to interrupt his studies. Furthermore, 
he cannot afford to pay 1,000 Dollars per year to continue studying engineering in Cairo. 
Hence, he is thinking about working in a second job in the evening after his eight-hour 
shift at his parents’ shop, to be able to accumulate the university fees. For Fādī, there is a 
direct connection between completing his education and being ready to get married. In a 
similar vein, Dāwūd described the challenges for young men: 
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“There is a sadness and difficulty like: ‘I don’t have an income, I cannot find a 
job, I cannot pay my rent, I cannot marry, I cannot send money to my family…’. 
The people are not anymore like they were in the past. Maybe the crisis made 
young men very old before they should have become old”.  
The inability to move on with one’s life caused distress and discontent among many 
Syrian men, while others tried to present it as a simple equation: even though they would 
have thought about getting married at this point of their lives in Syria, under the new 
circumstances, marriage had to be delayed, and work and securing one’s future took 
priority. Māzin said: 
“If I were still in Syria I would have thought about [marriage] by now, but here 
it’s difficult. I don’t know if I am staying here and also economically it’s difficult. 
I cannot do it until I know that I will stay in one country and that I have work and 
make money”. 
Displacement, unemployment and insecurity about one’s future prospects meant that 
marriage had to be postponed indefinitely until one’s life was normalised.  
It is important to contextualise the temporal aspect of Māzin’s statement. Due to 
the recentness of the Syrian civil war, the consequent displacement, uncertainty about the 
war’s outcome and the stability of the whole region, he does not feel able to think about 
marriage. He does not know what the near future brings and unless there is a minimal 
form of stability in his life he feels that he cannot make such a commitment. In essence, 
Māzin’s situation speaks to an argument put forward by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh 
(2010: 308): one of their interlocutors suffered as a result of the direct relation between 
his legal status and his love life. His uncertain legal status limited his potential to be a 
boyfriend or become a spouse due to the UK laws at the time. In Māzin’s and Bashār’s 
cases, which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter, it was not the legal status that 
determined their personal life, but their insecure economic situation and instability in 
Egypt. 
Overall, the stories that were shared with me often reminded me of the myth of 
Sisyphus (see Camus [1955] 1979), who is forced by the gods to put all his effort into 
pushing a stone up a mountain before it rolls back down and Sisyphus must start all over 
again. The torture is, according to Camus, that Sisyphus is deeply aware of the “whole 
extent of his wretched condition” (ibid.: 109). In a similar vein, Syrian bachelors had to 
begin anew to accumulate the capital they needed if they wanted to get married in Egypt. 
Often, they had already gathered this capital back in Syria, such as a flat of their own, a 
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stable job and a car. However, in Egypt, the stone they had struggled to push up the 
mountain had rolled quickly down and they needed to again gather together the economic 
resources to get married. Similarly, they had to find a way to reinstall their status and give 
weight and credibility to their reputation that was once an intrinsic part of their identity.  
 
Syrian women marrying Egyptian men 
 
Many Syrian men I talked to shared with me their concern about marriages between 
Syrian women and Egyptian men, which were commonly assumed to take place. During 
my fieldwork, I met and talked to one Syrian woman who had married an Egyptian, but, 
according to the gossip I heard, there was a sizeable number of women who had recently 
married Egyptian men. For Syrian men, women’s ability to choose a groom not only 
among Syrian but also among Egyptian men, seemed to cause a form of stress related to 
being forced to compete with Egyptian men to win Syrian women’s favour. Their once 
solid position in a patriarchal system of gender relations appeared to be in question by the 
presence of more men among whom Syrian women could choose. 
Qutayba experienced that Egyptian men, such as taxi drivers and even his former 
professor, asked him about a Syrian woman they could marry. Such a question was 
usually phrased as offering ‘help’ to Syrian women and their families. Qutayba did not 
appreciate such offers usually answering: “You don’t help us, you only try to find a cheap 
opportunity to marry”. He heard of families who had to accept “cheap” marriage 
proposals because of their devastating financial situations. Likewise, Wasīm recalled that 
Egyptians came to the community centre to ask about Syrian girls that they could marry, 
using the rhetoric of help: “We got angry and we answered in anger”, he remembered. 
According to Nūr, 2012 was the year in which Syrian women were “sold” to Egyptian 
husbands for 2,000 LE (approximately 200 US Dollars in 2015). She recalled that there 
were offices in 6th of October City that functioned as agencies, in which women were 
‘advertised’ for marriage to Egyptian men. However, she remembered that Syrian men 
had put an end to this by destroying those places in rage and anger, forcing the marriage 
brokers to stop selling Syrian women.  
Fatma, the head of a school for Syrian children, said the following when I asked 
her about Egyptian men trying to get marry Syrian women: 
“they are always after [the Syrian women]. They feel that in this crisis they are 
ready to get married for nothing. But it’s not right. […] Most Syrian families don’t 
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want to have an Egyptian man among them. Maybe in the Facebook groups you 
noticed that they write: ‘Syrian girls are only for Syrian boys!’ […] At the 
beginning there was somebody, I don’t want to mention her name, who used to 
help those women who were raped in Syria to get married here. […] she helps 
those girls to get married to Syrians, Egyptians, to whomever….”.  
Fatma welcomed marriage to Egyptian men only if Syrian women, due to being 
dishonoured by rape, did not have any chances on the marriage market anymore – 
Egyptian men were in that case better than no marriage at all. Syrian women’s marriage 
to Egyptian men seemed to be a second-class choice for Syrian women, who, due to a 
‘stigma’, would not be favoured by the majority of Syrian (middle-class) men. 
Most of my interlocutors were furious when they talked with me about the topic 
of intermarriages between Syrian women and Egyptian men, and Qutayba, when referring 
to “us”, suggested that it was not about individual cases, but rather about the ‘us/them’ 
binary and that women belonged to the Syrian community. He confirms an argument put 
forward by Nira Yuval-Davis and Marcel Stoetzler (2002: 340), who state that women 
are commonly constructed as “symbolic boundary guards of the collectivity and as 
representing the collectivity’s honour”. In a similar vein, Peteet (2005: 186) argues that 
gender was used as a real and symbolic marker of community among Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon. Palestinian women were advised not to marry Lebanese men, who were 
described as unfaithful and less committed to their families than Palestinian men.  
Mirjana Morokvasic-Müller (2004: 135/136) conceptualises interethnic marriages 
in the former Yugoslavia after 1991 as a living proof of the possibility to live with each 
other despite ethnic differences. While intermarriage can be considered a bridge between 
communities, it may equally be conceived as disruption of the social order, of the 
reproduction of the family, and of ethnic identities. Consequently, a woman who marries 
outside of her group, challenges the idea of women symbolising the nation, and is 
considered as lost to her community (ibid..: 137). The critique Syrian men voiced toward 
marriages between Syrian women and Egyptian men seems to be similarly related to these 
women’s disruption of the ‘us/them’ binary and to being ‘lost’ to the Syrian community. 
If men tried to explain to me why Syrian women and Egyptian men got married, 
it was commonly argued that Egyptian men were attracted to Syrian women because they 
were neater, cleaner, better cooks and more beautiful than Egyptian women. In this 
context, many Syrian men claimed that a marriage to Egyptian women was for them 
unthinkable. They perceived them usually as loud, aggressive and even violent against 
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their husbands. Rāfī’s brother Malik told me once half-serious, half-joking that his 
neighbours were an Egyptian couple and at night he would only hear the woman shouting 
and screaming. Her husband in the meantime would never say a word. He wondered 
whether his neighbour was a real man after all and whether he would not only be screamed 
at but also be beaten by his wife.  
Furthermore, it was often assumed that Syrian women married Egyptian men only 
because they needed protection and financial aid. The emphasis was on single women’s 
economic conditions that forced them to marry Egyptian men. Hānī had an ambivalent 
opinion about the topic: 
“It’s both positive and negative. If there is a woman and she really needs help and 
you as a man can help her, and if you like her and you want to marry her, it’s 
positive because you decide to stay with her all your life and to take care of her. 
But the negative thing is if someone wants to marry her only because he wants to 
give her a certain amount of money. This would be more like buying her, 
especially if he treats her like a slave and feels that he can leave her any time he 
wants. I can say that there is a phenomenon of taking advantage of Syrians”.  
For Hānī the marriage of a Syrian woman with an Egyptian man was acceptable if the 
man proved to have good morals and the best intentions. Again, Syrian women are fixed 
in a static version of femininity – they are considered helpless without the support of a 
man, which makes getting married to an Egyptian man acceptable. 
 
A woman’s perspective 
 
When volunteering as an English teacher in a community centre, I met Suhayr, a mother 
of four who got divorced from her husband shortly before the uprising in Syria. Fatma 
introduced me to her and henceforth I taught her three daughters. Suhayr came to Egypt 
and tried to support her family by working as a hairdresser. When I first visited the family 
in their small flat I was introduced to Shihāb, an Egyptian man in his thirties, who 
Suhayr’s five-year-old son referred to as baba (dad). In contrast to his uncomplicated and 
trusting way of dealing with Shihāb, his three sisters, all of them teenagers, were stiff and 
reserved and kept their headscarves on whenever he was around. Suhayr seemed to be 
initially embarrassed, but eventually told me how she and Shihāb had met and that he 
already had an Egyptian wife. For this reason, Shihāb could only contribute a small 
amount to the family’s income and rarely spent more than a couple of hours in Suhayr’s 
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flat. His presence and financial contributions nevertheless seemed to ease the situation. It 
allowed Suhayr not to have to work such long hours in the salon, and she could stay at 
home and focus on the household and her youngest child, while her older children went 
to school. She told me that the occasional presence of a man in the household gave her a 
feeling of safety.  
My personal contact with Suhayr was sporadic, but Fatma kept me updated. Once 
she told me that the family had a crisis because Shihāb had found one of Suhayr’s 
daughters on the streets with her friends in the evening. This had caused a big fight 
because Shihāb considered this behaviour immoral and inappropriate. Despite the on-
going tension between Shihāb and Suhayr’s daughters, Fatma told me that she tried to 
convince Suhayr to accept her husband’s issues assuring her that “having a husband like 
him was better than not having one at all”. She told me that she had calmed Suhayr down 
after the fight saying that Shihāb was obviously only concerned about the girls’ 
reputation. In Fatma’s opinion, Shihāb’s presence was priceless because he knew what 
was accepted behaviour and what was inappropriate in Egypt. Fatma thus seemed to 
suggest that a woman in Suhayr’s situation could only benefit from marrying an Egyptian 
man, since he could give her guidance, security and protection. In summer 2015, I heard 
the rumour that Suhayr and Shihāb’s marriage had not lasted and that Suhayr and her 
children had moved to another part of town. When I met Suhayr in her new flat in 
December 2015, she confirmed that Shihāb had divorced her after his first wife became 
pregnant with their first child. For Suhayr, this was a devastating experience. “We didn’t 
divorce in a fight, nevertheless, he disappeared from my life”, she explained. It left her 
sad and with the only option of moving to a new place, where rents were cheaper and she 
could hope for support from the various NGOs there. 
 There is literature that deals with the cases of refugee women getting married to 
men in their host country. Marina de Regt (2010: 113) finds that Somali women who are 
in Yemen without a male relative are eager to get married, hoping that it will relieve them 
from taking on paid work, increase their social status and protect them from sexual 
harassment. In a Guinean refugee camp, a new form of marriage – Bulgur marriage – was 
prominent as a strategy to negotiate unstable situations and available resources (Gale 
2007: 357). This new form of consensual union is not officially sanctioned and allows the 
partners in the union to be in several relationships at once. It represents a new form of 
kinship, provides women with agency, protection, economic security and companionship. 
It is a strategic alliance to handle daily life in the camp and improve both partners’ 
economic position (ibid.: 371). However, a Bulgur marriage can come with great cost as 
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it may not be approved by relatives or elders in the camp and defies community norms. 
What is suggested in both articles is that marriage becomes a protective shield for women, 
a way to improve their social status and economic situation, however, this does not always 
come without disadvantages and thus women need to evaluate carefully what is their best 
option. In the two articles, as in Suhayr’s case, women are in precarious positions, where 
they are displaced and decide to marry, which does not leave much room for negotiations.  
 Nevertheless, not only refugee women look to marriage for protection and 
improvement of their situation. Jane Kani Edward (2007: 96), who worked with southern 
Sudanese refugees in Egypt, observed that in several cases Sudanese men began 
approaching women for marriage if these women were recognised by the UNHCR and 
consequently had a chance to be relocated. This process was not one-directional and 
rumours in the community said that single women also tried to be relocated by being 
added to the file of a recognised man through marriage, albeit to a lesser extent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at Syrian men’s position in the marriage market during 
displacement. If men encountered economic instability in Egypt it could threaten their 
position in the marriage market. There was a direct connection between one’s economic 
status and one’s chances of getting married. Young men realised their loss and responded 
with fury to the misrecognition they experienced. Another challenge was related to young 
men’s inability to make their former status travel with them to Egypt. Hence, it was 
extremely difficult to convince potential spouses and their families of their middle-class 
background and respected masculinity. Again, Syrian young men frequently reacted with 
anger and fury to the constant rejection they experienced on the part of potential brides 
and their families. 
I have illustrated in this chapter that displacement opens the potential for new 
class formations and renegotiations of class and status, but also potential for 
misrecognition. Most young men willing to get married had to reinvent themselves anew 
as grooms, the work of Sisyphus, since it usually meant that they needed to find a way to 
prove that they should be perceived as dignified, proper middle-class grooms. In the 
struggle for reclaiming one’s economic and social groomability, several Syrian men 
blamed women’s extreme expectations as a way to gloss over the fact that they could not 
fulfil them.  
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Even if rarely on the surface, this chapter also dealt with love. Men recognised 
that a woman’s love was dependent on their economic position and they tried to negotiate 
their own expectations of love. This was obvious when Maḥmūd met women he did not 
feel attracted to, simply because he finally wanted to get married, and his final relief and 
outburst of emotions when a woman he actually loved accepted him as her husband.  
Another challenge Syrian men felt confronted with was Egyptian men’s interest 
in ‘their’ Syrian women and the potential ‘loss’ of Syrian women to the Egyptian ‘other’ 
men. In this case, Syrian men doubted Egyptian men’s intentions, love and feelings. The 
discussion of the ‘boundaries’ of the Syrian community, in this case, Syrian women who 
married non-Syrian men, functions as a door opener to in-depth analysis of who was 
defined as ‘Syrian’ and if there was a Syrian ‘community’ in Egypt – themes I will engage 
with in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – Of Anger, Hate and Estrangement 
or Establishing a living among several ‘others’ in Egypt 
 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, Muhannad invited me to meet his father so that I could 
ask him questions about Syria. I met Abū Muhannad in his drugstore where he asked me 
to follow him to his office. There, I was seated on a small chair in a corner while he sat 
down behind his huge, dark-wooden desk, which provided him with a sense of authority. 
Abū Muhannad, whose voice was often filled with rage and anger when he talked about 
his life in Syria, argued that sectarian affiliations could not be overlooked anymore after 
all that had happened since 2011. “How can you ignore if members of another sect are 
responsible for the death of your relatives and friends?”, he asked me furiously from 
behind his desk. He used his momentary authority in the room to try to sternly convince 
me of the sectarian character of the conflict.  
Likewise, Maḥmūd once expressed his anger to me about Syrians belonging to 
other sects. Outraged, he said that he could not understand how Syrian Christians denied 
the situation in Syria and continued to sympathise with and support the Assad regime. 
Agitated, he told me: “I don’t have any respect for the other minorities anymore!”. He 
assured me that he had tried for a long time to remain neutral and objective, but he could 
not retain this attitude anymore when witnessing the injustice and condemnations the 
Sunnis in Syria experienced in contrast to the other minorities. Another time, when we 
talked about a conversation I had had with an acquaintance of mine, who had a pacifist 
attitude regarding the ongoing civil war, Maḥmūd told me: “If we have people talking 
like this, we will not succeed. If there is an Alawi on the street, you have to kill him 
immediately. No one can convince me that Shias and Alawites are good people!”. 
Maḥmūd was not an impulsive man. Rarely did I hear him swearing or shouting. Usually, 
he had a smile on his face. Only when we talked about what Syria had become did his 
face turn pale and his features harden.  
This chapter concerns the construction of ‘self’ and ‘others’. I begin with a 
discussion of sectarianism (al-ṭāʾifiyya), a pressing theme and one of several aspects of 
life in Syria that migrated to Egypt with Syrian men and impacted on their lives there. 
Many Syrian men in Egypt shared with me their experiences of sectarianism, sectarian 
conflict and its absence in Syrian society, and they reflected on how sectarianism 
interfered with their present situation in Egypt and their future. While it is obvious that 
sectarianism is an important theme in understanding the situation of recently displaced 
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people fleeing from a war-torn, fractured country, I argue that living with sectarianism 
should also be understood as a crucial aspect influencing masculinity. Having been 
confronted for one’s whole life with injustice based on a system of sectarian preferences 
affects men (just as it affects women). It means experiencing multiple pressures, fears 
and the confrontation with unfair yet unchangeable power structures if one is not part of 
the most powerful sect. In some situations, it means silently accepting unjust treatment; 
in others, it means adapting to be able to make one’s life easier. Understanding identity 
as intersectional, sectarianism should be seen as one of the markers that create 
(masculine) selves.  
In the second part of the chapter, the focus shifts to the relation between Syrians 
and Egyptians. In order to describe Syria’s ties with the Egyptian host society, Syrian 
men often referred to the historical period of the United Arabic Republic (UAR). Another 
defining incident that was described to mark these relations was the Rabaa Square 
massacre in 2013 and its aftermath. Through narratives focusing on the UAR and Rabaa 
Square, not only perception of the host society can be analysed but also processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in the Syrian community. Moreover, I scrutinise the specific 
strategies Syrians used to distance themselves from the Egyptians. Emphasising Syria’s 
former wealth, work ethic, and the quality of Syrian products was a tactic many Syrian 
men used to create distance from the Egyptian ‘others’. When defining a specific ideal 
notion of Syrianness, Syrians I talked to – men and women alike – appeared to 
simultaneously create an ideal of Syrian middle-class manhood.  
The construction of an ideal image of Syrianness vis-à-vis the Egyptians stands in 
sharp contrast to the often-expressed feeling of ‘victimhood’ that displacement enforced 
on many Syrians, and which I will describe at the end of this chapter, evoking in them a 
feeling of inability to hold up the ideals of Syrian middle-class masculinity.  
 
Embedding constructions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ theoretically 
 
Given the fragility, ambivalence and incompleteness of what was described as the Syrian 
community, it is crucial not to fall into the common trap of analysing people in exile as 
logically belonging to a unified, homogeneous, essentialised community based on a 
common culture, history, similar experiences and longings, but to rather question what 
constitutes community in a specific context and why and how it came into being. Salih 
(2003: 118) problematises the perception of migrants belonging to homogeneous 
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communities neatly defined by ethnicity. She highlights that research on migration and 
displacement needs to pay attention instead to the various, contradictory and changing 
negotiations of boundaries of the community. She thus directs the focus on the migrant 
as an active agent, who includes and excludes, redefines ‘self’ and ‘other’ based on the 
context of the everyday, and constructs and deconstructs shared cultural and social 
identities (ibid.: 120). Importantly, Salih (ibid.: 131) also mentions the existence of 
“many others” rather than assuming the presence of a homogeneous entity against which 
identity is constructed in the context of migration and displacement. In a similar vein, 
Peteet (2005: 185) stresses that a major aspect of modern Palestinian national identity and 
subjectivity is formulated against several ‘others’, personified in the case of the 
Palestinians in refugee camps in Lebanon by the Israelis and the Lebanese host 
population.  
As far as masculinity in sectarian contexts is concerned, there is a remarkable 
absence of scholarly engagement with the interconnection of these topics. Material from 
which to draw a comparison, even though it is not a sectarian context like Lebanon, Syria 
or Iraq, can be found in the study of men and masculinities among the Palestinian minority 
in Israel. According to Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis (2008: 313), in a context in which direct 
routes to hegemonic masculinity, for instance via military service, are not available, the 
development of alternative versions of hegemonic masculinities takes place. Among 
those alternative forms are devout Islamic masculinity, the pursuit of secondary 
education, and football. The authors also suggest that the structural violence experienced 
by Palestinian men living in Israel leads to a crisis of masculinity and an increase in 
violent forms of masculinity (ibid.: 322). This article, despite being quite static in its 
methodology and conclusion, can give a hint to possible consequences of living in a 
society, in which most paths towards masculine accomplishments are blocked. Likewise, 
Monterescu (2006: 124), whose work I mentioned in the introduction, focuses on the 
Palestinian minority in Israel, arguing that it exhibits a process of fragmentation into 
local, religious, and regional-fractional sub-identities. During interviews with 
Palestinians in Israel, he realised that ‘multiple’, ‘dual’, ‘split’, and ‘paradoxical identity’ 
were reccurring terms and themes (ibid.: 126). He stresses that in a heterogeneous place 
like Yafa, the usually clear-cut dichotomy between insider and outsider, us and them, self 
and other, is not clearly defined. This state undermines the spatial ordering of the world 
since it creates an “incongruity between the ‘real’ world of inferior socio-economic and 
political status and the ‘ideal’ world of proud Arabness and patriarchal manhood” (ibid.: 
129). Monterescu’s main argument is that hegemonic masculinity is deconstructed as a 
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coherent, solid category of identity. Instead, masculinity is contradictory, manoeuvres 
between various discourses, and manipulates them if needed (ibid.: 134). What emerges 
is a situational masculinity that is consciously uncommitted, and dynamic, moving 
between various identity components (ibid.: 137).  
Encouraged by this literature and inspired by my fieldwork, I assume that living 
in a system of sectarian injustice and oppression can be an obstruction to reaching the 
aspired, ideal form of masculinity for men, who do not belong to the dominant or favoured 
group in society. Consequently, their masculinity needs to be elastic and dynamic, able 
to absorb damage since it emerges, at least partially, out of humiliating experiences with 
the powerful groups and the search for alternative versions of masculinity. 
 
Introducing sectarianism 
 
Among Syrian men I met in Egypt an important signifier of being Syrian was to 
emphasise that one was not Shia or Alawi. I suggest this was the case because there was 
a strong rejection of these religious groups, which can be detected in Maḥmūd’s account 
above. I assume that another reason is that the official state religion in Egypt is Sunni 
Islam and that there are prejudices, legal discrimination and state repression against other 
faith groups, such as Copts and Shia (El-Badawy 2016; Rieffer-Flanagan 2016). 
According to journalistic articles by the Egyptian news portals MadaMasr (Rollins 2015) 
and AhramOnline (El-Gundy 2013) and scholarly writings (see Abou-El-Fadl 2015: 212), 
there have been several cases of religious defamation against and persecution of Muslim 
Shia, as well as atheists and Copts in Egypt since 2011. Very occasionally I met Syrian 
Christians, but the majority of my contacts presented themselves to me as Sunnis.  
Even though I did not specifically ask about their experiences with sectarianism, 
the topic was brought up in one way or another in various conversations. Many Syrians 
highlighted the absence of sectarianism during their lives in Syria before the uprising. 
They stressed that sectarianism only became an issue with the beginning of the uprising 
in 2011, and usually combined this narrative with a story about their childhood when they 
used to play with children of different religious backgrounds and had good relations with 
neighbours belonging to a different religion. Furthermore, many Syrians stressed that it 
had not been common to ask people about their religious affiliation. However, I was told 
that this had changed since the beginning of the uprising in 2011. In addition, I sensed a 
strong anti-Alawi sentiment among most Syrians I met and I suggest that this was based 
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on the assumption that Alawites benefitted from an unfair and illegitimate link with power 
that granted them privileges in various aspects of their life in Syria.  
Researchers give various, often contradicting answers as to whether Syria before 
the uprising should be understood as a sectarian society, and if so, how this sectarianism 
can be defined and understood. Taking on a rather primordialist position, political 
scientist Nikolaos van Dam (2011: 165) follows the assumption that sectarianism is a 
signifier of actions and behaviour. Likewise, historian Elizabeth Picard (1996: 9 cited in 
Schmoller 2016: 422) argues that membership in a community affects individuals deeply 
and creates firm solidarities. In contrast, several researchers describe sectarianism as an 
outcome rather than a cause of political struggle (see Rabo 2012: 91). Kastrinou (2016: 
7) analyses sectarianism in Syria by setting it in its historical context. She argues, 
following Ussama Makdisi (2000), that the violence in 1860 in Mount Lebanon turned its 
inhabitants into political subjects and created a specific form of active political 
subjectivity based on religious affiliation (ibid.: 10). Sectarianism occurred when local 
forms of identity were politicised and essentalised to function as representation between 
citizen and state (ibid.: 12). Similarly, Peteet (2011: 16) stresses that sect and ethnicity 
are not preordained categories and their emergence and configuration are influenced by 
state-religious relations, external interventions, war, and displacement. Furthermore, she 
advises paying attention to the role sectarianism plays during forced displacement giving 
the example of Shia refugees from Iraq being turned back at the Jordanian border because 
of their sectarian affiliation (ibid.: 19). Here, she thus provides a reason why Syrians in 
Egypt might have chosen to highlight their belonging to Sunni Islam. Likewise, historian 
Christian Schmoller (2016: 420) directs the focus to the use of sectarianism among Syrian 
Christians during displacement in Austria, suggesting that sectarianism is context-
dependent and “a discursive construct remodelled and readopted in narratives about war, 
refuge, integration and belonging”. His research thus allows us to contend that sectarian 
affiliation becomes a strategic tool during displacement.  
In the military-led regime that governed Syria for the past decades, the Alawi 
minority held key positions of power in Syrian politics, economy, and the military. By 
1955, around sixty-five per cent of the Non-Commissioned Officers in the Syrian military 
were Alawites and there was a disproportionate representation of Alawites among 
ordinary soldiers (Sluglett 2016: 41). One of the main reasons for the Alawites’ large 
representation in the military was the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of the French 
colonisers at the beginning of the twentieth century who counted on recruiting minority 
groups. For the Alawites, this was a chance to escape their predominantly impoverished 
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situation (Joubin 2013: 26). Along with Syrians from rural backgrounds, Alawites joined 
the Ba’ath party in large numbers in the 1950s and 1960s because of its radical 
socioeconomic policies (Sluglett 2016: 41). Already before Hafiz al-Assad came to 
power, the Ba’ath party fostered a new political elite drawn from the country’s minority 
populations, especially from the Alawi sect, and from rural and lower- and middle-class 
backgrounds (Wedeen 1999: 8). Once Hafiz al-Assad, himself an Alawi, was in power in 
1970, he promoted Alawi officers, employed predominantly Alawites in the coercive 
apparatuses and gave the whole Alawi community a reason to back his rule (Hokayem 
2013: 31/32; Ismail 2011: 541). Zisser (1999: 135) describes the Alawites’ trajectory in 
Syria as a passage “from ethnic minority to ruling sect”. He defines the central elements 
in the process of Alawi mastery over Syria as: consolidation of the Alawite community 
within the army and the Ba’ath Party, hidden behind the leadership of Hafiz al-Assad; the 
transformation of the community into the main support of the regime; and the 
establishment of a covenant between the Alawites and other groups. 
 
Living with sectarianism in Syria 
 
Once, when we were sitting in a café belonging to an international chain, Majd, the 
student of economics with high career aspirations, explained the politics of Syria to me 
and repeatedly assured me that I could use his case and explanations in my research. 
Bitterly and with much agitation, he described sectarianism in Syria as a political strategy: 
“The regime tried to play the sectarian game (kān al-nizām yaḥāwal yalʿab ʿala 
al-watar al-ṭāʾifī). The regime played with that topic. Before in Syria, we didn’t 
have such a thing called sectarianism. My neighbours, for instance, were 
Christians and we were always visiting them and spent time with each other. The 
regime focused on this issue of sectarianism and started to tell the people: ‘If I 
leave as the regime, your sect will be erased. They will kill you!’ They started to 
force this idea into their brains (badaʾ yaghazīlhum min al-fikra). Unfortunately, 
there are some classes (ṭabaqāt) that are very ignorant so the regime put weapons 
in front of them and told them: ‘Defend yourselves!’ At some point, the people 
started to be convinced that this idea is not right. Then, the regime started to 
request support from foreign powers. However, it will not be able to oppress the 
people. We are the whole people (naḥna shʿab kāmil). We took up arms to defend 
ourselves. Even after many years the regime won’t be able to oppress us!”.  
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According to Majd’s narrative, sectarianism was a strategy used by the Assad regime to 
arouse fear of other religious communities within Syrian society, which some parts of the 
Syrian society were unintelligent enough to believe. In a similar vein, political scientist 
Salwa Ismail (2011: 540) recognised that the dominant motives among Syrians she 
interviewed immediately prior to the beginning of the uprising in 2011 were fear of the 
regime’s instrumentalisation of sectarian affiliation and a potential breakdown of society. 
Similarly, Joubin (2013: 25) stresses that the Syrian regime managed to cultivate a culture 
of fear in society by presenting itself as the last bastion of secular Arab nationalism and 
as the sole protector against imperialist threats and religious fundamentalism.  
Like Majd, Maḥmūd initially emphasised in one of our conversations the absence 
of differentiation or discrimination based on sectarian affiliation before the uprising. 
However, he eventually corrected himself throughout our discussion with growing anger 
and emotion in his voice: “Actually, we had a problem. Now that I am here in Egypt I 
realise it. There was an Alawi dialect. It was strong and if it was spoken it meant: be 
careful. It wasn’t the language of a partner, who lived in the same country”. Maḥmūd 
describes the power of one sect in Syria and its dialect as the marker of this power. He 
illustrated his argument by depicting the situation of a taxi driver, who brings his client 
to the desired address and asks for more money than was initially agreed. When the client 
starts to use the Alawi dialect and refuses to give him the extra money, the taxi driver 
leaves, intimidated by his assumption that his client is an influential, powerful person. 
Another time, Maḥmūd said to me when we talked about the Syrian society: 
“No one trusts an Alawi in the family, even if the Alawi is part of the family for 
a while. We never talk in front of an Alawi. We share information and criticism 
only with Christians or Druze. If you hear someone talking Alawi dialect, it means 
that someone threatens another person. If he wants to get privileges, then he will 
use Alawi dialect. People start to use Alawi dialect if they need it. […] When they 
speak Alawi dialect, people get afraid”. 
Michael Kerr (2015: 3) contends that being Alawi was primarily a “communal and 
cultural symbol” and calls contemporary Alawi identity “a function of the contested 
nature of Syria’s deeply divided society”. The Alawi dialect is described here as an 
instrument of action and power, a symbolic capital, which is bound to the speaker’s 
position in the social structure (Bourdieu 1977: 646). Through language, the speaker does 
not only aim to be understood, but also wants “to be believed, obeyed, respected, 
distinguished” (ibid.: 648). This means that the speaker is in a position of authority and 
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can control how the language is received. Bourdieu (ibid.: 654) maintains that the whole 
social person is speaking and that “the materiality conditions of existence determine 
discourse through the linguistic production relation which they make possible and which 
they structure”.  
It can be argued that the use of the Alawi dialect, in the way Maḥmūd experienced 
it, is a conscious move to communicate the Alawi sect’s dominance that is accepted 
through enforcement on the receiver, the other ethnicities in Syria. Maḥmūd’s narratives 
furthermore suggest that living with a dominating, powerful faith group means constant 
suspicion, fear of exploitation and an inability to confront inequalities and privileging. I 
contend, analysing masculinity from an intersectional perspective, that the dominance of 
one sect and its expression through a feared dialect influences the life of the ‘other’ Syrian 
men: They are constantly reminded of the unequal power structures that have to be 
endured, they need to be continually alert as to who is listening to their words and are 
always aware of their inferiority, so vividly described by Maḥmūd. 
While Majd spoke of the Syrian people as a unified corpus standing up against 
the regime, Maḥmūd distinguished between Alawites and the rest of Syria. Bashār 
described similar experiences with the Alawi sect, albeit more controlled and with less 
emotion in his voice than Maḥmūd: 
“If you enter to any governmental place you feel that it represents one sect only 
[the Alawites] and sometimes it makes you think that it represents only one 
village. You feel the injustice when they all speak in the same accent. You can 
feel the injustice in the country. That was a big mistake”. 
Bashār refers to the Alawites and their dominance in governmental positions, and alludes 
to their origin from a similar region. When Bashār depicts the injustice in the country 
with anyone but the Alawites on the receiving end, Bourdieu’s (1977: 652) notion of the 
power of language is useful again. He stresses that language is worth what the speakers 
are worth, which relates to the economic and cultural power relations of the holders. He 
contends that when one language dominates the market, it becomes the norm against 
which the prices of the other modes of expression are valued. Even though the Alawi 
dialect, as described by my interlocutors, does not dominate the Syrian ‘linguistic market’ 
but is only spoken by a minority, it nevertheless has the authority and power to enforce 
action. The dialect is thus described as manifesting the day-to-day sectarian injustice in 
Syria. 
Throughout our conversation, Bashār continued to emphasise the privileged 
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position of the Alawites in the country: 
“They [the Alawites] held the highest positions in the army and in the police. The 
minority governs, especially the Alawites, because they rule without considering 
all the other minorities. So, the Syrian people is made of two types: Syrians and 
Alawites. Do you watch Faisal al-Qassem7? This person says: there are Syrians 
and there are Alawites, but he is dealing with them from a political perspective, 
not from a religious point of view. This fighting now is after more than twenty 
years of such politics. This is what they call now a sectarian war, but actually it 
isn’t a sectarian war because we never cared about which religion you have or 
which sect you are from”. 
Like Majd, Bashār suggests that the conflict became sectarianised and opposes the idea 
that sectarianism was an inherent feature of Syrian society. 
Conversations I had with Syrian men in Egypt that had a totally different focus 
were often permeated by references to the privileged position of Alawites in the Syrian 
society. When talking about their generation and the dreams they had for their life back 
in Syria, ‘Abd al-Raḥman and Māzin stated that Alawites were, in contrast to them, 
advantaged and benefited through their affiliation with the regime. According to ‘Abd al-
Raḥman, students belonging to the Alawi sect attended better schools, received better 
education, and had a better standard of living. He further described that, when he was 
young, his parents forbade him to speak about the inequalities existing between the 
Alawites and the rest of Syrians, since the regime was supported by a huge security 
apparatus that controlled what was said about the regime’s sectarian basis. The all-
pervading power of the Syrian secret service, and how it impacted on Syrian men’s lives 
in Syria and migrated with them to Egypt, is the topic of the next chapter. As with 
sectarianism, fear of the security service migrated with Syrian men to Egypt and impacted 
on their lives there. 
Māzin, who studied dentistry at private universities in Syria and Egypt, after he 
had found an Egyptian sponsor, mentioned that, compared to the Alawites, he did not 
have many job opportunities back in Syria. Likewise, Hokayem (2013: 32) contends that 
the Alawi community did have better access to jobs in the security sector and that the 
overall conditions of the community improved over time. Creating dependence on the 
regime and alienation from mainstream society, the regime was interested in keeping the 
																																																						
7 Faisal al-Qassem is a Syrian Aljazeera host. He is the moderator of the weekly show ‘The opposite direction’, in 
which two guests discuss key debates of the Arab world (Lynch 2006). 
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Alawi community under its control, ready to be mobilised if needed (ibid.: 33). In 
contrast, several scholars express doubts about the Alawites’ overall advantageous 
situation and argue that it is over simplistic to assume that the entire Alawi community 
was in a privileged position (Harling and Birke 2013; Ismail 2009; Salamandra 2013). 
Instead, it can be argued that the Assad family established itself at the expense of Alawi 
elites (Harling and Birke 2013). 
Based on the judgements of several Syrian men, the Alawi community in Syria 
was privileged and in an overall powerful situation. This was expressed by Māzin when 
he mocked the Alawites’ rural background and how their life had changed from a “life 
with cows, sheep, animals and houses made of clay to palaces in Damascus and Europe” 
(Māzin, June 2015). This echoes Rabo’s (2005: 116) finding that it was common in 
Syria’s larger cities to associate tribal and rural structures with the Alawi faith group, 
members of the Ba’ath party, the armed forces, and people working for the security 
service. Her observation thus shows that there was no clear-cut differentiation in the 
public perception between the sect and the political entities. Furthermore, Māzin’s 
mockery could be understood as a way of challenging the Alawites’ dominance in society 
– at least indirectly in the absence of any Alawites and in front of an outsider like myself. 
This assumption is based on Wedeen’s (1999: 130) observation that through the use of 
rhetorical practices, such as jokes, people offer alternative visions of politics, challenge 
the official regime rhetoric, and show their awareness of the political system they live in. 
Even though sectarianism was described without an explicit reference to 
masculinity, I argue that the structures described influenced Syrian men, depending on 
their social standing, in their self-perception. Given the Alawites’ powerful positions in 
society because of their connections to the regime, their dominance in the army, security 
service and economy, I suggest that men belonging to other religious groups felt 
positioned at the lower end of the hierarchy when being confronted with the Alawi accent, 
as described earlier by Maḥmūd. This must have evoked a feeling of being less worthy, 
less acknowledged and less privileged. Sectarianism and one’s individual positioning in 
the sectarian context are thus part of how Syrian men feel as men. I suggest that 
Monterescu’s conception of masculinity in a heterogeneous place with its focus on 
fluidity, hybridity and dynamism, is useful in providing an answer to the question of how 
masculinities in sectarian communities are constructed: Masculine performance in a 
heterogeneous place, where various power structures are in place, is dependent on the 
different daily encounters and enforces manoeuvring the continuum of acceptable 
versions of masculinities in a given context. This might mean compliance vis-à-vis a 
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speaker of the Alawi dialect, while mocking and joking about the regime and the Alawites 
in their absence.  
Moreover, the narratives show that among the Syrian men I met in Cairo, the term 
‘sectarianism’ was used to refer to conflicts among Sunnis, Christians, Druze, Shia, etc. 
– and those were remembered as being absent before the uprising. When Syrian men 
spoke of the Alawi sect, they did not frame it as sectarianism but described it as an 
ongoing and omnipresent injustice. Hence, it can be argued that my participants defined 
the relation of Alawites with all the other Syrians not in sectarian terms, but instead in 
terms of a ruling sect and an oppressed people. I contend that sectarianism and the 
injustice on the part of the Alawites were thus perceived as two different themes: 
sectarianism and its absence before the uprising were related to my participants’ lives in 
a heterogeneous society, while the narratives around the conflict with the Alawites clearly 
related to state oppression and the unjust position of power held by some people in Syrian 
society. 
 
The migration of sectarianism to Egypt 
 
The issue of sectarianism had an influence on Syrian men’s everyday life in Egypt and 
on the future they envisioned for themselves and their home country. Akram, the primary 
school teacher, described the transformation of a Syrian’s identity since the outbreak of 
the uprising: “At the time of the Syrian revolution, people started to be killed for their 
ideas and the society became shaped as: this is a Sunni, this is an Alawi, this is a Shia”. 
Likewise, Abū Walīd, who shared with me his experiences of being actively involved in 
weapon transfer for the opposition during the uprising, illustrated the heightened focus 
on sectarian belonging, and spoke of his complete loss of trust in certain sects: 
“For the person, no matter if he is educated or illiterate, it is now generally 
impossible to live with other minorities. I am not talking about Christians, but 
about Alawi and Shia. We are the ones who were massacred (naḥna yalli 
zabaḥnā). The ones who massacred the country were Alawi and Shia. Their 
ideology is: ‘kill a Sunni and you will go to paradise!’ You are surprised to find 
him ready with his weapons after all these years. And you used to feel safe in his 
presence for all these years. Now, how will you ever be able to feel safe around 
him again? (shlūn raḥ targʿa taʾminīlu marra tānī?) In Homs, the most famous 
video maker, the one who took videos for the revolution and sent them to the 
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channels, came from America. He was Christian. He left his studies and he came 
to Homs. They killed him in Homs. Who killed him? The Alawites. They didn’t 
distinguish (ma mayazū) whether he was Christian or Sunni. With these people, 
there is no safety (līhadha al-ashkhās ma baqa fī ʾaman). I am not talking from a 
sectarian perspective. I explain for you what happens if you meet anyone who lost 
someone, was imprisoned or came to grief, and you ask him: ‘who do you hate?’. 
He will answer: Alawi and Shia, but he won’t give you names. Bashār is an 
individual, but he doesn’t make any decisions. The decisions are made for him in 
Iran by the Shia. This is the thing which happens in our country. There are many 
people who would oppose my opinion. They would consider my words sectarian. 
No, we don’t want to cover the truth. Our killer is one side (yalli qatalnā huwwa 
wāḥid). We caused the damage to us, but the Shia killed more. I don’t know if 
you are informed, but the percentage of Alawi in Syria decreased. They killed 
people from all the different groups of the Syrian people. They killed Sunni, 
Christians, Armenians, they killed them all. In my opinion, the living together will 
not come back to Syria (ma baqa yargʿa al-taʿayash al-mushtarak)”. 
Abū Walīd drew the picture of a community fractured by sectarianism and hate that will 
never be able to live together ever again. His bitterness, anger and insuppressible hatred 
of other sects are understandable if one considers Abū Walīd’s situation in Syria: he and 
his family used to live in an area that was dominated by Shia inhabitants. With the 
outbreak of the uprising, his former contacts, acquaintances and neighbours turned into 
his enemies. Shia militias tried to kill his father, who was a Sunni shaykh and then they 
kidnapped Abū Walīd at a street checkpoint, when he was on his way home. His family 
had to pay a lot of money for the kidnappers to set him free.  
In order to embed Abū Walīd’s narrative (as well as Majd’s and Bashār’s 
statements with regards to a conflict that became sectarianised), it is useful to review 
sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s (2002: 166) concept of ethnically framed conflict. He 
stresses that rather than thinking of an ethnic conflict, it is more fruitful to consider a 
conflict ethnicised. Ethnic groups are reified by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” (ibid.) in 
times of conflict to reach certain goals. The danger of reification of ethnic groups is, and 
here Brubaker refers to Bourdieu (1991: 220 in Brubaker 2002: 166), that this process 
only produces that which is designated by the users of such categories. Ethnicisation of a 
conflict should thus be understood as a process that takes place on the political, social, 
cultural and psychological levels through narrative encoding. It means that a conflict gets 
an ethnic component through “ethnicized ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing 
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(and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of remembering (and forgetting)” 
(ibid.: 175). Following his argument, both Akram’s and Abū Walīd’s narratives suggest 
that in the Syrian conflict sectarianism became a tool. Their perceptions of the conflict 
thus stand in sharp contrast to any primordialist conception of sectarianism.  
In addition, an argument by Arjun Appadurai (1998: 229) helps to frame Abū 
Walīd’s explanations. He brings ethnic violence in contact with the sentiment of 
uncertainty caused by various current developments, such as migration, or the meaning 
of identities. He argues that uncertainty relates among other things to the anxiety as to 
whether a person really is what they claim or appear to be. An answer to this kind of 
uncertainty can be, according to Appadurai (ibid.), violence in order to discover who is 
‘them’ and consequently who is ‘us’. Accordingly, ethnic violence develops because of 
a sense of betrayal, treachery and deception, which is the result of no longer being able 
to identify social contacts. Social contacts have transformed into monsters wearing masks 
behind which they hide their assumed, true, horrible nature leading the individual to sense 
that they have felt false solidarity and were utterly betrayed (ibid. 238). And indeed, Abū 
Walīd is shocked and abhorred by the Shia and Alawites being ready to fight after he 
trusted them for so many years, and consequently concludes that life in a heterogeneous 
community is no longer possible. I contend that having been shaken in one’s core beliefs 
about one’s society and previous life, as expressed by Abū Walīd, leaves the individual 
feeling unable to make proper judgement, enforces insecurity and lack of self-confidence, 
and creates ultimate fear and suspicion with regards to one’s present and future.  
The issue of sectarianism thus proves crucial for the discussion of Syrian 
manhood in Egypt, as it is a central social category, that has turned many Syrians into 
fearful, insecure, suspicious, human beings full of hate, whose former understanding of 
the order of the world is shaken if not completely lost. 
 
The Syrian ‘non-community’ in Egypt 
 
I now turn to an analysis of the consistency, manifestation and every-day experience of 
community life in Egypt. The reason I began to focus on the issue of ‘community’ during 
my fieldwork was its absence among Syrians in Egypt. I sensed an extreme suspicion and 
scepticism in my acquaintances’ dealings with each other. Syrian contacts kept telling me 
to be careful and not to trust any Syrian. They assumed that people would lie to me and 
would try to make use of me. Jamāl, for instance, who used to work with an NGO offering 
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psycho-social support to refugees, warned me that Syrians take advantage of my 
impression that they were ghalbānīn (poor). They would trick me to believe that they 
were in trouble in order to make me do something for them. ‘Azza, the Egyptian head of 
an aid organisation for Syrian refugees, told me that the Syrians in Egypt could not be 
defined as a community at all. She observed, for instance, that her Syrian clients would 
not inform each other of a free food or diaper distribution out of the fear that there might 
not be enough to cover their own needs. Most of the Syrians I met told me that there was 
no contact with other Syrians in Cairo and that Syrians preferred to keep to themselves. 
Scholars dealing with the impact of trauma on a community contend that the 
community’s social tissue is often dramatically damaged, causing loss of confidence in 
the self and in the surroundings. Social bonds tear apart and fault lines that ran silently 
through the community before the traumatic experience are forced open. Community 
members who are absent in times of crisis might be similarly traumatised (see Suárez-
Orozco and Robben 2000; Erikson 1995). Hence, it comes as no surprise that several 
studies suggest that refugee groups are internally factionalised and segmented. Fractures 
often exist along the lines of differences in class, politic views or religion, which reflect 
a continuation of divisions in the home country (Gold 1992; Kelly 2003). According to 
Kelly (2003:45), researching refugees who fled to the UK from Bosnia because of the 
civil war, the war not only ruptured family and friendship networks but also made the 
building of a community in exile problematic, as many people found it difficult to trust 
after what they had experienced. The literature on trauma and the consequent difficulty 
of building a community frames the extent of damage the Syrian society experienced and 
the severe influence the civil war and sectarianism continue to have on Syrians who fled 
the conflict.  
According to Qutayba, the conflict and its heightened focus on sectarianism and 
political affiliation were transferred to Egypt and had a direct influence on the everyday 
life of Syrians there. He recounted that the relationships among Syrians when they first 
arrived in Egypt were shaped by the overriding question of who was pro and who was 
against Bashār al-Assad. Qutayba remembered that the situation was explosive and that 
many Syrians refused to work together in case they had different political opinions. He 
described that political discussions were not rational between people who had lost loved 
ones at the hands of either the opposition or the regime forces. Moreover, he explained 
how he was rejected by other Syrians when he first arrived in Egypt because his home 
city had only been recently under attack. He experienced that other Syrians in Egypt 
calculated whether to help each other and this calculation was based on whether they 
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came from the same region or city, and if not, whether the home city of the one in need 
was included in the revolution and to what extent it was destroyed. His account thus 
reinforces the importance of region in Syria and how it permeates various aspects of 
Syrian identity. Moreover, his narrative stands in sharp contrast to Ismail’s (2011: 544) 
observation of the early days of the Syrian revolution, in which the residents of one town 
held protests in support and solidarity with people demonstrating in other regions of Syria 
showing their willingness to fight and sacrifice for each other. Qutayba’s experiences in 
Cairo allude to the politicisation of one’s origin, in which trust and support became linked 
to one’s home city’s involvement in the uprising.  
Qutayba remembered another incident illustrating how political opinion 
permeated and defined encounters with other Syrians in Egypt: Once, he met a girl at a 
kiosk in the streets of Cairo. She spoke with a Syrian accent the Egyptian kiosk seller did 
not understand, so Qutayba translated her words into Egyptian Arabic. Afterwards, the 
girl and Qutayba had a quick chat. The girl said to him: “Please don’t tell me that you are 
with Bashār al-Assad so I don’t have to hate you!”. Qutayba avoided meeting her again 
because he was disappointed by her judgement and general condemnation of anyone who 
did not share her political views. He was neither with nor against Bashār al-Assad and 
the revolution, he said, and wanted to be respected as such. Qutayba’s illustrations imply 
that certain personal characteristics, such as one’s origin and one’s home city’s 
performance during the uprising, have begun to outweigh one’s self. He is directly judged 
based on his political opinions and reduced to them.  
In a similar vein, Qays, the founder of an NGO planning activities for Syrians, 
drew a clear connection between the crisis and the communal life of Syrians in Egypt: 
“The crisis is big. It caused a psychological problem. This problem made the 
Syrians decrease their circle of friends. At the beginning, I was careful to say or 
show my political or rebellious opinions, in order not to be hurt, and the fear 
reached high levels because of the injustice of the regime. The social relations are 
not good so at this point our team entered”. 
The goal of the NGO Qays founded was to improve the relations of Syrians in Egypt and 
to help “in rebuilding the Syrian society newly from scratch”. For this reason, they were 
planning and organising communal events, such as an event for Syrian women on 
Mother’s Day. Like Qutayba, Qays’ narrative suggests that fear, self-control, uncertainty 
and suspicion define his everyday interactions and encounters. In order to describe the 
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lack of communal cohesion, Abū Walīd described his experiences of trying to establish 
joint projects in Egypt: 
“We wanted to open a Syrian kitchen to help families. We were about twenty 
Syrians. There is such a kitchen in Istanbul. There are twenty or thirty families 
who help each other. Such a project doesn’t have any success in Egypt because 
you have two classes of Syrians and the two classes are very far away from each 
other. The ones who are down cannot help, if the ones who are up don’t do the 
same thing. […] The Syrians are from many areas in Syria: Damascus, Aleppo, 
Homs and they don’t agree with each other. Maybe the women sit together in the 
morning and they greet each other, but regarding financial issues, they don’t 
agree. Maybe this is because we are outside of our homeland so everyone is afraid, 
but I don’t know the exact reason. As Syrians helping each other, we weren’t 
successful. Usually, Syrians are famous for making groups when they live outside 
of their homeland and they help each other, but here we are lost. On a level of 
twenty people, men and women, we couldn’t agree on a deal. We look like we are 
together, but actually we are not. When you create groups, there should be 
common things or affairs, but here it didn’t work out”.  
Abū Walīd describes the lack of community cohesion as a personal failure and points to 
feelings of isolation and of being lost because a common ground and mutual 
understanding have vanished and fear and suspicion have prevailed. 
In this context, it is worth noting that many Syrian contacts of mine complained 
about the inability to establish jamaʿiyyāt (associations) in Egypt – a form of social 
commitment that was frequently used in Syria to organise financial savings. Dīma, a 
lawyer and student of mine, recalled that it was impossible to organise a group of Syrians 
with the aim of establishing jamaʿiyyāt. Despite everyone’s initial motivation, at the end, 
no one would pay their share and the whole project would fail. Kastrinou (2016: 175) 
conceptualises jamaʿiyyāt as informal groups that are neither registered nor affiliated with 
the state. These groups, which were pervasive in Syria, comprised of networks of friends, 
families, members of specific occupations, neighbours and sometimes cut across religious 
and ethnic divides (ibid. 2012: 66). Their members meet with the aim of collecting fees 
from each member that are paid to a different member of the group each time the group 
comes together. It is thus best described as a “rotating credit association” (ibid. 2016: 
175). Kastrinou (ibid.: 180) argues that the establishment of jamaʿiyyāt supports “Syrian 
inventiveness and efficiency in creating spaces that occupy the in-between space of state 
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and household” (ibid.: 180). The failing of jamaʿiyyāt in Egypt proves the lack of trust 
Syrians had in each other.  
Furthermore, Dīma remembered bitterly a painful time in her life in Egypt when 
her husband was hit by a car on the streets of Cairo and broke both his legs. For three 
months, she took care of him at home and neither of them could work to provide for their 
two sons. She recalled how stressed her husband was, sitting at home unable to work as 
a dentist, and how she was worried and tense as well. They had to pay around 30,000 LE 
for his surgery and could only gather this amount of money through the help of relatives. 
Once, she posted a call for help on Facebook explaining the family’s devastating situation 
and their desperate need for expensive medication. She asked for help but never received 
any financial support. Later, she found out through her contact to a Syrian NGO that her 
Facebook post had been copied and shared by an acquaintance of hers with the added 
information that this person would collect money on behalf of Dīma. However, Dīma 
neither received any money nor did this person get in touch with her. Agitated, she 
explained to me that someone had obviously abused her vulnerable situation to receive 
donations and kept the money for themselves. She repeatedly mentioned during our 
various conversations that Syrians in Cairo would not help each other and would not care 
for each other. Dīma’s story thus describes the shock of not receiving help during one’s 
time of need but rather the abuse of one’s vulnerability. 
It is an important finding for the forthcoming chapter that Syrians in Egypt 
described themselves and were perceived from the outside as lacking communal 
cohesion, showing no signs of support or care for each other. I suggest that not only the 
memories of injustice, the migrated emotions and present experiences with sectarianised 
conflict created this sense of a ‘non-community’, but also the fact that Syria’s regime 
heavily relied on its coercive security apparatus to guarantee its rule, which strongly 
influenced Syrians in Egypt. I contend that the experience of living in a ‘non-community’ 
evokes a deep sense of insecurity, fragility, incomprehension, sadness and fear. 
(Masculine) identity must be built anew and can only be formed on the unstable ground 
of living without visible communal structures. Mistrust and suspicion in others are the 
norm. 
Having discussed the fractures, fissures and fragmentations among Syrians and 
the ongoing impact of sectarianism on Syrian men’s lives, I turn in the following 
paragraphs to a discussion of Syrian men’s encounters with the Egyptian host population 
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that were often defined in relation to the common historical period of the UAR and in 
relation to the Rabaa Square Massacre in 2013. 
 
Inventing ‘Syrianness’ through the United Arab Republic 
 
“Egypt was different for the Syrians at that time [in 2012]. The Syrians were more 
respected. They [the Egyptians] used to love them more and sympathised with 
them more. They always remembered the union between Egypt and Syria from 
1956 to 1958 [sic]. So, there was respect at the beginning but when the Syrians 
became more the situation changed. There were some underlying tensions 
(ḥasāsiyyāt) between the people”. 
As suggested by Māzin, one of the topics most often mentioned in my conversations with 
Syrians in Egypt dealt with their experiences with, perceptions of, and relations with the 
Egyptian host community. In order to frame their situation in Egypt, many referred to 
Syria and Egypt’s common history during the years of the UAR8. Based on their shared 
history, many of my interlocutors argued in a similar vein to Māzin that Syrians were 
initially welcomed in Egypt, that relations were “relaxed” as Hānī put it, and that there 
were “visas, projects and support” as described by Dāwūd. Moreover, Hānī understood 
the Union as a historical proof that Syrians and Egyptian could live together. He described 
how the UAR brought about close relationships.  
“I wonder whether they [Syrians and Egyptians] will get used to each other. But 
in this situation, I say that the people lost everything so … and we should 
remember that at the time of the Union between Syria and Egypt there were many 
marriages between Syrians and Egyptians. For example, I know a woman who is 
																																																						
8 Egypt and Syria, under Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and Sabri al-Asali proclaimed the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic 
in February 1958. The unity was declared after Syria stood up and supported Egypt, which was attacked by France, 
England and Israel in the Suez Crisis. The UAR was perceived as the only option to counter Western hegemony over 
the Middle East. Elie Podeh (1999: 5-7) describes the widespread appeal of pan-Arabism, the charismatic nature of 
‘Abd al-Nasir’s leadership and Syria’s and Egypt’s similar foreign policies as the main factors that encouraged and 
facilitated the existence of an Egyptian-Syrian union. However, several factors worked against the idea of a union, such 
as the physical absence of a mutual border, the different composition of the Egyptian and Syrian societies, differences 
in economies and politics that assured a difficult integration and a perceived superiority to the other existing in both 
countries (ibid.: 2-5). Syria held a subordinate role in the Union’s government with ‘Abd al-Nasir rejecting a joint 
leadership with the Syrian Ba’ath Party (Meininghaus 2016: 71). ‘Abd al-Nasir also made sure that Syria’s political 
parties were dissolved and that the Syrian army withdrew from political life (Jankowski 2002: 117). Shortly after its 
formation, the Union faced internal problems, induced by the introduction of a more centralised governmental structure, 
tighter controls of foreign trade, reforms of land and labour law. The Union eventually collapsed in September 1961 
after a coup staged by Damascene Sunni officers (Joubin 2013: 62).  
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Syrian and she is married to an Egyptian for twenty years and they still live 
happily together. This woman is one of my relatives. He takes good care of her”. 
According to his account, the UAR gives hope for a present and a future in Egypt, in 
which Syrians and Egyptians live together in acceptance and appreciation.  
In an attempt to understand why many Syrians revived Syria’s and Egypt’s short 
common history, it is revealing to look at anthropologist Anita Fábos’ (2001: 91) work 
on Sudanese refugees in Egypt. She found that Sudanese put emphasis on cultural 
similarities shared with the Egyptians and on the official discourse held up by the 
Egyptians that Sudanese were their brothers in the Nile Valley. This happened despite 
that fact that the reality did not mirror this unity, since Sudanese could not get citizenship 
in Egypt and had lost many legal and political privileges. Due to the ambivalence between 
the official narrative and the political reality, Sudanese in Cairo began to focus on the 
cultural concept of ‘propriety’ that gave them the opportunity to highlight both unity with 
and difference from the Egyptian host society (ibid.: 92). While both mainstream 
Egyptians and Sudanese base their concepts of morality and propriety on the same pool 
of cultural knowledge, Sudanese transformed some of these common norms and practices 
into an ethnic vocabulary that distinguished them from the Egyptians. Fábos (ibid.) 
stresses that the difference with the Egyptian concept of morality was only articulated in 
the private sphere, while publicly the focus was on “meta-narratives of shared identity to 
include and be included by Egyptians”. I argue that Syrians in Egypt, similarly to 
Sudanese in Cairo, made use of the UAR to point out that Syria once stood on equal 
footing with Egypt as a political partner in crisis that was taken seriously. I suggest that 
the memory of the Union was used to emphasise this equality, to create respect, and to 
maintain this image of Syria before the Egyptians despite Syria’s current crisis.  
Additionally, the memory of the UAR was related to a prospective return to 
Syria’s former position in the region. ‘Abd al-Raḥman said: 
“The Syrian people are generous. They hosted the Iraqis and the Lebanese people 
and didn’t make any tents for them. […] I just wish that these countries [Iraq and 
Lebanon] remember the Syrians and the many nice things they did for them. We 
wish that Syria becomes a state again and we build it and we return to have strong 
relations with Egypt. We had strategic relations with Egypt. In 1958, there was a 
unity between Syria and Egypt. We wish for more care for the Syrians and that 
we return to build the economy and to have again treaties with Egypt or Jordan. 
We just wish”. 
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‘Abd al-Raḥman’s narrative shows his longing for Syria to be a strong state again and 
thus reinforces the analysis to the relation of being a man with the state (which I 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and will discuss in-depth in the next chapter). As mentioned in 
the first chapter, the connection between masculinity and the nation state as an important 
aspect that requires analysis is reoccurring. It evokes the following questions: What is a 
man without a state? Can a nation state grant or guarantee masculinity? The need for 
making and analysing the connection between a strong state and the individual’s worth is 
furthered by Dāwūd: “Once I went back to Syria to see my family and frankly if I will go 
again, I won’t come back because in your own country you feel your value”.   
Based on the literature briefly presented in the first chapter, which lays out the 
intimate relationship between men and the state, and the discussion in Chapter 2, I suggest 
that men, and ʿAbd al-Raḥman’s account is indicative of it, suffer from the loss of contact 
to their nation state. They feel valueless and worthless. Moreover, Dāwūd’s and ‘Abd al-
Raḥman’s inability to currently rely on the nation echoes Nell Gabiam’s (2015: 488) 
observations among Palestinians in France with regards to statelessness. Her interviewees 
described statelessness as a feeling of non-existence, lack of recognition, as well as 
vulnerability to injustice and oppression. Statehood was instead related to a sense of 
belonging, control over one’s life, rootedness, and documents that guaranteed one’s 
mobility and origin. Consequently, I suggest that a strong state functions as a man’s 
backbone providing him with control and agency while a weak or an absent state relates 
to status loss, and lack of protection and social visibility.  
 The UAR is thus much more than a historical period that Syria and Egypt jointly 
experienced: it is a proof of Syria’s strength in the past, a claim for respect, a meta-
narrative of shared identity that gives hope of being included and accepted by the 
Egyptians and an attempt to rebuild masculinity on a state that was once strong, able to 
give shelter to people in need, and respected in the Arab world.  
 
‘Othering’ processes after the Rabaa Square massacre 
 
The initial support sensed by Māzin and other Syrians when they first arrived, and which 
they explained through the common Syrian-Egyptian history, did not last because of the 
political incidents that occurred in Egypt in the summer of 2013. The ousting of former 
president Muhammad Morsi and the Rabaa Square massacre had a lasting effect on 
Syrians living in Egypt. Hostility towards Syrians was on the rise even before 2013, when 
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Morsi extended protection and public services for them in the previous summer. By 
presidential decree, Syrians were allowed to access public education and the healthcare 
system – privileges denied to other refugee groups in Egypt (Fritzsche 2013). A speech 
by Morsi in June 2013, in which he expressed his full support for the Free Syrian Army, 
ordered the closure of the Syrian embassy in Egypt and demanded the Egyptian people’s 
participation in the fight against the Assad regime, further triggered anti-Syrian 
sentiments (Ayoub and Khallaf 2014: 20). After this speech, Syrians began to be accused 
of interfering in Egypt’s politics by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid.). Hostility 
towards Syrians was exacerbated when Syrian refugees were publicly denounced for 
participating in the sit-ins on Rabaa Square organised by Morsi supporters after his 
ousting (Fritzsche 2013). The media fuelled the anti-Syrian sentiments with TV presenter 
Tawfīq Okasha warning Syrians to stop supporting the Muslim Brotherhood within the 
next forty-eight hours, if they did not want Egyptians to destroy their homes (HRW 2013). 
According to Fritzsche (2013), Syrians in Egypt were utilised to polarise the country and 
delegitimise the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood was portrayed as a foreign-
led entity, Syrian refugees were demonised and depicted as a threat to national security. 
Among my Egyptian acquaintances, there was a strong sense of rejection of Syrians’ 
assumed participation in Egypt’s national politics and a lot of anger that Syrians who 
were tolerated as foreigners and guests would interfere in Egypt’s internal issues. 
Maḥmūd remembered that the summer of 2013 was defined by fear and insecurity. 
He avoided speaking Syrian dialect in public in order not to be identified as Syrian. He 
was called names and was treated badly by Egyptians. Mu’ayad, who had to flee to Egypt 
because of having been injured during the protests in Syria, remembered how he 
continuously reduced his presence on the streets of Cairo until he spent almost all his time 
at home unable to earn money and provide for himself. When I asked Rāfī, who regularly 
gave me a ride to 6th of October City, why he did not want to live there but instead chose 
another area of Cairo, where the Syrian presence was less visible, he answered that the 
Egyptians treated him better in areas with less Syrian presence. Rāfī clearly enjoyed 
spending time in 6th of October City. He said that the smell, the names, the shops and the 
chitchat on the streets reminded him of his life in Syria; however, he once experienced 
rejection there. When he entered a shop in 6th of October City, the Egyptian vendor 
immediately insulted him, saying “intū mish kwuayissīn (you are not good people)”. He 
assumed that the shop owner had had a bad experience with a Syrian and felt that all 
Syrians were the same. In order to avoid this sweeping rejection, Rāfī decided to live in 
an area of Cairo where fewer Syrians were living. 
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Bashār compared the Egyptians’ hostile attitude after the Rabaa Square massacre 
with their perception of Syrians before Morsi’s ousting in 2013: “When they heard the 
word ‘Syrian’, it was a very positive term and they used to say ahlan wa sahlan 
(welcome)”. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation after the summer of 2013, in 
which, Bashār remembered, “if you say ‘Syrian’, you feel that it’s nothing”. Furthermore, 
he explained that the changing attitude towards Syrians was most obvious in the 
immigration department: “In the past, they dealt with me like a Syrian – a ḍayf (guest). 
Now, you have a window and it’s written on it ‘Syrian’. Next to it, there is a window for 
Palestinians and another window is for all the remaining Arab countries”. Bashār 
describes how Syrians became a problematic case with regards to immigration to Egypt 
similar to the Palestinians, while before they were welcomed like other Arab countries 
before. Referring to the pro-Morsi demonstrations and the assumed Syrian presence there, 
Bashār proclaimed that Syrians in Egypt were accused of “things they didn’t do”.  
Only a few Syrians I met, assumed that there was an actual presence of Syrians 
on Rabaa Square as had been propagated by the Egyptian media. If they believed that 
there had been Syrian participation in the demonstration, they either strongly condemned 
it arguing that these protesting Syrians did not know they had no right to interfere in 
domestic politics with their status as ‘guests’ in Egypt, or they assumed that these Syrians 
had been ‘bought’ by the Muslim Brotherhood. They related this assumption to the initial 
widespread support for Syrians by Egyptian aid organisations affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and presumed that this drew Syrians into supporting the Muslim Brothers in 
demonstrations. Abū Māzin, for instance, told me that those Syrians who attended the 
Rabaa Square protests were extremely poor and were forced to participate by an Egyptian 
shaykh of a specific mosque in 6th of October City, where he provided Syrian refugees 
with material support. In contrast, Fāris, the manager of a clothes shop, did not try to find 
excuses for the assumed presence of Syrians in the demonstrations, but described that the 
attitude of Egyptians towards Syrians understandably changed for the worse because of 
“bad Syrians” partaking in the pro-Morsi demonstrations. These Syrians, he stressed, did 
not understand their position as guests in a host country.  
While Bashār used the term ‘guest’ as a status of respect, for Fāris, being a guest 
translates into the need for neutrality and staying out of the political issues of the host 
country. Being considered a guest and actively pursuing this role, can produce several 
additional consequences: In the context of Jordan, Salih (2013: 90) observes an arbitrary 
withdrawal of passports held by Palestinians. This practice is supposed to transform 
Palestinians in Jordan into docile subjects reinforcing the idea that Palestinians are 
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‘guests’ in Jordan rather than ‘citizens’. Likewise, in Lebanon, Palestinians are forcibly 
reduced to the status of ‘guests’ due to their national aspiration, which confronts them 
with expulsion, destruction, imprisonment and another statelessness (Salih 2014). Being 
a guest can thus easily transform into a silencing of the individual, enforcing complicity, 
docility, submissiveness and humiliation, and ultimately risks making the individual 
agentless.  
I contend that among the Syrians I met in Egypt, being a guest translated into self-
restraint and political apathy, which I not only found in the narratives just presented, but 
also in several other political debates, in which my Syrian acquaintances often preferred 
to remain silent. There was an awareness that activism and engagement in Egyptian 
domestic politics could endanger the collectivity of Syrians in Egypt and thus several 
Syrians, like Fāris, reiterated the discourse present in the Egyptian host population and 
induced by the Egyptian regime’s adoption of their portrayals of Syrians who participated 
in the events.  
Another theme occurring in Fāris’s narrative is the refusal to identify those who 
presumably participated in the demonstrations in support of the Muslim Brotherhood as 
Syrians. There was an internal selection as to who was defined as Syrian, and those who 
presumably participated in the demonstrations on Rabaa Square were excluded because 
of their behaviour. Howell and Shryock (2011: 79) detect a similar redefinition of identity 
followed by a stigmatisation of those who do not fit in the context of Arabs in Detroit 
after 9/11. They argue that “to reassert their status as ‘good’ and ‘loyal’ and worthy of 
respect, Arab Americans must distance themselves not only from negative stereotypes, 
but also from the people who are most likely to suffer from these images and their 
consequences” (ibid.). This means for people who “belong to this zone of Otherness” 
(ibid.: 80) that they are silenced and better keep themselves to the background. The 
reiteration of the Egyptian discourse against the Syrians thus offered men like Fāris the 
opportunity to purify themselves through the creation of distance from the ‘bad’ Syrians, 
and to render themselves acceptable in the face of the regime and the biased Egyptians. 
Consequently, the aftermath of Rabaa Square is not only an important signifier 
for Syrian-Egyptian relations, but also defines negotiations among Syrians. Syrians in 
Egypt had to make sense of being scapegoated by the Egyptians by creating a new ‘Other’ 
from their midst, against which they could construct a purer and ‘better’ version of 
themselves. 
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Making sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’ through stereotypes 
 
In addition to blaming ‘bad Syrians’, several Syrians I met blamed the influence of the 
media and the Egyptians’ ignorance for the rise in xenophobia, intolerance, and suspicion 
against Syrians, as expressed by Abū Walīd:  
“There are two Egyptian channels on TV and what they say in these channels is 
what the Egyptians believe. If the TV tells the Egyptians that we are terrorists, 
then we are terrorists. If we are kwuayissīn [good in Egyptian dialect], then they 
believe that we are kwuayissīn. Last year you put me on your head and now you 
believe that I am a terrorist? We started to see this in their eyes”. 
Abū Walīd was not the only one who shared with me the belief that Egyptians lacked 
political acumen, which was obvious when they blindly followed the media’s definition 
of the Syrians as scapegoats. A similar sense of ascribed ignorance and lack of 
understanding is obvious in ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s account: 
“From 2006 until 2011, I was a bāshā (a respected man) in Egypt. Any Egyptian 
would call me bāshā and I was loved because there were not many Syrians in 
Egypt. However, when the incidents started in Syria they thought that we were 
fleeing from the war and that we needed them, but the money that any Syrian paid 
for the flight ticket for him and his family can provide living for one year for an 
Egyptian family. The costs of the trip from Syria to Cairo can cover the living for 
any Egyptian family. We see a lot of people living in 6th of October City in nice 
houses and they opened very fancy restaurants. We see how the Egyptians left the 
Egyptian restaurants and came to eat in the Syrian restaurants”.  
The title bāshā had an important connotation in the pre-1952 monarchy in Egypt. The 
Palace bestowed this title on individuals (often large landowners) privileging them and 
giving them access to positions of power (Eid 2002: 194). It referred to influence, wealth, 
social status and authority (ibid.: 157). Nowadays, bāshā is used in everyday 
conversations in an informal manner. If used in an official environment, for example at 
the workplace or with high officials, it establishes and maintains relations of hierarchy 
(Shehata 2009: 227). According to Yūssif, an Egyptian student and acquaintance of mine, 
bāshā nowadays defines someone with money, property and influence, someone with 
high social status and a good life. Losing the status of bāshā, which ‘Abd al-Raḥman, 
recognised, can thus be understood as a feeling of degradation in terms of class, status, 
respect and masculinity. While being Syrian used to be an influential, valued status, the 
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Syrian crisis and civil war diminished Syria’s standing and consequently the position of 
a Syrian man in Egypt.  
In addition to Egyptians’ ignorance and lack of political knowledge, I heard 
several other stereotypes used by Syrians to describe themselves and stigmatise the 
Egyptian ‘others’. This echoes Kusow’s (2004: 179) argument that groups or individuals 
who experience stigmatisation by the society reverse the process and find their own ways 
to engage in stigmatisation of the dominant society. He found that Somali immigrants in 
Canada ascribe moral and cultural inferiority to Canadian society to draw a symbolic 
boundary, while they experience stigmatisation on the part of Canadian society because 
of their skin colour. Similarly, Peteet (2005: 184) argues that in times of conflict, moral 
distinctions were expressed. Palestinians found in the ‘other’ qualities they considered 
opposite to their own even while they could equally find similarities. 
In order to further conceptualise the use of stereotypes that I observed among 
many Syrians, I turn to anthropologist Michael Jackson (2002: 75), who stresses the 
importance of the erection of boundaries in the context of displacement as a measure to 
safeguard one’s sanity and integrity. He contends that a sense of control is recovered 
through the classification of the world in generalising, dichotomous entities, such as self 
and not-self, inside and outside (ibid.). For Homi Bhabha (1994: 94), the stereotype is a 
form of knowledge and identification that constantly moves between what is already 
known, taken for granted and acknowledged as a fact, and what must be anxiously 
repeated. Speaking of its texture, he argues that the central element of the stereotype is 
its ambivalence, which gives it currency, weight, credibility and guarantees its successful 
propagation. Anthropologist Felix Girke (2014: 14) argues that stereotyping serves to 
project both fear and longing, nurturing both disdain and adoration. Stereotypes and 
images of the ‘other’ are always implicitly or explicitly comparative and show what is 
relevant about a given ‘other’ in a certain situation (ibid.: 15). Importantly for the 
following argument, he stresses that the self arises out of the fraught contact situation 
with the ‘other’ (ibid.: 21). Moreover, Girke defines the attempt to proclaim one’s image 
of the ‘other’ as part of a system of domination and subordination (2014a: 147). 
Following these scholars, I analyse what the specific stereotypes in use reveal about fears 
and longing, situational relevance, how they were part of systems of power and group 
formation, and ultimately how they helped to define Syrian masculinity.  
Layla spoke about her stay in Egypt by using several complementary stereotypes, 
such as poverty and wealth, submission and dignity, complicity and agency. 
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“We said revolution against the tyranny and against the ignorance and the poverty 
and everything, but when we came to Egypt we saw a new level of poverty. We 
were living like kings in Syria. We don't have this level of poverty and we didn't 
see it before and we didn't know it. I am not saying that there is no poverty in 
Syria but it wasn't like this, not like what they have here. She doesn't kiss your 
hand and foot for one pound. Our pride and dignity are above everything as 
Syrians, but they don't have dignity here”. 
Layla clarifies her own middle-classness and the pride and dignity that middle-classness 
promises to women, by referring to the destitution she saw in Egypt that she considers 
incomparable to poverty in Syria. In order to further illustrate the level of poverty she 
found in Egypt, she referred to a ride in a minibus:  
“They fight here for the minibus ticket. He said: ‘it is one pound and twenty-five 
piasters’, and the other one answered: ‘no, it is only one pound!’ and they stop the 
minibus and fight over twenty-five piasters. At the end, I told them: ‘I pay’. I 
wanted to understand what is going on in the minibus. I wanted to understand 
what the problem is and they told me that there were twenty-five piasters missing. 
I told the driver: ‘I pay you half a pound or one pound just so you keep driving. 
Isn't it a shame that you to stop the traffic for twenty-five piasters?’. And someone 
said: ‘now the Syrian will solve our problems’. They stopped the minibus and 
went out to fight over twenty-five piasters”. 
Layla did not describe the life of the upper class in Egypt and similarly ignored that her 
perception of Syria did not represent the lifestyle and experience of Syrians from all social 
classes. She essentialises both Egypt and Syria and their respective populations – a core 
aspect of any form of stereotyping and othering. Through her use of stereotypes and 
comparison with the Egyptians, Layla, who faced a very difficult time in Egypt, manages 
to reintroduce the status she held in Syria. 
In addition to frequent discussions of Syria’s presumed wealth and Egypt’s 
poverty, many Syrians I met displayed the exceptional work ethic of Syrian employees 
and entrepreneurs, and the high-quality products produced by Syrian factories and 
companies. I often heard that Syrian houses and restaurants were cleaner, that Syrian 
doctors were more educated and trustworthy, that Syria’s streets were in a better shape, 
or that Syrian employers were preferred even by Egyptian workers. Qutayba, for instance, 
complained about the inadequate way his office was cleaned by the Egyptian staff. He 
said he usually had to tell the Egyptian cleaner to come back and redo their job three times 
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before his desk reached a satisfactory level of cleanliness. He added that he kept his own 
rag in his closet so that he could clean his desk and workplace if he remained unsatisfied. 
Qutayba believed it was Syrians’ high standards, their level of expectations in themselves 
and in others, which differentiated them from the Egyptians. He was convinced that the 
Egyptians forgot the incidents that occurred in the summer of 2013 as soon as the Syrians 
had established themselves in Egypt, were in possession of many factories and shops, and 
were appreciated for their work and the quality they produced.  
Maḥmūd had set up his own office in his flat and had created his own material for 
tours he offered to tourists; he remembered a conversation with his Egyptian landlord, in 
which the landlord told him that Egyptians could learn how to be creative from the 
Syrians. He admired the fact that even though Syrians were facing a war in their home 
country, they could come up with original, innovative ideas in Egypt to make a living. In 
another conversation, Maḥmūd spoke at great length about jealousy he saw in Egyptians, 
which was, in his eyes, an understandable outcome of their encounter with the more 
meticulous and diligent Syrians.  
“and sometimes there is envy on the part of the Egyptians. Why? Because, as I 
noticed, many Egyptians told me: ‘you are excellent in everything! You are the 
best in restaurants, you are the best in clothes. You open a dentist clinic here and 
you are the best. You open bla bla bla…!’ I hear it from many people. I feel happy 
but at the same time I feel that the Egyptians who work in the same field are not 
happy because of the Syrians. And they are right sometimes. I am in my country 
and someone comes to my country and he starts to make any food and the people 
go to his place. Some Egyptians ate ḥawāwshī [an Egyptian meat dish] in a Syrian 
restaurant with me and they said that it was the best ḥawāwshī they ever had. Bas 
ḥawāwshī yaʿnī masrī (But ḥawāwshī is Egyptian)! Imagine if another restaurant 
here that is very famous hears that ḥawāwshī is the best at the Syrians! And the 
one who said it is Egyptian. They will say: Fuck Syrians!”. 
Maḥmūd’s talk of the danger of being too successful in the host country echoes the 
discussion of being a tolerated guest, who has to keep his head down and should not stand 
out in any way. At the same time, he reiterates the image of the ideal Syrian middle-class 
man who is characterised by creativity, ingenuity, diligence and productivity. Focusing 
on the food industry, in which many Syrians in Egypt managed to make a living, he 
continued: 
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“So, this is the difficulty: if you want to work you might face problems because 
you may not be good. However, Syrians have a different problem: they are famous 
for being good. And maybe they are not good. Wallahī, I met someone in Medan 
Lubnan and I asked him where he used to sell shāwirmā in Syria and I discovered 
that he was ḥadād (smith) back in Syria. He wasn’t doing anything with shāwirmā 
before. But he opened a shāwirmā shop in Egypt and wrote ‘Syrian Shawerma’ 
on the signboard and all the people trusted him immediately. I found the shāwirmā 
okay, not very special”.  
There is a sense of reverse stigmatisation, as described by Kusow, in Maḥmūd’s 
narratives as well as a reclamation of Syrian middle-class identity and masculinity coming 
into being through the comparison with the Egyptian others. Having been publicly 
scapegoated and blamed for interference in Egyptian politics and support of demonised 
Islamism, Syrian men and women engaged in stigmatisation of the Egyptian host 
population by creating their own definitions of successful identity.  
 
Masculinisation through stereotyping 
 
Not all stereotypes only implicitly referred to images of ideal masculinity, some 
prejudices explicitly expressed characteristics of ideal manhood with the purpose of 
distinguishing Syrian men from their Egyptian counterparts. Maḥmūd told me that after 
the fourth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution there was a public outcry in Egypt 
following the killing of Sheimaa al-Sabbagh, that Egyptian men had no rujūla 
(masculinity). Shaimaa al-Sabbagh was killed by the Egyptian security forces on 24 
January 2015 when she participated in a peaceful protest in Cairo to commemorate the 
revolution (HRW 2015a). Maḥmūd told me that on the pictures and videos of her dying 
moments that went viral, he saw several men passing by without stopping to help the 
dying woman and the man who was holding her. To strengthen his argument, he added 
that Egyptian men on a bus would commonly not offer their seat to women and would 
rather watch them being harassed and stared at by other men. He said that in Syria, men 
always interfered if a woman was harassed, while in Egypt, men had not understood that 
rujūla was not only words but also actions.  
Likewise, Mustafa, a student busy with his final exams, who participated in a 
variety of trainings and courses in his free time and came over as very self-confident, 
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made use of stereotypes that related to work ethic in addition to emphasising on Syrian 
men’s appeal.  
“Nowadays, I get accepted. The beginning was hard. You have to enforce that you 
get respected. At first, Egyptian men treated me badly, but when you enforce 
respect by showing that you are a respectable man, then everyone treats you well. 
At the beginning in Egypt you have to learn how to find your place. Egyptian men 
treat Syrian men badly because all the Egyptian girls are now attracted to Syrian 
boys more than to Egyptian boys. Also, Egyptian employers prefer Syrian workers 
because they work very hard and much better than the Egyptians. […] The 
Egyptians are now used to us and they love to deal with Syrians”. 
As mentioned before, Mustafa describes women’s preferences in and choices among men 
as having an impact on men’s standing, in this case, a superior position vis-à-vis the less 
attractive Egyptians.  
Like Maḥmūd and Mustafa, Firās talked at length about the difference between 
Egyptians’ and Syrians’ approaches to work. When I met him, he was unemployed and 
was preparing to travel to Europe via the Mediterranean. He had initially tried to open a 
factory in Egypt but for many reasons could not do so. At the point of our meeting, he 
was unable to provide for his wife and two children. Nevertheless, he described 
extensively the success of his factory back in Syria, where they “worked with big 
contracts [and] used to work for France and Italy”. He ascribed the failure of his project 
in Egypt to a lack of work ethic among Egyptian employees, who, in contrast to the Syrian 
workers, were in his opinion not “productive”.  
“The difference is that Syrians are very hard workers. They love to work. The 
Syrian likes to eat from the sweat of his forehead, while the Egyptian likes to 
abuse and likes to steal. This is the thing. There is a big difference between Syrians 
and Egyptians, isn’t it? In their personality, there is a difference. They are cheating 
and they are not honest (biylifū wa yadawrū). The Egyptians are very lazy people. 
He thinks about the day only. The worker in the factory takes the salary at the end 
of the month. The next day he doesn’t come to work because he has money. He 
will come back when the money is gone”.  
Throughout the conversation Firās frequently described the Egyptians as “cheats” and 
bemoaned that everyone just wanted his money. He thus drew a clear picture of a certain 
type of man and his antagonist. There is the meticulous, diligent, enthusiastic Syrian 
worker, who appreciates the fruits of honest work and its opposite is the lazy cheat, the 
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liar, the thief, personified by the Egyptian. Knowing that he did not fit into this idealised 
picture of a Syrian man, being unemployed and preparing to leave for Europe in order to 
apply for asylum, Firās seemed to be even harsher in defending his perception of Syrian 
characteristics. I contend that his narrative defines Syrian masculinity in the first place by 
what it is not, namely cheating, lying or stealing. He uses the value of hard and honest 
work to degrade the Egyptians and give praise to the Syrians. The ‘lazy’ Egyptian 
embodied the opposite and abject notion of respectable Syrian masculinity and allowed 
him to reinstall a sense of success, dignity and manhood in a situation of displacement 
that disrupted his pre-flight goals and lifestyle. Here, stereotyping becomes a strategy to 
masculinise that is similar to the process described in Chapter 1, where the refugee in 
Europe is ‘othered’ and defined as undignified and less of a man.  
 
The victim aspect and compromises 
 
In addition to the glorification of Syria’s former wealth, the Syrians’ hard work and high 
qualifications and the consequent creation of ideal Syrianness and Syrian masculinity, 
another quite different narrative occurred in several conversations. It was the recognition 
of loss and the inability to maintain this value system. Abū Muḥammad said: 
“We are making ourselves victims because sometimes we go to the Egyptians and 
we tell them: ‘please can you bring me this product?’. In this situation, we don’t 
ask for the price but we just give him what we have because we need it. Hence, 
we make ourselves and others victims because the Egyptians can dominate and 
control the price and the Egyptian also knows where to get the product from. Also 
for the Syrians when they bring something that the Egyptians don’t have they 
make the prices higher, for example, a product that costs 100 LE I can sell it for 
120 LE because many people want it. Many Syrians do this because after three 
years of not working you can imagine everything. This is a small example but 
there are some people who sell something worth 1,000 LE for 2,000 LE. In this 
case, they are controlling each other and dominate each other. This creates hate 
but it’s inside. You hear them say that they love each other but inside of them, 
there is hate. This is the same among Syrians and Egyptians”.  
There are many layers in Abū Muḥammad’s description: he acknowledges that Syrians 
in Egypt are often in a situation of need, in which they cannot bargain and negotiate on 
an equal footing but must accept the conditions set by the Egyptians. At the same time, 
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he recognises a change in the Syrians, who depart from the above described idealised 
notion of masculinity defined by honest and hard work, making business in a similar way 
to the Egyptians, fuelled by their role as “victims” who “can imagine everything”. Abū 
Muḥammad connects the transformation he perceives in fellow Syrians in contact with 
the consequences of Syria’s crisis and civil war. Their poverty demands new measures in 
order to survive. Hence, people adapt their ways of bargaining and of doing business. 
Likewise, Abū Walīd describes that many Syrians have ‘become Egyptianised’: 
“I saw some who took over the personality of the Egyptians. They start to be 
dishonest (biylifū wa yadawrū) as well. It’s famous that the Egyptians abuse 
others so the Syrians take over these habits. Maybe some of the Syrians already 
had these habits in them in Syria, but in Egypt it shows. They begin to consider it 
shaṭāra (smartness)”.  
Abū Walīd draws the picture of a community that is forced to adapt, assimilate and 
‘become’ Egyptian. Living as displaced people in Egypt makes fellow Syrians show their 
true face and characteristics. Morals and values upheld in Syria are now exchanged for a 
better strategy of survival. Both narratives show that something has changed, that the new 
situation in Egypt makes it difficult to maintain certain ideas about life and images of 
ideal Syrian masculinity. Syrians are no longer in the position to make decisions solely 
based on their background and ideals, but the crisis enforces a re-evaluation of approaches 
to life. This echoes a study by Marlowe (2012) among Sudanese refugees living in 
resettlement in Australia, where men expressed that they had to ‘walk the line’ between 
connections with the past and what is considered normative within Australian society 
(ibid.: 57). This happened sometimes voluntarily and was sometimes enforced on them if 
they wanted to be successful in Australia (ibid.: 58). ‘Walking the line’ meant being able 
to compromise and to strategise in order to both recognise the present and hold onto the 
past (ibid.: 63). 
According to Dāwūd, the transformation of many Syrians is not only due to their 
inherent, but hitherto, hidden characteristics and the consequences of displacement, but 
also to their treatment by the outside world: 
“When the people see a Syrian family, they will only welcome it, if they have an 
interest of their own in them. Maybe they think that one of them can marry the 
daughter. Actually, all the relations became relations with interest. There is 
nothing human. This is the reality. […] The Syrians always used to have dignity 
but now the majority of people who want to help you, want to take advantage of 
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you. However, we always expect the good intentions. This is how we grew up. 
You arrive and you want to help but inside you have bad intentions. We are not 
used to that”.  
Dāwūd refers to a poisoning of Syrianness, which is characterised by a strong and naïve 
belief in the other one’s good intentions. Only when being confronted with the bad 
intentions of the outside world, did Syrians understand the cruelty of others and 
eventually adapted and transformed their otherwise ‘pure’ Syrianness. Forced 
displacement is described here as a force that has changed Syrians to the extent that they 
cannot uphold their ideals anymore and recognise how the others’ behaviour infiltrates 
Syrian values and morals. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed sectarianism as a form of ‘baggage’ that migrated with Syrians 
to Egypt and impacted on their social relations and lives there. Furthermore, this chapter 
has shed light on the omnipresent emotions of anxiety, grief, anger, betrayal, isolation 
and hate related to having had to flee from a sectarianised civil war and to the horror, loss 
of context and reality, and inability to understand what Syrian society has become. The 
sectarian violence that has become part of the Syrian civil war made Syrian men feel that 
they learned the truth about fellow Syrians who used to be their neighbours, acquaintances 
and friends but ultimately betrayed them and showed their ‘true’ faces. Syrian men 
responded with a new awareness of who was ‘us’ and who was ‘them’ and reported to 
have become hostile, suspicious and hateful vis-à-vis other Syrians. Sectarianism as well 
as emotions, memories and experiences carried on from Syria could not but influence 
Syrian men’s encounter with other Syrians in Egypt and thus impacted on their 
experiences of community and social contact. During forced displacement, there was an 
absence of community cohesion and the form of living together in Egypt Syrian men 
described could only be conceptualised as a non-community. 
From an intersectional perspective, sectarianism, and the sentiments that come 
with it, such as being less privileged, less worthy, less seen and treated unequally, can be 
described as markers that colour and inform Syrian male identity.  
 Moreover, this chapter has dealt with Syrians’ encounters with the Egyptian host 
society that were often narrated by referring to the UAR and the incidents on Rabaa 
Square. Both discourses do not only describe the contact of Egyptian and Syrians but also 
	 167 
illustrate processes of ascription and denial of an ideal version of Syrianness to other 
Syrians. The stereotypes that were used to describe Syrian superiority over Egyptianness 
speak to the image of the ideal Syrian middle-class man described in the previous 
chapters. 
 Having analysed notions of community, self and ‘other’ in this chapter, the focus 
of the next chapter is on Syrian men’s interactions with the state, their encounters with 
the Syrian security apparatus, and the omnipresence of fear that did not release its grip on 
them despite their geographical distance from Syria.  
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Chapter 6 – Of Fear, Guilt and Mistrust 
or Masculinity, interaction with the state and the migration of fear 
 
In May 2015, I met Abū Muḥammad. He was the father of one of my students and of 
three more children, and had managed to open a little food shop in a busy middle-class 
neighbourhood in Cairo. When he found out that I was from Germany he approached me 
asking whether I could give him some information about life in Germany as he and his 
family had been chosen by the UNHCR to be resettled there, and he was eager to discuss 
what I knew about German lifestyle, culture, habits and traditions. Over the course of our 
meetings we not only talked about Germany but he also shared with me his opinions, 
experiences and beliefs about Syria.  
One time we met in a café. Abū Muḥammad was about to travel to Germany with 
his family and suggested that I should meet his cousin Layla and her daughter who would 
remain in Cairo after his departure. He gave me strict instructions how to behave when 
visiting them knowing that his widowed cousin and her teenage daughter were in a 
precarious situation because Layla’s son had gone to Sweden and there was no man in 
the flat. Abū Muḥammad advised me to meet his cousin in her flat wearing appropriate 
and decent clothes in order to avoid any gossip from the neighbours. If I wanted to 
interview her or other Syrian contacts, he suggested that I recorded in secret, keeping the 
device hidden in my pocket. He also encouraged me to ask questions relating only to 
societal and economic issues and strongly recommended avoiding any kind of political 
questions, especially those referring to political affiliations and preferences. He said that 
the Syrians in Egypt were exhausted and anxious and they would assume that I was a spy 
if I did not follow his instructions. Abū Muḥammad further stressed that it was difficult 
for Syrians to assess me as a person, my intentions, and the reasons behind my research. 
The underlying assumption that I, as well as other foreigners, could be affiliated with the 
mukhābarāt or could work as a spy for the ‘West’ was, according to several scholars who 
conducted research in Syria, a widespread phenomenon (see for example van Eijk 2016: 
13; Borneman 2009: 238). In order to clarify the relevance of his instructions, Abū 
Muḥammad mentioned an Egyptian American volunteer, who taught English in the same 
institution as me and had just posted pictures from a trip to Israel on Facebook. Abū 
Muḥammad announced that people, and especially our students, were “scared of both of 
[us].”  
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In this chapter, I aim to analyse the omnipresent fear that was behind Abū 
Muḥammad’s clear instructions. This fear, I argue, has its origin in Syrian people’s past 
encounters and experiences with the Syrian state. It did not stop at the borders of Syria 
but travelled with most people I spoke to in Egypt, where it turned into a pervasive anxiety 
and suspicion of the Syrian embassy, the Egyptian state and its authorities, as well as 
individuals believed to be allied with either the Egyptian or Syrian states. In this context, 
I highlight how Syrian men’s anxiety was most candid and obvious with regards to the 
services of the Syrian embassy. The Syrian embassy had the reputation of being an 
extension of the Syrian regime that had the potential to threaten, haunt or even kill Syrians 
living in exile, and thus indicates the migration of fear that many of my interlocutors felt.  
Furthermore, I discuss in this chapter the relationship between Syrian men and the 
Syrian and Egyptian nation states. I follow James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002: 984) 
who argue in the context of their research how the state comes to be understood in local 
communities in India as an entity with particular spatial characteristics that “an analysis 
of the imaginary of the state must include not only explicit discursive representations of 
the state, but also implicit, unmarked, signifying practices”. I highlight how Syrian men 
in Egypt remembered their interactions with the state apparatus in Syria – especially in 
terms of bureaucratic procedures and the need to make use of bribes and wasta 
(connections) to manage them. Wasta is a concept defining a set of useful relationships 
needed in order to get anything from jobs, political favours, loans, documents or subsidies 
in Syria. In Schielke’s (2015: 155) words, wasta refers to “networks of nepotistic and 
clientelist dependence”. The ‘currency’ to pay for wasta is personal favours or bribes. 
Nevertheless, in order to be able to make use of wasta, ethnic and kinship ties as well as 
social status are needed, which means only well-off and well-connected people can 
benefit from it while minorities and marginalised groups are often subjected to patronage 
relationships and are dependent on people in positions of more power (Galie and Yildiz 
2005: 34). Another aspect of this chapter is a discussion of what it means to leave behind 
a life under an authoritarian regime only to arrive in a country with comparable features, 
such as a corrupt bureaucratic system and a powerful security service. I discuss how 
Syrian men navigated their encounters with the Egyptian state and how the ‘taste of wasta 
and corruption’ stayed with many of my interviewees and affected their lives in Egypt. 
Ultimately, this chapter identifies both the fear of state authorities and the 
problematic strategies Syrians had to adopt when approaching the Syrian state as aspects 
that affected Syrian men. Regarding the influence of fear on constructions of gender, I 
follow anthropologist Linda Green (1994: 230) who conducted research among women 
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in Guatemala and argued that “any understanding of the women’s lives would include a 
journey into the state of fear.” Getting used to a life in terror and crisis, which ultimately 
destroys the social fabric of society, “allows people to live in a chronic state of fear with 
a face of normalcy” (ibid.: 231). In a similar vein, an understanding of Syrian men’s lives 
requires an analysis of the fear that defined various parts of their lives in both Syria and 
Egypt.  
With its focus on state-induced fear, this chapter sheds light on how living under 
an authoritarian regime destabilises notions of manhood and threatens the contours of 
masculinity. Fear and discomfort accompanied the transition from citizen under an 
authoritarian regime to refugee in an authoritarian host state. Syrian men’s notion of fear 
was active, in motion, docking to new objects and persons in Egypt. The focus on 
uncomfortable practices, such as making use of wasta and bribes, shows that men both 
back in Syria and in Egypt were in the first place reactive and responsive to the 
authoritarian system and had to juggle their morals, values and beliefs with their 
economic survival.  
 
Corruption, bribery and wasta in Syria 
 
According to an earlier work by Akhil Gupta (1995: 388/389) on the theme of corruption 
and the state in the everyday conversations of villagers in Northern India, corruption is 
by definition a violation of norms and standards of conduct and thus the opposite of 
accountability. The discourse of corruption, he argues, is central to understanding the 
state-citizen-relationship because it both enables people to construct the state 
symbolically and to define themselves as citizens. There are varying opinions as to how 
corruption should be assessed, where it is a phenomenon that ‘humanises’ the state or 
whether it leads to an unjust distribution of resources. I follow the approaches put forward 
by Tone Sissener (2001), Jonathan Parry (2000) and David Sneath (2006) – all of them 
engaged in analyses of forms of and discourses around corruption – who argue that 
corruption does not exist in a vacuum, that we need a personalised and situational 
perception of corruption listening to our interlocutors when defining what is considered 
legal and where corruption begins, and that we need to include an analysis of the 
boundaries of the state.  
Under the rule of Hafiz al-Assad, the number of state employees in Syria increased 
dramatically between the 1970s and the 1990s. The expansion of bureaucratic procedures 
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facilitated access to the state, while, at the same time, the regime made its presence visible 
all over Syria. Perthes (1995: 142) argues that public employment was a means of 
political and social control. Through voting cards, identity cards, passports, and various 
permits required by citizens wanting to travel, build, marry or work, people were bound 
to the state’s bureaucratic apparatus (Rabo 2014a: 220) and corruption was widespread 
within this apparatus. Consequently, there was a need for the people to keep in with 
authorities and civil servants. Connection to state employees was often essential to gain 
what one was legally entitled to (Perthes 1995: 142). Rabo (2005: 150) emphasises that 
most of her informants, Aleppian traders and merchants, were acutely aware of the 
ubiquity of bribes and corruption, which was perceived as a structural disease. She further 
describes how they faced uncertainty and inconvenience in their daily dealings with 
representatives of the public sector (Rabo 2014a: 219). The possibility of bribery existed 
because citizens had to approach the Syrian authorities in person and because they were 
tied to the public sector in various ways (ibid.: 220). Aleppian traders usually attributed 
everyday petty corruption and bribes to the low salaries of state employees. Even though 
in principle bribes were rejected as immoral and shame was expressed about their 
existence in Syria, Aleppian traders often argued that they had no choice because state 
employees would not grant them their rights without receiving a bribe (ibid.: 219).  
In order to give a contextual and theoretical framework to the discussion of wasta, 
bribery (rashwa) and corruption (fasād), I begin by introducing two ethnographies and a 
political analysis of Syria and compare them with Hannah Arendt’s analysis of 
administrative strategies of British imperialism. A recurring theme in both Annika Rabo’s 
(2005) and Paul Anderson’s (2013) ethnographies focusing on Aleppo’s merchants and 
traders is the misery of being part of a political and economic system one despises for its 
unjust practices. People interviewed by Rabo and Anderson were aware of their 
complicity with, and engagement in, a system of which they were critical. Anderson’s 
informants condemned their involvement, which to them represented inevitable moral 
degradation and gave them a sense of self-contempt. Their dissatisfaction echoes political 
scientist Lisa Wedeen’s (1999) analysis of the politics of ‘as if’ prevalent in Syria under 
the rule of Hafiz al-Assad. Syria’s cult of the leader – the omnipresent pictures, the 
rhetoric of praising his rule and the frequent public acclamations – served as a way of 
disciplining and controlling citizens and created an atmosphere of public dissimulation, 
in which Syrians had to act ‘as if’ they admired and respected their president. People had 
to show their obedience by performing and pronouncing their support, whether they 
believed in it or not. The state’s power was painfully visible for the very reason that it 
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could make its citizens act against their opinions ‘as if’ they truly believed in their own 
actions and approval of the regime. Furthermore, the regime carried out actual 
punishment of those who disobeyed, but also and primarily relied on the citizens’ 
anticipation of punishment (ibid.: 146). According to Wedeen (ibid.: 6), the politics of 
‘as if’ proved effective because it produced guidelines for acceptable speech and 
behaviour and induced complicity by creating practices in which citizens became 
‘accomplices’. The division between ruler and ruled was blurred, she maintains, because 
people were in their way both victims and supporters of the system (ibid.: 81). The cult 
around Hafiz al-Assad and his regime not only enforced active and passive compliance 
(ibid.: 147), but also isolated citizens from one another. While Wedeen’s analysis focuses 
specifically on the strategy applied by the Syrian regime to control its people, her 
concentration is less on the question of how the ruling strategy of forcing the citizens to 
act ‘as if’ they truly supported their president impacts on the self-perception and 
negotiations of identity of the Syrian people.  
This gap in Wedeen’s work can be filled by Anderson’s research. His focus is on 
the question of how living under an unjust regime impacts on the individual. He detects 
a notion of scorn among Aleppian merchants, who are acutely aware of their incapacity 
to distance themselves from a political system they oppose (2013: 468/469). He identifies 
these narratives of scorn as a form of political agency. He argues that narratives of 
involvement that identify the self as an object of scorn make sense in a political climate, 
in which it is dangerous to identify power holders and in which a clear-cut distinction 
between the oppressors and the oppressed cannot always be drawn. Since relations with 
the local regime and bureaucratic officials were an essential part of everyday life in order 
to secure one’s social and economic survival, the practices and ideas of power and 
resistance became blurred and diffused (ibid.: 469). Like Anderson, who maintains that 
the subject is not simply oppressed by the circumstances, but is actually tainted, 
transformed and influenced by them, Rabo (2014) argues that the prevalence of bribery 
was ubiquitous and much discussed among traders and manufacturers in Aleppo. 
However, in contrast to Anderson, she observed that the traders’ participation in the 
system of corruption was excused as an inevitable need for survival. While it was 
important for a trader’s reputation not to be too intimately connected to the state, there 
was a general acknowledgement that a trader could not survive without paying the bribes.  
Regarding the meaning of corruption and oppression, Hannah Arendt (1973: 212) 
argued in her pioneering work on totalitarianism that, in contrast to the strategy of 
“aloofness” used by all members of the British services in the colonies, in which all 
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contact between the despot and his subjects is lost, corruption, exploitation and 
oppression seem to be “safeguards of human dignity” because the connection between 
oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited and corrupter and corruption is not 
totally cut. Rather, ruler and ruled are fighting for the same goals, live in the same world 
and aim for the possession of the same things. It could thus be added to the picture drawn 
by Anderson and Rabo that contact with the ruling regime, even though it is defined by 
corruption and bribery, still guarantees a minimum of human dignity to the people forced 
to comply with such actions.  
Several times during discussions with Syrians I met in Egypt, we came to talk 
about the payment of bribes, the need to make use of wasta and the existence of corruption 
back in Syria. Once, I followed a heated debate about politics and corruption between 
Maḥmūd, Yāsmīn and Firās.  - Firās: Life in Syria was wonderful. We lived happily. The poor and the rich were 
able to live. The people were together and they lived in peace. We didn’t have a 
problem with sectarianism. Our neighbours were Shiites and Alawites and we 
were living and we all loved the president… - Yāsmīn: I feel that the interview takes place in Syria and not here! - Firās: … We didn’t talk about politics because we were living our lives. We were 
happy. No one cared about politics. No one thought about it. We lived, we were 
happy and there was money. - Yāsmīn: Were you happy with the regime and the police? - Firās: There were mistakes but we were used to it and we were happy. Al-fasād 
kān fī damna! (Corruption was in our blood!). Whenever you [he points at 
Maḥmūd] enter a public office the first thing you do is to try to put 500 SL on the 
employee’s desk. It is your nature. It is our nature. - Yāsmīn: The poverty led to corruption. - Firās: No, the poor and the rich were living (kunna ʿayshīn). - Yāsmīn: Give the message in a correct way! What do you mean with living 
(ʿayshīn)? The poor were living eating falafel and the rich were living eating 
kebab. You should make this message clear.  - […] - Yāsmīn: The corruption was spread all over Syria because of the poverty. The 
dictatorial regime ruled with an ‘iron hand’ [quwa wa ḥadīd]. Any policeman or 
soldier can control the Syrian. The corruption comes from up, not from down. The 
soldier takes money in order to feed his children because the salary is low. The 
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regime follows the strategy of making people hungry. The regime just gave you a 
little bit so that you can only think about how to feed your children and not about 
politics. […] There were people who lived in rubbish to find food and there were 
people who lived in palaces. You can find men who die of a heart attack when 
they are forty years old because they cannot feed their children. […] Corruption 
comes from the poverty. It doesn’t come by itself. The state employees take 
money because of the poverty and so do the police. Even the ordinary citizen gives 
bribes because he has been corrupted. Why? Because he needs his documents and 
the salaries are not high enough in order to make us not think about politics. We 
were living like wild animals! (ʿayshīn naḥna mitl al-bahāyim!).  
In this dialogue, several important issues are addressed that are relevant for this chapter: 
Firās is teased for talking as if the interview took place in Syria implying that there is a 
certain way of speaking inside and outside of Syria; there is a sharp class distinctions and 
difference in experiences and opinions based on one’s class background; there was an 
absence of political debate back in Syria; there was extreme poverty among the people 
and indifference by the regime and how the poverty impacts on the people, so that men 
die because they fail as protectors and providers of the family.  
With regards to corruption, Yāsmīn’s points of view can be framed when bringing 
them in connection with Rabo’s ethnographies as they mostly affirm her observations. 
The explanation Yāsmīn gave for the existence of corruption closely resembles the 
justification Rabo (2014a: 219) regularly heard while conducting research in Syria, which 
is that bribery and corruption persisted because of general poverty and the low salaries of 
Syrian public employees. Furthermore, Yāsmīn excuses ‘ordinary citizens’’ engagement 
in corruption. They have been left with no other choice, she argues, because without the 
use of bribes they would not receive their legal entitlements. Corruption is perceived as a 
tool in the hands of the regime, thus coming ‘from above’ rather than being an inherent 
characteristic of the Syrian’s nature, as Firās described it. Hence, Yāsmīn echoes another 
of Rabo’s (ibid.) observations, which is that her interlocutors excused their own use of 
bribes using the argument that the state would not grant its citizens rights without a bribe. 
However, Yāsmīn goes even further when she bitterly assumes that the existing poverty 
and consequent corruption is a conscious strategy of the regime to keep citizens under 
control and too busy to develop an interest in politics. Similarly, Rabo (ibid.: 213) heard 
from her informants that daily life in Syria was hard and challenging in order to keep 
people distracted and too busy to be politically active. Furthermore, Yāsmīn shows her 
disappointment in the living conditions she had to accept in Syria, comparing it to the life 
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of ‘animals’. Based on the persistence of corruption, bribery and poverty she ascribes to 
the Syrian people a degraded and inhuman status, which makes men die at a young age 
because of their inability to feed their children. In contrast, Firās perceives corruption as 
a natural trait of the Syrian people and as a useful technique and strategy to ease one’s 
life. Both Yāsmīn and Firās explain the contradictions of being part of a corrupt system 
and negotiate in albeit different ways the paradoxes they used to live every day. Their 
dialogue shows forms of denial, downplaying and naturalisation of corruption in Syria.  
While Yāsmīn tried to explain the existence of corruption and bribery in Syria and 
Firās defined paying bribes as a ‘natural’ and an entirely acceptable and useful habit, Abū 
Muḥammad shared with me in one of our long conversations that he was against bribery, 
even though he was clearly aware of its existence and power in Syria:  
“In Syria, life was beautiful and things were going well. Regarding our jobs, we 
faced limitations. You could get a governmental job through wasta, nepotism 
(maḥsubiyya) and bribes (rashwa). We didn’t object it. If there was a problem at 
the border at the customs office we were only able to resolve it with money. 
Money had the power to resolve problems and also nepotism was really important. 
So, life in Syria was nice, the only problem was the existing injustice and 
domination”. 
Throughout the conversation, he repeatedly mentioned that he felt helpless and unable to 
escape the corrupt system. “They ask for impossible things and you won’t be able to do 
them”, he explained referring to state officials who could stop anyone randomly at the 
border or in the streets and arbitrarily create a problem, and “then you have to pay a 
bribe”. According to Abū Muḥammad, the status quo in Syria was comparable to enforced 
adaptation: 
“It was impossible to object. When the price of bread increased, we didn’t say 
anything. We didn’t have any objection. I simply started to buy less quantity of 
bread. There was nothing called objection, but you had to manage yourself (zabaṭ 
ruḥak). […] The government didn’t feel the suffering of the people. You should 
pay for anything. You had to pay for anything you wanted no matter if it was your 
right to possess it or not”. 
His descriptions illustrate an arbitrary, inescapable control that every citizen encountered 
and the citizens’ adaptation – through bribes or through changes in their lifestyle – as the 
only coping mechanism available. Even though opposition and objection are perceived 
as a reasonable reaction to the experienced injustice, it simply did not happen. Instead, 
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money became the tool to achieve one’s needs. Through the right amount of money, one 
could get any item that one wanted.  
Because Abū Muḥammad was against paying bribes and tried to circumvent it 
whenever possible, he employed a middleman if he needed something, such as documents 
or other state services, that could require the payment of bribes.  
“I didn’t like paying bribes. What did I do? I phoned someone who we call 
muʿaqqib al-muʿāmalāt (middleman). I paid him and I didn’t care if he paid bribes 
or not. I just gave him the money he requested because I didn’t like to deal with 
this. […] I said: ‘I don’t have any relations with bribes, you do everything.’ We 
can consider him an ordinary person, who has relations with the employees. He is 
not a lawyer. If he pays bribes or not it’s not my problem. Generally, the problem 
of bribes is big”. 
He distanced himself from paying bribes whenever possible. However, this did not mean 
that he subverted the system, but rather, that he found a way to reconcile his morals with 
necessary survival under a corrupt regime. He knew that he was part of the unjust system 
that he rejected. This echoes an argument that anthropologist Veena Das (2015: 323) puts 
forward in her analysis of corruption in ordinary, everyday practices. She claims the 
banalisation and condemnation of corruption often go hand in hand and that a double 
valence is created in order to be able to acknowledge both the immorality of corruption 
and the personal involvement in it. In accordance with Das’s insight, Abū Muḥammad is 
both vocal about the bad impact of corruption on his life, but simultaneously describes 
his own way to navigate a corrupt system. 
 In a long conversation with Mu’ayad, he explained to me that a person in an 
influential position (mas’ūl) could be described as a qafl (lock). If one needed something 
from the mas’ūl, the first step one had to do was to find the muftāḥ (key). The key was a 
person whom the mas’ūl trusted and who took over the position of the mediator. As a 
mediator, the muftāḥ could tell the one in need of a favour from the mas’ūl what kind of 
bribes were accepted. Bribes could be anything from personal favours to money or 
jewellery for the mas’ūl’s wife. Mu’ayad’s account echoes an argument Gupta (1995: 
380) put forward in his analysis of the discourse of corruption in rural India, namely that 
bribery was not simply an economic transaction but a cultural practice that required a 
high level of performative competence. Furthermore, Mu’ayad told me that, in his 
opinion, it was the desperate situation in Syria that made people accomplices of the 
system and made them accept corruption and bribery. He explained to me the following: 
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if one’s family was in danger and one knew that the only way to protect them was through 
bribes, anyone would engage in bribery even if one had said in times of peace that one 
would not get involved in such practices. He implies that people had to navigate their 
beliefs and that with more pressure applied, the less focus could be given to one’s morals, 
values and convictions.  
His words resonate with a statement by anthropologist Michael Jackson (2002: 
122) in the context of his dealing with storytelling among “people in crisis”. He argues:  
“As with people in crisis anywhere, life is ad hoc, addressed anew each day, 
pieced together painfully, with few consoling illusions. To get through the day, or 
through the night until morning, little or no thought is given to what is true, 
meaningful, or correct in any logical or ideological sense; one’s focus is on what 
works, on what is of use, on what helps to survive”.  
The severity of a situation enforces the use of certain measures that one would avoid in 
less stressful and dangerous times. This is also obvious in the way Fādī put his father’s 
use of wasta after he took part in a demonstration in 2011.  
“[…] My best friend talked to him [an acquaintance of Fādī] and convinced him 
not to tell his father that he had seen me in the demonstration. But then, a member 
of the secret service called my father to tell him that he wanted to interrogate him 
and me. My father needed to make use of his connections to solve the problem”.  
In both Mu’ayad and Fādī’s accounts it is the family’s well-being that is under threat and 
in order to protect it, the use of ‘immoral’ measures is required. As far as the construction 
of gendered, and especially masculine, identity under such circumstances is concerned, I 
argue that the omnipresence of bribery, wasta and corruption urged each individual to 
make sense of their actions. Whether one accepted bribery and corruption as part of the 
system and used them as a tool to extend one’s power, like Firās, or whether one tried to 
reconcile the necessary payment of bribes with one’s morals, like Abū Muḥammad 
accepting that payment guaranteed survival – a negotiation of one’s stance towards 
bribery, corruption and wasta was necessary and inevitable, and affected one’s self-
perception in one way or another. I suggest that this process of making sense could prove 
in a painful way one’s inability to live up to personal standards and values showing with 
clarity that one yields to the pressure and caves in.  
A revealing example to prove this point is given by Arendt (1973:431/432), when 
she depicted humiliation on the part of the employee who got a job because of the unjust 
removal of his predecessor. The jobholder in this situation becomes a conscious 
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accomplice in and beneficiary of the crimes of the government. She contended that 
becoming a beneficiary of the regime, whether one likes it or not, may not only lead to 
feelings of shame and disgrace but also to a more passionate defence of the regime. 
Adapting her analysis to the situation many Syrians faced in their interactions with the 
Syrian state, I suggest that the daily need to make use of wasta, bribes and corruption 
created among Syrian men a feeling of fault, guilt, responsibility and pressure as implied 
by Yāsmīn, Abū Muḥammad and Mu’ayad, unless this feeling was turned into celebrating 
one’s cleverness and access to power, as described by Firās.  
Likewise, Anderson’s (2013: 468) analysis of the ‘politics of scorn’ in Syria is 
revealing in this context, since it shows his informants’ resignation and shame in knowing 
that they could not circumvent the state’s system even though they despised its unjust 
structures and immoral procedures. The daily involvement with unjust structures and the 
constant practice of immoral actions appeared to have led to a feeling of guilt or 
complicity. According to Rabo (2005: 151), bribery involves two parties tied together in 
creating a win-win situation for each other, but at the same time, divided by a sense of 
loss of dignity and respect for each other and for oneself. Thus, I contend that every 
interaction that included bribes or corruption created a sense of disrespect and denigration 
for oneself, the other and the circumstances under which one lives. The narratives 
mentioned above can then be understood as the various and diverse lines of reasoning of 
living and being involved in a corrupt system.  
The main themes mentioned in the literature in relation to ‘immoral’ interactions 
with the state can be summarised as a loss of dignity and respect for oneself, others and 
one’s life, shame, humiliation, self-denigration and disgrace. I contend that Syrian men 
had to somehow make sense of these emotions. Treacher’s (2007: 292) analysis of 
Egypt’s colonial past that is related to a sense of shame and humiliation among men is 
relevant in this context. She argues that the experience of having been ruled by outsiders, 
of being excluded and denied complex personhood and agency caused the disintegration 
of the male ego and male self-perception that are usually firmly grounded on the illusion 
of coherence and control. Similarly, Joubin’s (2013: 211) analysis of Syrian soap operas 
brings to the forefront that the widespread corruption in Syrian society is depicted as 
making it increasingly difficult for a young man to remain a qabaḍāy – a decisive, 
honourable, and heroic man. Rather, men in the miniseries risk compromising and 
succumbing to the forces of societal evil leading to inferior masculinity. As far as 
masculinity formed in a system of corruption is concerned, I suggest that it is affected 
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and challenged by the gap between the knowledge of what is honourable and moral and 
the enforced adaptation and adjustment of one’s morals in everyday reality.  
The following discussion of other aspects of state control and surveillance and the 
impact on masculine identity adds to this debate and, by the end of this chapter, I will 
hopefully have been able to present a rich picture of the impact of living under dictatorial 
regimes on constructions of masculinity.  
 
Navigating encounters with the Egyptian state 
 
Anderson’s (2013) and Rabo’s (2014) works reflect a tension that is also described by 
anthropologist Samuli Schielke (2015) in his discussion of rural Egypt. Schielke (ibid.: 
177) underlines that participating in the Egyptian labour market under Mubarak’s rule 
pushed people towards immoral actions, such as stealing or cheating, as a necessity for 
survival. This has created a situation in which there is no clear-cut differentiation between 
oppressors and oppressed since the system urges everyone to be involved. According to 
Schielke (ibid.: 178/179), there was a deep awareness among Egyptians of the injustice 
of the system paired with participation in the very system they endured. In contrast to the 
tactics and responses observed by Anderson and Rabo, Schielke argues that in order to 
have at least some control over their situation and to maintain their dignity, many 
Egyptian men engage in illegal and immoral actions. Here, what is considered ‘illegal 
action’ by the state becomes a tool for men to regain agency. Thus, similarly to the other 
authors, Schielke highlights that living in an authoritarian state significantly impacts on 
the individual’s negotiations of identity, work and life, on one’s well-being and 
subjectivity. It can be argued, that in both Syria and Egypt, the division between the 
oppressor and the oppressed is to an extent hazy and indistinct, if the focus is on the 
individual’s dependence on the system for one’s survival. The individual has little choice 
but to be compliant, and to become (at least) a silent acceptor of the system, even if one 
is painfully aware of the system’s immorality. By stating this, I do not mean to suggest 
that every Syrian is equal in their acquiescence in a totalitarian state, rather I argue that a 
totalitarian state manages to request at least adaptation from its citizens in return for 
survival and life in relative peace.  
Based on the ethnographies presented above and their focus on how people 
negotiate opposition and complicity with the ruling system in both Egypt and Syria, 
several questions can be raised: What does it mean to leave a corrupt system behind only 
	 180 
to cross borders into a country in which a similar system is in place? Does this give the 
individual a sense of control and power over the situation? In the context of Syrians in 
Egypt, it appears that their experiences in Syria under an unjust and authoritarian regime 
‘travelled’ with them and influenced their encounters with the Egyptian state, defined 
their reactions to such encounters, their daily fears and worries and their anticipation of 
trouble with both the Egyptian authorities and the Syrian embassy. 
Abū Walīd, for instance, who was involved in pro-opposition activism in both 
Syria and Egypt, was imprisoned in both countries and had not only similar experiences 
but also used the same strategy of paying bribes to get out of prison. In Syria, his 
imprisonment by a Shia militia after the outbreak of the revolution ended because his 
parents paid the ransom to free him. Abū Walīd spoke with me about the immense danger 
in which he put his mother and the great risk she took when she met his kidnappers to 
hand over the requested sum. After his imprisonment, Abū Walīd had to leave Syria. He 
was told: “inta ʿalayk shi’! (you are wanted!)”, so he and his family arranged to leave 
Syria immediately. His flight to Egypt was only possible because his father paid bribes 
to obtain the travel documents for his son, and at the airport, so that Abū Walīd could 
leave without any problem. When Abū Walīd was imprisoned in Egypt, he was again 
dependent on the financial help of his parents to be able to get out of prison. He had vivid 
memories of the horror of his imprisonment and how his psychological state deteriorated 
afterwards. 
“I used to go to Libya illegally (tahrīb) at that time, so did several Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters. They arrested all of us and delivered us to the Egyptians. 
The Egyptian police were surprised to find Syrians in the group. They said to the 
Syrians: You are with the Muslim Brotherhood. And this gave them an 
opportunity to blackmail us (ibtizāz). If we, the Syrians, wanted to be free, we had 
to pay. I paid a lot of money in order to call my family. I had to pay 1,500 LE. My 
family transferred money to me. I paid the colonel 5,000 LE to let me go. […] 
Another time I was arrested in Downtown. The Muslim Brotherhood supporters 
were demonstrating, that’s why they were arrested, but I was not with them. I had 
the yellow card and the passports of my family with me. It was obvious that I had 
nothing to do with the demonstrations, but was on my way to the embassy. They 
beat me because I was Syrian and they considered me pro-Muslim Brotherhood. 
My charge was defined before they even interrogated me. I paid again. The 
existence of corruption in Egypt helped me a lot. It’s good that you can pay in 
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such a situation. I paid and left. After the imprisonment, my psychological state 
was really bad”. 
Bribery is here described as a solution in a situation of absolute despair, and danger, in 
which human treatment and a fair handling of the imprisoned are not given. Furthermore, 
the opportunity for bribery was described as a lucky, positive tool that guaranteed Abū 
Walīd’s survival and temporary safety. In another situation, Abū Walīd contacted people 
working in the Syrian embassy to find out whether he was truly maṭlūb (wanted) by the 
Syrian regime. He bribed them to get this piece of information. Again, bribery was used 
to receive a crucial piece of information that had life-changing significance. Knowing 
that he was wanted in Syria and assuming that this piece of information was shared by 
the Syrian government with the Egyptian government made him reduce his presence on 
the streets of Cairo and his contact with Egyptians to an absolute minimum.  
Maḥmūd, as a tour guide for foreigners receiving many bank transfers from 
abroad, also had an encounter with the Egyptian authorities. He was contacted by the 
secret service (amn al-dawla), responsible for the economics section and asked to appear 
at their office. Scared and stressed, he did not know what to do and asked an Egyptian 
friend for advice. His friend suggested bringing a lawyer to the meeting and also 
recommended a good one. During the meeting, Maḥmūd was asked why he received so 
many bank transfers from abroad. Through a contract with a hotel and by showing his 
website and Facebook page, Maḥmūd was able to prove to the secret service that he was 
a tour guide and thus received income from abroad. The secret service was specifically 
interested in the money transfers he received from individuals who had names of Arabic 
origin. Maḥmūd explained that several tourists he guided had grown up abroad and 
wanted to see the country of their ancestors. The secret service officer told him that they 
wanted to make sure that he did not receive this money for terrorist purposes. Maḥmūd 
told me he was allowed to go after this interrogation. The Egyptian lawyer sat silently 
next to him throughout. When Maḥmūd asked the security state office whether he should 
expect more trouble, he was told that he would have not been allowed to leave unless 
everything was considered fine. Maḥmūd was convinced that the lawyer’s presence had 
been one of the main factors that helped Maḥmūd in his encounter with the Egyptian 
authorities. 
 Abū Khālid, the community leader in 6th of October City, had an encounter with 
the Egyptian secret service in November 2014 and left Egypt shortly afterwards. His son 
explained to me that the secret service “didn’t seem to like his work of helping the Syrians 
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so they took him and interrogated him”. Eventually, Khālid told me, the secret service 
recommended that Abū Khālid left Egypt for another country and should not plan to come 
back. It was not clear to me whether this was Abū Khālid’s only reason and motivation 
for leaving Egypt. After the family’s departure to Turkey, there were a lot of rumours: I 
was told that Abū Khālid and his family had kept donations that were intended for the 
Syrian community, got into trouble and thus decided to leave. With regards to his father’s 
encounter with the Egyptians security service, Khālid, who communicated with me via 
Facebook and was his father’s spokesman after he had left the country, said: 
“My father wants to tell you that the security service doesn’t take anything with 
good intentions. They don’t believe you if you say that you want to help just 
because you consider it the right thing to do. So, Magdalena, try to avoid teaching 
in 6th of October city or limit it”.  
Not only did Khālid and Abū Khālid expect and describe the bad intentions of the security 
service and their denial of the existence of helpfulness as a reason for one’s activities, 
they also assumed that anyone could come under the scrutiny of the regime and thus tried 
to warn me suggesting that I reduce my presence in and outreach to 6th of October city as 
a coping strategy.  
 Mu’ayad also had to come into contact with the Egyptian state. When he tried to 
apply for a residency permit for his cousin who was at that time in Syria, he spent hours 
and hours in the Mugamm’a, waiting for the papers to be processed. Eventually, he was 
told that there was a problem and that he could not finalise the papers of his cousin without 
a letter of authorisation. His cousin made some phone calls and Mu’ayad was phoned by 
an Egyptian friend of his cousin who told him to go to the office of a general in the 
Mugamm’a. The next day, Mu’ayad visited the employee’s office and the bureaucratic 
procedures were completed within minutes. Mu’ayad did not describe this way of solving 
the problem as a heroic act of performing power. Instead he spoke of the fear and anxiety 
that haunted him during the process and the even bigger dread of causing problems for 
his cousin that made him accept his cousin’s request to make use of wasta.  
Abū Walīd, Maḥmūd, Abū Khālid and Mu’ayad were neither surprised nor 
entirely helpless when confronted with the Egyptian authorities. The had all experienced 
interrogation before, and in Abū Walīd’s and Abū Khālid’s cases, even imprisonment. It 
almost seemed to be normalised and they expected they would have to deal with the 
Egyptian security service at some point and that they would have to make use of certain 
methods and coping strategies, such as bribery or wasta when dealing with the Egyptian 
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authorities. All of them reacted pragmatically, thinking of solutions that could ease their 
situation and using techniques that were common in Syria. This did not mean that they 
felt proud, empowered, ‘smart’ or in control of the situation. Instead, according to 
Mu’ayad, paying bribes could rather be perceived as a necessary and familiar tool to be 
used in Egypt, whose system resembled many aspects of that in Syria. Abū Walīd’s 
encounter with and handling of the interaction with the authorities particularly resonates 
with Parry’s work (2000), in which he analyses corrupt activities in India. He argues that 
corruption persists among his interlocutors and even proceeds on rather low levels of trust 
in the middleman, because of despair, hopelessness, fear and the conviction that 
corruption is the only way out of one’s miserable situation. Similarly, I argue that 
corruption was perceived as a means to circumvent greater problems, as a measure 
applied in times of despair, and as a tool to save oneself. 
Connecting what the four Syrian men experienced to an analysis of displacement 
could bring us to the conclusion that the experience of loss of network and lack of in-
depth knowledge about the context they lived in were, in their cases, partially retrieved. 
Based on their previous experiences in Syria, the four men handled their encounters with 
the Egyptian state by applying measures, such as bribery or making use of wasta, to 
resolve their issues. Despite the high level of stress and anxiety all of them felt during 
their encounter with the Egyptian authorities, it could be argued that they retrieved a sense 
of agency and control over the situation, thus countering the loss that defined their 
experience of displacement. This could even be analysed as a way of regaining 
masculinity constituted through “mastery, activity and power” (Treacher 2007: 292). 
However, while it is tempting to define the described narratives as a reclaiming of power 
and control over one’s situation and a consequent boost for one’s position as a man, the 
humble and reluctant way in which the four men described their encounters with the 
Egyptian state made me analyse them in a less positive way. Fear and despair were the 
driving forces behind their engagement in bribery, wasta and corruption. They were 
vulnerable with regards to their status in Egypt, could not assess the uncertain economic 
and political future of the country, had just experienced a rise in xenophobia among the 
Egyptians, and had great deal to lose. Nevertheless, in one way or another they were 
forced to deal with the Egyptian state – an opponent, whose corrupt system and disrespect 
for human rights was well known to them.  
Consequently, instead of understanding their experiences with bribery and use of 
connections in Egypt as winning back agency and control over their lives, I argue that the 
engagement in bribery, wasta and corruption in the new country of residency was an even 
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more dangerous endeavour. Even though coping strategies were known from their life in 
Syria, in the new context in Egypt, Syrian men lacked contacts, networks and practical 
experiences and were thus in an even more precarious situation when being forced to 
engage in bribing or making use of wasta. In a similar way to anthropologist Luigi Achilli 
(2015: 272), who conducted research among Palestinian refugees in Jordan, I contend 
that the hardship many refugees experience relates to the actual lack of wasta in terms of 
family connections and relationships of patronage. Hence, rather than celebrating a 
regaining of power among Syrian men in Cairo I argue that the loss of the “entire social 
texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct 
place in the world” (Arendt 1973: 293) is aggravated. This means that masculinity during 
displacement in a corrupted, authoritarian state is more likely to be defined by the 
opposite of Treacher’s definition of masculinity in terms of ‘mastery, activity and power’, 
namely, impotence to be in full control of the situation, being forced to react rather than 
being in the position to act freely, and incomprehension and weakness based on one’s 
position in Egypt. 
 
Omnipresent fear 
 
Another aspect of life under the Syrian authoritarian regime that was often mentioned in 
my conversations with Syrian men was the ubiquitous fear of the Syrian mukhābarāt. 
Perthes (1995: 146) describes the Syrian security apparatus as an influential agency of 
social and political control and economic power. Through open mukhābarāt surveillance, 
the Syrian regime could maintain an atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and compliance. The 
omnipresent and powerful intelligence service infiltrated deeply into Syrian society and 
conditioned the behaviour of the citizens. Dealing with the security service became part 
of people’s strategies for survival (ibid.: 148). The regime managed to cultivate and 
sustain a ‘culture of fear’ that had ramifications for all kinds of social relations (Geros 
cited in van Eijk 2016: 12/13). Government intelligence relied on its citizens spying on 
their surroundings, relatives and contacts, and reporting any suspicious activity to the 
state (Galie and Yildiz 2005: 34). The knowledge that anyone could work for the 
mukhābarāt and could pass on information, even family members, created a general sense 
of distrust, suspicion and self-censorship amongst many Syrians (Van Eijk 2016: 13). 
According to Rabo (2015: 115), Syrians lived in a country of fear “where one half of the 
population was said to spy on the other half”. The reputation as well as the invisibility of 
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the mukhābarāt discouraged any freedom of expression in Syria (Galie and Yildiz 2005: 
34). Ziadeh (2013: 24) defines the Syrian security apparatus as an “Orwellian system of 
surveillance.” Syrians were aware of the danger of speaking in public, the unchecked 
power of the security services, the absence of rule-of-law, and how mukhābarāt officials 
made use of their position of power (Perthes 1995: 149). Joubin (2013: 297) highlights 
the invasion of the privacy of innocent citizens by the Syrian security service as well as 
the arbitrariness and limitless power of security officers.  
Arendt’s analysis of police rule in totalitarian countries offers a critical lens to the 
analysis of the omnipresent fear among Syrians of the Syrian secret service. She argued 
that places of detention in totalitarian countries are turned by the police into “veritable 
holes of oblivion into which people stumble by accident and without leaving behind such 
organising traces of former existence as a body and a grave” (Arendt 1973: 434). Her 
statement reinforces the arbitrariness with which the secret service operates in totalitarian 
regimes and the tactic of forced disappearances, often used to not simply kill a person, 
but to delete the person’s presence completely. Both aspects are relevant in the later 
discussion of Syrian men’s experiences with the Syrian secret service. Arendt (ibid.: 433) 
contended that with regard to forced disappearances, one of the biggest challenges for the 
police is to erase the memory of the people, who disappear, among those who loved them. 
She argued that the traditional dream of the totalitarian police of knowing the truth 
changed and became the “modern police dream” to possess a map that shows the 
relationships, connections and the degree of intimacy between people (ibid.: 433/434). 
Consistent randomness and arbitrariness in the choice of victims by the part of the 
totalitarian regime has the potential to “negate human freedom more efficiently than any 
tyranny ever could” (ibid.: 432/433). Even though opposition remains a theoretical choice 
in one’s life under totalitarian regimes, its performance is worthless since opposition 
members can only expect the same punishment that everyone else might also have to bear. 
Another argument that Arendt (ibid.: 435) put forward is the knowledge the population 
has about actions undertaken by the secret service; at the same time, the people know that 
it is “the greatest crime ever to talk about these ‘secrets’”.  
In order to apply Arendt’s insight to the context of the Syrian state, it is relevant 
to point out whether there was a difference in the perception of the Syrian police (shurṭa) 
and the Syrian mukhābarāt among the people I spoke to. According to Perthes (2000: 
155), both entities fall under the Syrian security apparatus in addition to the regular armed 
forces, conscripts drafted into the army or police each year, and a huge number of 
civilians employed in companies run by the Ministry of Defence. It is obvious in the 
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accounts of many Syrians that the police were associated with power, control and enjoyed 
the support of the Syrian state. In addition, the Syrian police were assumed to be biased, 
fuelled sectarian rivalry, and played a crucial role in aggravating the conflict that led to 
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Abū Walīd described the police’s bias by referring 
to a situation in which a Shia who bought something from a Sunni and was not satisfied 
with the quality of the item and thus wanted to return it. When the Sunni refused to take 
it back, the Shia went to the police and then the police closed the Sunni’s shop and 
“treat[ed] the Sunni very badly because the Shia [was] automatically right”.  
Apart from these direct characteristics ascribed to the police it is striking that, in 
several accounts, there was no clear-cut differentiation between the police and the 
mukhābarāt relating to the power and control ascribed to both entities interchangeably. 
‘Abd al-Raḥman remembered that every time he came back to Syria from Egypt where 
he studied between 2006 and 2011 “someone from the Syrian security” came to him:  
“Sometimes I would arrive very late at night even without telling any of my 
friends; still in the morning the security (al-amn) will knock on my door to tell 
me: ‘Good to have you back!’. It is a police state (dawlat būlīsiyya). They were 
asking me: '’What did you do in Egypt?’ […] I always told them that I am a 
student and that I just study in Egypt and come here in the holidays nothing more. 
This was called political investigation”.  
In ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s account, the distinction between security service, police state and 
political investigation are blurred. For him the individual who knocks at his door to 
investigate him seems to resemble all of these notions at the same time. ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s 
narrative not only sheds light on the hazy distinction between police and security service, 
but also hints at high level of surveillance Syrians were subjected to. Feldman (2000: 47), 
analysing the conflict in Northern Ireland, highlights that “the linkage between the 
penetration of the domestic space and the penetration of the body directly captures the 
psychic effect of the surveillance grid.” The scopic penetration of the domestic space does 
not only contaminate the private sphere but also one’s life (ibid.). And indeed, ‘Abd al-
Raḥman’s memory shows the total disruption of, and disregard for, his home and his 
privacy.  
In contrast to the police, the mukhābarāt – who, according to Mu’ayad, were the 
organisation people really feared (al-nās takhāf minhu) – were often associated with even 
more power than the police, because they had the ability to kill or abduct someone and 
act completely arbitrarily. Their power was assumed to reach every part of Syria. 
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According to Perthes (2000: 154), the mukhābarāt have “virtually unchecked powers and 
a long record of arbitrary encroachments on the freedom and property of citizens”. 
Foucault’s analysis of the panopticon can add to Arendt’s insight about the police 
in a totalitarian regime. According to Foucault (1980: 39), surveillance is a tool that 
reaches the “very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts into their actions 
and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives”. Surveillance can 
thus be understood as ubiquitous, a defining marker of every aspect of one’s life and 
becomes part of body and mind. Furthermore, Foucault (ibid.: 155) argues that the system 
of surveillance, established in the 18th century, caused an interiorising to the point that 
the individual becomes his or her own overseer. Consequently, surveillance can be 
considered an extremely powerful tool, in which the individual is an accomplice of those 
carrying out the surveillance by exercising control over one’s action. The specificity of 
the panopticon is that each individual, depending on their position in the system, feels 
constantly watched and controlled by all or certain others. This causes circulating and 
omnipresent mistrust (ibid.: 158). Foucault’s perception of surveillance and his analysis 
of the panopticon clarify how powerfully a security service of a totalitarian regime can 
impact on the individual and has the ability to change behaviour, self-image, activities, 
bodily sentiments and learning.  
 Coming back to the omnipresent fear of the Syrian security service, Māzin, a 
student of dentistry from Homs, described the security apparatus and suspicion of being 
overheard in Syria using two idioms I heard frequently during conversations.  
“We used to say that al- ḥayṭān ilha adān (the walls have ears). It was difficult to 
talk about this (he refers to criticizing the regime). If you talk, ḥaywadūk warā al-
shams (they will take you behind the sun). Since the revolution started up until 
now, you still find people who are afraid to speak”.  
What Māzin’s account illustrates is people’s constant paranoia of being spied on and 
controlled by the regime’s informants if they wanted to voice their opinion about politics. 
Describing the endurance of the fear to speak out, Māzin furthermore confirms 
anthropologist Elaine Combs-Schilling’s argument that “durable systems of domination 
are often ones in which the structures of power as so embedded within the body of self 
that the self cannot be easily abstracted from them” (1991: 658 cited in Peteet 1994). 
Maḥmūd interpreted the idiom ‘ḥaywadūk warā al-shams’ in the following way: “they 
will take you and no one will know where you are”, and Mu’ayad translated it as “forced 
disappearances”. Both translations suggest the cruel consequences people can expect if 
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they speak critically about politics in public. The anticipation of unknown but real 
punishment when citizens express their political opinion in authoritarian regimes is 
defined by Wedeen (1999: 147) as an effective way for the regime to consolidate its 
power and enforce the citizens’ obedience. Furthermore, the idiom Maḥmūd used echoes 
Arendt’s analysis of the strategies of the secret police in totalitarian regimes. As described 
above, she argued that it was the modern dream of the police to not only kill a person, but 
to also eliminate his or her presence and memory.  
The ubiquitous suspicion that one’s words might be overheard and one’s actions 
might be controlled led, according to Bashār, to a misrepresentation of politics and an 
inability to imagine a variety of opinions.  
“Maybe in Syria we have a different mentality than people in other countries. Our 
thinking was focused on how to work. There was only one party and no other 
political parties, which made us hear one opinion only. There was no opposition. 
You only hear one opinion. There were no discussions at all except in closed 
rooms. When they wanted to speak in closed rooms they even kicked out the 
children so they could not share what has been discussed at home in front of 
others. If these kids had said anything you would have gotten many problems. We 
used to hear about the events and about what happened in the 1980s. We heard 
that many people were killed, but no one would speak clearly about it. We used 
to hear it but I personally didn’t care about it and didn’t pay much attention to it”.  
Bashār portrayed the anxiety of the older generation to express their opinions, to mention 
the regime-induced massacre of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in the 1980s9, their 
fear of spies and lack of trust even in their children. He links this state of mind to the 
absence of opposition, vague and opaque knowledge and lack of diversity of opinions. 
The self-censorship that results from the feeling of a constant gaze on oneself, as 
described by Foucault, heavily impacts on information that is shared and accessible. 
Furthermore, his narrative shows that the all-pervading fear induced by the totalitarian 
regime created suspicion, also theorised by Foucault, and distance among the citizens and 
fostered a sense of loneliness.  
Moreover, Bashār’s account relates to Wedeen’s (2013: 865) analysis of a Syrian 
TV serial in which the government’s informer in a rural community decides to leave his 
																																																						
9 In the 1980s, anti-regime opposition was growing and was led by the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Recurring clashes and violent uprisings took place and the regime was unable to gain the upper hand (Perthes 1995: 
137). In 1982, the army bombarded Hama – a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, and killed an estimated 10,000 
people. The effects of this period were still visible in Syria up until the uprising in 2011, since thousands of Syrians 
were still imprisoned, killed or had disappeared (Rabo 2014).  
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job. The villagers are in terror because they do not know whether the spy’s replacement 
is already among them collecting information. While every villager announces in public 
that they would not take over the job no one can be sure that friends, neighbours or their 
spouses are actually telling the truth. Eventually, the villages choose the certainty of the 
known and expected coercion over the inability to locate the informer and bring the old 
spy back into service. According to Wedeen (2013: 864), the episode shows how 
conditions of authoritarian rule are reproduced based on people’s dread and their choice 
to ‘wear blinders’. Even though my interlocutors’ narratives do not confirm that they 
preferred to ‘wear blinders’ Wedeen’s insight is useful because it resonates with Bashār’s 
description of the lack of trust in everyone, the constant wondering who could leak 
information and the total absence of a safe space.  
 Using the example of his father’s imprisonment, Khālid described what could 
happen to someone who was not afraid to speak about politics in public and had 
“knowledge about what’s going on in the world”. Because “he talk[ed] about what is in 
his heart” and said what he thought about the government, his father’s name was 
mentioned to the government by an informer – an old school friend of his, a couple of 
years before the outbreak of the uprising. Soon after, the whole family was woken up one 
night by someone knocking on their door. When Abū Khālid asked, who was outside, the 
answer was: ’we’re the police (shurṭa)!’ “They didn’t say ‘we’re the intelligence 
(mukhābarāt)!’”, Khālid recalled. Then, ten heavily armed men entered their flat and 
searched it. They took Abū Khālid with them saying he would only undergo interrogation 
and would be back after two hours. Eventually, he returned after forty-five days of 
imprisonment. Fifteen days after Abū Khālid’s disappearance the family was informed 
where he was. In prison, Abū Khālid was interrogated repeatedly, described by Khālid in 
the following way: 
“They made him repeat his life story lots of times. They do this to find out if he 
is lying. If he is lying ones and forgets that he will make a mistake the next time 
he has to tell his life story. He just wanted to get out and do nothing but obey. 
However, once my father didn’t want to answer and the officer said: ‘if you don't 
answer we'll get your wife here!’. My father kicked him but he was handcuffed 
and blindfolded”.  
Khālid’s description of his father’s imprisonment sheds light on various issues: the danger 
of being politically aware and speaking about it in public; the possibility of being betrayed 
by one’s acquaintances; the inability to differentiate between the police and the security 
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service; the absolute power of the regime; the illegitimate and inhumane measures of the 
authorities, and compliance as the only possible response and the only way out. 
 
Living under state oppression 
 
When Qays tried to describe the situation of the Syrian people vis-à-vis the Syrian regime 
to me he used the following, evocative sentence: “the regime sat on the chest of the people 
for the past 45 years (al-niẓām kān yajlas ‘ala ṣidr al-nās lī mudda khamsa wa arba‘īn 
sinna)!”. What he describes is a constant state of suffocation, narrowness and the inability 
to move or free oneself from the tight grip of the regime.  
A useful frame for the discussion of living under surveillance, control and 
oppression and its effect on the people is Kleinman’s (2000) analysis of the impact of 
Maoist totalitarian control on Chinese people, in which he argues that regulation of 
movement, suppression of free speech and the contradiction between state propaganda 
and lived reality evoked a “deep reservoir of rancour, bitter resentment, [and] fantasies 
of revenge.” Being controlled by a totalitarian system also induced feelings of 
powerlessness, enforced passivity and numbness (ibid.). Kleinman (2000: 238) argues 
that the daily presence of violence, normalised through hierarchy and inequality, creates 
fear, anger and loss. Through violence in social experiences the lives of individuals are 
shaped, and “all-too-often twisted, bent, even broken” (ibid.). 
Jackson (2002: 44), referring to Kleinman’s analysis, contends that living under 
such circumstances evokes social death, a “disempowering descent into passivity and 
privacy, solitude and silence.” A person’s humanity is violated when their status is 
reduced to objectivity, since it denies this person the ability to exist in any active or social 
relationship to others. Instead, this person has experienced “nullification” of their being 
and can only exist in a passive relationship to themselves without a place in collectivity 
(ibid.: 45). Citing W.H. Auden, Jackson (ibid.) comes to the conclusion that the 
consequence of living under a totalitarian regime is that “men die as men before their 
bodies die”.  
Joubin (2013) highlights the relation between government oppression and loss of 
manhood. In one of the soap operas she analyses, the consequence of having succumbed 
one’s manhood to government oppression is that the main actor cannot protect his wife 
from being harassed by another man (ibid.: 299). Similarly, Ismail (2006: 113) illustrates 
how state control and oppression cause a sense of loss of masculinity among young 
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Egyptian men in a low-income neighbourhood of Cairo. Police raids, repression and 
monitoring are experienced as humiliation, infringement on one’s dignity and sense of 
self, and create persistent fear that the police could exercise their power again (ibid.: 121). 
The humiliation experienced at the hand of the police translates into the enactment of 
control over women’s mobility and presence in public as a strategy of restitution (ibid.: 
122). 
The following accounts show the effects of state surveillance: feelings of fear, 
domination and enforced compliance. ‘Abd al-Raḥman compared the situation in Syria 
with his experiences in Egypt, when he first came to study in Cairo during the then-
President Mubarak’s rule. He remembered his surprise on finding Egyptians cursing and 
mocking Mubarak in public. 
“When I arrived in Cairo I saw freedom. It is true that Hosni Mubarak was a 
dictator and that he was trying to starve the people in order to prevent them from 
actively engaging in politics, however, I saw a kind of freedom that you might not 
find in Syria even after fifty years. Freedom did exist in Mubarak’s era. The 
president was cursed while he was still in power and no one said anything. I 
remember a meeting of the Arab league, for which the Arab presidents came 
together. I was watching the meeting in a coffee shop. I think it was the summit 
number twenty in Damascus and President Mubarak was absent back then. I heard 
one of the people, who were watching with me, saying: ‘Where is our dog?’ if 
these words had been said in Syria, not only the guy who said it but also his whole 
family would have disappeared”. 
‘Abd al-Raḥman portrayed a situation of relative freedom of speech under Mubarak’s rule 
in Egypt that he had not seen in Syria. As suggested by Arendt (1973: 433/434), not only 
the fear for one’s own life but also the fear of losing loved ones controls people and makes 
them compliant in a totalitarian regime. With regards to Syria, ‘Abd al-Raḥman drew a 
dark picture: 
“In general, each Syrian child was aware of the care of his parents. The parents 
looked after him, however, there were external factors impacting on him. He was 
not allowed to talk, was always ruled, always suppressed, couldn’t express his 
freedom, couldn’t write a story or a poem, couldn’t talk about any subject related 
to the state until the beginning of the Syrian revolution (thawra). The Syrian 
revolution came to set the country free of the dictatorship, the rule of Bashar al-
Assad”. 
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After a while, he continued: 
“After we finished the preparatory and the secondary school we realised that we 
can't talk about anything. Not about freedom. Not about improving our lives. We 
couldn't talk about the fact that we are ruled by the Alawite sect, and we were 
beaten up or humiliated by our parents in order not to talk about 
the aforementioned topics because they were worried about us”.  
The child in ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s account is in a paradoxical state of feeling at the same 
time taken care of and protected in his family, and left alone, unprotected and controlled 
by his surroundings. Schizophrenically, there is, on the one hand care, warmth and 
protection, and on the other, an external threat that invades the private sphere and denies 
the child his agency, freedom of expression, artistic development and even leads to 
punishment by the parents.  
Mu’ayad and his friend Laith similarly described dealing with the presence of the 
mukhābarāt in their lives as a slow process of learning and adapting. Said Laith:  
“In school, we were taught that al-Assad was the right and only president. We 
didn’t hear any other opinion. There was one TV only and it showed only state 
channels. This was the same in the whole street – so how could we build another 
opinion? At some point in our lives, we learned about the existence of the secret 
service and we learnt to include this knowledge in our everyday lives. You realise 
that there is something fishy, but no one would tell you anything until you are a 
bit older (kibīr fīl-‘omr shway)”. 
Both ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s and Laith’s description of the external control that the child 
experiences resonate with Foucault’s as well as Combs-Schilling’s insights about 
surveillance mentioned above. Surveillance conquers the individual’s body, mind and 
learning. From a very young age, the child feels an external power that controls his life 
and reduces his freedom of expression, agency and space for critical thinking. ‘Abd al-
Raḥman’s narrative further corresponds to Schmitt’s analysis of objectification, which he 
defines as a “carefully orchestrated and systematic refusal of genuinely human relations” 
(Schmitt 1996: 36). Through objectification, the subjectivity of the oppressed is devalued 
and dehumanised (Hill Collins 1996: 18). It could thus be argued that the Syrian regime 
aimed to, and was partially successful in transforming its citizens into mere devalued, 
broken objects, devoid of their own subjectivity, agency or autonomy and unable to 
engage in human relations.  
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In a similar vein to ‘Abd al-Raḥman, Majd portrayed the situation in Syria, clearly 
indicating that freedom of speech was unimaginable: 
“The majority of people were against him [Bashar al-Assad], but our families used 
to tell us always that ‘the walls have ears’. We were prohibited from talking about 
politics at all. Even if I saw corruption in an institution I was not allowed to report 
about it in a newspaper, on TV or in any place. If you and I had this conversation 
in Syria, I would be dead”.  
For Majd, it was painful to recognise injustice without being able to acknowledge, 
criticise or report it. Held back by the advice of his family and the expectation of being 
killed he has to accept what he considers wrong, immoral behaviour. 
It is noteworthy that ‘Abd al-Raḥman, Majd and Bashār all highlight the serious 
consequences they expect once they speak out critically in public. The mechanism of 
control through anticipation of punishment described by Wedeen defined these men’s 
statements, and arguably their actions. Importantly, Majd further expressed that the fear 
of sharing one’s opinion was lasting and kept Syrians from expressing their opinions in 
Egypt, even though they were no longer under the direct threat of punishment at the hands 
of the regime: 
 Magdalena: Can you talk about politics here in Egypt? 
Majd: “Yes, you are outside of Syria so it’s no problem. Nevertheless, some 
people are still worried about their relatives in Syria and that’s why they are not 
talking about politics here in Egypt. If the regime finds this out, those people in 
Syria will be in danger. In Syria, you cannot oppose anything. You are deprived 
of your own opinion. This is how the regime works. As for my friends and I, we 
are talking about politics but some of them are also afraid of doing so because of 
their relatives, besides their name could be put on the list of maṭlūb people by the 
regime”.  
Despite being a long distance from Syria, many Syrians in Egypt do not voice their 
opinions out of fear for their loved ones. As described by Arendt (1973: 433/434), the 
totalitarian regime does not only threaten the individual’s well-being but also knows 
about the individual’s connection to loved ones. This adds another layer of stress and 
enforces compliance in a perfidious way, even if the individual is no longer in the 
immediate scope or outreach of the regime.  
Enforced loneliness, silence and isolation, as described by Jackson at the 
beginning of this section, are indeed detectable in my interviewees’ accounts. Due to the 
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pressure and all-pervading fear of the regime and its security service that accompanied 
Syrians through their daily lives, it appears that Syrian men I met as well as their contacts 
reduced their exchanges about politics, their expression of opinions and individuality to 
an absolute minimum and silence occurred where exchange would have been desired. 
The humiliation understood as loss of masculinity, described by Joubin and Ismail, is 
expressed in Syrian men’s narratives when they refer to the total deprivation of agency 
and the worthlessness and dishonour related to being forced to comply. Thus, it can be 
argued that Syrian men ‘die as men before their bodies die’ because of their experience 
of constant surveillance; the anticipation of severe consequences for themselves or their 
families if they disobey; their consequent self-censorship; and their objectification by the 
hands of the state, which denied them agency, individuality and the ability to show 
backbone and protection for loved ones. Mu’ayad summarised this sentiment well when 
he asked me: “Aren’t men supposed to provide for and protect their family? So how do 
you think men feel under such oppression? They feel useless”. 
Even though Syrian men did not speak about themselves explicitly as ‘dead men’, 
what reverberates from Mu’ayad’s description of men feeling useless in an authoritarian 
system because of their inability to be the family provider is clearly as sense of men dying 
inside before their bodies die, as suggested by Auden and conceptualised by Jackson. 
 
The migration of fear 
 
The omnipresent fear and suspicion did not stop at the Syrian border, but travelled with 
many of my interlocutors to Egypt. Most Syrians, who eventually agreed to be 
interviewed for my research only did so after they had made sure that their names, and 
other details of their backgrounds would not be mentioned, and several of my 
interlocutors refused to have their voices recorded. They carefully selected the places we 
could meet for the interviews: usually in their family home, at their workplace or, more 
rarely, in cafés, where they had a personal relationship with the staff.  
 The fear of the mukhābarāt, their omnipresence and survival techniques impacted 
on Syrian men’s encounter with other Syrians in Egypt. Hānī said: 
“At the beginning [in Egypt] I faced problems. For example, if I meet you and I 
know that you are Syrian it is difficult for me to tell you immediately that I am 
with the revolution. I will think that it is possible that you were sent by the regime. 
By the way, this happened with me”.  
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Again, Hānī shows that Syrian men live with a constant suspicion, wondering whether 
the all-pervading gaze of the Syrian regime made it all the way to Egypt. This reduces 
opportunities to get in touch with other Syrians and paves the way for the existence of a 
non-community as described in the previous chapter. 
Syrian men’s fear and anxiety were also noticeable when they spoke about the 
Syrian embassy in Cairo. Mu’ayad described the embassy in the district of Dokki as 
having the exact shape and appearance of a mukhābarāt branch back in Syria. He thus 
makes a revealing comparison especially when framing his statement with literature 
revolving around how different forms of material culture, such as uniforms, documents 
or buildings are central to “how the state comes to be imagined, encountered, and 
reimagined by the population” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:12 cited in Hull 2012: 260). The 
Syrian embassy, following Mu’ayad, with its architectural shape indicates resentment and 
seems to intend to remind the visitor of the power and presence of the Syrian regime. 
Generally, the Syrian embassy had a very bad reputation and most Syrians I met 
tried to avoid setting foot in it whenever they could. It was perceived as the long arm of 
the regime and many horrible stories grew around it. Abū Walīd, for instance, shared with 
me the devastating story of an acquaintance of his: the Egyptian secret service had 
arrested his friend, and had handed him over to the Syrian embassy in Cairo from where 
he was taken to Syria, where he was murdered. Sāmir, who worked in an NGO providing 
aid to refugees, told me about the case of a Syrian contact of his, who had relatives in 
Syria that supported the opposition. This man went to the Syrian embassy in Cairo to 
renew his passport. When the employees at the embassy saw his name, they connected it 
to his brother in Syria, who was with the FSA. His passport was immediately destroyed 
and he was requested to enter the embassy. However, he ignored their request and ran 
away fearing consequences.  
Following Feldman (2000: 48), such rumours and stories that circulated among 
Syrians are the necessary complement to the diffuse, capillary system of state 
surveillance. Through these rumours the state apparatus achieves visibility and physical 
presence. And indeed, the undefined but present power of the Syrian state had become 
localised in the form of the Syrian embassy. 
Abū Walīd compared the Syrian embassy in Egypt to “the ministry of the 
interior”, since it had the “power to arrest anyone”. Based on what happened to his friend, 
Abū Walīd was tremendously afraid of any interaction with the Syrian embassy and with 
the Egyptian security service: 
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“I am maṭlūb by the government. They will arrest me. And if I have any problem 
with the Egyptians, I will end up in the embassy and the embassy will send me to 
Syria, just as happened to my friend. The Syrian embassy has power. Now I am 
only going from my flat to the shop and back. I try to avoid any contact with the 
Egyptians because I am afraid that the embassy has already shared my name with 
the Egyptian mukhābarāt. I always try to avoid the embassy. Even if they ask for 
documents, I don’t go”.  
Abū Walīd’s fear of the Syrian security apparatus has extended to include not only the 
Syrian embassy, perceived as the long arm of the regime, but also, the Egyptian 
authorities as collaborators with the Syrian regime. His situation suggests that being a 
refugee is not only related to the heightened importance of documents and papers, as 
described in the first chapter, but also to a constant negotiation of various constraints. If 
Abū Walīd risked not going to the embassy to get the documents he needed to work, drive 
or enrol his children in school in Egypt, he would face numerous problems in his daily 
life. However, if he yielded to the pressure that he was exposed to by not having the 
documents and went to the embassy, his life could be in danger because of his past in 
Syria and the cruelty of the Syrian regime. He had to weigh up and negotiate the two 
evils. Furthermore, Abū Walīd’s situation powerfully illustrates how the power of the 
citizenship-giving state does not stop at the border, but follows refugees into exile, where 
it still has the strength to influence, affect and control their lives. It thus confirms Gupta’s 
argument that the cultural practices by which the state is symbolically represented “cannot 
be conceptualized as a closed domain circumscribed by national boundaries” (Gupta 
1995: 377). 
 Likewise, for Akram, who desperately needed to go to the embassy in order to get 
married legally in Egypt, the embassy represented the ubiquitous power and absolute 
sway of the Syrian regime.  
“The embassy presses on us if we want to renew or apply for documents because 
they relate our situation here to our military situation back in Syria. There are 
documents that you cannot apply for unless you have finished your military 
service in Syria. This is the pressure coming from the Syrian government, which 
follows us everywhere and always, always, always...”.  
Sarcastically he continued: “The beautiful thing is that if I have a problem and I want to 
resolve it, my embassy tells me to bring a document from Syria that I completed my 
military service. However, I escaped from Syria in order not to do the military service!”. 
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Akram described how the Syrian regime haunted him wherever he was and that he, even 
though he had physically escaped the country, could not escape the regime’s procedures, 
control, gaze and regulations. He is in a vulnerable situation since the Syrian state could 
even control and impair his life abroad – because he had not completed what the state 
defined as his male responsibilities.  
Anthropologist Linda Green (1994: 227) analysed fear in Guatemala as “a way of 
life”, “a chronic condition” and a “collective imagination”. She argues that fear is a reality 
“that is factored into the choices women and men make” (ibid.: 227). In this chapter, I 
have expanded her argument by suggesting that the omnipresent fear and suspicion 
Syrians experienced in their home country did not stop at the Syrian border. In fact, it 
was mobile and not geographically fixed and located, but travelled with many of my 
interlocutors to Egypt where it connected itself with the embassy, ‘other’ Syrians and 
foreigners. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the importance of paying attention to men’s position vis-à-vis the 
state of origin and the state of asylum when conceptualising masculinity in the context of 
forced displacement. The state’s security apparatus had left a mark on Syrian men, fixing 
in them a form of suspicion, self-surveillance and anxiety they could not get rid of. 
Growing up in Syria meant learning to live with an omnipresent and controlling state and 
this knowledge instilled self-control in Syrian men when it came to the expression of their 
political opinion, their interests and ideas.  
Furthermore, this chapter has discussed how most Syrian men struggled to come 
to terms with the criminality of the Syrian regime: they knew that the regime and its 
authorities engaged in illegal activities, such as accepting bribes, and Syrian men were 
aware that the state’s criminality dragged them into the same illegal structures. They had 
to comply with a system that was immoral in most men’s eyes, and they blamed the state 
for the immorality enforced on them. They were aware that the state had significant 
control over their lives, potential, development and aspirations. Having grown up under 
a dictatorial regime and having fled to a country with a similar regime impacted on Syrian 
men’s everyday lives and caused shame, self-censorship, suspicion, anxiety, depression, 
isolation and anger.  
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I suggest that the palpable presence of the Egyptian and Syrian states in men’s 
everyday lives affected their sense of manhood: it bent and twisted them to an extent that 
they were unable to develop and show agency, subjectivity, selfhood and the ability to 
protect their loved ones from suffering the same fate. Syrian men reported to experience 
that they were left with no other option but enforced obedience and adaptation to the 
authoritarian systems they lived under; no way to break free from the ubiquitous states; 
and no opportunity to convey the knowledge they had to their children and loved ones to 
give them access to a better, more informed, self-determined life.  
Ultimately, this chapter has illustrated how Syrian men move on from a form of 
paradoxical, insecure citizenship to a similarly insecure status as refugees in Egypt. Both 
legal statuses require interactions with the state that do not conform with Syrian men’s 
morals and values. The overriding theme defining interactions with both states is the 
anticipation of severe consequences for oneself and one’s loved ones if one does not 
accept the states’ practices, and thus, men endure constant anxiety and engage in self-
censorship. 
With its focus on state-induced fear, this chapter sheds light on how living under 
an authoritarian regime destabilises notions of manhood and threatens the contours of 
masculinity. Fear and discomfort accompanied the transition from citizen under an 
authoritarian regime to refugee in an authoritarian host state. Syrian men’s notion of fear 
was active, in motion, attaching to new objects and persons in Egypt. The focus on 
uncomfortable practices, such as making use of wasta and bribes, shows that men both 
back in Syria and in Egypt were in the first place reactive and responsive to the 
authoritarian system and had to juggle their morals, values and beliefs with their 
economic survival.  
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Chapter 7 – Of Sadness, Shock and Despair 
or Being a man vis-à-vis militarisation, war and the uprising 
 
Having discussed Syrian men’s various encounters with the Syrian state and how it 
affected their lives during forced displacement in Egypt, I turn in this chapter to a 
discussion of Syrian men’s experiences of militarisation and war preparation in Syria. 
Furthermore, I focus on the predominantly negative meaning ascribed to the military 
service and the army. In the narratives that were presented to me, men were critical of the 
militarisation of their lives in Syria and distanced themselves from the army, the regime’s 
war propaganda and the usefulness of the military service, even though they did not have 
the option to circumvent mandatory military service or military camps in their youth. 
Most Syrian men I met did not identify with aspects of militant masculinity in their past 
and present, and sought and presented instead other paths to acceptable masculinity. 
Hence, I contend that literature defining an inherent relation with masculinity and military 
combat fails to incorporate the experiences of men who do not wish to fight and therefore 
act accordingly.  
Furthermore, I engage in a debate about the specific vulnerability of young men. 
Young men were defined in several narratives as the main reason for the whole family 
deciding to leave Syria. In other accounts, it was the parents’ decision that their young 
male offspring had to leave Syria on their own at the beginning of the uprising. Then, I 
focus on how Syrian men experienced the uprising describing subsequent changes in their 
feelings, and its impact on their life in Egypt. For some men, the uprising felt like a 
threshold to maturity, while others felt that the experience of the outbreak of the civil war 
numbed their emotions or evoked a previously unknown sense of fear and anxiety in 
them.  
The versions of acceptable manhood Syrian men adopted in exile, namely, being 
a pacifist or a father, which I present towards the end of this chapter, show that 
masculinity is subjectively and actively constructed (Connell 1995; Haywood and Mac 
an Ghaill 2003) and that men form masculinities by weaving in attitudes, behaviours and 
practices they find available in their specific social context (Wentzell 2015). As argued 
by Butler (1999), identities, and in this case masculinities, are performative and 
constituted in accordance with the existent framework of acceptable gender roles. Syrian 
men presented themselves by discursively adopting versions of manhood they considered 
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acceptable and honorable vis-à-vis their current situation as refugees in Egypt, in which 
fighter masculinity was unavailable to them. 
Ultimately, this chapter is about the nuanced responses to violence, military 
combat and militarisation in my participants’ life and challenges any direct, homogeneous 
linkage between masculinity, war and fighting. This chapter is on the one hand, a 
powerful example to undergird that masculinity is actively created and composed, subject 
to the specific circumstances in which a man finds himself. In their search for acceptable 
alternatives to militant masculinity, some Syrian men proved that construction of 
masculinities meant strategizing and assessing one’s options in order to reach a stance 
that is worthy, accepted and beneficial. On the other hand, however, this chapter 
highlights the powerlessness, depression and anxiety that cannot be incorporated in any 
form of positive and successful masculine selfhood. 
 
Growing up in a state of ‘war’ and militarisation 
 
In Syria and in the Middle East, wars, conflicts and upheavals were a regular feature of 
life in the 20th century. Owen (2000: 325) argues that the number of wars, the effect of 
the memory of past wars, and the permanent fear of the outbreak of a new one have had 
a strong influence on politics and economic and social arrangements in the region. Syria 
fought against Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 and has lost part of its territory to Israel. 
Furthermore, Syria’s army was active in Lebanon: it entered the neighbouring state in 
1976 to ‘regulate’ its civil war (Rabo 2005: 66). Perthes (2000: 151) argues that in Syria, 
militarisation and war preparation were not a prelude to actual war making but instead 
“an end in itself” that had political, social, and domestic benefits. Moreover, he contends 
that in the discourse of the Syrian government, the preparation for a potential war against 
Israel had always been given absolute primacy (ibid.).  
According to Edward Ziter (2015: 61), who analyses Syrian theatre, the Syrian 
regime tried to erase the memory of the 1967 defeat and its consequent territorial loss, 
while the 1973 war was omnipresent and celebrated in textbooks, monuments, war 
panoramas and government buildings. He argues that war was transformed into an 
“abstraction” in the background of everyday life in Syria (ibid.: 57). The conflict with 
Israel can be furthermore defined as a national trauma and an on-going fear in Syria’s 
citizens of losing more of their homeland. Ziter (ibid.: 61) asserts that the theatre plays, 
which followed the 1967 war with Israel, illustrate men’s suffering because of their defeat 
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in war and their experiences of oppression by the Syrian authorities. War, trauma and 
self-contempt are thus linked to Israel’s victory and to living under a dictatorial regime. 
Aghacy (2009: 5), approaching the theme from the discipline of comparative literature, 
considers the war with Israel in 1967 a threat to everything that was assumed to be 
constant and undisputable. It not only instilled a feeling of constant fear and threat in 
Syrian citizens, but also caused a male trauma because of men’s feeling of incapability to 
change the outcome of the war. Aghacy (ibid.: 6) contends that the history of defeats in 
successive wars in the Levant shook men’s self-perception and self-confidence in their 
dominant role in society. 
I learnt about the persistent presence of war in a conversation about growing up 
in Syria with Mu’ayad and Laith. Both of them grew up in a village close to the Syrian 
border with Israel, and they described how they constantly felt that there was an external 
threat to their country. Laith, an engineer in his early thirties, who had fled to Lebanon 
before coming to Egypt, told me that the conflict with Israel was used in his childhood to 
make him understand that he and his family could not be rich. He was told that all the 
extra income a Syrian accumulates should be devoted to the fight against Israel: “If you 
are poor you should be fine with that because we are in the state of war”. Following his 
statement, war can be understood as an omnipresent and permanent national challenge 
and it was every citizen’s responsibility to live their life accordingly, that is, to sacrifice 
livelihood and individuality, as well as material and financial means for the sake of 
winning the war. 
The sheer number of stories I heard about the Syrian military illustrates the 
comprehensive impact and control that war and the consequent militarisation of the 
Syrian society had over the lives of Syrian men. ‘Abd al-Raḥman, for instance, 
remembered vividly the influence of the military on his everyday life as a child in Syria.  
“We were raised up in Syria in a Ba’athi childhood and the party’s childhood 
(ṭufūla ba‘athiyya wa ṭufūla ḥizbiyya). They were always saying that we are in the 
first line of defence (al-khaṭ al-dafā‘a al-awal) against the Israeli enemy. 
Therefore, the student was always wearing the brown uniform (al-maryūl), which 
has the colour of the soil (al-turāb) so that the child grows up with a military 
appearance. However, there is something wrong according to the humanitarian 
principles. If I am between five and ten years old, I am still a child. I don't 
understand what a weapon is. I don't understand the meaning of war. However, 
the mentality of the Syrian regime was the mentality of the Ba’ath party, which 
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focuses on the topics of militarisation and carrying weapons in order to confront 
the Zionist enemy or the Israeli enemy. And this is nonsense to start with, because 
for forty years the Syrian Golan has been occupied by the Israelis and not a single 
bullet was fired”. 
From his narrative, themes like constant indoctrination and militarisation from an early 
age onwards emerge, causing mental overload.  
Perthes (2000: 154) stresses that much of the Syrian society was militarised due 
to the regime’s aim to incorporate all active parts of society into the security apparatus 
and engage in the “militaristic socialization” of the younger generations. Students in 
intermediate level and in high school had to wear uniforms in the style of the army. From 
primary school to university, Syrian students were taught militaristic values. In addition, 
the military organised mandatory training programmes for students from high school and 
university, and students who participated in special combat courses could obtain 
preferential university acceptance (ibid.: 155). Furthermore, Jones (2006) suggests that 
militarised masculinity is inherently extremist, “with a momentum that rapidly pushes it 
beyond the bound of what would be considered ‘acceptable’ behaviour in societies 
technically at peace” (ibid.: 454). In a similar vein, Lorraine Macmillan (2011: 63) argues 
that militarisation does not only mean teaching someone physical skills to participate in 
war, but to also normalise violence and acquire a disposition to accept killing. Enloe 
(1993: 68 cited in Giles 1999: 89) claims that militarisation does not only appear in ‘war 
zones’, nor is it static or and always similarly shaped; instead, militarisation informs 
gender relations in various ways in multiple locations, from factories, to police stations 
and bedrooms. ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s critique of a child who must carry arms in the military 
camps targets exactly this extremism, the omnipresence of militarisation and the 
imposition of a certain radical mindset inherent in militarised masculinity. In a similar 
vein, Abū Walīd came to talk about the military camps he had to attend when growing 
up: 
“Since we were children in the elementary school, there was a camp called ‘The 
children of Baath’ (maʿaskar al-ṭalāʾʿa). […] There, they are shouting (yunādū) 
slogans saying that the president shall live forever. In the intermediate school 
there is another camp, which is called ‘The youth of Baath’ (maʿaskar al-
shabība). You will find a guy who is fifteen or sixteen years old and they bring 
him to the camp and teach him how to use a gun. It is almost like the system in 
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the army. He is shouting in the same way for the life of the leader. This is what 
we learned”. 
Again, themes like the interconnection of state propaganda and military, and the 
militaristic upbringing from a young age are described. Abū Walīd’s words illustrate how 
the regime manoeuvred children through the process of militarisation  
In addition to discussing their militarised past with Syrian men, I often asked them 
for their views on the Syrian army, which, according to Perthes (2000: 155), can be 
described as the strongest instrument of the Syrian state, since it enabled the regime to 
monopolise the means of organised violence. Sluglett (2016: 42) writes that the Syrian 
armed forces were generally perceived as vital to the defence of the country because of 
Syria’s position as a ‘front-line state’ in the Arab-Israeli conflict and due to its 
involvement in the Lebanese civil war. He goes as far as arguing that, over time, the 
military’s main task became to defend the regime from the people. Bashār describes his 
ambivalent emotions towards the army: 
“At the beginning of the revolution (thawra), the people had high hopes in the 
army. They were chanting: ‘al-sh‘ab wa al-jaysh yid wāḥda!’ (The people and the 
army are united). The army represent the sons of the homeland. Maybe my friend 
or my cousin are in the army, or anyone else. You find people from many different 
ages, so the army represents all of our country. At the beginning the army was 
with the people but the problem is that there are people in high positions in the 
army but actually they are not in control. So, the army started to apply their orders. 
At that time, the army started to lose the support of the people. For each action, 
you will have a reaction. When the army applied violence, it received the same 
reaction”.  
Bashār’s statement illustrates a sense of unity and a connection among Syrians from every 
part of the country, which resonates with an argument put forward by Perthes (2000: 157), 
who contends that the militarisation of Syrian society helped to create a spirit of 
Syrianness beyond loyalty to regional and subnational groups. Instead, the new spirit was 
related to the Syrian post-independence borders.  
 Overall, I contend that Syrian men describe their lives as being to a large extent 
militarised and that their memories and experiences are intertwined with, and informed 
by, a militaristic upbringing. The statements contain the expression of the inevitability of 
escaping the militarising campaigns and efforts of the regime and show that these 
measures were successful in teaching citizens their position in the societal hierarchy. 
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Furthermore, several Syrian men expressed a sense of disbelief and resentment that even 
children and adolescents were exposed to weapons, a high level of state propaganda and 
cult around the president. I also detected shock and cynicism about the use of lies to 
prepare young people to loyally defend their country. Moreover, these men’s memories 
illustrate again the powerlessness of the individual vis-à-vis the authoritarian state: the 
state enforced militarised education, defined the dominant understanding of masculinity 
with regards to weapons and the military, and the individual was left with no choice but 
to obey.  
 
Serving in the Syrian army 
 
According to Kronsell and Svedberg (2012: 17), the military in most states is at the core 
of state formation and discourses of nationalism, and thus military practice and national 
identity formation are closely connected. Massad (2001: 100) defines the military as an 
identity-establishing institution within the nation state, which defines the ‘national 
culture’ as well as those who are part of the nation. Furthermore, the military, and 
especially conscription, plays an important role in shaping images in the larger society of 
how a man ought to be (Barrett 1996: 129). This is proven by the fact that military service 
is often described as a ‘rite of passage’ that has the power to turn adolescent boys into 
adult men (see Carreiras 2006: 41; Haugbolle 2012: 120; Klein 1999; Kandiyoti 1994: 
208). According to Sune Haugbolle (2012: 120), military service is frequently equated 
with a path to national awareness and purposefulness and is defined as a way to protect 
the nation, subordinate women and other men. Islamologist Achim Rohde (2006: 189) 
argues that, through their uniform, soldiers signify that they sacrifice their private self for 
the good of the public and national identity. They enjoy high social prestige as the 
defenders of the national will. Moreover, military service utilises emotional control, overt 
heterosexual desire, and self-discipline as resources for the construction of hegemonic 
masculinity. There are also material benefits, such as economic security, that bring a 
conscript or a soldier closer to the role of the ideal man (Hinojosa 2010: 180).  
Military service in Syria is mandatory for men and lasts more than two years, 
unless the young man is the family’s only son, is incapable of serving in the army due to 
health issues, or had enough money to purchase an exemption. Studying at university or 
college also means an automatic postponement (Davis 2016: 51). Military service had a 
very bad reputation and only through payments to the officers was it possible to change 
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the location, treatment, tasks of the conscripts and to ensure a better quality and quantity 
of food (Rabo 2005: 152). Avoiding military service was not a solution. Young men who 
had not completed their military service had, for instance, extreme difficulty obtaining a 
passport (ibid.: 197). Despite its bad reputation, Rabo (2012: 83) argues that institutions 
like mandatory military service nevertheless assisted in creating the Syrian people out of 
a heterogeneous population.  
Rochelle Davis (2016: 51) defines conscription “as not a huge issue of concern 
for most Syrian men”. Contrary to her view, I came to the conclusion that it actually was 
an issue of concern for most Syrian men I met in Egypt for various reasons, such as the 
feeling of having wasted a significant amount of their lives, or of being obstructed in their 
personal development. While disagreeing with Davis’ statement, I do not mean to argue 
that conscription was a marker of adult manhood and hegemonic masculinity in the 
specific context of Syria. Instead, I aim to illustrate that the perception of conscription 
and the military among my interlocutors was highly ambivalent, but mostly connoted 
with negative feelings. Ihāb, for instance, a young, unmarried man working as a 
construction worker, had left school when he was twelve years old because he felt that he 
could not learn anything there and would only receive punishment and beatings, so 
instead started working. He said the following with regards to the army: “All the people 
were escaping from the army because in the army you feel like a slave. No one liked to 
go. Everyone wanted to escape from the army”.  
While Ihāb had not done his military service, Firās told me proudly that he did his 
military service by managing to complete it in the position of the “sukhra (service boy) 
for the colonels”. He described the service as two-and-a-half years of his life, which he 
lost “making tea and coffee”. In a later conversation with Maḥmūd, who set me in contact 
with Firās and was present during our meeting, he shared with me his surprise about Firās’ 
feeling of pride to have been a service boy in the army. Maḥmūd told me that Syrians 
living outside of Damascus looked down upon being a sukhra during military service. 
They preferred suffering regular military service to being in the service of the officers. 
According to Maḥmūd, being a sukhra could be equated with being a slave and with being 
available to give the officers sexual services. Since Firās was obviously proud of having 
found an easy way to survive his military service, this could only mean, Maḥmūd 
assumed, that Firās was rich enough to pay for being treated respectfully despite being in 
the position of the sukhra.  
	 206 
This incident shows, as did most aspects of the lives of the Syrian men I met, that 
success and respect during military service were defined by one’s wealth and social status. 
The importance of wealth and background suggests that military masculinity is in many 
cases a class-specific aspiration predominantly related to working-class men. And indeed, 
Perthes (2000: 155) argues that in Syria, it was specifically appealing for young, 
uneducated villagers to be in the army, since the army represented a chance to leave rural 
life behind and pursue a career. For them, military service was frequently the only chance 
to receive a professional training. Following the connection of military masculinity with 
working-classness and rural background, Syrian men I met who were critical of the army 
proved to come from a class background, in which it was not necessary to pursue a career 
in the military to demonstrate their masculinity. Obviously, other routes to achieving 
respectable masculinity were available to these men.  
While Firās did his military service in the early 2000s, Abū Māzin, who was in 
his sixties, told me that he did his military service during the war with Israel in 1973. He 
described his experiences in the army in the following way: 
“We learned in the army to follow a system and we did sports activities. There 
were sports as you can see them on TV. So, we played sports plus we had exercises 
with the weapons. […] For us, the army was an obstacle that stopped the young 
people, a big obstacle. I mean the person who didn’t go to the army cannot do 
anything. He cannot study or work in a good way. As I told you, the army is an 
obstacle especially for men”. 
Abū Māzin also mentioned that the army was “destroyed” (mudmir) by Hafiz al-Assad 
because he turned it into a “sectarian place” (makān ṭāʾifī) with the Alawites dominating 
soldiers from all other religious groups. It is acknowledged by several academics that 
recruitment and promotions in the army predominantly favoured Alawites, and thus 
Alawites occupied most of the dominant positions (see Sluglett 2016; Trombetta 2014: 
29). This means that in addition to class and family background, one’s sectarian affiliation 
defined one’s experience in the military. 
In a similar vein, Abū Walīd remembered the privileged treatment that Alawites 
enjoyed in the army based solely on their sectarian background:  
“I went to the army as a normal soldier, but in order to relax in the army you 
should pay the colonel. All the colonels are Alawites. The Alawi sect is the sect 
of the president. My place in the army was at the Syrian-Iraqi border next to Deir 
ez-Zor. In order to relax and go to Damascus I used to pay a lot, 10.000 Syrian 
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Lira. It was written that I wasn’t a normal soldier, but a driver; however, I actually 
didn’t drive for them. I just paid 10.000 SL and I could go to Damascus. The army 
is corrupt. With money, everything works. If a soldier cannot pay he will stay in 
the barracks and nothing will reach him. Even if the family sends him something, 
it won’t reach him, because the colonels will steal it. The soldier has a salary that 
is not higher than ten dollars a month. The Shia and Alawi soldiers are spoiled. 
The regime treats them well. They get permission for holidays”. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, bribe paying and corruption, just as differing 
treatment based on sectarianism, infiltrated every part of life in Syria and even in Egypt. 
In the context of the military service, bribes were needed if one wanted to guarantee a 
conscript’s food supply and good treatment (Rabo 2005: 153). In addition to the presence 
of sectarian hierarchies, Abū Walīd describes a certain form of vulnerability derived from 
being at the mercy of the officers’ ill will among conscripts that is also recognised by 
Deniz Kandiyoti (1994: 206). She defines this sentiment as “the utter helplessness in the 
face of total, arbitrary authority, where each man will have been controlled by the whims 
of another man”. In the context of Syria, this helplessness and enforced acceptance of 
hierarchies are intertwined with sectarianism and a corrupt, totalitarian system and thus 
affect men in the army differently depending on their social status.  
Akram, the primary school teacher who fled to Egypt because he did not want to 
do military service, described how the conscription transformed into a choice between 
life and potential death after the uprising in 2011.  
“We had something that we called military service. However, if we go and do the 
military service we will probably die, maybe by the hands of the people who are 
fighting the army or by people, whom we refuse to collaborate with. […] They 
started to take the young people from the checkpoints. They stopped you and 
asked you to show your ID. For example, you are travelling and they stop you and 
they see your name. Then, they tell you: ‘please come with us!’. Then, they 
obligate you to go to the military service and they accuse you because you didn’t 
want to do the military service in the first place. With all this trouble and horrible 
things, we used to say that we live but we live like animals that only survive to 
eat. The animals just eat and sleep and follow their desires, but enjoying life and 
being happy – no!”. 
It is worth noting that Akram, just like Yāsmīn, when describing poverty and corruption 
in Syria, compared the situation back in Syria to the life of animals, reduced to basic 
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instincts and survival. Yāsmīn defined corruption, poverty, the regime’s indifference and 
the malaise of the system as an environment in which the individual lives and feels like 
an animal. What made Akram feel like an animal was the inability to refuse to follow 
what the dictatorial system expected of him. 
 I suggest that military service was neither appreciated nor used as a tool to acquire 
resources to achieve hegemonic masculinity. Rather, military service is remembered as a 
time of humiliation, unfair favouritism based on sectarian belonging, and as an obstacle 
to one’s personal development.  
 
Being young, male and vulnerable 
 
Anthropologist Stephen Lubkemann (2008: 19) writes that movement is not the only 
choice for people who are refugees. They could have also opted to stay and engage in 
active fighting, passive resistance or accommodation to new regimes. He emphasises that 
decisions to stay or flee are not self-evident and need to be scrutinised and discussed “in 
the light of the multidimensional concerns of socially and culturally situated actors” 
(ibid.: 20). Moreover, he states that in the context of the Mozambican civil war, war-time 
movement was motivated by the culturally imagined life projects of inhabitants of the 
war zone (ibid.: 21). Proceeding from his argument that forced migration during civil war 
is not self-evident, I analyse why Syrian men left their home country and decided not to 
take up arms.  
Most of the men I met in Cairo fled Syria between 2011 and early 2013. Most had 
experienced the regime’s violent response to peaceful demonstrations, harsh crackdowns 
in their neighbourhoods and arbitrary arrests. Several families I met identified their 
concerns about young male family members as the main reason for their flight. I was told 
that young men were in danger of being recruited into al-Assad’s army, arrested, 
kidnapped or killed. Hence, they were urged to leave the country and often their families 
accompanied them or joined them shortly after. Al-Ali and Pratt (2009: 12) point out that 
men and women suffer during war and conflict in gender-specific ways. Since men often 
remain in the position of decision-makers, politicians, soldiers, etc., certain types of men, 
such as soldiers, are vulnerable. According to Jones (2006: 452), the most vulnerable and 
constantly targeted population group in situations of war is non-combatant men of ‘battle 
age’, since they are perceived as a threat to the conquering force. This group is also most 
likely to have the repressive apparatus of the state directed against them. Mikdashi (2014), 
	 209 
who examines Israel’s war on Gaza, contends that the Palestinian male is perceived as 
“always already dangerous” in contrast to the undistinguishable group of women and 
children, who are dealt with as civilians. She goes on to say that boys and men are judged, 
according to what they might do to the militaries that occupy their country or to the 
‘actual’ civilians. It is thus challenging, she stresses, to designate the status of ‘civilian’ 
to the male Palestinian.  
Analysing the situation of young men in Syria, Davis et al. (2014: 35) declare that 
men, even if they do not carry weapons, are assumed at the very least to be willing to 
fight and are consequently viewed either as an asset or as a threat to the regime or the 
opposition movement. Since the conflict began, even men who have already completed 
their military service have been called up to serve again until the age of forty-two (ibid.). 
While it used to be possible to pay 7,500 US Dollars to be exempted from service, the 
regime raised the fee to 15,000 US Dollars in 2013. Since 2012, it is not only men who 
have not completed their military service who are banned from leaving Syria, but all men 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-two are prohibited from travelling without prior 
authorisation (ibid.: 36). It thus became almost impossible for men of fighting age to 
avoid serving in the army or to leave the country. 
 In the following section, I present several narratives I collected among young 
Syrian men in Cairo that illustrate the fear of their families, and the authority parents used 
to urge their sons to flee. Hānī shared with me that he was told by his father to leave Syria 
when the army was about to enter his hometown. His brothers were also told to escape to 
Turkey because his father feared they would be arrested. ‘Abd al-Raḥman experienced a 
similar situation. He recalled having breakfast with his family on 13th March 2011 “and I 
told my father that I would join the revolution once it starts and he said to me ‘You 
shouldn’t stay in Syria. You must leave Syria because you talk a lot’. I had to leave and 
continue my studies”. Both Hānī and ‘Abd al-Raḥman were impelled by their fathers to 
leave Syria because of their gender and in ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s case because of his talkative 
character. His father ignored his wish to stay and join the revolution and instead urged 
him to escape from Syria against his will.  
Ghassān described his family’s decision to leave Syria in the following way.  
 MS: Who made the decision to leave Syria? 
Ghassān: “My parents. The reason was their concern for their sons. We lived in 
an area that was not very safe. My uncle had some problems. They arrested him 
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in this area. There were some people who brought the security service to my 
cousins only to arrest them as well”.  
The overriding worry about male family members of fighting age was fuelled when 
Ghassān’s family witnessed the arrest of male relatives, and was hence the main motive 
for his family to leave Syria. In Ghassān’s account it is obvious that young men were in 
danger due to their gender and age. There was no room for discussion, it seems, and all 
three young men eventually deferred to their family’s wishes.  
Fādī was similarly forced by his family because of the rising danger of young men 
being seen in the demonstrations in Syria. 
 Magdalena: Why did you decide to leave Syria at that particular point in time? 
Fādī: The son of an officer of the mukhābarāt saw me in a demonstration. He 
threatened me by saying that he would tell his father that he saw me, but we 
managed to solve the problem. […] My father was mad because demonstrating 
was dangerous and he didn’t want me to be in danger. 
[…] 
Magdalena: how was the first day in Egypt for you? 
Fādī: I was shocked. I didn’t want to leave my country but my father forced me 
to go with the family. I couldn’t believe that I had left my country. I was so sad. 
[…] I should be in Syria. I should defend my country. I should not have left. I 
have nothing to lose. I believe in heaven. Heaven is better than life here. However, 
the family made me stay [in Egypt].  
Fādī described how he opposed his family’s wish to leave Syria. However, just like ‘Abd 
al-Raḥman, Ghassān and Hānī, he eventually accepted his family’s decision. 
The following narratives from mothers with adolescent sons reinforce a 
predominant attitude of the parents making decisions based on their sons’ gender and age. 
Um Marwān, a mother of two adolescent boys, remembered the moment when the fleeing 
family was stopped at the Syrian border because the border guards were suspicious of her 
younger son’s age. Um Marwān told the soldiers at the border that her son was only 
seventeen-and-a-half years old and consequently he had six more months before he had 
to present himself available for the military service. Before she and her family left Syria, 
she had made sure that her older son, who had just finished his military service, escaped, 
since she was extremely worried that he would be recruited. When I first met Um 
Marwān, her sons were already in Sweden, and she was proud of how they were doing 
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and was relieved to know that they were safe. She showed me videos on her mobile and 
called her sons via Skype to talk to me. In a similar vein to Um Marwān, Um Bāssim, 
whom I introduced earlier as a woman with three children who had become the main 
provider of the household after her husband had lost all his savings and could not work 
anymore, decided that her eldest son had to leave Syria immediately when the revolution 
broke out. He had had an accident before the beginning of the uprising and both his legs 
were broken. Um Bāssim was worried that the regime would suspect that he had 
participated in the demonstrations and had been injured there. She thus sent him to a 
relative living in Cairo. When her son wanted to come back after seven months, she did 
not allow him to return because she still feared he could be arrested.  
During these conversations, I observed that female family members were not the 
object of these worries or among the main reasons why families and individuals left their 
home country. I assume that female family members were perceived as less vulnerable 
because of the traditional assumptions that Syrian women are more likely to spend time 
at home and are thus not in the direct scope of the Syrian regime. Furthermore, 
authoritarian regimes have often defined young men as a particular danger to their rule 
due to their energy, youth and visible presence in public (see for example Ismail 2006).  
Not only do these women’s memories prove young men’s exceptional 
vulnerability in Syria, they also show the obvious and unconditional love and care for 
each other and the cohesion of the nuclear family. What reverberates from all the accounts 
and statements is that decisions are not made individually but rather in a “connective” 
and “relational” (Joseph 1994: 55) way proving “the primacy of the family over the 
person and society” (ibid.: 56). The theme of ultimate love and care for the family has 
been discussed already in previous chapters and should be understood as a defining 
marker of Syrian men and women’s lives, relationships, decisions, and understandings of 
gender roles. 
It is important to note that even though I collected several accounts in which 
parents were described as the main decision-makers and the ones who pushed their sons 
to leave Syria, this experience cannot be applied throughout. Mu’ayad, for instance, was 
shot in Syria while protesting in the first days of the revolution and when the wound did 
not heal, he decided to leave Syria for Egypt. In Syria, he could not get medical help, he 
told me, since the secret service was checking hospitals for patients with bullet wounds, 
which they took as proof of their participation in demonstrations. Patients with bullet 
wounds had to fear arrest and death, Mu’ayad said. He also knew that a bullet wound in 
	 212 
a young man’s body would not only put him in danger, but would also be a safety risk for 
his family and friends. The longer he stayed in Syria and was hiding in different places, 
the more people knew about him and his injury, and the clearer it became that, sooner or 
later, his family and the people who offered him shelter would get into trouble with the 
regime. Hence, Mu’ayad decided to leave Syria. He did not tell his family that he was 
planning to escape to Egypt, but only informed them that he would stay in Damascus until 
his wound healed. His decision to leave Syria was described to me as an act of sacrifice 
for the sake and safety of his family.  
Mu’ayad, like the other young men who were urged to leave Syria, had wanted to 
change something in his country. They had wanted to participate in demonstrations, to 
inform the world through videos and pictures about what was going on in Syria, and they 
had wanted to press for changes. However, they were powerless apropos the omnipresent, 
all-knowing and violent state, and for the sake of their families and their own lives, they 
accepted the state’s superiority and their own powerlessness and left Syria. 
 
Experiencing the Syrian uprising 
 
Carolyn Nordstrom (2004: 59) asks in her ground-breaking ethnography on war and 
violence: “And how does violence feel?” suggesting that it feels like hopelessness, loss 
of future and existential crisis. She argues that death and violence change in their 
meaning: they become sentiments rather than mere facts (ibid.). In an attempt to answer 
her question, this paragraph discusses how violence and death felt to the Syrian men I 
met in Cairo. 
The uprising changed Syrian men’s lives in various ways. Most of them described 
a change in their emotional state and a new perspective on life due to the uprising and 
their life in exile. Akram, for instance, who fled Syria with his father in 2012, described 
a long-lasting and previously unknown encounter with fear and anxiety. 
“During the last two years in Syria I was afraid of sleeping and waking up only to 
find someone arresting me and taking me to I don’t know where. Maybe a bomb 
or a missile will fall on me and kill me. This fear put a heavy weight on our 
shoulders. When I arrived in Egypt and I heard any fireworks I was afraid. I 
thought that there were bombs and attacks. […] Even if we are young people and 
we have a big capacity to stand these situations we really became exhausted. It 
took me the whole first year to forget all these noises of bombs and explosions. 
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When I see certain types of cars I still get scared. When I see a pickup, I get afraid 
because the army used these cars. There were many things that I used to get afraid 
of”. 
Akram felt that he was supposed to tolerate and endure fear easily. However, he had to 
realise the burden of constant insecurity, distress and anxiety that he describes as a feeling 
of being pulled down by a weight put on his shoulders. Anxiety haunts him and occurs 
unexpectedly in his daily life in Egypt. This echoes what Das (2007: 9) discusses in the 
context of fear and the everyday in India. She describes a “temporality of anticipation” 
(ibid.) defined through one’s loss of trust in the social context one used to know. Fear is 
constantly present and is not the fear of the unknown but fear of what one has already 
encountered. Akram’s description of his emotional state also resonates with the 
investigation of war and trauma by Yolanda Gampel (2000: 50), in which she argues that 
the confrontation with an “unreal reality” that is incompatible with anything experienced 
before creates an overwhelming feeling of “uncanniness”, anxiety of one’s imagination 
and a loss of trust in one’s senses. The pain and terror of war cause the destruction of the 
individual’s capacity for perception, its representation and symbolisation (ibid.: 55). 
Likewise, Jackson (2002: 46/47) provides a frame for Akram’s narrative: he is 
interested in deconstructing the abstract term ‘fear’ when analysing stories told by men 
who had fought in the Second World War. He argues that the metaphors used by the 
soldiers to describe their fear related, on the one hand, to the helplessness they felt when 
they were unable to change their external situations, and on the other hand, fear was 
expressed because of their immediate, subjective inability to control their body and inner 
emotions. For Akram, fear equates with feelings of powerlessness to change his fate, 
passivity and the feeling of being haunted by memories and uncontrollable physical 
reactions.  
 Rāfī, similarly, felt that the uprising had confronted him with so far unknown and 
unimaginable stages of anxiety. He remembered how he was once hiding with his three 
small children in the bathroom fearing for their lives. Neither his children nor he himself, 
he told me, could forget up until that moment the noises of the war they heard outside. 
Rāfī left for Egypt with his family to guarantee his children’s safety. In Egypt, when 
people asked him why he had left his country he unusually answered that the situation in 
Syria was unbearable, and unimaginable for others. 
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In contrast to Akram and Rāfī, who described their hitherto unknown experiences 
of anxiety, Ihāb, who came to Egypt in 2012, referred to a loss of emotions and deadening 
of his feelings.  
“The bad thing is that I lost feelings. Even if I hear a lot that my friends died or 
that my relatives died I don’t have any feelings. The feelings died and this is the 
bad thing. In Syria, when someone died, we cried for him, but now it became 
normal and we don’t cry anymore. We got used to it. In Syria, bombs flew over 
your head and there were bullets in the air, but now it’s normal. We became used 
to it. The violence planted in us toughness. There are no more tears and nothing 
else”.  
Ihāb finds no emotions or tears in himself to mourn the multiple deaths of loved ones 
around him. There is nothing in him that can respond to the catastrophe he experiences. 
According to Jackson (2002: 92), arbitrary and untimely death “can neither be construed 
as the consummation of a journey nor the conclusion of a story”. In this case, he contends, 
death occurs as a fact without significance. With Jackson’s narrative in mind, I suggest 
that the inability to make sense of the arbitrary and unexplainable death around him 
transformed Ihāb’s emotions and evoked a feeling of incomprehension, emptiness and 
normalisation.  
 Doug Henry (2009: 119) refers to Carina Perelli’s term “blood memories” to 
describe a situation in which “life becomes broken into a before and after of 
discontinuities and disruptions”. Consciousness loses the social rationality and normality 
as well as the referents, identities and social conventions once taken for granted. Andreas 
Bandak (2015: 672), who analyses Syrian Christians’ fears, anxieties and horrors at the 
beginning of the uprising, argues that the Syrian conflict opened a space of death through 
“diverse forms of actual dying of individuals, as the symbolic dismemberment of a 
society, and as concrete and imagined fears of extinction, religious persecution and of 
becoming refugees”. Even though one wants to cling to what has been known “one is 
forced away by a storm too strong to resist” (ibid.: 684).  
Regarding his engagement with the Syrian uprising in exile, Hānī mentioned his 
ambivalent reactions to and handling of information he received from Syria.  
“I am here for three years now and my soul is completely destroyed. I am very 
influenced by what’s happening in Syria. Sometimes one or two months pass and 
I don’t care about the news. I am not following the news. Sometimes they 
bombard the areas where my family and friends stay and I don’t know about it. 
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The areas of some of my relatives in the countryside were bombarded and I didn’t 
know about it. It is a negative thing. Also, my friends here in Egypt, who have 
families in Syria, do not follow the news anymore like the used to before”.  
Hānī not only describes being unable to follow the news but also a consciously applied 
strategy on his part and that of his friends not to know and be aware of the dramatic 
developments in Syria in order to endure daily life in Egypt. It appears as if this decision 
serves as a coping mechanism and helps Hānī to survive in Egypt, but it also shows a 
strong sense of depression, anxiety and a consequent conscious deadening of his 
emotions.  
According to sociologist Victor Seidler (2011: 392), who studies forms of 
masculinity in the West in the context of the holocaust and its survivors, if masculinity is 
constructed through a negation of everything feminine, it is not easy to acknowledge 
feelings of sadness, vulnerability and fear, since such emotions are predominantly 
considered to be feminine. He argues that dominant European heterosexual masculinities 
have suppressed loss and traumatic events of the past (ibid.: 389) and thus emotions of 
sadness and anxiety become transformed into the anger or violence that sustains male 
identities. He further asserts that masculinities are often identified with self-control, 
control of emotions and of desires that can distract one from pursuing one’s life goals 
(ibid.: 396). By ignoring particular layers of painful experiences, men attempt to retain 
the image of masculinity that others expect them to perform (ibid.: 397). Based on 
Seidler’s argument, I suggest that in order to pursue his life and retain a masculine image, 
Hānī tried to control his emotions by rejecting a daily engagement with the war in Syria. 
It appears as if he aimed to avoid unknown, irrepressible and overwhelming emotions 
being triggered (ibid.: 336). I observed this coping mechanism as well among Syrian 
friends who had left Egypt for Germany and still had family back in Syria. A conscious 
confrontation with the daily news from Syria would have left them heartbroken and 
unable to continue with their daily routines. That meant that conversations with them 
were sometimes abruptly interrupted by them as soon as they turned to the news from 
Syria.  
Likewise, Māzin, a student of dentistry, who arrived in Egypt in 2011 on his own 
before his parents joined him in Egypt several months later, described the painful situation 
of not knowing whether his family back in Syria was safe and the consequent emotional 
turmoil he felt.  
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“The first month was chaotic and during the first five months I wasn’t sure what 
I wanted to do. Will I leave? Will I continue with my studies in Egypt? Will I go 
back to Syria? Will I stay? The situation was confusing and difficult. Many times, 
we didn’t have connection to our families in Syria. And we are here and hear that 
there are problems, bombs and attacks in our areas but couldn’t contact our 
families. The first five months were really very difficult but al-ḥamdu lillah 
(thanks God) at the end it worked out”.  
In Māzin’s account, one senses not only the emotional distress of not knowing whether 
one’s family is well, but also the struggle of liminality. Refugeeness can be described in 
Victor Turner’s (1967: 93) words as a liminal phase of being “betwixt and between” and 
of being in an “interstructural situation”. Simon Turner (1999: 7), who analysed the 
situation of young Burundian men in a Tanzanian refugee camp, used this definition and 
extended it by declaring that “refugees are neither here nor there, neither this nor that, 
they cannot be classified as boys or men”. It is a phase of complete insecurity, instability, 
perplexity and precarity. All the aspects that, according to Turner, mark refugeeness are 
painfully present in Māzin’s narrative, when he questions his decisions and expresses 
severe doubts about his present and future.  
Both Hānī and Māzin also shared with me the changes they observed in their 
approach to life since the outbreak of the uprising and their consequent flight. Hānī 
compared the ideas he had had before the outbreak of the revolution and his current 
attitude to life.  
“The events changed many things. It changed my mentality, my way of thinking. 
I learned more about life. Life taught me many things. When we were in Syria we 
were thinking in an easy way about life. But really, life is difficult and it needs 
effort. Life became difficult and the Syrian starts to compare death with death in 
order to find a country where he can live a good life. We thought about a good 
job, a car, a house, a nice position in the social class background in Syria. I 
remember that a long time ago there was hardly anyone who went by the sea to 
Europe, but now there are many. […] These people risk their lives. They either 
die or arrive”.  
The uprising taught Hānī to see the hardship in life and to assume responsibility rather 
than to take life easily. Life after the revolution is defined as full of dilemmas, dangers 
and devastation and people’s decision to risk their lives to live in safety is generated out 
of this condition. People’s options are confined and limited to a choice between two paths 
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and at the end of both paths lies potential death. Likewise, Māzin describes the uprising 
and its consequences for his life as a lesson for him to act responsibly and have a mature 
outlook on life.  
“I think that I grew up faster. I feel that I am more mature and more responsible 
here. When I left Syria, I was 21 years old and now I am 25 years old. I grew older 
and understand more now. When I graduated, I started to think about what I should 
do. At the end of Ramadan in 2011 two of my friends died as martyrs. The first 
one died on the first day of Ramadan, the second one died on the 15th of Ramadan. 
They were living in the same house. They died in the demonstrations. I was here 
in Egypt. Now, I am older and I understand more. In Syria, I never thought about 
all these things. My life was normal. I thought about having a job, a house, a 
family, but now it is different. Here I think about my future, my situation, my 
family, where I should go and what I should do”.  
Māzin defines his experience of hardship during the uprising as a transition to maturity. 
Knowledge, experiencing the death of loved ones, confronting worries and attempting to 
make sense of an uncertain future are the characteristics that have made him more mature 
and sensible and have a deeper understanding. It is significant that Māzin juxtaposes his 
absence from the conflict in Syria and his friends’ death in his narrative. I suggest that 
his consciousness of this contrast added another layer of maturity and an urge to make 
something meaningful out of his life. And indeed, Māzin not only talked about 
responsibility and maturity but also acted accordingly. In the late summer of 2015, he 
decided to travel via Turkey to Germany after he had been trying to obtain a visa at the 
German embassy in Egypt since 2015. Knowing that his elderly parents depended on him, 
he took them with him on his two-week long journey to Germany where he currently 
attends language courses in order to be able to work in his profession as a dentist to 
provide for himself, his parents and his new wife. 
For ‘Abd al-Raḥman and Abū Walīd, the arrival in Egypt, the inability to 
(continue to) engage in the Syrian uprising and do anything for their family and friends 
back in Syria, and the feeling of powerlessness translated into actions and activism in 
Egypt. ‘Abd al-Raḥman described the devastating helplessness he felt when he could not 
reach out to his family back in Syria.  
“They were writing about heavy bombing in [his hometown] and about dozens of 
people who got killed there. My family was still there and there was no 
communication so I couldn’t check on them. I always imagined when I hear 
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bombing that it was raining bombs and bullets from the sky and all I thought about 
was death and blood. We decided here in Egypt that we should make a stand to 
show to the world what was going on in Syria and that it was wrong. We contacted 
our friends and we arranged the stand in front of the embassy. We were attacked 
there. Many thugs came out of the embassy and attacked us. […] The 
demonstrations in Syria took place in [his hometown]. I was angry because it was 
my home city and I couldn’t control my anger and I started chanting: ‘Down with 
the regime and down with Bashar al-Assad!’. This might have been the first time 
I said it in public”.  
‘Abd al-Raḥman described how the unfamiliar fright and rage he experienced, when 
demonstrations took place in his home city and he had no opportunity to participate in the 
protests or check on his family, transformed into new forms of bravery, courage and 
resistance. It was easy for him to become an activist because of his knowledge of Egypt, 
his long-term stay there, his network with other Syrians in Cairo, and his longstanding 
involvement in politics.  
Likewise, Abū Walīd remembered that upon his arrival in Egypt, when his 
“psychological state wasn’t good”, he felt that he wanted to become active again and so 
contacted some people in Syria who put him in touch with activists in Egypt involved in 
support of the opposition.  
“I wanted to participate in something. I talked to some people in Syria and they 
said that there were some people in Egypt. […] I went out of a place where there 
was a revolution so I should continue with the same work that I used to do. So, I 
talked to some people and the line of Egypt, Libya and Turkey was working. There 
were money transfers taking place. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood was in 
power in Libya, Egypt and Turkey these things weren’t official. They left for us 
things to do in secret, like using bank accounts of someone. When Morsi fell and 
al-Sisi came to power the security service stopped these things because they knew, 
who was helping in this situation”. 
Abū Walīd had been involved, with his family and friends, in the revolution in Syria from 
its beginning through voluntary support in weapon transfers before he had to flee due to 
his activism and consequently felt that he could not give up his activism for the uprising 
after having fled.  
 The various ways in which the experiences of the uprising had an ongoing effect 
on Syrian men’s lives as refugees in Egypt call for an analysis of masculinity which is 
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sensitive to emotions, vulnerabilities and memories that have ingrained themselves in 
these men and have become a marker of their self. Being a man and refugee, who fled 
civil war and violence, involved dealing with traumatising experiences that had a lasting 
effect on the self and included incorporating and accepting them. Among the men I met, 
memories of the civil war determined differing actions and motivated various decisions: 
from complete refusal to know to angry activism; from a deadening of feelings to 
uncontrollable fear. Consequently, I suggest understanding masculinity as elastic and 
tensile. Being a man meant to reconstruct the self around unknown emotions and to create 
an acceptable version of manhood that could exist alongside their traumatising memories. 
 
Choosing not to defend the home country 
 
On one occasion, I talked to the aunt of an Egyptian friend of mine. I had known her and 
her family for a while and she knew about my research. She asked me why Syrian men 
came to Egypt instead of staying in Syria and defending their country. She said that she 
could not understand why Syrian men escaped from their country leaving the stage open 
for the regime and ISIS.  
When I asked Syrian men I met what importance they ascribed to staying in Syria 
in order to take up arms, an answer I received regularly was that they did not see any 
sense in fighting. They were against carrying weapons, violence, bloodshed and killing. 
Ihāb, for instance, informed me that being armed was not common among Syrians in their 
everyday life before the uprising. If someone carried a gun, it marked him as influential, 
dominant and powerful, connected to the regime and, for this reason, above the law.  - Magdalena: Were weapons normal in Syria? - Ihāb: No, weapons were forbidden. It’s not like here in Upper Egypt. In Syria, it’s 
prohibited. No one can carry them. It’s even forbidden to have a knife. If someone 
fights with a knife, he will be imprisoned for seven months. - Magdalena: So, it wasn’t normal at all? - Ihāb: No, not at all. A person who carries a weapon is either supported through 
wasta or is an official in the government. 
Based on Ihāb’s description and several other critical statements regarding weapons, I 
understand that being armed was not a signifier of every’ man’s masculinity in pre-war 
Syria, but rather a display of a certain powerful position within Syrian society that only a 
few men held. And thus, it comes as no surprise that Hānī argued that he had no 
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knowledge of weapons or about killing someone. He said that he was not raised this way 
and for this reason it did not occur to him to participate in the fighting in Syria. His friend 
Bashār, who was present during our conversation, supported his opinion, arguing that in 
Syria the majority of men neither carried nor used weapons: 
“There are some people who want to go back [to Syria] to carry weapons. 
However, carrying guns can bring a disaster. Really, in Syria we were not used to 
the culture of guns. We were like a civil country and most of us were civilians. 
No one was thinking about having guns. And also the regime considered having 
guns a big thing. When we started the revolution, it was peaceful. Then with time 
having guns was like a reaction. The people who brought the weapons to the 
revolution stayed, the ones, who didn’t use weapons, left. The problem is that the 
people started to get used to the life with guns. With time, it started to become 
normal. Now the people who have guns are showing off. It’s like: ‘look, I have a 
gun!’”. 
Bashār described a gradual normalisation of the use of weapons. In a society in which 
bearing arms was seemingly not common before the uprising, weapons have become a 
status symbol among the people who stayed in Syria. 
Weapons are usually considered integral to the context of violence, war and 
militarisation and are furthermore frequently described as symbolising manhood (see Jaji 
2009; Maringira et al. 2015; Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis 2008). Henri Myrttinen (2003: 37) 
states that carrying weapons is predominantly perceived as natural and as part of a 
particular notion of masculinity that equates manliness with the accepted and authorised 
use of violence. He writes that weapons are used as status symbols, as instruments to 
acquire economic and social advances, and as a way to apply power over unarmed men 
and women. Through the display of a weapon in public, a man displays his masculinity 
and his role in society (ibid.: 38). Jaji (2009: 181) argues that in a context of everyday 
violence, wearing a gun becomes an integral aspect of hegemonic masculinity, and men 
who flee from violence and from men who carry guns can only exist on the periphery of 
this masculinity. Consequently, it can be argued by echoing Jones (2006: 455) that the 
absence of arms during combat represents a profound failure and rejection of masculinity.  
 Akram, the primary school teacher, also refused to bear arms and fight because 
he could not reconcile killing with his morals and ethics.  
“I was peaceful in the revolution. Like for any guy in Syria, it would have been 
possible for me to get weapons during the revolution, however, I used to refuse it 
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because of the issue of killing another person. No matter if he is my friend or my 
enemy I refuse to kill a person. Some people got used to it and started to kill 
others. My attitude is like the attitude of everyone, who is waiting for someone to 
give us back some kind of dignity”. 
Based on his moral code that tells him not to kill, Akram chooses to be passive while Ihāb 
describes the feeling of disillusion and hopelessness when thinking about fighting.  
“Who shall I defend? Both are fighting each other. This one is killing in the name 
of God and that other one is also killing in the name of God. With whom shall I 
side? He is killing and you are killing so whom will I support? And now there are 
even more groups that are killing each other and each one has its army. At the 
beginning, there was the FSA and the regime’s army only, but now you don’t 
know anymore. Now there are too many militant groups”. 
Ihāb was not able to see the bigger cause for which the various groups in the Syrian war 
are fighting. None of the groups convince him and thus their actions can be boiled down 
to useless killings that make them all the same. He cannot find a position in this conflict 
for himself. I sensed a feeling of impotence and helplessness when he continued to 
explain who the beneficiaries of the revolution are. 
“No, no one got benefits from the revolution. There are people who died and there 
are people who sold their property. Some people got benefits like thieves and the 
people who work in weapon trade and the big traders who are controlling the 
prices. These are people who don’t care if the FSA or the regime might get 
destroyed – they don’t care about these things, the ones who control the prices”.  
Expressing the feeling of being utterly unimportant to those holding the reins in the Syrian 
civil war, Ihāb repeats Muhannad’s opinion: 
“In the first demonstration, I went out with my friend. […] But now, after four 
years, I don’t know who I am with anymore. Frankly, no one cares for us. 
Everyone only wants his benefit. Now there are many groups. That’s why I 
somehow agree with the ramādiyyīn (neutrals). What will happen? What’s the end 
of this? At the beginning, I was hoping for a civilised society, civilised people, 
civilised leaders. Now we are refugees with all this destruction”.  
What is prominent in Akram’s, Ihāb’s and Muhannad’s opinions is the inability to find 
meaning and a position for themselves in this conflict. In contrast to the several young 
men who fought with their parents to be able to stay in Syria, these men retreat to the role 
of external observer. Likewise, Abū Muḥammad refrained from an active engagement. 
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He said: “I don’t want to be one of the people who are destroying the country by being 
on one side or the other”. Siding with one of the conflict parties equates for him with the 
destruction of his home country and thus he remains unsupportive of any group.  
With several Syrian men expressing their scepticism about the civil war and 
participation in it, the connection between men, war and fighting being predominantly 
perceived as natural is challenged. According to Lynne Segal (2008: 30), men are self-
evidently associated with the rhetoric of domination, the use of coercion, toughness, 
assertiveness, stoicism, obedience and heroism. Women are instead perceived to be more 
passive during war, and are attributed with roles, such as the caregiver to family members, 
the mourner for kin and the potential victim of war crimes (see Toivanen and Baser 2016: 
299; Gentry 2009: 244). The importance of constructions of gender in the context of war 
is exemplified by Joseph Massad (2001: 208), who observes that the Jordanian military 
defeat was rhetorically equated with a defeat of masculinity. The shaming of the soldiers’ 
manhood became a way to mobilise them for war. Similarly, the feminisation of the 
enemy was used to activate the army. Massad’s observations confirm the argument of 
feminist international relations theorist Cynthia Enloe (2004: 108) that militarisation of 
ethnic nationalism depends on the individual, who needs to be convinced that his own 
manhood will be questioned if he does not perform as a soldier. She argued, by unveiling 
the link between masculinity and war, that this kind of socialisation predominantly 
requires artificial construction and sometimes coercion. She, among other feminists, 
called for the deconstruction of the victim category occupied by women and the 
categorisation of all men as militia fighters during war. She stressed that this dichotomy 
does not pay attention to men who are “marginalized, silenced, or injured” in times of 
conflict (ibid.: 104). Even if cultural ideals of femininity and masculinity reinforce a link 
between successful manhood and fighting, it does not mean that all men do take up arms 
all the time – instead, some might flee the country (ibid.: 108). Similarly, Cynthia 
Cockburn (2009: 163) describes the significant difference between representation and 
practice: while men are represented in a generalising and essentialising way to be 
courageous fighters, there are men in all wars who are frightened, reluctant to fight and 
unwilling to kill.  
 Rarely did I hear of men who returned to Syria in order to fight. A Syrian woman 
I met when I volunteered in an NGO told me that her son had recently completed his 
studies in Egypt and had just returned to Syria in order to fight with the FSA. She said 
that he was guided by the wish to fight for freedom and a new government. She also told 
me that he was initially against the use of weapons and that his original idea was to help 
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the people in Syria. When I took a short break from fieldwork to spend Christmas with 
my family, I met the brother of one of my Syrian students in Germany. ‘Abbās, who was 
in his early twenties, and whose arm was injured when he fought against the regime’s 
army, told me that he wished to go back to Syria to take up arms. He could not stand the 
fact that so many of his friends were dying in Syria while he was safe in Germany. While 
he used to tell me that he was injured during the demonstrations in Syria, the longer he 
knew me the more openly he talked to me culminating in his confession that he had lied 
to me at the beginning and that in fact he had been injured while fighting against the 
regime. ‘Abbās was convinced that Syrian men would be held accountable on the Day of 
Judgement for having left Syria. They would be punished, he assumed, for having fled 
while Syrian women were still and continuously being tortured in Syrian prisons. Since 
my first encounter with him he kept mentioning that he wanted to return to Syria to 
participate in the fighting. The only thing that seemed to stop him were his parents, who 
were still in Syria, begging him to stay in Germany, in safety.  
While ‘Abbās described the ‘natural’ connection between fighting and manhood 
expecting punishment because of having fled from his responsibility to fight, the majority 
of my Syrian contacts in Egypt assumed a neutral or a refusing position. This distancing 
from any form of combat masculinity shows that, in the context of war, the use of violence 
remains merely one means of achieving masculinity among several other ones, rather than 
an integral component of manhood (Dolan 2003: 78). Nevertheless, choosing an 
alternative to combat masculinity includes an effort on the part of the men to explain 
themselves and justify their decisions. And thus, Syrian men presented several versions 
of acceptable manhood to me: the obedient family member, the educated pacifist and the 
informed observer who is unwilling to fight. 
 
Using weapons versus helping in a human way 
 
Carrying guns is predominantly understood in the literature to symbolise manhood, 
however, in Syria it identified the carrier as a beneficiary of the regime, as described by 
Ihāb. I recognised that many Syrians perceived the use of weapons as the main reason for 
the escalation of the conflict. Carrying and using weapons was predominantly perceived 
as having brought evil to Syria. Hence, weapons were not regarded as tools of protection 
or as markers of manhood among Syrian men I met, but indicated rather the opposite, 
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namely uproar, illegitimate possession and use of power, and a guarantee of conflicts. 
Hānī describes weapons as instruments that transform people into killers and destroyers.  
“The people who participated in the revolution were educated people and they 
weren’t extremists. However, when the arms arrived many people took up arms 
even though they were still thinking about freedom and the goals of the revolution. 
They used arms but at the same time they continued thinking about all these 
goals”. 
Hānī’s account implies that participants in the conflict radicalised and eventually used 
guns to press for their visions of a better Syria. This, however, was strongly rejected by 
many Syrian men I met. Abū Muḥammad said: “Starting with weapons and using bullets 
were the main reasons why the problems grew bigger. It was the wrong decision. You 
shouldn’t use weapons! You can use other ways to claim your rights and apply pressure”. 
There was not only a strong condemnation of the use of arms at the beginning of the 
uprising but also a strong sense of wishing to be able to be involved in the conflict without 
being forced to use weapons, as Abū Muḥammad explained to me:  
“I had some money at that time and I told them: ‘I want to help in a human way; 
I want to help the old and the sick. I don’t want to give money to support the 
militias’. I refused it because if I paid for weapons the people would use them 
against each other. If a problem appears between the owner of the weapons and 
one of his friends, he will use the weapons and the government will not understand 
this. In such a situation, I would have helped in killing people but not in solving 
and helping. I personally want to participate in building Syria. I want to help 
humanity. I am not into the topic of weapons”. 
Fādī, who felt forced to comply with his father’s wish to leave Syria even though he 
sought to stay to defend his country, laid out to me his vision of taking part in the conflict: 
“I don’t want to be with the FSA. I want to fight to save other people’s lives and 
to defend others. It is not because I like to carry guns. I only want to fight to help 
people. I don’t want to fight innocent people. I would want to demonstrate in Syria 
and to volunteer in hospitals. I want to help people rather than killing them”.  
Akram, Fādī and Abū Muḥammad display a pacifist attitude and the urge to engage in 
peaceful activism for their homeland. And thus, I argue that it was a strategy among 
Syrian men I met to articulate a non-aggressive masculinity. Assuming that statements 
like the one that asked why men would not stay in Syria to fight, did not only reach me 
but also Syrian men, I contend that men had to find a way in their narratives to reconcile 
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their flight to Egypt with the expectations others had of them because of their gender. 
Emphasising their pacifism was apparently one path to acceptable manhood in light of 
the inaccessibility of combat masculinity once they had decided to leave Syria. A 
conscious rejection of weapons and militarism seemed to have become an acceptable 
explanation to a female researcher as to why men chose to flee and then remain in Egypt. 
Having listened to various reasons Syrian men put forward to point out why they 
were not fighting, I argue that it was one of several strategies among Syrian men who 
lived as refugees in Egypt to articulate a non-aggressive, non-violent masculinity. In light 
of the inaccessibility of combat masculinity outside Syria, their pacifism was one path to 
reaching an acceptable form of manhood. Given that in the context of conflict, non-
combatant men’s ability to achieve key elements that confirm the normative model of 
masculinity in which they have been socialised is severely reduced (Dolan 2003: 67; Jaji 
2009), these men managed to stabilise themselves through the verbal adoption of the role 
of a passive, pacifist, non-violent refugee. Furthermore, articulating how they opted out 
of violence helped these men to present themselves as educated and belonging to the 
middle-class – an endeavour, in which Syrian men invested a lot of energy, as already 
detailed in previous chapters. 
 
Highlighting one’s position as a father 
 
Another strategy of constructing an acceptable version of masculinity I observed among 
some Syrian men with children was to define themselves as sacrificing fathers. Among 
the Syrian men who had children, Abū Muḥammad was the one who spoke at length with 
me about his responsibilities and fears as a father. He described in great deal how he had 
tried to prevent his son from joining the armed groups in Syria.  
“There is the problem that people take advantage of the enthusiasm of the young 
people. I told him [his son]: ‘I will stay here [in Egypt] and I will work in the field 
of helping people but if you want to go back I won’t stop you. Do what you want. 
It is your choice. But I will stay here.’ He answered: ‘You are more experienced 
than I am and you know more than me so I will stay with you and the family.’ So, 
he decided to stay. I told him that in case something happens to me he has to 
continue with my job. To be honest, I would have not let him leave, however, I 
brought it to him in this way, as if he had a choice. I used this way in order to 
impose it on him to stay. I wouldn’t have let him leave even if I would have had 
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to force him back then to come here because I know that anyone can do anything 
with him. So, I told him: ‘you have two options: either you leave or you help me 
in my work.’ I used this way to convince him”. 
Abū Muḥammad stated his wish to protect his son from the people who might abuse his 
enthusiasm to volunteer for the good of the people, and described the strategy he used to 
avoid his son feeling that a decision was forced on him. Abū Muḥammad reminded his 
son of his manly responsibilities towards his family and himself. He continued 
explaining: 
“Since the beginning of the uprising when we were still in Syria I was trying to 
protect my children from the psychological pressure of the uprising. Thanks God, 
I was able to do that until now. I consider this one of the achievements I made for 
my family. The achievement is that I protected (janabtuhun) them from the aḥdāth 
(incidents) physically and mentally so they didn’t influence them. If my son had 
been influenced by the aḥdāth he would have gone back to Syria to take revenge 
for his father in case something had happened to me. Now he might do nothing 
but maybe in ten years he would go. We decided that we don’t want to be with 
any group. We are just observers. All the sides make mistakes and we don’t want 
to be a part of them. If you need any help from humans, yes, we help, but use the 
correct way to ask for it. Our country is dear to us but now we cannot do anything 
for it because the allies also entered into this question. The best thing that I did in 
these years was to make my children avoid this kind of problems”. 
Avoidance, apathy and pulling back are described as the most feasible and reasonable if 
not most heroic decisions. If he cannot find a meaningful position for himself from which 
he can protect his country, Abū Muḥammad, stated, he can at least protect his children. 
Throughout our discussion, Abū Muḥammad argued that the loss of financial and 
economic resources became a problem during the uprising and that this led to the dilemma 
of deciding between providing for one’s family or joining the uprising. He said: “Imagine 
you demonstrate, you are with the revolution and you lose your job, so how can you feed 
your children?” His statement reinforces that a man must choose between his 
responsibility to stand up against an unjust regime and his responsibility to his family and 
offspring. He has to weigh two versions of himself against each other. He could have 
been engaged in protecting his country; however, he came to the conclusion that he was 
unable to defend it in accordance with his morals and values, namely in a “human way”. 
Instead, he turned to fatherhood and put all his efforts into protecting his family, 
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especially his son, from harm. He repeated his commitment to his family, and especially 
to his children, several times throughout our various conversations. 
Achilli (2015: 270) analyses the ideals of masculinity available to young 
Palestinian men in a Jordanian refugee camp. He writes that besides the image of the 
heroic fighter for national liberation, there is the model of the male provider and nurturer 
of the family. Breadwinner masculinity serves as an alternative to the role of the fighter, 
however, the traits that are associated with breadwinner masculinity overlap with the 
female domain and thus they have to be negotiated (ibid.: 273). While both ideals of 
manhood, that of the fighter and that of the provider, can coexist in the lives of many 
young Palestinian refugee men, the reconciliation of contrasting registers of masculinity 
entails the potential for discrimination, failure and frustration (ibid.: 274). In Abū 
Muḥammad’s case, defender masculinity and breadwinner masculinity cannot exist 
simultaneously. He had to make a decision between two lifestyles and two versions of 
masculinity. The role of the breadwinner he consciously assumed relates to protection, 
patriarchal authority, steadfastness and sacrifice, but in his case, also to political apathy.  
In 2015, the UNHCR offered Abū Muḥammad and his family the chance to 
resettle to Germany. His children, he emphasised, were the main reason why he decided 
to accept the resettlement. He was convinced that he would be able to give them security, 
safety and a good education in Germany. When contrasting his life in Egypt with his 
children’s future in Germany, he said: 
“I cannot live my life like this working twenty-four hours. I go home and sleep 
and wake up and work. It’s impossible. At the same time, I don’t want to be 
unemployed. Also, there are problems in education and in health care [in Egypt]. 
There are also problems in many other fields. I think about them even when I am 
asleep. I don’t want my children to live this way. That’s why I will sacrifice my 
life, everything, in order to make them not live my life without shopping, without 
relaxation and anything to enjoy themselves. The other thing is: if they live and 
study in Egypt which future do they have? When I came from Syria I hardly 
managed to have a good situation here. It will be difficult for them. […] The most 
important thing in my life are my children and once I said to me wife: ‘we already 
lived a good life. We used to go out a lot – so it’s okay now!’”.  
Abū Muḥammad explained that he was led by the goal of offering a better lifestyle to his 
children than the one he was then living in Egypt. Furthermore, he clarified again through 
this statement that he spoke from a middle-class perspective that defines a good life as 
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one that provides time for shopping, relaxation and pleasure. In order to offer his children 
such a lifestyle he limits his own needs and aspirations. He clearly defined himself as the 
caring and devoted father whose main focus in life is the well-being of his children. As 
described by Rabo (2005), Abū Muḥammad managed to make himself a respectable 
father and good head of household. He took over the role of the provider and at the same 
time he defines himself as an affectionate, caring and devoted father, a role that is 
regarded positively and an ideal that is defined as worth pursuing. Abū Muḥammad turned 
turn to fatherhood at a time when other ideals of manhood, such as the defender of one’s 
country, were not available to him. In a way, he himself benefits from the sacrifice he 
describes as being willing to make for his children because it granted him legitimacy, 
authority and approval.  
 The theme of sacrifice for one’s children, mentioned by Abū Muḥammad, 
occurred in several of the Syrian fathers’ narratives. Firās, the father of two daughters 
who used to work in his father’s factory in Syria but did not manage to find work in Egypt 
and prepared himself for his trip to Europe, repeated many times that he wanted to go to 
Germany via the Mediterranean Sea for the sake of his children. He said: “I am not 
travelling for myself, I am travelling for my children. I don’t care for myself, I can live 
here, but they won’t adapt to this country”. When Firās put the sacrifice for his children 
to the fore, he managed to hide behind the valuable role of the caring father the many 
other reasons that might have influenced his decision to travel to Europe, such as his 
unemployment and lack of perspective in Egypt. I sometimes felt that Firās and Abū 
Muḥammad, benefitted themselves from emphasizing the sacrificing father role they 
claimed to have adopted.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated men’s perception and critique of having grown up with no 
opportunity to circumvent enforced adaptation to a radical, militarised mindset. The 
state’s interference in Syrian men’s everyday lives from early childhood onwards is 
described as a painful experience. The uprising caused for many Syrian men a new and, 
so far unimaginable, confrontation with fear for their lives and those of their loved ones. 
Their fear is a new companion in their lives that is experienced as a heavy burden that 
continuously affects them. Hence, this chapter shows that conceptualisations of 
masculinities among refugees who have experienced war and violence need to pay 
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attention to the ways in which men deal with shock, trauma, despair and depression. 
Ultimately, masculinities should be understood as challenged, shaken and questioned by 
experiences of war, but, at the same time, as tensile and able to incorporate men’s extreme 
emotions and memories. 
Moreover, this chapter has shown that most Syrian men struggled with finding 
their place in the aftermath of the uprising – they did not know how to reconcile their 
values and expectations with military masculinity. Hence, several men articulated other 
versions of being a proper man, namely, through pacifism, a rejection of violence or 
fatherhood. The expression of different forms of ideal masculinity proves Syrian men’s 
conscious effort to create an acceptable notion of manhood using what is available in their 
current context. 
Ultimately, this chapter highlights both men’s vulnerability during war as well as 
their agency and efforts to reformulate their masculinity and put it back on stable ground 
after it was shaken by their flight from Syria. 
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Conclusion: Mosaics of Masculinity 
 
This thesis has dealt with various themes that were of significant importance in, and 
defined the lives of, Syrian men who fled to Egypt. The ‘puzzle’ I would like to lay out 
in the conclusion has the ‘constants’ masculinity and forced displacement and then goes 
on to describe their entanglements and conjunctions with the state, middle-classness, 
patriarchy and emotions. 
This work has shown that masculinity is relational and that it is dependent on and 
connected with others. An important ‘other’ for Syrian men being women. Women 
symbolised the weaker, less able and resilient counterpart, who were defined as in need 
of support and help from the hands of men. Women’s devaluation and the creation of a 
static image of femininity helped men to form a complementary valued form of 
masculinity. They existed in “contradistinction from some model (whether real or 
imaginary) of femininity” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). The existence of 
femininity, defined as weak, dependent and less resilient, guaranteed that men were never 
positioned in the lowest part of their social lifeworld. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that women did not step in to help or support men – in fact, women had enormous power 
to protect or destroy men’s reputation, bestow or deny men recognition and legitimacy, 
and were aware of this power as identified by Ghannam (2013). Women even had the 
power to severely challenge men’s standing, for example, as unreachable and demanding 
brides or as ‘lost’ women, who married Egyptian men. Masculinities and femininities are 
thus interrelated and interdependent. Additionally, women defined the contours of the 
community (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002). Women’s value equated the values and 
standing of Syrians as a community and thus, men had various reasons to aim to control 
‘their’ women. If Syrian women were perceived as ‘cheap’ or ‘easy to get’ it 
automatically caused a diminishment of ‘Syrianness’ and Syrian men’s position, as laid 
out in the third chapter. Consequently, I suggest conceiving of masculinity as not able to 
exist without a form of femininity, which is as much as possible discursively created by 
men themselves. Men construct femininities with an intention and a purpose – in this 
work I presented that femininities were formed to be the ‘other’, the controlled and the 
‘boundary guards’ of the community. 
 It was not only women who were constructed as ‘others’ against which 
masculinity could be formed. Generally, the process of ‘othering’, that is, the process of 
reaching out to others to be able to understand oneself and defining one’s identity (Taylor 
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1994: 32), played a major role in Syrian men’s constructions of masculinities. If 
constructions of masculinities are imagined using Monterescu’s (2006: 129) metaphor of 
the ‘polygon’, then men should be positioned in the centre of this polygon. The various 
discursively created ‘others’ are vertices of the polygon, which are connected with the 
centre and function as referents and ‘inferior alternatives’ (ibid.). Constructions of 
masculinities then work by measuring, manoeuvring and manipulating the distances to 
these ‘others’. Through the ‘others’, such as ‘the refugee in Europe’, the sectarian ‘other’ 
or ‘the lazy Egyptian’, firmly positioned at the vertices of the polygon, Syrian men could 
create their own, valued, respected masculinity in a time and situation, in which they were 
overwhelmed by unknown emotions, experiences and encounters. Despite the 
inflexibility of this model, the image of the polygon helps to understand masculinity as 
inherently relational and as composites and as drawing on the materials available in the 
social context (Connell 1995; Wentzell 2015) Doing masculinity has an account of 
agency, even though the agent needs to be understood as always acting within the given 
structures and norms (Butler 1999). 
 Throughout this thesis, I have presented several ‘blows’ that severely tested men. 
Among these challenges to masculinity were threats to Syrian men’s role of provider and 
‘groom-ability’ as well as Syrian men’s remembered encounters and experiences with 
authoritarian, sectarian states. Several scholars have described men’s confrontation with, 
and responses to, similar challenges by making use of the notion of ‘masculinity in crisis’ 
(e.g. Sa’ar and Yahia-Younis 2008; Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 2003; Barnes 2002; 
Kandiyoti 1994). Even though I recognise the severity of the various issues Syrian men 
were confronted with, I abstain from using the term ‘crisis’. Connell (1995: 84) argues 
that the term ‘crisis’ requires a “coherent system of some kind, which is destroyed or 
restored by the outcome of the crisis”. However, following Connell’s overall reasoning, 
masculinity is not a system but rather “a configuration of practice within a system of 
gender relations” (ibid.) and thus, it only makes sense to speak of a disruption or a 
transformation of this configuration, for example in the form of attempts to restore a 
dominant masculinity or conflicts over strategies of legitimation (ibid.: 85). Instead of 
speaking of ‘masculinity in crisis’, I consequently suggest conceiving of masculinity as 
tensile, elastic and resilient, because of its persistence and adaptability proven in its 
encounters, negotiations and reconciliation with challenging circumstances. Connell 
(2013: 56) describes masculinities in the security sector as “pragmatic”, another attribute 
worth considering. She argues that masculinity is open to negotiation and change and 
opposes the assumption that men in contact with weapons, surveillance techniques and 
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legalised authority show violent or extreme masculinities. Similarly, I perceive it as more 
fruitful and more telling to highlight the expediency and resilience of masculinities when 
being confronted with the challenges of forced displacement, rather than turning towards 
dramatic attributions that only reinforce a notion of extreme manhood that requires 
violent measures to be reinstated. 
 
      *** 
 
Different feelings flow through this thesis, such as fear, anger, sadness, hate or confusion. 
I have used these emotions as signposts and landmarks on a vast map that features Syrian 
men’s experiences during forced displacement. Following Syrian men’s expressed 
emotions became a way of knowledge-making and guided me to various underlying 
themes and connections. For instance, the fear of making use of the services of the Syrian 
embassy in Egypt became a way to understand the severe and ongoing impact of the 
Syrian mukhābarāt on Syrian men’s lives. In addition to seeing emotions as signposts and 
an instrument of knowledge production, I suggest understanding emotions as markers of 
relations of power, depending on the social and historical context. Furthermore, emotions 
should be conceptualised as adhering and constitutive, and as contours of the individual’s 
social reality. Building on the argument that emotions are connected to one’s position in 
the social structure and to one’s access to power (Pease 2012; Lutz 1996), I suggest that 
research dealing with emotions, masculinity and forced displacement is in a particular 
way able to provide nuanced answers to questions concerning constructions of 
masculinities, since forced displacement means an encounter with previously unknown 
forms and intensities of emotions. 
As far as emotions as an aspect of constructions of masculinity are concerned, I 
recognised that most men did not capitalise on emotions. Rather, they experienced 
emotions as overwhelming, such as the numbing fear, sadness and depression they felt 
after the uprising, and tried to find ways to deal with them in their daily lives. I observed 
that men invested in dealing with their emotions in order keep their image, reputation, 
standing and position intact. In the context of the emotions they felt during and after the 
uprising, this meant that they had to repress them, ignore them and circumvent them. 
However, this did not lead to a refined or reformulated version of masculinity. 
Consequently, I distance myself from concepts, such as ‘the new Arab man’ (Inhorn 
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2012) or the new ‘sensitive’ man (Cottingham 2017) that confidently relate various 
emerging emotions in men to conscious changes of the ideal gender roles they hold on to.  
 
      ***      
 
Looking at the emotions that migrated with Syrian men to Egypt and at the characteristics 
that could not travel, for example their social status and symbolic capital as laid out in the 
third chapter, I suggest conceptualising forced displacement as a process of both leaving 
behind and accepting the ‘sticky’ features that are ingrained in one’s self and do not 
disappear even with geographical and temporal distance. It does not come as a surprise 
that forced migration entails a process of letting go, leaving behind or cutting something 
out of one’s identity. There were obvious aspects of their lives that Syrian men had to 
leave behind, such as their homes, family and friends, network and possessions. Likewise, 
Syrian men could not take with them their taken-for-granted roles, social status, self-
confidence and self-esteem based on their intact connection with the state. They lost, in 
Arendt’s (1973: 293) words, the “entire social texture into which they were born and in 
which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world”. At the same time, 
however, there were certain aspects that were based on Syrian men’s previous 
experiences, ways of having grown up and understanding the world that travelled with 
them to Egypt, were ‘sticky’, and defined their lives during forced displacement.  
Anoop Nayak (2005: 141) uses the term ‘sticky’ to describe how the process of 
racialisation enables race to operate as a sign that magically adheres itself to bodies, 
places and a whole host of social activities. Following this argument, I suggest that forced 
displacement sheds light on the characteristics that have clung to Syrian men over the 
course of their lives in Syria. Among those adhering features are mistrust, fear, anxiety, 
and uncanniness that have their origin in an authoritarian regime and a sectarianised 
conflict. Ahmed (2004: 16) identifies emotions as ‘sticky’ and argues that they “move 
sideways (through ‘sticky’ associations between signs, figures and objects) as well as 
forwards and backwards (repression always leaves its trace in the present – hence ‘what 
sticks’ is bound up with the absent presence of historicity)” (ibid.: 45). She thus provides 
with a foundation for my observation that Syrian men’s emotions connected the past, the 
present and the future and that they followed them horizontally in their interactions, 
influencing their lives in various spatial contexts.  
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      *** 
 
One of the leitmotifs emerging in this work is Syrian men’s strong, yet ambivalent and 
paradoxical relation to the nation state. The significance of the state for Syrian men’s 
lives shows in various forms: firstly, Syrian men’s understanding of the state is expressed 
in the image of the abject ‘other’ embodied by the ‘refugee in Europe’, which I presented 
in the first chapter. The discourse around the undignified ‘refugee in Europe’ proves that, 
according to Syrian men’s understanding, the citizen had the duty to aim for economic 
self-sufficiency and that depending on the state’s welfare was not a dignified option. 
Furthermore, Syrian men were concerned about the invalidity of identity papers, such as 
passports or driving licenses, that could prove their identities and would be directly 
accepted by the Egyptian state and its authorities. Syrian men feared loss, expiration or 
invalidity of documents, which they directly related to a questioned, unsound personal 
identity. Closely connected to this theme was Syrian men’s awareness of being effectively 
unprotected by the Syrian and the Egyptian state institutions during their forced 
displacement. State services, especially from the Syrian embassy, were perceived to be 
unavailable and the right to be protected from crime and ill will in Egypt seemed out of 
reach. Turning to alternative service providers, such as the UNHCR or other aid 
organisations, could not restore the stability Syrian men felt to have lost in exile. Missing 
their secure ground in the form of the citizen-state relationship caused several Syrian men 
to question themselves as human beings and their consequent right to be in this world, as 
described in the first chapter. They felt betrayed by a system that granted them an identity 
and rights based on a state-citizen relationship that they could, however, not resort to in 
Egypt. Their state had granted them a form of stability and security that they could not 
find during forced displacement and thus living in exile translated for most Syrian men 
to being an apathetic, disrespected, merely tolerated person, a guest, who could not risk 
behaving as if his citizen-state relationship was still intact. In Chapter 4, I described the 
nostalgia Syrian men expressed with regards to the UAR and their wish to see Syria 
developing in an economically and politically stable state, which holds international 
relations and is respected in the region and in the world. These narratives symbolise again 
men’s longing for a state that could function as identity-establishing and as their 
backbone. Finally, Syrian men were conscious that they had lost a direct, securing 
connection to the state when they could not do what was defined as one of their duties as 
citizens, namely, protecting their country. Having lost their trust in the parties and groups 
involved in the uprising and the civil war, as described in the sixth chapter, most Syrian 
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men in Egypt felt unable to defend their home country. They did not see a setting for 
themselves through which they could engage in meaningful protection of their country 
and consequently had to leave their state behind.  
One the one hand, Syrian men expressed in these various ways their difficulties 
in being without a strong Syrian state that functioned as their mainstay granting them 
rights, protection, responsibilities, duties and an unquestionable, strong identity. On the 
other hand, however, men were critical of the nation state’s oppressive nature and were 
haunted by its omnipresent gaze and far-reaching control. They were aware of the state’s 
privileging of certain sects, a theme that emerged in the fourth chapter. Moreover, they 
struggled to come to terms with the criminality of the Syrian regime: it was known to 
them that the regime and its authorities engaged in illegal activities, such as accepting 
bribes, nepotism and corruption, and Syrian men were aware that the state’s criminality 
dragged them into the same illegal structures – the main theme of Chapter 5. They had to 
comply with a system that was immoral in most men’s eyes and they blamed the state for 
the immorality enforced on them in their interaction with the state and the inability to 
conform to honourable versions of masculinity. They were aware that the state had major 
control over their lives, potential, development and aspirations. Furthermore, the state’s 
security apparatus had left a mark on Syrian men, fixing in them a form of suspicion, self-
surveillance and anxiety they could not get rid of. Growing up in Syria meant learning to 
live with an omnipresent and controlling state and this knowledge instilled in Syrian men 
self-control when it came to the expression of their political opinion, their interests and 
ideas. Furthermore, the state enforced a militaristic upbringing that men could not 
circumvent, whether they agreed with this kind of upbringing or were critical of it, as 
described in Chapter 6.  
Based on these various forms in which the state appeared and impacted on Syrian 
men’s lives, I argue that Syrian men had a paradoxical connection to the state that could, 
on the one hand, reassure them and back them up in their dominant role in society, but 
could, on the other hand, severely damage them, plague them, exhaust them and 
ultimately challenge them in their masculinity. The state was a provider of their 
masculinity but at the same time it robbed them of their manhood. Upon their forced 
displacement, when their contact to the state had ultimately changed, Syrian men severely 
critiqued the state but simultaneously bemoaned its loss. Syrian men felt both insecure 
and fragile in the absence of the state, but at the same time suffocated and tortured in their 
experiences and encounters with it. Because of men’s initial specific relation to the nation 
state (see. Joseph 2000) and the loss of structure, self-confidence and self-assurance 
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during forced displacement described throughout this thesis, I suggest that men 
experience a specific form of loss if they are not in direct touch with their state when 
living in exile. 
Ultimately, I argue that research on the contact of men with the state during their 
forced displacement shows the ambivalences and paradoxes that defines these 
relationships and would have otherwise remained hidden under the surface. 
 
      *** 
 
Given that states provide structures, meanings and order, Syrian men were in the 
challenging situation to regain such structures, meanings and order during forced 
displacement. They had to reformulate the values of their identity as Syrians. One of the 
structures and values that warranted reconstruction was patriarchy. States nurture a 
patriarchal societal order from which men benefit (Joseph 2000: 116). Given the Syrian 
regime’s authoritarianism, it is useful to understand patriarchy in Syria as “a system of 
male privilege in the social order that functions as a recompense to men for their 
disempowerment vis-à-vis the state” (Ismael and Ismael 2000: 185). In such a patriarchal 
order, “women are to men what the citizen is to the state” (Akgul 2017: 2), namely the 
controlled ones. Outside Syria, men could not access a state-supported patriarchal system 
and thus had to create it on their own while being in Egypt. I suggest that lacking access 
to ‘patriarchy-as-usual’ (Kandiyoti 2013) during forced displacement was one of the 
reasons why most Syrian men could not reconcile the fact that women took over increased 
responsibilities to provide for the families, as I presented in the second chapter. In a 
patriarchal society, providing income and being in charge of a family still determines 
being a (middle-class) man (see Schielke 2012). The firmness with which Syrian men 
discussed women’s labour in Egypt and the force with which they relegated women to 
the household confirm the severity of the issue. Consequently, I argue that the men’s loss 
of the citizen-state connection impacts indirectly on gender relations and leads to a 
defence of the realms Syrian men used to control, at least in the idealised, discursive 
constructions of Syrian gender roles. The road to stabilising ‘patriarchy-as-usual’, which 
Kandiyoti (2013) calls ‘masculinist restoration’ referring to higher levels of coercion by 
the state in times in which notions of female subordination are no longer securely 
hegemonic, was in the case of Syrian men in Egypt to protect what used to be a strong 
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pillar of their masculinity and similarly secured their patriarchal control: their role as 
provider and women’s consequent ‘luxury’ to stay at home.  
Directly related to the conservative approach to gender relations that puts men in 
the provider position and women as their counterpart to the household is an underlying 
theme that was similarly present in various other debates that emerged in this thesis: the 
importance of middle-classness. Belonging to the middle class was a dominant and 
defining marker of identity among Syrians in Egypt. They associated middle-classness 
with success, education, hard work, creativity, smartness, resilience and stamina. Their 
continuous struggle to confirm their class position shows that for Syrian men losing their 
middle-class status was not an option. Being middle class was seen and used as a proof 
of their intellect, behaviour and access to the world. Furthermore, being middle class 
guaranteed respect, aspirations and self-esteem (see Schielke 2012). A major aspect of 
concern that related to their middle-classness was Syrian men’s access to paid labour. 
Paid labour in an accepted and respected profession was a way to prove their inherent 
values, such as creativity, diligence, hard work, stamina, inventiveness and their 
education. In Egypt, however, Syrians were confronted with vulnerability, instability and 
precarity in the labour market, and what peeked around the corner, seemingly waiting for 
them at any minute, was unemployment, to which shame, idleness and dependency were 
ascribed. When looking at the importance of work in an honourable profession and the 
fear of unemployment, as described in the second chapter, it can be argued that being 
middle class was, as suggested by Heiman et al. (2012), related to a constant fear of being 
unable to prove it.  
Moreover, Syrian men experienced that established class structures in Egypt were 
subject to change: especially bachelors trying to get married in Egypt realised that they 
were not recognisable as decent, middle-class men anymore and could not rely on what 
used to define them, as I described in the third chapter. Syrian men were unrecognisable 
because the family of a potential spouse could not access the ‘frame of reference’ (Rabo 
2005) by which a potential groom is socially classified, that is, they could not access 
knowledge about his family’s reputation, his place of origin, his upbringing and 
education. Several young men feared that class differences or the inability to prove one’s 
initial class status would cause rejection. Other bachelors looking for brides, however, 
realised that Syrians’ mutually experienced forced displacement had put them and the 
bride’s family in the same situation and that previous class differences were erased. What 
is obvious is that traditional class boundaries were differently experienced: some men 
sensed that they sharpened or kept intact, while others witnessed that they had become 
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blurry and porous. Consequently, I come to the conclusion that, as similarly described in 
the literature (e.g. Muhanna 2013; Edward 2007), traditional barriers and statuses do not 
remain static, but are subject to change in times of crisis, uncertainty and liminality. 
Moreover, I observed that the changing values ascribed to class and the unpredictable 
handlings of and responses to traditional class structures caused confusion, insecurity and 
uproar, which confirms Reay et al.’s (2009: 1105) argument that “when habitus 
encounters a field with which it is not familiar, the resulting disjunctures can generate not 
only change and transformation, but also disquiet, ambivalence, insecurity and 
uncertainty”.  
Class needs to be understood as a “relational and interproductive phenomenon” 
(Heiman et al.: 13) emerging in relation to other classes. This relational characteristic is 
obvious when paying attention to Syrian men’s implicit creation of ‘other’ social classes 
to be able to demarcate and refine their own social position. I suggest that Syrian men 
created a class structure that functioned as visible markers in relation to which they could 
define their middle classness by relating to ‘other men’ who had chosen less respected 
life paths or proved to have shameful morals. Syrian men implicitly described themselves 
as middle class, when they positioned themselves vis-à-vis ‘refugees in Europe’, who beg 
and wait for the welfare system to take care of them, or the ‘lazy Egyptian worker’, who 
prefers cheating over honest, hard work, presented in the fourth chapter. Consequently, I 
argue that being middle class should not only be conceptualised as relational and 
interproductive, but also as both a conscious and an unconscious endeavour (see Rizzo 
2015; Bourdieu 1985). Furthermore, I suggest that class is constituted through gender and 
vice versa. This idea is based on an argument put forward by Connell (2013) in the context 
of her analysis of constructions of masculinities among men in the security sector. She 
argues that “we see class (on a global scale) being constituted by gender, rather than 
intersecting with it” (ibid.: 56). Connell herself does not develop this thought further in 
the chapter, however, thinking of gender and class as constituting each other rather than 
intersecting is a fruitful starting point for my own analysis. I observed that Syrian men 
engaged in actions and efforts to form class and masculinity that were often overlapping. 
The refugee in Europe is not only an (emasculated) man but an (emasculated) classed 
man, likewise, the Egyptian lazy worker is not only a man, but a man showing values that 
do not align with middle-classness. Thus, in the context of forced displacement, in which 
both masculinity and social class structures are shaken and in need to be re-invented, 
these aspects are not only interrelated and intersecting, but are actively constituted 
through each other. 
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Overall, social class proves to be a significant object of analysis in the context of 
forced migration, since it sheds light on how men position themselves, try to prove their 
identity and lay out their life trajectories. Furthermore, social class should be understood 
as an instrument of hierarchisation and a parameter of judgement of others. 
 
      *** 
 
Fādī’s reaction to a begging woman on the streets of Cairo made me question my assumed 
knowledge at the beginning of my fieldwork in 2014. With a description of his actions, I 
started this work and with a reference to his situation I will end it. Despite all his efforts, 
ideas and trials, Fādī did not manage to remain on the path he aspired to follow. His dream 
is to become an engineer, however, he had to interrupt his studies at the university after 
he had successfully finished his first year. He could not afford the university fees and his 
family needed his support in the little corner shop they had bought. Fādī thinks about 
leaving Egypt for Europe, he wonders whether there are scholarships for which he could 
apply, and he has calculated that if he takes on a second shop in the evenings after he 
finishes his shift in his parents’ corner shop, he might be able to go back to university in 
the coming semester to continue with his studies. He hopes that after graduation from 
university he will be able to get married and live a more settled life.  
The work on this PhD has finished after four years, but Fādī’s as well as other 
Syrians’ struggles in Egypt, other parts of the Middle East and Europe are far from over: 
their daily challenges in finding work, dealing with the refugee label, uncertainty, 
liminality and the loss of their home, status and capital, the coming to terms with their 
memories and experiences of Syria, the uprising and the civil war, as well as the 
challenges to find a secure future and liveable present, are an on-going condition. 
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